

ISTITUTO PER LA STORIA DEL RISORGIMENTO ITALIANO

BIBLIOTECA SCIENTIFICA

Serie II: Fonti

Vol. LVII

# L'UNIFICAZIONE ITALIANA

VISTA DAI  
DIPLOMATICI STATUNITENSIS

A CURA DI  
HOWARD R. MARRARO

Vol. III  
(1853 - 1861)

ROMA  
ISTITUTO PER LA STORIA DEL RISORGIMENTO ITALIANO  
1967

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
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*Alla Columbia University in grato riconoscimento delle straordinarie facilitazioni e degli insoliti privilegi di cui godo da più di mezzo secolo.*

*Ai miei colleghi, studenti e amici, i quali con il loro incoraggiamento, consiglio e aiuto hanno appoggiato validamente i miei sforzi per rafforzare i legami culturali e spirituali tra l'Italia e gli Stati Uniti.*



## PREMESSA

*Nel licenziare questo terzo volume dei dispacci dei ministri statunitensi, desidero esprimere la mia più viva gratitudine per il valido aiuto che ho ricevuto da colleghi, studenti ed amici, ciascuno dei quali ha contribuito a rendere meno faticoso il mio lavoro. In modo particolare desidero ringraziare il prof. Daniel Penham della Columbia University, la prof. Lena M. Ferrari della St. Johns University, il reverendo Robert Trisco della Catholic University di Washington, D.C., il reverendo George Albertini dei Consolata Fathers di Washington, D.C., l'on. Edward D. Re, presidente della Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States di Washington, D.C., il dott. Pino Cicala di Washington, D.C., e la signorina Miriam Freri. Ringrazio altresì il signor M. Neil Franklin, Chief, Diplomatic, Legal, and Fiscal Branch of the General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., per l'efficace aiuto a rintracciare la versione originale italiana o francese di numerosi documenti. Ringrazio il prof. Terence K. Hopkins, Segretario del Council for Research in the Social Sciences della Columbia University, per i vari sussidi che ho ricevuto. Ringrazio anche il signor Robert B. Carter della casa editrice James T. White & Co., per il permesso di riprodurre la fotografia di James Buchanan, Segretario di Stato dal 1845 al 1849 e Presidente degli Stati Uniti dal 1857 al 1861.*

*La pubblicazione di questi volumi non sarebbe stata possibile senza il generoso aiuto e la collaborazione avuta dai miei amici e colleghi dell'Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento italiano.*

New York, 25 agosto 1967.

HOWARD R. MARRARO



## RAPPORTI



JOHN MONCURE DANIEL

23 luglio 1853 - 2 marzo 1861





***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel*<sup>1</sup>**

*Senza numero*<sup>2</sup>

Department of State, Washington, July 26, 1853

Sir. The President having appointed you Chargé d'Affaires of the United States for Sardinia, I have the honor to transmit your Commission, and to request that you will inform this Department how soon, in the event of your accepting the appointment, you will be prepared to proceed upon your mission

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Senza numero*

Richmond, Virginia, July 29, 1853

Sir. I have received your favour of the 26th inst, enclosing a commission signed by the President of the United States for the office of Chargé d'Affaires in Sardinia.

You will please notify the President of my acceptance of the same, and signify my appreciation of the high honour conferred upon me.

Absence from the city at the time your letter arrived is the cause of the delay in this reply

I will do myself the honour to wait upon you on Monday next for instructions I hope that the fatigue consequent upon a rapid journey in weak health will be considered a sufficient reason why I do not more immediately attend

<sup>1</sup> John Moncure Daniel (1825-1865) giornalista e diplomatico nacque nella contea di Stafford e morì a Richmond, Va. Dopo aver fatto gli studi di legge senza alcun interesse, divenne bibliotecario della *Patrick Henry Society*, e direttore del *Southern Planter* e del *Richmond Examiner*. Nel 1853, in riconoscimento di una certa sua attività politica, il presidente Pierce lo nominò rappresentante alla corte di Sardegna dove sfortunatamente si trovò in serie difficoltà con le famiglie torinesi più eminenti. Vedi FREDERICK S. DANIEL, *Richmond Examiner during the War or writings of John M. Daniel with Memoir of his Life* (1868), G. W. BAGBY, *John M. Daniel's Latch key* (1868), R. W. HUGHES, *Editors of the Past* (1897), L. G. TYLER, *Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography*, 1915, vol. 3, *Dictionary of American Biography*, 1930, V, 67-68

<sup>2</sup> Fu indirizzata a Daniel nella sua casa di Richmond, Virginia

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 1*

Department of State, Washington, August 15, 1853

Sir: Your Commission as Chargé d'Affaires of the United States to the Government of Sardinia having been forwarded to you, and your acceptance of the appointment having been received at this Department, I have now the honor to transmit, herewith, the following papers necessary to you on entering upon the duties of your mission.

1. A letter of credence addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sardinia and an office copy of the same. In presenting the original you will avail yourself of the occasion to repeat to the Government of Sardinia the assurance of the earnest desire by which the President is animated to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations so happily subsisting between the two countries

2. A special passport for yourself and suite.

3. A letter of credit on the Bankers of the U.S. in London, authorizing and instructing them to pay your drafts for your salary as it becomes due, and for the contingent expenses of the mission. The latter credit is to be used only for expense actually incurred, and these are limited to the sum of \$ 500 per annum. In availing yourself of this authority you will be careful to conform strictly to the rules laid down in the printed personal instructions referred to below, and in the printed letter giving directions on the subject of drafts drawn by diplomatic agents of the United States

4. A printed copy of Personal Instructions to the Diplomatic Agents of the U.S. in foreign countries, with the Supplement thereto, and the additional Circular of instructions of the 1st of June of the present year, to all of which your attention is specially directed. Also (marked A & B) two printed circulars; the one giving certain directions to be observed by the diplomatic agents of the U States in drawing bills on public account, the other establishing a rule respecting the salary of those agents when absent from their posts.

5. A list of the diplomatic and consular agents of the U.S. in foreign countries corrected to this date.

Your salary as fixed by law is at the rate of \$ 4,500 per annum, with an amount equal to one year's salary for an outfit, and a quarter's salary for your return to this country. By a general rule the salary of ministers to foreign courts commences on the day of their leaving their residences to prepare for their departure on their missions, and ceases on their

taking final leave of the courts to which they are accredited, after having received orders or permission to return home. In your case it will commence on the 14th instant.

The archives and other property of the Legation (of which you will prepare and transmit hither an exact list) will be delivered to you by your predecessor (Mr. Kinney) who has signified to the Department his willingness to remain at Turin until the arrival of his successor.

Instructions given to your predecessors, so far as they are applicable and remain unexecuted, are to be considered as a part of your own. Further instructions will be sent from time to time as occasion may require.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio senza numero*

Turin, October 10, 1853

Sir: I arrived in Turin on the 5th of October. My journey hither was protracted thus far by the fact that I was compelled to wait in France for some members of my family who came to Marseilles by a sail vessel in the usual time. I did not find my predecessor in Turin. He had left here two months ago. The duties of the Legation appear to have been properly discharged by his Secretary Mr. William Magoun<sup>3</sup>.

On yesterday I addressed a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting him to name an hour at which I could present my letter of credence. He appointed 2 o'clock P. M. of the present day, and at that time I presented to him your letter and made the usual assurances of continued good will.

The Minister replied that he placed unusual emphasis on these assurances because the Government of the United States had just given to Sardinia a signal proof of its equitable and courteous disposition in the case of Mr. Foresti<sup>4</sup> lately appointed U.S. Consul at Genoa. He went on to state that Foresti had been for many years a chief agent in the political intrigues of all the Italian states; that he was a violent and determined

<sup>3</sup> Il segretario non può essere identificato dai *Personnel Records* degli Archivi nazionali di Washington

<sup>4</sup> E. Felice Foresti (1789-1858). Per la posizione che occupò fra gli esuli italiani in America vedi H. R. MARRARO, *American Opinion*, cit., pp. 5, 9-10, 31, 93, 176, 206-207, 289. Vedi anche: E. F. FORESTI, *The fate of the Carbonari. Memoirs of F. Foresti*, in *Columbia University Quarterly*, XXIV (dicembre 1932), pp. 441-475; H. R. MARRARO, *Eleuterio Felice Foresti*, in *Columbia University Quarterly*, New York, XXV, marzo 1933, pp. 34-64; HOWARD R. MARRARO, *Da Ponte and Foresti: the introduction of Italian at Columbia*, in *Columbia University Quarterly*, XXIX, 1937, pp. 23-32.

partisan, that the Sardinian States were full to overflowing with refugees from all parts of Italy who were Mr Foresti's former associates, and that if he should come here, under the protection of an American flag he would not fail, (in his belief) to reorganize his party and engage it at once in movements which would embroil the Government with all the states of middle and southern Italy. He further said that if Sardinia were not so full of these Italian refugees and politicians, the Government would not say a word against the appointment; but that in the present condition of society here, he felt certain that this appointment would endanger the peace of the State. Therefore immediately upon the arrival of the intelligence the Sardinian Government had directed its Chargé at Washington to lay these facts before the American Secretary of State. and that distinguished officer after giving them a prompt and kind attention, had stated that if they had been known to the Government before, the appointment would not have been made, and that the *exequatur* of Mr Foresti would not be demanded. The Minister concluded his statement with renewed commendations upon the course of the American Government in this affair.

I said in reply that I had received no communications from the American Secretary of State relative to Mr Foresti, and therefore had no official cognizance of the case; previously to leaving the United States, I had been informed through unofficial sources that Mr Foresti had been appointed Consul at Genoa. that Mr Foresti, so far as I knew, was a citizen of the United States much respected by those who knew him, and that if his *exequatur* should be demanded by an agent of the American Government, it would be on the understanding that Mr Foresti should confine himself strictly to the duties of his office, and interfere in no manner direct or indirect in the politics of Italy.

The Minister replied that he felt perfectly certain that it was the sincere desire of the American Government that all its officers abroad should deport themselves in accordance with the laws of nations, but that he also felt certain that Mr Foresti would not and could not confine himself to the duties of a commercial agent if he got back here among his old associates in a position so conspicuous. He would not be Consul of the United States at Genoa, but the Chargé d'Affaires of Mazzini in Italy. The Minister said that though Mr Foresti had been many years a citizen of the United States, he had never ceased to interfere with the politics of Italy. Farther that in various public meetings of foreigners in New York, as well as in Italian papers published there he had often expressed himself in a manner so violent that it would be exceeding-

ly disagreeable to the Minister to grant him an *exequatur* even if regard for public safety did not render it impossible.

In reply I again stated that I had received no communication from the American Government relative to Mr Foresti, and therefore declined entering into any examination of the alledged [sic] objections to him: but that if it should ever become my duty to ask the said *exequatur* I did not doubt that the means would be furnished me to satisfy the Minister that Mr Foresti would conduct himself while at Genoa in a manner becoming an American Consul. I then alluded to some facts unofficially known to me relative to Mr Foresti's disputes in former years with Austria, imprisonment in Spielberg &c, and hoped that no interference on the part of that power had caused the aversion to the supposed appointment.

The Minister assured me, he had never received any communication, direct or indirect, official or unofficial on this subject from Austrian agents, but that his opposition to Mr Foresti proceeded entirely from a desire to avoid trouble to Sardinia itself. He went on to say that there was little sympathy between this country and Austria: that they had long been at points, and that they had little communication of any sort lately.

At the conclusion of my visit the Minister desired to know whether I should like to be presented to the King. After answering in the affirmative, I intimated to the Minister that the American Government believed it to be more in accordance with the principles and sentiments of the United States that its agents should hereafter appear at court in the respectable attire of American citizens than in uniforms which had no significance in our social system, that discretion was left to them in the matter, but while I would not like to offend against the customs and manners of a foreign country, my personal preferences were warmly in favor of pursuing my instructions in their letter and spirit.

The Minister very politely expressed his acquiescence in the good sense and propriety of the instructions referred to, and stated it to be his belief that there would be no difficulty on that score at court.

I then took my leave.

With regard to the allusion to Austria in the last remark of the Minister, I believe there is good ground for giving it the fullest confidence. The Sardinian Minister left Vienna long ago: and the Austrian Minister left Turin a few days before I arrived.

I have not yet had time to examine the effects of the Legation now in the hands of Mr. Magoun, but shall do so without delay and forward the inventory.

**William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel**

*Istruzione n 3*<sup>5</sup>      Department of State, Washington, November 7, 1853

Sir. I have received your despatch of the 10th ultimo, giving an account of your first interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sardinia

I regret to perceive that the Minister has been misinformed as to what passed between Mr. Mossi, the Chargé d'Affaires of Sardinia, and myself in relation to the appointment of Mr. Foresti as Consul at Genoa

Mr. Mossi sought an interview with me in which he stated, by the request, as he said, of his government, some objections to receiving Mr. Foresti as Consul at Genoa. These objections were substantially the same as those presented to yourself by the Sardinian Minister. My reply to him was that this government could not have intended to send any one as Consul into the dominions of the King of Sardinia to whom his Majesty could fairly take any exception, for it was the desire of the President to maintain friendly relations with that government, and that it was not anticipated when he was selected that there would be any objections to him.

I then observed to Mr. Mossi that after what he had stated I considered it due the Sardinian Government to inquire into the matter, and if it should satisfactorily appear that there were good grounds for these objections, the President might change his views in relation to the subject; but I added that Mr. Foresti had received his appointment, and the President would not revoke the Commission unless he should be satisfied that the reasons for not receiving him were well founded, and of a character to justify the Sardinian Government in refusing an *exequatur*.

I further stated to Mr. Mossi that Mr. Foresti had been for many years a citizen of the United States; that he was much respected by all who knew him, and that he had been presented to the President as a gentleman in every way qualified for the situation for which he had been selected. I also remarked that I had heard Mr. Foresti was undecided in regard to accepting the office, and he might perhaps decline it when he should learn that objections were made to his reception by the Sardinian Government, and in that way all embarrassment on the subject

<sup>5</sup> L'istruzione n 2, Washington, 31 ottobre 1853, trasmetteva la nomina di E Felice Foresti a console degli S U a Genova con la domanda di *exequatur*

might be removed. I added that should he accept, the President would not retrace the step he had taken unless he was satisfied that the former relations of Mr Foresti with the Sardinian Government had been such as to justify it in withholding an *exequatur*.

The Sardinian Minister of Foreign Relations has received an incorrect account of what passed at the interview between Mr. Mossi & myself. I went no further in that interview than to say that if the President had supposed that there were well founded objections against Mr. Foresti, he would not have selected him. I only intimated that an *exequatur* might not be demanded, upon the ground that Mr. Foresti might decline the office tendered to him, or that on examining the matter it might appear to the satisfaction of the President that Mr. Foresti's former political course towards Sardinia was such as to constitute a well sustained objection against sending him into that country to reside as an agent of the United States.

After this interview with the Sardinian Minister I had one with Mr. Foresti in which I stated to him the views which had been presented to me by that Minister. Mr Foresti admitted to me that many years ago, when he was a resident of Italy, he had incurred the displeasure of the Austrian Government, but in regard to Sardinia he had done nothing to which she ought to take exception, nothing which was at all calculated to disturb her tranquillity, or that could give offence to her.

The President has therefore deemed it proper to transmit to you Mr Foresti's Commission as United [States] Consul at Genoa for the purpose of obtaining an *exequatur*.

I did not understand from the Sardinian Minister here, nor do I perceive in the objections of the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented to you, that Mr Foresti is charged with any hostile act towards the Sardinian Government, before or since his emigration to this country. It was his conduct towards other states — not towards Sardinia — to which exceptions are taken, and the main objection to him is that if he should go to Italy, as U.S. Consul he will join his former associates in movements which would embroil the Government of Sardinia with all the states of middle and southern Italy.

Mr. Foresti's character and conduct during the whole course of his long residence in the United States should remove any such apprehension from the Sardinian Government. It not only is the duty of the representatives and functionaries of the United States, but they have standing instructions to abstain from all intermeddling with the political affairs of the countries in which they reside. The Sardinian Government ought

not to assume that Mr. Foresti will be unmindful of this duty. Any departure from this course would be visited with marked displeasure by the President as soon as it should be known. I do not permit myself to doubt that Mr. Foresti's conduct as Consul at Genoa will be such as to merit the approval of the Sardinian Government as well as of his own

You are instructed to take an early occasion after you have received this communication, to assure the Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Sardinia that the President has duly considered the objections which have been urged against Mr. Foresti, but he does not find them of such a character as to induce him to remove him from the office to which he has been appointed. Mr Foresti has been long separated from Italian affairs and has formed new political obligations and associations, and it is not doubted that he will act with fidelity to his country, and abstain from any interference with the affairs of other countries in any manner inconsistent with his duty as a citizen & officer of the United States.

The President trusts that you will be able to remove the unfavorable impressions which the Sardinian Government seems now to entertain against Mr. Foresti, and to induce it to grant the *exequatur* which you are instructed to ask for. Sincerely desirous as the President is to maintain friendly relations with that government, he would regret that they should be in any degree disturbed by so comparatively unimportant a concern as the one herein considered. Having selected for the situation of Consul at Genoa a citizen in all respects worthy of his confidence and capable of discharging its duties, whose past relations with the Sardinian Government have been unexceptionable, and whose future conduct he does not doubt will be such as to remove unfavorable impression, the President is persuaded that objections to receiving him in that character founded upon vague apprehensions will be readily withdrawn.

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 4*      Department of State, Washington, December 19, 1853

Sir: I have received your despatch No. 2 of the 23d of November, 1853, in which you inform me that the Sardinian Government has refused an *exequatur* to Mr. Foresti, whom the President had appointed Consul to Genoa. You have learned before this date, from my



despatch No. 3, of the 7th of November, last, how entirely Mr. Valerio, the Sardinian Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* near this Government, has misrepresented the conversation which passed between him and myself in regard to Mr. Foresti's appointment. I wish to believe that Mr. Valerio misapprehended what I said to him on that subject. I have stated, as I think with entire accuracy, that conversation in my despatch of the 7th ultimo to you. I trust you will have used it, before this note is received, to remove from the mind of Mr. Dabormida, the Sardinian Minister of Foreign Relations, the erroneous impressions he has received through Mr. Valerio. These impressions being removed, I hope there will be no further difficulty in respect to granting an *exequatur* in Mr. Foresti's case.

You can assure the Minister of Foreign Relations of Sardinia that I am confident in my recollections as to what passed between Mr. Valerio and myself, and that they are such as I have stated them to be in my former despatch to you. After such a correction, as you are authorized to make, I shall be much surprised if the Sardinian Government shall persist in refusing an *exequatur* to Mr. Foresti on the grounds which have been presented to you. As the refusal is placed, as I understand, solely on the declarations supposed to have been made by me to Mr. Valerio, when the Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs becomes aware that there has been a strange misapprehension of the true import of those declarations, it will be awkward for that Government to take any other objection. Presuming that there is entire good faith in this matter, I do not expect that there will be any objection to receiving Mr. Foresti after erroneous impressions shall have been removed.

I herewith return you Mr. Foresti's Commission and instruct you to renew the application for an *exequatur* and at the time of doing so you will present to Mr. Dabormida, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, — if you have not done so previously, — the substance of my account of the conversation between Mr. Valerio & myself.

A Consul or Consular Agent will immediately be appointed for the port of Spezzia, of which fact you are directed to inform Commodore Stringham.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Silas H. Stringham fu nominato guardiamarina il 15 novembre 1809, luogotenente il 9 dicembre 1814, comandante il 3 marzo 1831, capitano l'8 settembre 1841, collocato in posizione ausiliaria il 21 dicembre 1861, contrammiraglio in posizione ausiliaria il 16 giugno 1862. Morì il 7 febbraio 1876.

*Dispaccio n 2*

Turin, Nov. 23, 1853

Sir. Your communication dated the 31st of October, containing the Commission of Mr. E. F. Foresti to be consul at Genoa was duly received on the 19th of the present month.

On the same day, I waited on General Dabormida the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in an unofficial conversation communicated to him the fact. He repeated at great length the various objections which he had stated in our previous interview, detailed in my former dispatch, to the receiving of Mr. Foresti as the Consul of the United States. He laid particular stress upon the alleged fact that Mr. Foresti had presided some months ago over a meeting of foreigners in New York when the crew of a Sardinian frigate made some disturbance at that port, in which meeting the King and government of Sardinia had been very much abused and that Mr. Foresti had joined in that abuse. Finding that this statement seemed to be grounded on newspaper rumor, I asked if I could produce positive proof that Mr. Foresti had never done or said anything on this or any other occasion to place him at issue with the government of Sardinia, — would he (the Minister) recede from his opposition and do this citizen justice? Whereupon he appeared to change his ground and as the foundation of his determination at present, made this statement. That on the first intelligence received at Turin of this appointment by the President, the Sardinian Chargé at Washington had been instructed to lay before your Excellency a statement of the reasons why it was undesirable that Mr. Foresti should be sent here — that on the receipt of this statement your Excellency had thanked the Chargé for the information, and distinctly stated that if the facts had been known earlier, Mr. Foresti would not have been appointed, that the Government would now request Mr. Foresti to resign, and if he should refuse to do so, the Sardinian Government would be perfectly justifiable in refusing an *exequatur* (Here he produced the dispatches of Mr. Valerio, the Chargé, in verification of his words, and continued) That in accordance with this intelligence the Sardinian Government had taken its ground and declared its determination not to receive Mr. Foresti; that if after all this it should now change its position, it would be with a great loss of dignity, that all its opponents would at once declare that it had been driven from its determination. It would be impossible therefore to

reconsider this matter at the present point, and that painful as it was, he was absolutely compelled to deny the *exequatur*

I suggested that Mr. Valerio might have been possibly mistaken as to the nature of the alleged communication made to him by the American Secretary

The Minister replied that in such case, the matter would stand in a very different attitude, but that he did not think such a thing probable or possible.

He dwelt on the alleged mischief which might ensue if a man of Mr. Foresti's radical tendencies and partisan temper (as he believed) should be placed in an influential position in the turbulent town of Genoa. He asked me if the Government of Great Britain should send an orator of Exeter Hall to be a consul in a port of Virginia, would the American Government hesitate a moment about sending him back to Liverpool?

I answered that I did not think the American Government would take so much trouble about such a trifle. That only a short time before I left the United States, the British Government had appointed one James to be its Consul in Norfolk, which was a port of Virginia — the said James if not an orator in Exeter Hall, being a partisan of abolition and having written both in bad English prose and worse doggerel verse to incite our slaves to insurrection, and that I never heard that any difficulty was made in relation to his *exequatur*

It was remarked that however this might be, the Government of the United States could not have thought such an appointment a proper one.

I replied that I knew nothing about the views of the American Government in the matter, but that whatever they might have been I did not believe that such a small matter would ever be deemed a sufficient cause to make a question between the United States and a friendly nation

The Minister replied with quickness that neither had the Sardinian Government deemed the consulship at Genoa a sufficient subject for a question with a power towards which it entertained so much regard as the United States. That in the first instance it was not made a question. That the Sardinian Chargé at Washington had merely been directed to say that it would be *disagreeable* to receive Mr. Foresti, and to state the reasons why; that the American Secretary had seen the force of those reasons, and with the greatest kindness of manner had signified his intention if possible to relieve Sardinia of the embarrassing subject and

if he could not, gave the Sardinian Government permission to act as it pleased without misunderstanding therefrom. That he did not believe now that the American Government would misunderstand the refusal of Mr. Foresti's *exequatur* or take umbrage at it. In any case he could not recede from a position once taken

The foregoing conversation was wholly unofficial. At its conclusion I stated that it was evident that nothing was left for me but to make an official demand for the *exequatur* in obedience to the directions I had received; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs would make such official reply as he deemed fit. Accordingly I drew up the following note:

American Legation, Turin, Nov. 17, 1853

The Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Sir: Enclosed you will find the Commission of Edward [*sic*] Felix Foresti to be Consul of the United States at the port of Genoa in the Sardinian State which I have received from the Secretary of State of the United States with directions to apply to the Sardinian Government for the usual *exequatur*. Hoping that there will be neither difficulty nor delay in the granting thereof, I have the honour to be, with assurances of the highest consideration.

I received this morning a reply of which the following is a translation.<sup>7</sup>

Turin, 21 Novembre 1853

Monsieur

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception des lettres de nomination de Mr. Foresti au poste de Consul des Etats Unis d'Amérique à Gênes et de la Note du 17 ct qui les accompagnait.

C'est avec le plus grand regret que je me vois dans l'impossibilité de faire à cette communication une réponse telle que vous semblez l'attendre. Mais je ne mets pas en doute que vous n'en serez point surpris, puisque vous connaissez les motifs qui ne permettent pas au Gouvernement du Roi d'accorder l'*exequatur* à Mr. Foresti, et les déclarations du Gouvernement fédéral à ce sujet. Vous savez que ces motifs ayant été soumis à Mr. Marcy par notre Chargé d'affaires à Washington dès qu'il fut question de la nomination de Mr. Foresti, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères des Etats Unis voulut bien les apprécier dans sa sagesse et donna au Gouvernement de S. M. une nouvelle preuve d'amitié et sympathie en lui faisant déclarer qu'il reconnaissait notre droit de

<sup>7</sup> Noi diamo, invece, l'originale che è accluso al dispaccio del Daniel

refuser l'*exequatur*, qu'il aurait invité Mr Foresti à offrir lui-même sa démission, mais que dans le cas qu'il n'aurait pas cédé à cette invitation le Gouvernement Fédéral n'aurait pas réclamé contre le refus que nous aurions opposé

Persuadé que vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, agréer à votre tour cette simple exposition de ce qui a été en quelque sorte convenu entre les deux Gouvernements, je saisis avec empressement l'occasion de vous renouveler les assurances de ma considération très distinguée

Dabormida

I append to this despatch also (A) a copy of the original of the foregoing translation, and re—enclose Mr. Foresti's Commission.

In connection with this subject I beg leave to suggest that a Consul of American birth is very much needed at Genoa. The present incumbent is a foreigner, the deputy of the last appointed consul. This deputy has appointed a deputy of his own at Spezia where the American squadron usually lies. I have heard so much complaint with regard to this deputy that I should [take] the responsibility of appointing a provisional consul there, until the arrival of some appointee of the United States at Genoa if I were certain of my power to do so, and I respectfully beg some advice on this point from your department

The Diplomatic code authorizes me to appoint a provisional consul in case of vacancy but I am at a loss to know whether I should be authorized to remove a deputy and create a consulate. The nature of the complaints against the said deputy will be seen from the letter of Commodore Stringham to the undersigned which I append to this despatch (B).

The only political event of sufficient importance for your notice is the dissolution on yesterday of the Chamber of Deputies by the King and present ministry. The Ministry have been defeated in the Senate on a bill to place the financial affairs of this country in the hands of the National Bank, — as those of England, Belgium, etc now stand. This was their first measure for the present Session; and drawing the conclusion that if a bill purely financial is defeated thus early, there will be no chance at all for the political measures they have yet to propose, the Ministry have determined to dismiss the present Chamber of Deputies and have ordered a new election in the 8th of the ensuing month

The probable result of that election is involved in some doubt. There are three parties in the country: a small minority known as the Reds who are republicans; a large, wealthy and powerful party, containing most of the aristocracy and all the Church, together with the most ignorant

of the mob, popularly termed the « Çodinos » (i.e. pigtails or queues — from the fact that many of the leaders are elderly gentlemen of the old school) who are reactionists, desiring a return to the absolute government which subsisted here previous to the Revolution of '48 and the establishment of a Constitution, lastly the moderately liberal party, who are satisfied with the advances the country has made towards republicanism and neither desire democracy nor absolutism. This last party contains all the middle classes — together with the most sensible public men. The present Ministry belongs to it.

The republican party is too small to do anything. In the approaching election the struggle will be between the ministerial and reactionist parties, and if the latter gets the upper hand — which is not impossible — there will be a complete change of men and measures in Sardinia — perhaps of revolution. If the reactionists should get the upper hand, and desire to do away with the present liberal Constitution they would be upheld in the enterprise by the forces of all the surrounding despotic states (Austria, Tuscany, the Pope, etc.) and might succeed. Such a result would be unfortunate for this Country. Under the present state of things there is more freedom in the laws than in England and in consequence this Kingdom is flourishing to an extent long unknown in an Italian state. Population increases by emigration from all Italy. Turin grows like an American town, prices of labor and everything else are high, joint stock companies spring into lucrative existence, newspapers exhibit considerable vitality, education rapidly spreads and the power of the Clergy over the popular mind is almost annihilated. A return to absolutism would freeze all this progress in a night. The present Ministry is not everything that could be desired. Count Cavour who is the head of it communicates his own nature to all its movements. He is an able man, but does not impress me as being either bold or sincere. Hence his ministry is cautious and timid both in small and great things — their refusal of Foresti because he has been a republican etc etc. is a fair illustration of their character. Foresti's past history ought to be anything but a fault in their eyes. But while this Ministry is not everything that could be desired, it appears to me the best that the parties existing here can afford; and its overthrow would be, in my view, a great misfortune to this people.

**S. H. Stringham a John M. Daniel<sup>8</sup>**

*Official*      Flagship *Cumberland*, Gulf of Spezia, Sardinia, Sept. 26, 1853

Sir. I take the earliest leisure moment since my arrival in this port with the Frigate *Cumberland* to invite your consideration to a matter of public interest and one which I trust you will deem worthy of attention.

I allude to the appointment of Vice-Consul for the United States at Spezia, which I believe is in the view of our Legation at Turin

I may, however, premise by observing that I am led to address you upon this subject, from having recently met with the circular letters from the Department of State at Washington relative to the tenure of officers of trust and responsibility abroad for our Government by Foreigners.

The present incumbent of the vice-consular office in Spezia is an Italian of French descent, named Aimée, who cannot speak one word, nor write a certificate issued under the Consular seal, in the English language. Nor does he, I am constrained to add, reflect any credit upon our common interests or country

In place of Mr Aimée, I take the liberty of presenting to your notice for the appointment, Mr. William L. Long of North Carolina, who now fills the office of Naval Store Keeper to the Squadron in the Mediterranean

In the many opportunities I have had whilst in command of the Naval forces on this station, of forming an opinion as to the character and abilities of Mr Long, I feel persuaded that the seals of our Government could not be placed in better hands, nor the duties performed by any person, in a more satisfactory manner. I may add that Mr. Long is a true American, both by birth and education, and that the fees of office are very trifling indeed.

Should any doubts exist in your mind concerning the expediency of investing Mr Long with the office of Vice-Consul, while he holds that of Storekeeper, it is in my power to assure you, the precedent existed in Port Mahon, when the depot of Stores for the squadron was located there, in which Mr. Boyle exercised the functions of both offices

In making the above application, I beg you to believe that I do so entirely unsolicited by the gentleman for whom it is made and solely actuated by motives of public good

<sup>8</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 2 di Daniel

Allow me to congratulate you upon your appointment to the honorable position you now fill, and permit me to add, that I shall at all times be pleased to confer with you upon topics pertaining to the interests of our Government in this part of the world, while at the same time I shall always be happy to receive you personally on board my flagship should you feel disposed to visit La Spezia.

*John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy*

*Dispaccio n 3*

Turin, November 28, 1853

Sir: On the 19th of the present month I received your Dispatch No. 2, enclosing the Commission of Mr. Foresti and directing me to ask for his *exequatur*.

I did so without delay and supported the request with all the arguments at my command. It was refused for the reasons which you will find detailed in my own Dispatch No 2.

Since that Dispatch was written I have received yours No 3, dated the 7th of this month, correcting the misapprehensions of the Sardinian Chargé relative to his interview with you and requiring me to re-iterate the application.

I demanded an interview with General Dabormida without delay and obtained it this morning. I reminded him that he had placed his refusal to reconsider his denial of the *exequatur* mainly upon alleged statements made to his representative by the American Secretary of State, and that I had then stated it as my opinion that the said Chargé had misunderstood the Secretary, that he (the Minister) had replied, if such should be the case, the affair would bear a different aspect, and I then proceeded to tell him, that dispatches just received from Washington had justified my expectation. I added that I did not intend to assert that Mr. Valerio had wilfully misrepresented facts; but that I thought it quite likely that when speaking in a foreign language, he had misunderstood the kind expressions and placed so much stress upon the courteous manner of the American Secretary as to derive from the interview impressions altogether unwarranted by his words.

After this preface I communicated to the Minister the contents of Your Excellency's Dispatch No 3, and asked if he would not now reconsider the case, giving to me on the part of Mr. Foresti an opportunity



to combat the objections made to that gentleman and examine the supposed proofs in which they were founded.

The Minister replied that it was altogether impossible for him to comply with this request. He said a government could not go into an investigation of charges like a court of justice—that he was satisfied both from the facts he had mentioned to me and from others which he could not mention at all, that Mr. Foresti was a person whose presence in this kingdom would be dangerous to its safety—that Mr. Foresti had been Mazzini's *chargé d'affaires* in the time of the Roman Republic, and that if he should come back here now, it would not be for the sake of the office of consul, but to engage in political intrigues which would embroil Sardinia with other countries. These and many other reasons, he said, would render it impossible for him in justice to his country to grant this *exequatur*. But there was another reason of a peculiar kind. When the news of Mr. Foresti's appointment had reached here, before the appointment of the undersigned to the office of *Chargé d'Affaires*, he (the Minister) had ordered the objections of the Government to be laid before the American Secretary of State, and made known his determination to refuse the *exequatur*—that the papers of the Kingdom opposed to the present Government and existing Constitution had immediately taken up the question and violently denounced him for his determination, at the same time declaring that the American Government would persist, and that Sardinia would be compelled after all to grant the *exequatur*. So public had the affair become and to such a point had it been pushed, that he declared to me (confidentially of course) that he would rather quit the ministry than now submit to the mortification of granting the *exequatur*. It was therefore wholly impossible for him to reconsider the determination announced. He deeply regretted the necessity of denying a request thus made by the United States. He had the highest possible respect and regard for that country, as had all the liberal party in Sardinia. He was ready to do any thing for the purpose of cultivating its honorable good will and esteem without degradation to himself and injury to the country. He requested that I would make a full and impartial statement of the reasons which obliged him to assume a painful position, and on such statement he did not think that the authorities of my country could take an unkind or unjust view of his persistence in the refusal of Mr. Foresti's *exequatur*.

Seeing that it was useless to press the matter further, I took my leave expressing as I did so, some mortification that the first piece of business with which my superiors had intrusted me should have met

with an unsuccessful termination. Whereupon the Minister took occasion again to assure me in terms of apparent sincerity that it was not from want of willingness to comply with the requests of my country or myself that he had taken one course in this matter, and that he trusted future transactions would place his deference to the United States beyond doubt.

He further requested me to state the substance of our interview in a short note, that he might have an opportunity to reply thereto in writing. This correspondence I attach to this Dispatch (Appendix A.)

Taking a general view of the whole, I am inclined to think the authorities perfectly sincere in the regret which they express at finding themselves at issue with the United States. We are popular in this country. The sympathy and respect of the United States are regarded as one of the supports of this little liberal kingdom in the midst of hostile despotisms. I do not believe either the people or the Government would willingly disoblige the United States. But the unwillingness of the Government to receive Mr Foresti became so well known at the first announcement of the appointment, that they really would be in a rather awkward position if, after all, they should have yielded, and this at last I believe they would have done but for the same publicity.

I append to this dispatch also an Inventory of the books belonging to this Legation which I found here in possession of Mr. William Magoun the Secretary. (Appendix B.)

### ***John M. Daniel a Giuseppe Dabormida***

Turin, November 28, 1853

Sir. In the interview which you gave me last week, you stated as the reason why you could not enter into a reconsideration of the case of Mr Foresti to be this. that on the first intelligence of his appointment, you had directed your Chargé at Washington to state your objections to the Secretary of State. that the Secretary had acknowledged the force of those objections and had expressed an intention to request Mr. Foresti to resign, and if he did not do so would consider the Sardinian Government justified in refusing his *exequatur*. that after receiving this intelligence, the Sardinian Government had declared its determination, and could not now reconsider it.

You will recollect, I replied that Mr Valerio, your Chargé, might have construed the courteous expressions of the Secretary, in taking his

objections into consideration, more strongly than they had been intended and have mistaken the position which he had assumed in that interview. From the dispatches just received by me from that high officer, I find that I was wholly right in that conjecture

Mr. Marcy asserts that he promised to take the objections of Mr. Valerio into full consideration and to ascertain their foundation in fact. His investigations have satisfied him that a mistake exists as to the character and purposes of Mr. Foresti, and that he is convinced that if received by the Sardinian Government, that gentleman would conduct himself in all respects as behooved him in the position of a consul of the United States.

Such being the nature of the case at present, I hope that you will feel at liberty to examine the alleged objections to this appointment and regard the matter with that indulgence which may reasonably be expected in discussions between two countries respecting and sympathizing each with the other.

***Giuseppe Dabormida a John M. Daniel*<sup>9</sup>**

Turin, le 4 Décembre 1853

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires.

J'ai reçu la note que vous m'avez adressée en date du 28 Novembre échu et par laquelle, en rappelant notre dernier entretien au sujet de la nomination de Mr Foresti et en vous référant à une récente dépêche de Mr Marcy vous témoignez l'espoir que le Gouvernement de Sardaigne veuille bien examiner de nouveau les objections qu'il s'est trouvé dans le cas de présenter contre cette nomination, afin de voir s'il ne lui serait point encore permis de revenir de la détermination qu'il a annoncée à cet égard

Pour répondre à cette communication, je vous prierai, Monsieur, de me permettre de retracer ici la marche que le Gouvernement du Roi a suivie dans cette affaire, et par laquelle il se flatte d'avoir concilié ses propres devoirs avec les égards dont il désire sincèrement faire preuve en toute occasion envers le Gouvernement des Etats Unis, avec qui il tient à maintenir sur le pied le plus amical les relations si heureusement existantes.

<sup>9</sup> Allegato, come la lettera precedente, al dispaccio n. 3 di Daniel

Dès que quelques journaux américains eurent annoncé comme probable le choix de Mr. Foresti pour le consulat des Etats Unis à Gênes, le Gouvernement Sarde, qui avait de puissants motifs de désirer tout autre choix pour ce poste, pensa qu'il était plus conforme à ses rapports de bonne harmonie avec le Gouvernement Fédéral de le prévenir sans retard confidentiellement des motifs qui ne permettraient pas d'admettre Mr. Foresti à exercer les fonctions consulaires à Gênes, plutôt que de se borner simplement à lui refuser l'*exequatur* lorsque, une fois sa nomination effectuée, il aurait demandé à entrer en fonctions. Le Gouvernement du Roi espérait être encore à temps pour prévenir par cette démarche l'accomplissement du projet de confier le Consulat des Etats-Unis à Gênes à Mr. Foresti, et, dans tous les cas, il voulait user d'un procédé délicat et faire preuve d'une déférence amicale envers le Gouvernement Fédéral en lui exposant franchement sa pensée à cet égard, ce qui aurait permis au Gouvernement de l'Union d'envisager sous son vrai jour le refus que le Gouvernement Sarde se croyait en devoir comme en droit d'opposer à la demande de *exequatur* de Mr. Foresti, si elle venait plus tard à lui être présentée.

Malheureusement la dépêche par laquelle je chargeais Mr. Valerio de cette communication ne parvint à sa destination qu'après que Mr. Foresti avait déjà reçu sa commission de Consul. Mr. Valerio ne s'empressa pas moins de s'acquitter des instructions de son Gouvernement, en faisant connaître à Mr. le Secrétaire d'Etat de l'Union les observations que nous avait suggérées la première nouvelle du projet de nomination de Mr. Foresti. Cette communication fut accueillie avec autant de courtoisie que de bienveillance par Mr. Marcy, et ce Ministre, après avoir soumis l'affaire à la haute considération de S. E. le Président, voulut bien faire à Mr. Valerio une réponse que celui-ci crut pouvoir me rapporter dans les termes que je vous ai fait connaître par ma note du 21 9bre dernier et qui laissèrent le Gouvernement du Roi dans la confiance d'avoir obtenue le résultat qu'il s'était proposé.

Mais si en recevant les rapports de Mr. Valerio le Gouvernement du Roi a ressenti une juste satisfaction, non moins qu'une sincère reconnaissance envers le Gouvernement des Etats Unis, pour la solution qu'il croyait avoir été donnée à cette affaire, ces sentiments ont dû faire place à une pénible surprise lorsque vous m'avez fait connaître, soit verbalement, soit ensuite par votre note du 28 Novembre, que Mr. Valerio a pu se méprendre sur le sens des réponses de Mr. le Secrétaire d'Etat, et leur attribuer à tort une portée qui s'accordait avec les désirs du Gouvernement Sarde, mais qu'il n'était pas dans la pensée de Mr. Marcy de

leur donner. Je n'ai su, je l'avoue, m'expliquer autrement que par un malentendu, assurément très regrettable dans la circonstance actuelle, la différence que vous m'avez fait remarquer entre la réponse de Mr. Marcy telle qu'elle nous a été rapportée et celle que ce Ministre vous indique lui-même dans sa dépêche.

Quoiqu'il en soit, accueillant encore le désir que vous m'avez exprimé par votre note précitée, le Gouvernement de S. M. n'a pas manqué de porter de nouveau une attention sérieuse sur la demande de l'*exequatur* en faveur de Mr. Foresti. Mais ce nouvel examen de la question n'a pu que confirmer le Cabinet Sarde dans la détermination à laquelle il avait déjà jugé devoir s'arrêter à cet égard; car les motifs sur lesquels elle se fonde et qu'il a fait exposer au Gouvernement Fédéral subsistent encore à ses yeux dans toute leur force, et à ces motifs graves viendrait s'ajouter maintenant une considération de dignité, depuis que des journaux de ce pays même, organes d'opinions ouvertement contraires au Gouvernement actuel, méconnaissant sans doute les dispositions amicales du Gouvernement des Etats Unis envers lui, ont tenu sur cette affaire un langage non moins injurieux pour les nobles sentiments du Gouvernement de l'Union, que blessant pour la dignité de celui de S. M.

Je ne puis en conséquence que vous témoigner ici de nouveau les regrets les mieux sentis de n'être pas à même de vous faire aujourd'hui une réponse plus satisfaisante sur la demande de Mr. Foresti. Je me permets en même temps de vous exprimer l'espoir que le Gouvernement des Etats Unis voudra bien être persuadé qu'il n'a pas tenu à défaut de bon vouloir de la part du Cabinet Sarde de donner à cette affaire une solution différente, le Gouvernement du Roi n'ayant rien de plus à coeur, j'aime à le répéter, que de maintenir sur le pied d'une franche et sympathique entente les rapports heureusement existants entre les deux pays.

Agréez, Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération bien distinguée.

### ***Elenco dei libri della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino***<sup>10</sup>

Senate Documents	1839. 40	Vols.	8
» »	1840. 41	»	5
» »	1841.	»	1
» »	1841. 42	»	5

<sup>10</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 3 di Daniel

»	»	1842. 43	»	4
»	»	1843. 44	»	6
»	»	1844. 45	»	10
»	»	1845. 46	»	9
»	»	1846. 47	»	3
»	»	1847. 48	»	10
»	»	1848. 49	»	8
»	»	1849- 50	»	10
»	»	1850- 51	»	5
Senate Journal from		1839 to 1846 inc.	»	8
»	»	1846- 49	»	3
»	»	1849- 50	»	1
»	»	1850- 51	»	1
Senate Special Session		1849.	»	1
»	Miscellaneous	1849- 50	»	2
»	»	1850- 51	»	1
Executive Documents		1839. 40	»	7
»	»	1840. 41	»	6
»	»	1841. 42	»	6
»	»	1842. 43	»	8
»	»	1843. 44	»	6
»	»	1844. 45	»	5
»	»	1845. 46	»	8
»	»	1846. 47	»	4
»	»	1847. 48	»	9
»	»	1848. 49	»	7
»	»	1849. 50	»	11
»	»	1850. 51	»	8
Senate Reports		1849 50	»	1
»	»	1850 51	»	1
House Journals		1839 to 1844 inc.	»	6
»	»	1844. 45	»	1
»	»	1845- 46	»	1
»	»	1846- 47	»	1
»	»	1847- 48	»	1
»	»	1848. 49	»	1
»	»	1849 50	»	1
»	»	1850 51	»	1
House Miscellaneous		1847- 48	»	1
»	»	1848 to 51 inc.	»	4
	from			

Reports of Committees	1839- 40	»	4
» » »	1840- 41	»	1
» » »	1841	»	1
» » »	1841- 42	»	5
» » »	1842- 43	»	4
» » »	1843- 44	»	3
» » »	1844- 45	»	1
» » »	1845- 46	»	4
» » »	1846- 47	»	1
» » »	1847- 48	»	4
» » »	1848- 49	»	2
» » »	1849- 50	»	3
» » »	1850- 51	»	1
Annals of Congress		»	9
United States Statutes at Large		»	8
Synoptical Index of the Laws of the U.S. 1789-1851		»	1
Messages of the Presidents		»	1
U S. Illustrated Atlas		»	1
U. S Official Register '47 '49 '51		»	3
American Archives	1774- 76	»	5
» » 4th Series 6th vol.		»	1
» » » » » »		»	1
American Almanacs		»	2
The Magnetic Observations	1840- 45	»	3
and plates accompanying		»	1
State Papers, Viz.			
Finance		»	3
Claims		»	1
Naval Affairs		»	1
Military &c		»	2
Commerce & Navigation		»	2
Public Lands		»	3
Foreign Relations		4	4
Indian Affairs-vols. Post Office		»	3
Miscellaneous		»	2
Laws of the U S. to 1839 & Index (old.)		»	10
Commercial Regulations		»	3
Cooper's American Navy		»	2
Journal of Federal Convention		»	1
Murray's Geography		»	2

Dictionary of Commerce		»	2
Sparks' Diplomatic Correspondence		»	12
Diplomatic Correspondence	1788- 89	»	7
American Diplomatic Code	1774- 1834	»	2
Secret Journal of Congress	1775- 88	»	4
American State Papers	1781- 1818	»	12
Statistics of the U. S.	1840	»	1
Sixth Census of the U.S. and Compend of it		»	2
Statutes at Large & Treaties.			
Misc. 1851. to 1853 pamphts		»	2
			<hr/> 359

### ***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 4*

Turin, January 4, 1854

Sir. Since the date of my last dispatch No 3, principally relative to the case of Mr. Foresti, nothing has transpired in the Sardinian States immediately affecting the interests of the American Government; but the results of the new election to Parliament have been so important and decisive, that I deem it proper to make a brief statement thereof.<sup>11</sup>

The late Parliament was dissolved on the 20th of November on account of the opposition experienced by the present Ministry in the Senate from the reactionist and radical minorities in that body, and new elections were ordered for the purpose of testing the sense of the country.

These elections took place on the 8th of December. The returns show a vote of two to one in favour of the existing ministry. The radical party has gained some ground, but the reactionists have nearly suffered what is equivalent to political annihilation. The Ministry of Count Cavour may be considered in consequence as permanent for many years to come, and all chance for the restoration of ecclesiastical influence and power in Piedmont by any other means than those of foreign interference are gone.

<sup>11</sup> Le elezioni dell'8 dicembre 1853 furono un trionfo per Cavour e per il suo partito. Il 26 dicembre Bon Compagni, candidato di Cavour, ebbe 74 voti su 107 come presidente della Camera dei deputati, mentre Pareto, il candidato repubblicano, ne ottenne solo venti, 13 voti furono annullati. Vedi EDOARDO ARBIB, *Storia parlamentare del Regno d'Italia*, Roma, 1909, II, p. 4



The disappointment of the priest party has found vent in a number of trifling emeutes in various parts of the Kingdom. The most considerable was in the valley of Aosta <sup>12</sup> All were easily put down and without bloodshed. But the victorious Ministry, I am sorry to say, have shown their shallow knowledge of history, human nature and practical government, by making in consequence of these ignorant insignificant tumults, no less than four hundred arrests already, and are continuing to make more. The persons arrested are for the most part uninformed peasants. These, it is believed and hoped, will be mildly treated by the courts; but if any persons are discovered who had a hand in inciting the tumults, it is highly probable that they will be publicly executed.

The new Parliament met on the 18th of December, and its session wa opened by the King in person. Appended to this dispatch (Appendix A ) will be found a translation of his address on that occasion

The quarterly statement of the expenditures of this Legation are not appended to this dispatch, because the bill of John Miller, U. S. Dispatch Agent in London, for the usual outfit of stationery &c has not been received—the ordinary communications with Great Britain having been interrupted for the past week by the severe cold, ice, snow, &c. When received the said statement and accompanying vouchers will be promptly rendered.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 5*

Turin, February 1, 1854

Sir: The prospect of a general European war engrosses the whole attention of this Government and people. It is reported, and I believe truly, that the Sardinian Government has just concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with France, it is certain that extensive military and naval stores and munitions are now being collected in Genoa.

<sup>12</sup> Verso la fine di dicembre del 1853 seri disordini scoppiarono in molte parti della Val d'Aosta e nel capoluogo stesso. La causa di questi disordini fu l'opposizione alla tassa sul patrimonio. Ma, come mise in evidenza Hudson nel suo rapporto del 29 dicembre 1853 a Lord Clarendon, « poiché i dimostranti appartenevano alle classi meno abbienti, vi era ragione di sospettare che questi fossero stati provocati dai preti e dal partito reazionario per mettere in difficoltà il governo ». Ad Aosta la Guardia Nazionale e i vigili del fuoco combatterono contro i dimostranti e li obbligarono a lasciare le armi prima che un esercito regolare dovesse intervenire. Il rapporto di Hudson è pubblicato in FEDERICO CURATO, *Le relazioni diplomatiche fra la Gran Bretagna e il Regno di Sardegna (1852-1856)* Il carteggio diplomatico di Sir James Hudson (1852-1856), Torino, 1956, I, p. 496

The Government does not make this movement willingly. but Sardinia being a small state at the mercy of the large ones near it, it is a political necessity. France controls all its considerable movements, because France has only to withdraw its protection and Piedmont would follow Lombardy into the pocket of Austria. But this Government and people look with any thing but satisfaction on this compulsory alliance and the prospect which it opens up. The Sardinian states at present are nothing—what are five millions on the map of Europe? But they are now upon a career of unexampled improvement—at least it seems so to Italian eyes. With a rising commerce, improving agriculture, and with railroads nearly completed, Sardinia needs only an interval of quiet to become a new country. In ten years it would be no longer the weak little kingdom it has been in all the past. It would assume an importance unknown to a Cis-Alpine state since the downfall of Genoese prosperity, and the formation of that Kingdom of Northern Italy, embracing Lombardy and Venice, which is the dream and the future of its ambitious politicians, might become something more than a baseless, brilliant, fabric of a vision. But all their hopes may and probably will be, extinguished by the approaching war. Should Austria side with Russia, —or should Austria side with France and England and the Czar overthrow that imperial idol of iron and clay—in either of these cases the plains of Piedmont become, by their necessary position and inevitable fate, again the battle ground of Europe. Again will Northern conquerors come down Mount Cenis and again will the Po be red with a hundred battles, again will the drama of Marengo be enacted, and Alessandria be the key of military manoeuvres, the date place of treaties, the headquarters of renowned soldiers, as in all the centuries that are passed. Of the losers in the game, this small Kingdom, which can least afford to be so, must needs be the greatest. Its commerce will be annihilated, all improvement come to a stand-still, the cultivated plain of Piedmont become the blackened theatre of war. But it cannot avoid the destiny. Too weak to be neutral, it has selected the best chance—that is to say the lamb prefers the friendship of wolf to that of hyena.

With these things I hope our own fortunate republic has and will have nothing to do, save like the spectator of the poet Lucretius, to see from the safe shore the fleets which labor in storm and the long battle arrayed over the fields, but I present, in accordance with the duty of my position, what seems to me at the present moment the political prospect of the country to which I am accredited. Whenever facts

bearing upon it shall come into my possession I will hasten to communicate them.

Nothing has transpired bearing upon the direct interests of the United States

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 6*<sup>13</sup> Department of State, Washington, February 27, 1854

Sir: Your despatches to No. 5, inclusive, (excepting No. 3, no despatch so numbered, having reached the Department) have been received. Your private note of the 1st instant, has also been received. In reply to the request you prefer therein, to obtain permission to absent yourself, for a few days at a time, from your post to visit neighboring cities, I take pleasure in informing you that it is most cheerfully accorded.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 6*

Turin, March 19, 1854

Sir: Your dispatches No. 4. and 5. have been received.

I learn with regret that my Dispatch No 3 has never reached you. It was sent in the month of December last, and I am not able to say how or why it has miscarried. I hasten to send you a full copy, made from the Record-book of the Legation, which you will receive in the same mail which brings the present unless it again miscarries.

Permit me to offer you my thanks for the favorable attention you have given to my request for short leaves of absence, and for the prompt transmission of my commission confirmed by the Senate and signed by the President of the United States.

<sup>13</sup> L'istruzione n 5 del 14 febbraio 1854 trasmetteva la nomina di Daniel a incaricato d'affari degli S.U. presso il regno di Sardegna

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

Dispaccio n 7

Turin, April 1, 1854

Sir: Since receiving your Dispatch No 5. dated February 27th informing me that my own dispatch No 3. dated November 28th had never reached you, I have made inquiries relative to its loss or detention, but can ascertain nothing satisfactory. It was mailed here at the regular office of the post within a few days after its date, but seems never to have reached London. It was enveloped in the usual form to John Miller the Dispatch Agent in London, sealed with the seal and stamped with the stamp of this Legation. I learn from the Secretary of this Legation that this is not the first instance of miscarriage and he believes it attributable to the unusual size of the document. Heavy packages frequently miscarry in the continental post. —A long and important dispatch written by Mr. Niles was never received at Washington. I hope that the copy of my despatch taken from the records of this Legation, mailed to you immediately on learning the non-receipt of the original has reached you safely.

I regret extremely that its contents have been thus delayed, but can assure you that the delay results from no fault of mine, or of any other person connected with this Legation.

The contents of that dispatch, as you doubtless know by this time, are extremely important. It contains the final refusal of the Sardinian Secretary of Foreign Affairs detailing the grounds of his refusal.

Since then a sequel to the affair has come to my knowledge. It seems that the Austrian Government has thought proper to remove its Consul General at Smyrna, M. de Weckbecker<sup>14</sup>, whose participation in the Kozta [sic]<sup>15</sup> business has rendered him so conspicuously offensive to all citizens of the United States, from that post, and appoint him its Consul General at Genoa. Whether its action was based upon the refusal of the Sardinian Government to receive Mr. Foresti there, I am unable to say with certainty, but the succession of these events would seem to indicate it<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> Peter von Weckbecker, console generale a Smirne, fu trasferito a Genova nella primavera del 1854, ma, prima che potesse occupare il posto assegnatogli, il suo incarico fu annullato. Più tardi fu inviato a Bucarest *ad interim*.

<sup>15</sup> Sulla questione di Martin Kozta, vedi vol II, p 354

<sup>16</sup> Il governo sardo si rifiutò di dare l'*exequatur* per Weckbecker come console austriaco a Genova, per ragioni diverse da quelle per cui era stato negato l'*exequatur* a Foresti. Quest'ultimo era « un noto seguace della dottrina rivoluzionaria di Mazzini » e « la sua presenza a Genova [sarebbe servita] a raccogliere tutti gli Italiani che ave-

I understand that the first notice given the Sardinian Government of this appointment, was the receipt of M. de Weckbecker's commission. They have not yet granted it; but have addressed a remonstrance on the subject to the Austrian Government. To this remonstrance no answer has yet been received.

I do not think it probable that the *exequatur* of M. de Weckbecker will be granted, as popular feeling both at Genoa and in Turin, is very decidedly opposed to such a measure. But should the Government yield, it would seem to me a just cause of offense to the United States.

The chief political topic in this country at the present time, is a speech delivered by Lord John Russell in the British Parliament of a character calculated to discourage the Italian party that desires to drive the Austrians from the peninsula by force of arms. The policy of England at present is therefore regarded as adverse to the cause of Italian independence, and the statements of Lord Russell are criticised by the liberal papers of Genoa and Turin with considerable warmth.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio senza numero*

Turin, April 28, 1854

Sir: I informed you in my last dispatch (No 7. dated April 1st) that the Austrian Government had appointed as its Consul in Genoa Mr. Weckbecker formerly Consul at Smyrna who made himself so offensive to American feeling in the Koszta affair, and that the Sardinian Government had remonstrated against the said appointment. Subsequently it has refused positively to grant the *exequatur* and the Austrian Government has declared itself satisfied with the reasons alledged [sic] for the refusal.

You have doubtless heard something from the newspapers of the petty disturbance created in the early part of this month and in a province of this Kingdom by a gentleman known as the « Duke of Valentinois and hereditary Prince of Monaco. »<sup>17</sup> Monaco is a little peninsula in the

vano opinioni politiche estremiste e che avevano già stabilito in questa città il loro quartiere generale» Weckbecker non fu accolto per le sue idee chiaramente reazionarie e perché la sua presenza a Genova avrebbe incoraggiato le forze conservatrici. Vedi il rapporto di Hudson a Lord Clarendon, datato 17 marzo 1854, e pubblicato in: FEDERICO CURATO, *op cit*, vol I, pp 43-44

<sup>17</sup> Il 6 aprile 1854, il duca di Valentinois, figlio maggiore del principe di Monaco, Florestano I, arrivò a Mentone acclamato da circa 20 persone che agitavano la bandiera dei Grimaldi. Fu subito arrestato dai carabinieri e la Guardia Nazionale lo

Mediterranean on the Sardinian coast. It belongs to an independent prince and is the smallest monarchy in the world. Formerly he possessed a territory on the mainland also. But in 1848 the people of this territory threw off his yoke and were annexed to the Sardinian Kingdom. In the beginning of this spring the Duke of Valentinois, the heir apparent of Monaco, was induced by some silly people to believe that if he would show himself on his old domain, the people would rise in his favor and be reannexed to his hereditary rock of Monaco. In consequence he left Paris where he usually lives and came down to Menton — which is one of the towns of the mainland territory aforesaid. He showed himself in the streets, — and a few men of straw threw up their caps and cried « Long live the Duke. » But the people confined their demonstration to looking out of their windows, while the Sardinian police pounced on the Prince and his small suite & lodged them comfortably in jail, to « secure their personal safety. » After a short detention they have however been set at liberty and permitted to depart, perfectly content with the valuable information they have gained as to the real sentiments of their former subjects. The affair has been the occasion of much talk here, but is and was always considered of no consequence or signification.

The Parliament of the Sardinian states has authorized the Government to raise a new loan of 35 millions of francs. It has been readily taken up, part by the Rothschilds [sic] and the rest in the Kingdom itself.

Enclosed you will please receive the accounts of salary and contingent expenses at this Legation for the quarter ending the 31st of March 1854.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 9*

Turin, May 18, 1854

Sir. A few days since received a visit from a Mr Wilbor, the son of the Consul of the United States at Nice, who informed me of the following facts.

That his father had received from you a letter, directing him to go to

tenne prigioniero nel forte di Villafranca. Le difficoltà sorte fra il principe di Monaco e il regno di Sardegna sulla questione di Mentone sono trattate in NICOMEDE BIANCHI, *Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia dal 1814 al 1861*, Torino, 1870, VII, p. 106, vedi anche L. H. LABANDE, *Annales de la Principauté de Monaco*, Monaco-Parigi, 1939, p. 184 sgg., HENRI MÉTIVIER, *Monaco et ses princes*, La Flèche, 1862, II, p. 269 sgg.

Genoa and take possession of the Archives of the American Consulate there for an indefinite time. that in accordance with this direction he went to Genoa, and found the Vice Consul there ready to aid him in all that was necessary: but that inquiries induced him to believe that without a regular commisison and appointment for the port of Genoa, his acts would not be recognized by the local authorities of that city. He came to me for the purpose of ascertaining whether an *exequatur* could be gotten on the strength of Your Excellency's letter to him.

I told him that I thought it would be exceeding my duty to demand an *exequatur* without any hint or direction from you to do so; and that if you desired me to make such demand, I did not doubt that you would inform me of the fact. But at the same time, I would do what I could in carrying out the object indicated in the letter to Mr. Wilbor.

I then went to the Foreign office and stated the facts to the persons in authority there, and desired to know whether any obstacle would be thrown in Mr. Wilbor's way in the execution of his instructions. I was very politely assured that the Sardinian Government would render every respect to a person so authorized, but that the magistrates of Genoa, certainly, would not recognize any one as Consul at Genoa, who was in fact the Consul at Nice only: and to enjoy the immunities and discharge the duties of a consul at that port fully, it would be absolutely necessary to possess either a commission from an American consul already recognized at the place, or a regular nomination & an *exequatur* from the Government.

I will add that from all I could learn the Consul at Nice is supremely indifferent to the new office conferred upon him, regarding it as a burthen rather than a blessing. Indeed his son directly told me so. Mr. Wilbor Sen.r is a merchant who lives in Nice for the transaction of business and the preservation of his health. He is old, and infirm, and I suspect that the presence of his son there, is necessary to his purposes. I am fully convinced that his son told me the exact truth when he stated that his father was anxious to avoid the responsibilities and trouble of the consulate at Genoa, if he could do so without failing in his duty to the Government.

There has long been trouble about the Consulate at Genoa—It seems to be impossible to make any man worthy of the place who is fresh from the United States, stay there longer than a few months Consul after consul has come out, under the impression that the place is a valuable one, worth at least twelve hundred dollars, and on discovering the mistake re-delivered the archives into the hands of Vice Consul Moro

and either gone home or spent his time elsewhere in Europe till his removal by a change of administration. This has been the regular course of things for very many years, and the consequence has been that this individual, Mr. Moro, is perpetual acting consul at Genoa.

As it would be very desirable to have at this port a Consul who is an American by birth, who is honest and well instructed in the sort of business he would have to discharge, who knows the languages and customs of this country and the laws of our own: and as it is very improbable that if such a man could be found in the United States willing to come here, he would be willing to stay in Genoa on the small profits afforded by that consulate, I therefore hope that you will pardon me if I step beyond my place in suggesting how the office might be filled by just such an individual, who would in all human probability remain at the post as long as the Government permitted.

The individual to whom I allude is Mr. William Magoun, the Secretary of this Legation. Magoun is a native of Massachusetts, was educated in the University of Rhode Island and during a portion of his life was a lawyer in New York. He came to this country six or seven years ago as Secretary to Mr. Niles; he continued attached to the Legation under Mr Kinney: and has since acted under myself. He speaks all the languages current in these countries, is fully acquainted with their laws and customs, is a man of middle age, of a grave temper, and I believe him perfectly conscientious [sic] and fully capable of discharging all the duties of the post in question. His tastes and experience render the ordinary life of this country more suitable to him than it would be to most Americans, and if appointed, I think there would no longer be any doubt as to the citizenship of the Consul or Vice Consul at Genoa. Even should a new consul hereafter come out from the United States he would almost certainly retain him as Vice, and the office would thus no longer be thrown into the hands of a foreigner.

I hope that you will pardon me for stating these facts. The only reason why I have ventured on the nomination is, that I have long thought such an appointment would be one of the most useful and perfect that could be made, for such a post, and would relieve the Government of the United States of a great deal of trouble and annoyance. Mr. Dudley Mann<sup>18</sup>, the Assistant Secretary of State, will probably give you

<sup>18</sup> Ambrose Dudley Mann Dal momento che il presidente Pierce e il segretario di Stato Marcy erano completamente inesperti di politica estera fu deciso di nominare Mann, diplomatico di carriera, segretario assistente Mann aveva un'esperienza diplomatica e consolare pluridecennale che si era fatta in Germania, Svizzera e Ungheria



further information relative to Mr. Magoun, as it was from him that I first heard his name, before I left Washington in last August. His presence at this Legation is no longer necessary as I have a member of my own family with me who could discharge the duties of my secretary in a competent manner.

If after the refusal of Mr. Foresti's *exequatur* you should not be disposed to make another demand on the Sardinian Government, I would suggest that the difficulty could be surmounted by permitting me as Chargé d'Affaires for this Kingdom, and in accordance with the 49th section of the Diplomatic Manual, in Elliot's American Diplomatic Code, (Vol. II p. 391. 392.) to appoint Mr. Magoun provisional Consul, myself. On such an appointment, I do not doubt I could obtain the *exequatur* of the Government here without the slightest difficulty, and it would still leave the appointment in a manner open, if it should be thought proper in the United States to fill the place by some person known to the Administration.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 10*

Turin, May 21, 1854

Sir: I beg leave to present for your consideration a matter of some importance connected with the Consular Convention between the United States and the Kingdom of Sardinia.

In our treaty with France, and in our treaties with most other powers, there is a clause empowering our consuls to take charge of the chattels of citizens of the United States who happen to die in the territories of those countries to which the said consuls are accredited without relations or near friends present at the time. But from some cause, apparently forgetfulness, in the treaty concluded in 1838 between Sardinia and the United States there is no such clause. The laws of the United States I believe meet the contingency and enable the Sardinian consuls to take charge of the chattels of Sardinian subjects dying intestate in the United States, but the laws of this country have no such effect; and the consequence is that the authorities of the place take charge of the property belonging to our citizens who die here, and exact heavy fees for the service from the relatives of the parties when they make their claims.

e gli era pure familiare la politica europea del Dipartimento di Stato per cui si riteneva che avrebbe facilmente superato le difficoltà iniziali GRAHAM M. STUART, *The Department of State*, New York, MacMillan, 1949, p. 119

The town of Nice is a place in this Kingdom where many American invalids come yearly. Many die there far from their kindred and friends. The Consul at Nice has been in the habit of attending to their goods and facilitating their transmission to America. It has only been lately observed that he has no authority to do so by the treaty, and the local judges now enforce their right of possession and exact their fees.

I have been informed at the Foreign Office that a modification of the treaty could easily be arranged to meet such cases should the American Government empower me to demand and put it in form. The treaty of 1838 was concluded for the space of ten years only. Since then it has been continued from year to year. Modifications and additions could therefore be easily introduced.

Italian politics begin to wear an aspect more serious than hitherto. The republicans throughout Italy are believed to be ready for movement. An armed vessel containing seventy refugees lately anchored near Spezia and effected a landing. Their object is said to have been a general insurrection throughout Italy, and that they chose this Kingdom for their first demonstration, not because they were particularly dissatisfied with it, but because they supposed that if attacked or seized before their body gained strength, they would only have their passage paid to America, whereas if they should land in Tuscany or Modena and the same misfortune befell them there, they would certainly be hanged. The whole affair proved a failure. The authorities were prepared for them and the carabinieri on the spot. Many have been arrested and the rest are wandering in the mountains. What will be done with the poor creatures I do not know.

The existing Government maintains its ascendancy in Parliament and before the people. The party who desire despotism and Church Government have lately received several severe falls. It could scarcely be otherwise in a country where the press is comparatively free, and where the partisans of such a party are animated by the insensate spirit which characterizes them here. As a specimen of that spirit, I will quote a sentence from a speech lately delivered by one of them in Parliament. It is simply this: « *The church has rights anterior to the rights of humanity and human society* »<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Non è stato possibile identificare con certezza la persona che ha fatto questa affermazione e l'occasione in cui è stata fatta. Può essere del conte Solaro della Margarita, che, in questo periodo, sedeva come deputato all'estrema destra e strenuamente difendeva i principi assolutistici e i privilegi della Chiesa. Per una esposizione della sua politica, vedi, MICHELE MONACO, *Clemente Solaro della Margarita*, Torino, 1955.

So long as they make their battle on such a ground as that, it is not surprising that they meet perpetual defeat and suffer from an eternal marasmus.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 11*

Turin, July 10, 1854

Sir: Your Dispatch No. 7 enclosing a letter to the King of this country, congratulating him upon the birth of a Prince was received last evening, and I have this morning taken the necessary steps for its presentation. Owing however to the absence of the King himself and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, some time may elapse before the accomplishment of that object.

Since my last dispatch (No 10.) not a single public incident has transpired affecting the interests of the United States. Two treaties with the South American states of Paraguay and Peru have been concluded and confirmed <sup>20</sup> I shall transmit copies of the same as soon as they are printed

Parliament concluded its deliberations last week, though the formal prorogation has not taken place. Its debates have not been marked by peculiar features. The Government has triumphed in all its measures. These however have been entirely local in their aim and effect—relative to the building of roads, aqueducts [sic], laws respecting the sale of real property, and the privileges of some towns.

The most important of all the bills passed was one making it a criminal offence for the clergy to convert their pulpits and the days set apart by law for the service of religion, into a place and time for political diatribes against the laws, constitution and government of this land. Such a law was much needed here, and might be worthy of consideration elsewhere. <sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Un trattato di amicizia, navigazione e commercio con il Paraguay fu concluso il 4 marzo 1853. Come gli altri trattati stipulati in questo periodo, esso pure era basato sul libero scambio. Il 14 giugno 1856 fu concluso un trattato simile con il Perù. Vedi *Traité publics de la royale maison de Savoie avec les puissances étrangères depuis la paix de Chateau-Cambresis jusqu'à nos jours*, Torino, 1861, VIII, p. 31 sgg., p. 52 sgg.

<sup>21</sup> Nel gennaio del 1854 Urbano Rattazzi presentò un progetto di legge che prevedeva severe pene per i ministri della Chiesa che avessero criticato le leggi dello Stato mediante scritti, riunioni pubbliche e nell'esercizio del loro ministero. Le pene andavano da un minimo di tre mesi a due anni di prigione per i preti che avessero

The political Church and the clerical party for centuries the bane of this Kingdom seems to be completely destroyed—absolutely annihilated. The priesthood has lost all influence and power of the people. The Government has seized the property of the seminaries and this law deprives them of their final resort for the recovery of influence.

The chances of war, so imminent a few months ago, have altogether disappeared. The Sardinian Government has evaded all the offers of France for an implication in the oriental question, and from the present aspect of the conflict it really seems that there was no need at any time of their interference.

Two important railroads have been completed—one to Novara on the high road to Milan and Venice—the other to Susa at the foot of the Alps on the way to Paris. I call them important because they are so in the eyes of this people. They were inaugurated with great ceremony—the presence of the King and diplomatic corps, balls, dinners &c—but in America they would hardly call for more notice than a newspaper paragraph—one being thirty and the other about forty miles long.

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n. 8* <sup>22</sup>

Department of State, Washington, July 13, 1854

Sir. Herewith I transmit a letter, and a copy of the same, from the President to Her Royal Highness, Louise, Regent of the Dukedom of Parma, etc. in answer to one from the latter announcing the recent death by assassination of her husband, and her accession to the Regency in consequence of the minority of her son, the hereditary Prince Robert. <sup>23</sup>

In the absence of a representative of the United States at Parma, I have to request that you will take the proper measures to communicate

criticato le leggi dello Stato nei loro discorsi; da un minimo di sei mesi ad un massimo di tre anni e a duemila lire di multa per i preti che avessero censurato le leggi dello Stato con scritti letti in riunioni pubbliche e pubblicati. Se questi scritti e discussioni avessero anche incoraggiato i cittadini a violare le leggi, la pena non sarebbe stata inferiore a due anni di carcere e a duemila lire di ammenda. La legge fu approvata e emanata il 4 luglio 1854.

<sup>22</sup> L'istruzione n. 7, Washington, 19 giugno 1854, trasmetteva una lettera del Presidente a S.M. il re di Sardegna in risposta ad una comunicazione di questi che gli annunciava la nascita del principe Tommaso di Genova.

<sup>23</sup> Carlo III (1823-1854) fu pugnalato il 26 e morì il 27 marzo 1854, gli successe il figlio Roberto di sei anni, sotto la reggenza della madre, la duchessa Luisa Maria, figlia del duca di Berry.

the enclosed letter to Her Royal Highness with as little delay as practicable.

I take this occasion to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches dated up to the 21st of May, last, and numbered as follows: — 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 7 —, [sic] 8, 9, 10, 10 [sic]. The despatch previous to the last is not dated.

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 9*<sup>24</sup> Department of State, Washington, July 17, 1854

Sir: The President having determined to accredit you to the government of Sardinia in the character of Minister Resident, I enclose herewith, your commission in that quality, a new letter of credence, and an office

<sup>24</sup> Questa istruzione — identica a quella inviata al nuovo ministro statunitense in Svezia — si conserva tra le *Instructions to Ministers, Sweden*, p 63 negli Archivi nazionali di Washington

Diamo qui di seguito i testi delle lettere del presidente Pierce a Vittorio Emanuele II (copia in Archivio dell'ambasciata degli S U a Roma) e di Daniel a Dabormida (copia in Archivio di Stato di Torino)

« Washington, July 14, 1854

Great and Good Friend Having thought proper to accredit to Your Majesty, as Minister Resident of the United States, Mr John M Daniel, who has hitherto been accredited as their chargé d'affaires to Your Majesty's Government, I pray you to receive from him the assurances of the friendship which the United States bear to your Government, and of our desire to cultivate the harmony and good correspondence so happily subsisting between us From a knowledge of his fidelity, probity and good conduct, I have entire confidence that he will render himself acceptable to Your Majesty, and give effect to our desire of preserving and advancing on all occasions, the interest and happiness of both whatever he shall say you on the part of the United States, and most of all when he shall assure you of their wishes for your prosperity, And I pray God to have Your Majesty always in His safe and Holy Keeping »

« United States Legation, Turin, 14th August 1854

Sir: While acknowledging your note dated the 11th of August, and thanking you for the favourable consideration you have therein given my request for the exequatur for A Herbermont, I beg leave to bring before your attention the following facts

The President of the United States, moved by the advice of the Senate, by the high respect entertained in that country for His Majesty the King and the Government of Sardinia, and by a desire to render more complete certain portions of its diplomatic organization, wishes its representative agent in Turin to be hereafter Minister Resident, instead of chargé d'affaires as hitherto He has therefore thought proper to give me a letter of credence to that effect addressed to His Majesty the King I have the honor to transmit a copy of the same to Your Excellency; and I am instructed to say that the sealed original is now in my hands to be delivered according to usage and to His Majesty's wishes

Praying that Your Excellency will at your convenience inform me when and in what manner I may be enabled to fulfill the purposes of the President, I take the occasion to assure you of the very high consideration ... ».

copy of the same. The last you will enclose to the Minister of Foreign Relations, and request him to designate a convenient time for your presentation of the original to the King of Sardinia.

This appointment, you will understand, affects only your diplomatic rank, the clause of the Act of March 3, 1853, making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the government, and authorizing this change having expressly provided that the Ministers Resident thus appointed, « shall not receive more compensation than is now allowed to a Chargé des Affaires. »

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 12*

Turin, July 22, 1854

Sir: Since my last Dispatch Parliament has been formally prorogued to the 27th of November 1854. The country is tranquil The public mind was for some time agitated by renewed rumors of an alteration in the Ministry. It has been again intimated that Gen. Dabormida was about to retire from the Foreign Office to take position in the Army. The report has now been officially contradicted.

The event of real importance this month is the ceremony of laying down the first submarine telegraphic wires of the line by which this country proposes to connect Europe with Africa across the Mediterranean <sup>25</sup> The wires were solemnly submerged yesterday in the presence of the Ministry at the gulf of Spezia. The wires are to be carried on the bottom of the sea from Spezia to the island of Corsica, from that island to the island of Sardinia, thence to Bona in Africa The expense is partly borne by France, who will have the use of it as her medium of communication with her Algerian territory. It is perhaps the greatest submarine telegraph yet practically commenced.

The news of the triumphant insurrection in Spain has given popular

<sup>25</sup> Vedi, per l'opera di John Brett, ingegnere inglese, vol. II, p. 322. La linea Cagliari-La Spezia doveva essere il primo tronco di una più lunga linea per unire Malta all'Inghilterra, passando per la Sardegna, La Spezia, Genova, la Savoia, Ginevra, Basilea, la valle del Reno e il Belgio senza tuttavia passare per la Francia Sarebbe poi stata estesa all'Africa, alle Indie Orientali e all'Australia Brett diresse i lavori di posa del cavo fra la Sardegna e la costa dell'Africa cominciò a capo Spartivento in Sardegna e terminò a Bona in Algeria La posa di questo cavo fu molto difficile come si sa dalla corrispondenza di Craig console inglese a Cagliari Vedi FEDERICO CURATO, *op cit*, vol I, p. CXXIV, i rapporti di Craig a Lord Clarendon del 22 dicembre 1854 e del 10 ottobre 1855, a p. 156 e a p. 363

satisfaction here. It is regarded as a consequence of the reactionary and despotic course for some years adopted by the Spanish Government.<sup>26</sup> Its character has been made practically known to the people of this country by the various prosecutions of the press in Turin carried on by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires here under the orders of his Government. The Kingdom of Sardinia being a little country *à la merci* of the large nations around it, though it permits great and almost complete freedom to its own press, was compelled by diplomatic interference to pass a law rendering any journal indulging in personal observations on the sovereigns of Europe liable to prosecution and heavy fine. During the last six months some newspapers in Turin have published extracts from English journals detailing the well known facts of the scandalous transactions in the royal family of Spain. For this offence they have been vindictively prosecuted and severely mulcted at the instance of the Spanish diplomat here.

I have the honor to transmit the accounts of this Legation for the quarter ending the 30th of June 1854; and with assurances of great respect

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 13*

Turin, August 5, 1854

Sir: Your dispatch No 8. dated the 13th of July enclosing a letter addressed to the Regent Duchess of Parma by the President of the United States was received here by last evening's mail. Although the capital of Parma is only twenty four hours journey from this city, there is no diplomatic intercourse between the two countries, and the Sardinian Government is therefore unable to afford any facility (beyond that of the common post offices) for the transmission of such a document. It will therefore be necessary for me to go in person to the city of Parma to deliver it, but this step involves little difficulty, and will require an absence of three days only.

<sup>26</sup> Il 1° aprile 1851, era stato concluso un concordato fra la Spagna e la Santa Sede per cui veniva concesso alla Chiesa cattolica il diritto di supervisione sulle università, l'abolizione di tutte le leggi e i decreti contro le istituzioni della Chiesa e una stretta sorveglianza sulla stampa in materia di religione. Il 28 giugno 1854 scoppiò un'insurrezione militare e conquistò il potere il partito progressista spagnolo, che diede un serio colpo al concordato con il voto sulla vendita dei beni ecclesiastici. Il governo O'Donnell poi si accorderà con il Papa e condannerà quei sudditi che si erano convertiti alla religione protestante.

I may be permitted to add in this connection, that there are several states in the immediate vicinity of this Kingdom with which the United States have no diplomatic relations and that in all similar occasions, I am not only willing to act as their agent, but should be highly gratified to have such opportunities for service allotted to me.

The Duchy of Parma has lately been the scene of much disturbance. The assassination of the late Duke is attributable to private motives. Hideous rumours are rife concerning that matter. No clear official statement of the transaction has ever appeared, nor has the assassin been detected by the law. The political power of the Duchy has long been in Austrian hands, and since the death of the Duke it has fallen more completely and openly under their rule. Their troops are quartered in all parts of the country. Within the last ten days the students of the capital have been in revolt against them, and have been put down by murderous fusillades. There are some reasons for believing that the affair was gotten up, or at least, permitted to arrive at a crisis by the Austrian authorities, that they might have an excuse for increasing their forces.

All the western coast of Italy is at this time devastated by cholera. It is very bad at Naples, at Civita Vecchia, at Leghorn and at Florence. In the neighboring city of Genoa, the port of Sardinia, it is terrible. For some time past the deaths have averaged over a hundred *per diem*. Yesterday there were one hundred and thirty four in the city and suburbs. As Genoa does not now contain more than 50,000 people—40,000 of the inhabitants having fled—it will be seen that the proportion is heavy. The commerce of the place is suspended and the miseries of the town are aggravated by the superstition of the people. The streets are the scenes of frequent *emeutes*—foreigners are threatened, and physicians sometimes mobbed on the supposition that they have poisoned the dying or imported the pestilence.

At Turin there have been two or three deaths. One of them was that of Count Revel, a distinguished member of the high aristocracy, lately Minister of this country at the Court of Vienna.

The King and Ministers went on yesterday to Genoa and walked through the hospitals for the purpose of reviving the confidence of the population.



**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

Dispaccio n 14

Turin, Aug 12, 1854

Sir. Your Dispatch No 9. dated July 17th, informing me of my appointment as Minister Resident near the Court of Turin and enclosing a letter to the King of Sardinia, with my Commission signed by the President. and your Dispatch No 10. dated July 19th,<sup>27</sup> enclosing the Commission of Mr. Herbemont to be Consul at Genoa have been both duly received

I have the honour to inform you that Mr. Herbemont's Commission has been duly presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and that orders have been transmitted to the Magistrate of Appeals at Genoa for the granting of his *exequatur* Mr. Herbemont will receive the same on his arrival of which I have not yet heard.

The cholera continues its ravages at Genoa but now seems on its decline. A few cases have occurred at Turin, but the disease does not take an epidemic form.

A confused agitation appears to prevail throughout Italy. The Republican party are disposed to a general attempt. I do not think they will effect any considerable movement. All rational hopes of a national revolution in this peninsula departed when Austria declared herself decisively on the side of the Western powers.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

Dispaccio n 15

Turin, September 4, 1854

Sir. The public affair which engrosses the political circles of this kingdom is the seizure, by the Government, of property belonging to the monasteries and convents.<sup>28</sup> It has been my lot to witness here, in this

<sup>27</sup> L'istruzione n 10, Washington, 19 luglio 1854, trasmetteva la nomina di A. Herbemont, della South Carolina, a console degli SU a Genova

<sup>28</sup> Il 28 ottobre 1854, proprio mentre i tre vescovi mandati a Roma da Vittorio Emanuele II, — i monsignori Charvaz, arcivescovo di Genova, Vibert, Vescovo di Moriana, Rendu, vescovo di Annecy, — stavano trattando con la Santa Sede (il governo sardo voleva liberarsi dell'onere delle spese per il culto assunte in seguito alla convenzione stipulata con Leone XII sull'incameramento dei beni ecclesiastici già secolarizzati da Napoleone), il ministro Rattazzi presentò alla Camera un disegno di legge per la soppressione degli ordini monastici. Eccettuate le suore di carità, gli ordini insegnanti, missionari e ospedalieri, gli altri dovevano essere aboliti e le loro rendite

liberal and well ordered country, and in this nineteenth century, scenes and acts nearly parallel to those which rendered most memorable, in the constitutional history of England, the reign of Henry the Eighth. These events have no bearing on American affairs but to the eyes of an American they are so remarkable that I propose to make a brief statement of them in this Dispatch.

Religious corporations, known as monasteries and convents have subsisted in this country from immemorial time. Their existence, their power to inherit and hold property has been recognized by the Government in every way that such a thing could be recognized and confirmed. These corporations possess a considerable amount of real property—some of it the gift of former kings, much of it bequeathed or donated by individuals—for the perpetual use of the monks and nuns constituting various orders of the Catholic hierarchy.

The Government acting in its own will and judgment, unsupported by legal decisions or public laws that I am aware of, has seized the property of a vast number of these corporations, and is now seizing, and will hereafter seize on the property of a great many more. The proprietors protest, and sometimes resist. When they do so, their doors are broken open, or their walls are cut through, and the nuns or monks as the case may be, are dragged or pushed out by the soldiers and gendarmes. Their houses are then converted into barracks, hospitals, &c.

Public opinion supports the Government in these measures With the exception of a very small and feeble minority, consisting chiefly of the high aristocracy, the people are all on the side of the Government and only complain of delay in the procedure.

With these facts present, one who has been educated in the ideas and customs of the United States will think that there must be some way to reconcile the action of the government with the common rights of property. I have looked anxiously for some such justification. I have

avocate al demanio dello Stato Questo progetto provocò una reazione violenta da parte del clero piemontese Comunque, dopo alterne vicende ed aspre battaglie parlamentari e giornalistiche e dopo avervi apportato alcune modifiche (si stabiliva fra l'altro di non disperdere subito i frati e le monache delle comunità abolite, ma di lasciarli nei loro conventi o di riunirli insieme sino alla loro completa estinzione fornendoli di una pensione, per evitare che costoro, — circa 8 000 —, tornando alla vita normale, non riacquistassero i diritti civili e venissero così a turbare l'assetto finanziario delle rispettive famiglie) il progetto ministeriale venne approvato dal Parlamento subalpino Il 26 luglio 1855 Pio IX pronunziava un'allocuzione concistoriale con la quale lanciava la scomunica maggiore su tutti coloro che avevano direttamente cooperato all'emanazione di questa legge i ministri che l'avevano proposta, i deputati e senatori che l'avevano approvata ed il Re che l'aveva sanzionata

read the proclamation of the Government and the articles of its newspapers. All the defence which I have found is reducible to two statements.

1st. That monks and nuns do no good to the common weal—that they are idle drones, in the way of all improvement, producing nothing:

2nd. That the rest of the people want their property to make barracks, hospitals, &c.

Such are the facts and reasons. They would seem to us impossible, monstrous, unaccountable, did we not recollect one grand principle which distinctly separates all the political ideas of the Latin races from those of a Teutonic or Anglo origin. The idea which lies at the foundation of our whole political organization, the principle that gives vitality to our laws, and is the basis of our society, is—that individuals possess rights which can be interfered with neither by other individuals nor by the State—that there is a certain circle around every man over which the law and the country however strong can never step—and that in proportion as that circle may be wide or narrow is the Government bad or good. It appears to me that this idea has no root in the south of Europe, among those which are known as the Latin races. Their notion of a state whether republic, monarchy or oligarchy, is despotism controlled by temporary expediency. It was so in old Greece and Rome, and is so still in Italy, Spain, and France. Their writers sometimes did and do express a different conception—but their actual law and practice were, and are that the individual is nothing if weak, the state is every thing if strong.

It is my belief that one such act as this sequestration of property in the United States would shiver the Government of that country in a single day. We are not troubled with monasteries and convents, but we do have a species of property which in the eyes of a large class—perhaps a majority—is much more questionable in point of right and utility—I mean the negro property of our Southern States. We know what would be the consequence if a single one of those slaves should be taken from his owner by the Government. While this sequestration in Piedmont has been actually going on, the law of the United States has been roused to its utmost effort for the protection of a master in his rights over a runaway negro who had taken refuge in a city opposed to the rights of that master almost to the point of unanimity. Had it been necessary all the blood and treasure of our States would doubtless have been laid out to secure that one worthless negro: because the rights of the individual citizen depended on his capture. It is curious to compare the two countries at that moment.

The Government of Piedmont by intention is the best I know in Europe. The men who are at the head of it mean to do right, and the laws are liberal and good. But when I witness such a transaction as this, I think they want the fundamental idea of a good government. The monasteries are without doubt mischievous and detrimental to the prosperity of the state. Their suppression on the score of temporary expediency would be wise. But whether it is wise to trample on the right of property for any temporary good, is a question which an American cannot discuss.

I have devoted this dispatch to this tender subject of Sardinian domestic policy. I find nothing new that is worthy of note in its relations with other Governments.

The cholera continues to prevail at Genoa though now diminishing. In Turin some three hundred people have died of it since I last wrote.

Mr. Herbemont the new Consul of Genoa has not arrived

The letter of the President accrediting the undersigned to the King as Minister Resident has been duly presented to His Majesty in person, and was kindly received.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 16*

Turin, Oct. 21, 1854

Sir: I have delayed sending the enclosed statement of accounts for the quarter ending on the 30th of Sept. in the hope that I might be able to accompany them with some political intelligence worthy of your notice. But no event has occurred, or is likely to occur shortly in this country calculated to interest us. I have already stated more than once, that the politics of Sardinia are controlled by foreign powers. Its statesmen from the necessity of things are in a great measure puppets, whose wires are in the hands of England and France. At the present time, these great countries have their attention fully occupied elsewhere, and Sardinia is for the time forgotten. During the last winter when they were not certain of their ability to cope with Russia, they were disposed to levy a contingent from every country under their control, and from Sardinia among the rest. At present however they no longer regard such efforts necessary, and the smaller powers are allowed to rest quietly.

Parliament not being in session, the internal affairs of this country are also devoid of interest. The cholera diminishes as the weather

becomes cooler. This disease together with the absurd quarantines which Italian states think it necessary to inflict upon themselves in all unhealthy seasons, has done the greatest injury to the business men of northern Italy. The commerce has been diminished and the travel annihilated. Consequently, many mercantile houses have failed both here and in Genoa.

Mr. Herbemont, the new Consul, for the latter post has arrived and been duly installed in his office. He has appointed his son Vice-Consul with my full approbation.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 17*

Turin, December 24, 1854

Sir: The American ship *George Green*, H. C. Redman captain, arrived in Genoa from New Orleans towards the middle of November, laden with cotton and tobacco. *He* had a mutinous crew of negroes, and being occupied with their conduct for some days after his arrival, he forgot to give his list of stores and provisions to the custom house authorities. Meanwhile his mate, without inquiring whether this legal requirement had been observed, commenced discharging the cargo. His action was of course a contravention of the laws, and immediately brought the Sardinian officers upon the ship.

Another error was also unfortunately committed. When the list of stores was finally delivered up, the weight of a certain quantity of tobacco was stated at much less than it really was.

For these two offences against the revenue laws, the usual suits were instituted against Captain Redman in the courts of Genoa by the crown, and the facts being undeniable, he incurred a fine amounting to 19,642 francs and 38 centimes.

This case was reported to me by the American Consul at Genoa, and finding many circumstances in it which satisfied me that Captain Redman had no intention of defrauding the Custom House, I deemed it a proper subject for interposition on the part of Government. I therefore collected authentic evidence of the exculpatory facts above alluded to, and sent them enclosed in a dispatch recapitulating the whole to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was made the subject of further investigation in the Department of Finance; and the fines were at last reduced from 19,642 francs to 210 francs.

Believing that the Captain had committed no wilful offence at all, I was desirous that even this small penalty should be removed. But finding the authorities unwilling to do more, and understanding that the sum in question was necessary to cover the expenses of the investigation, I have desisted from further interference. Indeed it cannot be said that the Sardinian Government has acted with illiberality in the matter. Whatever may have been the rectitude of the American's intention the law was certainly transgressed, and as the penalty was reduced from nearly four thousand down to forty dollars—almost 99 per cent—I cannot think we have reason to complain.

I have thought it prudent to detail these facts in this dispatch, because the affair has necessarily been nearly six weeks unsettled, and such cases sometimes become subjects of misrepresentation in the United States. I have therefore appended my first note to the Minister on the matter and his final reply (Appendix A).

It is to be regretted that American citizens trading in these ports will not be more careful of such accidents. This is not the first, or the second or the third affair of the sort recorded at this Legation. Tobacco is more dangerous than gunpowder to an American vessel in a Sardinian port. That article is a government monopoly and its duties are rigidly enforced. A few ounces introduced with the slightest irregularity subject the ship to serious losses, a considerable quantity might occasion its entire confiscation. It sometimes happens that sailors make the trouble, but the law regards only the captain and owner, and the custom house officers listen to no explanations. The Government it is true on proper representations is generally well disposed; but its action is a matter of favour only and its patience cannot always be relied on.

***John M. Daniel a Giuseppe Dabormida***

Turin, December 4, 1854 <sup>29</sup>

Sir: It becomes my duty to ask your attention to the case of the American Capt. Redman of the ship *George Green* who has been subjected to burden some fines by the Custom House officers at Genoa, on grounds which appear to me imaginary and unsubstantial.

Capt. Redman sailed from New Orleans on the 7th of September,

<sup>29</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 17 di Daniel

with a cargo of cotton and tobacco, and arrived in Genoa on the 3d of November. Having lost a man during the voyage, he was ordered to land a large portion of his Cargo and fumigate his skip. In obediencteto Spezia for a quarantine of fifteen days. Here he was further ordered to this order, he was compelled to break the packages of his cotton; and when so broken, it was impossible to store it all in the hold of his vessel again. He was then obliged at the end of his quarantine to return to Genoa with a large portion of the cotton on the open deck. As it was here exposed to great injury from the wet weather then prevailing he was of course anxious that it should be landed and placed under shelter as soon as practicable. So soon therefore as he was allowed pratique, he went on shore and delivered up the manifest of his cargo with all the ships papers to his consignee. Inquires [sic] were made for a list of the provisions (*vivres*) &c belonging to the ship, not intended to be landed, reserved solely for the use of the crew. He was not told that this list should be delivered within any certain hour; and on handing it in at one o'clock the next day, he was told that it should have been delivered within twenty-four hours after pratique, and was then exactly thirty minutes too late. In the meantime, the weather threatening rain, the mate of the ship, thinking pratique had been allowed and the manifest having been delivered, that all was ended, commenced placing some of the exposed cotton in the boats at the side of the vessel. Although cotton is free from all duties, although no part of it was landed, and although the manifest of the whole cargo had been duly delivered up, Capt. Redman was informed that he would be heavily fined because he had commenced the work of unloading before the *list of provisions* had been placed in the hands of the authorities.

The next morning a custom house officer came on board and asked to *see* the provisions. They were immediately shown. Among them was a small quantity of tobacco and 200 cigars for the personal use of the crew. The officer took these on shore, and after weighing them the Captain was informed that the weight had been understated in the list of provisions, and he would be further fined for that offence.

As lists of provisions are always, in all ports, necessarily made on *estimation* (ships seldom carrying scales and weights) it is possible that this small quantity of tobacco might have been slightly understated. But that it was an unintentional mistake and not an attempt at fraud is evident from these two facts: 1st. That no attempt was ever made to carry it on shore; 2dly The whole quantity was delivered at once into the

hands of the custom house officer himself, and no attempt at concealment ever alledged [sic].

I now beg leave to refer your Excellency to the authenticated pieces of evidence appended to this dispatch. [Here follows a detailed statement of the said pieces.]

The statements I have made appear to me fully borne out by these documents.

In taking a view of the whole I cannot deny, and do not wish to conceal, that according to the strict letter of the law, Capt. Redman committed the error of delivering his list of provisions *thirty minutes too late*. But I pray your Excellency to observe, 1st that the error is of a character the most immaterial, not in the slightest degree affecting the spirit of the law or the interests of the revenue: 2ndly that it was an error wholly unintentional. Captain is a foreigner, arriving in your port for the first time. He was not informed and he could not know the necessity of delivering up the said list at a particular hour. He did the best he could to comply with the demands made upon him

Under these circumstances I respectfully request the remission of the fines laid upon him. He has already lost the greater part of the profits of this voyage, by having to lie idle and at expenses in a long quarantine; he has lost also by having to unship his cargo twice. If, in addition to these losses, he is now compelled to pay fines for errors so unintentional and immaterial, his first voyage to Genoa will not only be profitless but ruinous.

Captain Redman has been a captain of 21 years service, between New Orleans and Liverpool, and has a character of great punctuality and exactitude in discharge of his duties and of the laws. The present is the first voyage he has ever made to Genoa and now, for the first time, he finds himself involved in a dispute with the officers of the customs.

I may be permitted to suggest in conclusion, that an enforcement of the letter of the law in such a case as this will tend greatly to the discouragement and disadvantage of a commerce now advantageous both to the United States and the Kingdom of Sardinia



***Giuseppe Dabormida a John M. Daniel***

Turin, le 22 Décembre 1854 <sup>30</sup>

Monsieur,

En recevant la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 4 de ce mois concernant les procès en contravention intentés par la Douane de Gênes contre le Capitaine Redman, du navire américain *George Green*, je me suis empressé de porter votre communication et les pièces y annexées à la connaissance de Mr. le Ministre des Finances, et je me suis fait un plaisir de recommander particulièrement à l'attention bienveillante de mon collègue les différentes circonstances que vous m'avez signalées dans l'intérêt du Capitaine Redman.

Le Ministre des Finances vient de me faire à cet égard une réponse de laquelle il résulte qu'après avoir attentivement examiné cette affaire, et après s'être encore procuré des explications de la part du Directeur de la Douane de Gênes, et avoir eu communications des pièces de la procédure instruite contre le Capitaine Redman, il a donné pour instruction au Directeur surdit d'accepter de la part du Capitaine Redman des offres de transaction, savoir de la somme de 10 francs pour la contravention relative aux balles de coton, et de 200 francs pour celle qui se rapporte au Tabac, et cela bien que les peines pécuniaires que le Capitaine avait encourues s'élevassent en total à la somme de 19,642 francs, 38 centimes.

Je m'empresse, Monsieur le Ministre, de vous faire part de cette décision de mon collègue des Finances, d'après laquelle nous avons tout lieu de croire que l'affaire que vous avez été dans le cas de me recommander aura reçu à cette heure une solution conforme à vos désirs, autant que les lois du pays le permettent, et j'ai l'honneur de vous renouveler les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

P.S J'ai l'honneur de vous faire retour des pièces à l'appui qui accompagnaient votre office précité.

<sup>30</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 17 di Daniel

Sir · For the last four or five months, it has been rumoured in Europe that the United States wishes to purchase the principality of Monaco for a naval station in the Mediterranean. Monaco is a little peninsula, off the coast of Sardinia near Nice, belonging to the Grimaldi family, whose rule there was nominally an independent and absolute government. In 1848 however, the moiety of this Prince's subjects, being too much taxed, (it is said) took advantage of the general fermentation to drive him away and place themselves under the protection of the Sardinian Government <sup>31</sup>. Here they have since remained, but the title of Sardinia to the acquisition being still a subject of negotiation with his Royal Highness, the rumour of which I have spoken has occasioned some stir in this country.

The manner in which this rumour arose is a curious example of the credulity with which reports from America are received on the European continent. There is a person in Paris, apparently in indigent circumstances, who addressed during the last summer certain letters to the Minister of the United States in that city, which he signed as « Prince of Monaco. » They were so strangely written that the distinguished gentleman referred to came to the conclusion that he was insane, and never answered any of them. His mode of procedure was to enter the enclosure of the Minister's house, place his missive stealthily in the hands of the concierge, and go rapidly away. He was also in the habit of visiting the bureau of the Legation, and on one occasion, while there, a correspondent of an American newspaper came in; whereupon his Highness got up and precipitately retired. The journalist endeavoured to ascertain who it was, and an American gentleman present, by way of practical joke told him it was the Prince of Monaco who was about ceding his valuable possessions on the Mediterranean to the United States. So the story went to America, and after having gone the round of the newspapers there, again crossed the Atlantic to disturb the digestion of European politicians. It has been frequently pointed to in the press,

<sup>31</sup> Il principato di Monaco non era esattamente sotto la protezione del regno di Sardegna. I Savoia godevano, tuttavia, del diritto di « souveraineté », ossia di sovranità feudale sul ducato. In altre parole, i principi di Monaco erano feudatari di Casa Savoia.

as a proof of the grasping disposition of the United States and their first step towards a general system of European annexation

I thought this ridiculous tale had died from inherent emptiness, but a few weeks since it was again brought to my attention. Two American vessels of war belonging to our Mediterranean squadron found occasion to enter Villafranca, the Sardinian port nearest to Monaco. The Sardinian Ministry was always I believe too well informed to give any weight to the rumours referred to; but the ignorant people in the neighbourhood of Nice attached so much importance and made such a noise about the presence of those two vessels that I was the other day interrogated as to their intentions through a high officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs. He stated that the Government was fully aware of the unfounded nature of the story in question, but so much had been said, that it would be glad to get any information about those vessels which would enable it to satisfy the minds of those who might make our presence near Monaco a subject of talk.

I communicated in conversation what I had heard to be the origin of the *canard*, and while I had no official information on the subject thought myself authorized to say it was impossible that the vessels at Villafranca had any intentions bearing on the claims, real or supposed, which Sardinia might have upon the adjacent territory. For the rest, as these vessels had a right under treaty to enter that port, their actual business was not a subject for enquiry. The Government might, I thought, rest assured that it certainly was not that which foolish rumour declared. Since my last notice of this country's affairs Parliament has resumed its session. The chief business before it is the ministerial project for the suppression of monasteries and a new distribution of ecclesiastical property—a sort of sacred agrarian law of which I have previously endeavoured to give some idea. The scheme is agreeable to the mass of the nation and unpalatable only to the church and to a few of the noblesse. I presume it will be carried in despite of their clamour and the opposition of the Holy See. An excommunication of the Ministry however is not impossible in case of its enforcement.

The alliance of Austria with the Western Powers is a great grief to the Italians. It puts an end to their hopes of a revenge upon that power in case of general war. A short time since a body of French troops were ordered from Rome back to France. The French Government demanded a free passage through this country, and the Sardinian authorities did not think it prudent to refuse. This affair has occasioned no little mortification to the people, and some of the newspapers com-

mented on the event in severe terms. These newspapers were promptly seized on the demand (it is said) of the French Minister here, and their issues sequestered.<sup>32</sup> Such a procedure seems strange in a country which professes to give unlimited freedom to its press, but while the press is actually free to discuss Sardinian affairs, the weakness of the country compels the Government to be very arbitrary when it presumes to comment on the strong despotisms which surround this Kingdom. Two journalists here on demand of the Spanish Minister have lately been subjected to imprisonment and heavy fines for republishing from the English papers some story about Queen Isabella II of Spain.

Great distress prevails among the masses of this country. The price of bread raises daily, and the Sardinian Government has been compelled to establish bakeries in the neighbourhood of Turin where coarse food is sold at a moderate rate. The Eastern war causes the scarcity. There is less work for mechanics than usual, and travellers from abroad are much fewer than ordinary. I have not lately vised more than four or five passports per month at this Legation a fact which proves the diminution.

There is however a subject of discussion in Italy which has occupied the public attention more than its social, material and political evils, and even drowned the roar from Sebastopol. That subject has been the immaculate origin of the Virgin Mary. A great council of the Catholic Church has been convoked to settle the dispute. Two hundred Bishops and Archbishops have sat in conclave at Rome, among whom were numbered many from our own enlightened land. It has long been the established belief of all Christendom that our Saviour was conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of a Virgin. In the Roman Church the worship of the Virgin has consequently prevailed for many ages. But the idea has arisen in that Church that Mary herself was born as her son was, that is to say, conceived by a miracle and born of a Virgin. The Great Council held was convoked to settle the orthodoxy of that idea; and the two hundred bishops assembled voted unanimously that the said beleaf [sic] was founded on fact. An addition has thus been made to the Roman Creed, and it results that both the mother and the grandmother of our Saviour were equally Virgins. I state the matter as I have gathered it from the public discussion. The newspapers of Piedmont which have in general but little respect for the Church, expend much

<sup>32</sup> Due redattori de *La Voce della Libertà* furono condannati a quindici giorni di carcere e a una multa di 200 e 100 franchi rispettivamente per aver attaccato Isabella II di Spagna. Anche il redattore capo del giornale *Opinione* fu condannato a quindici giorni di prigione e a una multa di 200 franchi.

irreverence in the matter, for however careful they are compelled to be in speaking of Queen Isabella, there is no curb upon them when they feel inclined to be witty at the Blessed Virgin's cost, and they appear to compensate their reserve towards the first by ribaldry relative to the latter.

***John M. Daniel & William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 19*

Turin, January 12, 1855

Sir. I hasten to inform you of an important political fact Sardinia has joined the Triple Alliance of France England & Austria.

The announcement was yesterday made in Parliament, and on the same evening I received a note from General Dabormida, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that he had resigned his seat in the Cabinet and that the King had accepted his resignation. By another note from Count Cavour, the Premier and Minister of Finance, I am informed that he himself takes the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, retaining the Presidency of the Council and temporarily the Ministry of Finance.

The cause of Dabormida's resignation was the accession of Sardinia to the alliance. He held that a Minister who had signed the celebrated protest of this country against the treatment it received from Austria two years ago, could not now sign a contract which would bring the Kingdom into an alliance with that power, while all the causes which led to the protest were still in full force. Other members of the Cabinet are said to take the same view, and further resignations are expected.

Meantime the news create much popular ill feeling, and will lead to bitter debates in Parliament. The Ministry will not be able to alledge [sic] the principal reason of their action, which is thought to be this, that if Sardinia did not join the alliance voluntarily, France would endeavour to coerce her. The public defense will probably be that peace will shortly be made, that a Congress of nations will be held to settle, at once, the terms of that peace and the balance of European power; and Sardinia may regain some of her rights by having a voice in that Congress. Whereas if she remains isolated, she will not only get nothing, but will loose [sic] the sympathy and support of France and England which has been so far her principal maintenance against the power of Austria.

It is said that 15,000 Piedmontese troops will go to the Crimea

under Gen. La Marmora (at present Minister of war) or under the Duke of Genoa. I disbeleive [sic] this rumour altogether, and I do not think that the Ministry would have under any circumstances done this thing if they had not been well assured that peace was imminent. Indeed the rumour was contradicted to me at the Foreign Office; though that fact does not necessarily prove its falsity.

The whole negociation [sic] has been speedy. A month ago, it was well understood that France and England would not require the adherence of Sardinia. Shortly afterwards they renewed their application which was declined, and the French Minister took *congé* and left Turin. But the accessions of Austria changed the face of affairs, the French Minister made his appearance here again, and in two or three days afterwards the treaty was announced.

The Bill for the Suppression of Convents meets with unexpected opposition. If it does not pass the Chamber of Deputies in a few days, the Cavour Ministry falls altogether. In the Senate the majority is dead against the bill; but the Senates [sic] opposition will be easily overcome by the creation of a batch of new senators.

Maria Teresa, Queen Dowager of Sardinia, the widow of Charles Albert and mother of the present King, died on yesterday. On the other hand the present Queen has given birth to another son. The usual notes have passed between the Palace and this Legation on these events, and I am requested to convey the news to the Government of the United States.

M. Bertinatti for sometime Secretary of Legation in the Sardinian diplomatic corps, has been appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Washington in room of the present incumbent.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Giuseppe Bertinatti presenterà le credenziali come incaricato d'affari il 2 ottobre 1855, come ministro residente il 27 marzo 1861; come inviato straordinario e ministro plenipotenziario il 30 luglio 1864. Lascerà gli Stati Uniti l'8 giugno 1866. Bertinatti richiederà anche il gradimento come console generale del re di Sardegna negli Stati Uniti il 2 ottobre 1855, gradimento che gli sarà concesso dal Segretario di Stato Marcy il 4 ottobre dello stesso anno.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 20*

Turin, Jan. 24, 1855

Sir: I hasten to acknowledge your Dispatch dated Dec. 18 th.<sup>34</sup> I have communicated its contents, with the list of Consuls adjoined, to the proper authorities here, and requested them to communicate to me any information they might be able to obtain on the subject.

The intelligence that there were persons calling themselves Vice-Consuls of the United States in this Kingdom, without authority, has doubtless arisen from the fact that one Moro appointed Vice Consul at Genoa by a former Consul, acted as such during the whole of the long interval between the resignation of the said Consul and the appointment of Mr. Herbemont. It is my impression that he has no longer anything to do with the Consulate at Genoa. I warned Mr. Herbemont against making further use of him, and I cannot suppose that he still acts as Vice Consul. I shall however go to Genoa tomorrow, and if he still does so, put an effectual stop to his pretentions.

Mr. Wilbor, the Consul at Nice, has been for a long time sick. He has a Mr. Borelli with him, who styles himself in a business letter lately written to me by him, « Secretary to M. Wilbor ». All the passports I have seen from that Consulate were signed by Mr. Wilbor. I have nevertheless taken care to communicate to the Consul at Nice the nature of the reports which had reached the Department of State, and charged him to inform me if any person has been permitted to assume the title of Vice Consul in his neighbourhood.

I mentioned in my last Dispatch that the Queen Dowager of Sardinia had died. Since then the reigning Queen has also departed this life. This event seems to be sincerely regretted. The Queen was an amiable and virtuous woman and was both respected and beloved by the people. She leaves a large family of young children—her death being caused by illness consequent on her late delivery of a son.

The Duke of Genoa, the brother of the present King, and second son of Charles Albert lies very ill and will not survive long.

Contrary to my expectations, Sardinia sends 15,000 troops to the

<sup>34</sup> Si tratta dell'istruzione n 11, Washington 18 dicembre 1854, che ha come argomento alcuni abusi dei consoli degli S U nei possedimenti sardi. Vedi anche il dispaccio n 29, con la stessa data, a Lewis Cass Jr, a Roma. Con una circolare senza numero, datata Washington 15 agosto 1854, il Dipartimento di Stato aveva trasmesso altri documenti ai governi di Sardegna e di Toscana. Vedi *Instructions to Ministers*, vol *Spain*, n 2, p 69 negli Archivi Nazionali di Washington.

Crimea. They will sail towards the end of February. The articles of the treaty are now known. By Art 1st Sardinia adheres, not to the treaty of the 2d. December but to that of 10th. April between England France and Turkey. Art. 2d., 15,000 troops go to the Crimea under Lamarmora, and will form part of Lord Raglan's army Art 3d, The expenses of their transportation are to be paid by the Western powers Art 4th., A loan of 50,000,000 francs is garauntied [sic] to Piedmont by England. Art. 5th, The Sardinian troops when once landed in the Crimea are to be supplied by their own Government

This treaty is regarded as very important in Europe, not so much for the force to be supplied by Piedmont as because it leaves Austria free to act That power could not well be brought into action so long as the Piedmontese army remained here in Italy, ready to take advantage of any misadventure in the course of the war. In the Crimea they will be hostages to Austria for the security of her Italian provinces

If the war is speedidly [sic] concluded by a European Congress, the alliance will be a great hit for this country. But if that hope fails, Sardinia will pay dearly for the privilege of being recognized as a European power.

I have the honour to enclose herewith the accounts and vouchers of this Legation for the 4th quarter of the year ending December 31st 1854.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 21*

Turin, March 10, 1855

Sir. I have held some unofficial conversations with persons in authority here relative to the reported refusal of the Mayor of New York to permit the landing of certain persons, charged with political misdemeanours in Sardinia, lately sent to the United States on board of a Sardinian frigate. These officials affect to consider it hard that the Federal Government has not, or will not, interfere to change the decision of the local authorities of New York, because the United States has never yet formally protested, as Mexico, Brazil &c have long ago done, against the importation, of the class of persons referred to, from Sardinia.<sup>35</sup> It is not worth the while to detail these conversations more

<sup>35</sup> Questa dichiarazione si riferisce ai rifugiati politici che si erano imbarcati sul *San Giovanni*. Vedi nota 96, nel vol II, pp 326-327



particularly; but I avail myself of the opportunity to state why I was silent on the subject when the above mentioned cargo departed from the port of Genoa

I was perfectly aware of its nature and destination; but the records of this Legation gave me no precedent for objection. Former officers here seem to have both permitted and countenanced such exportations; and in the United States no objection seems to have been hitherto made. Regarding the whole matter therefore as a settled question, I did not make it a subject of communication either with your Excellency or with any official of this country.

Since however the indisposition of local authorities in the United States to receive these foreign products has been made manifest, I beg leave to say that my own observations and reflections in these countries entirely justify the measures they have taken. We are accustomed to look upon persons who attempt to change the governments of Europe by popular revolutions as republicans like ourselves, and as patriots. That a small number of their leaders are indeed patriots, I think quite probable, though I have yet seen none of them whose idea of republicanism bears the slightest resemblance to our own. But the mass of adventurers who are brought before the courts by the failure of their movements are neither republicans nor patriots. They are generally people of total ignorance and of an uncultivated *morale*, who are easily enlisted for all such affairs because they have been too slothful, or reckless, to pursue a life of legitimate industry, and who are therefore, and from no better reason, ripe for violent changes in every social order. To inflict severe penalties on this unhappy class would be impolitic as well as inhuman, and a moderate government is therefore always willing to anticipate their trial by throwing them on our hands.

Worthy individuals may be found among them, but it is needless to say that as a whole they form a very undesirable sort of emigration. They are destitute of means, and what is worse, of industrious habits. That they would not abide by the law in their own country is certainly no reason to suppose that they will strictly respect the peace and order of American cities. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that they are not willing emigrants, who come to us because they prefer the United States to the land of their nativity, but men who are sent against their will, because they have been found to be bad citizens at home

For these reasons I think it would be judicious to signify in a formal manner to the Government of Sardinia that they should cease to regard the United States as a Botany Bay for persons charged with political

misdeameanours. We should then have no more trouble on this score. Brazil and most other South American governments have long ago sent it such a protest, and their wishes so expressed have been respected.

Since I last wrote, the Convent Bill has passed the popular branch of Parliament.

The Duke of Genoa, brother to the present King, is dead.

Russia having made a formal declaration of war against the King of Sardinia, in which it is charged that the said King has commenced hostilities against the Czar without cause, Sardinia has replied in a proclamation to the public and a letter to the diplomatic corps, containing some sufficiently curious revelations. It appears that the Czar Nicholas took the attempt made by Charles Albert to drive the Austrians out of Italy so much to heart, that he not only broke off all diplomatic relations with that Monarch, but refused to put on mourning for his death, refused to receive the letters stating the accession of the present King, and has always refused to recognize the new constitutional institutions of this country. Military preparations continue uninterrupted by the news of the Czar's death.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 22*

Turin, April 12, 1855

Sir: I received in January last a dispatch from your Excellency informing me that information had reached the Department of State that there were persons in the Kingdom of Sardinia styling themselves without authority vice-consuls of the United States, and that some of the Sardinian police were suspected of connivance in their assumptions. On the receipt of this dispatch, as I have already informed you, I communicated without delay, these suspicions to the three legitimate consular agents of the United States in Sardinia, and to the Sardinian authorities themselves.

It was not until yesterday that the Minister of Foreign Affairs made his reply. I am assured that strict orders have been given to all their agents, to recognize no persons as having authority other than Messrs. Wilbor, Herbemont and son, and they ask, if any proofs can ben afforded of the improper action of the police in the past that they will be furnished through this Legation.

After dilligent [sic] enquiry, the only persons whom I find styling

themselves vice consuls of the United States in this Kingdom, are two of its subjects in the island of Sardinia, appointed by Mr. Herbemont, Consul at Genoa, shortly after his arrival. I have given that consul strict orders to recognize these persons as such no longer. They are of no use, the United States having no trade with that island, and our citizens seldom or never visiting its ports.

I have the honour to transmit herewith the accounts of this Legation for the quarter ending the 31st. of March 1855, with the accompanying [sic] vouchers.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 23*

Turin, April 30, 1855

Sir: For the last three days this city has been the scene of great political excitement; and though the final event is yet uncertain, I do not deem it proper to let the present mail depart without giving you some notice of what is passing.

The cause of said excitement is the triumph of the clerical party in the Senate, and the consequent resignation of that Cavour ministry which has so long controlled the destinies of this country.

As I have before notified you, the great bill for the suppressing certain monasteries passed the Representative branch of Parliament without difficulty. The Church seems to have reserved its strength for the Senate. In that arena the Bishops conducted the contest with a degree of ability which astonished me. By a final and most masterly manoeuvre, which would require too much space for me to describe it here, at the close of the last week they completely checkmated the Ministry, and the bill was lost by a decided vote.

Mr. Cavour, and all the Ministry except General Durando the new minister of war, immediately resigned. General Durando having entered the Ministry long after the bill had been proposed, was not affected by its failure and therefore did not resign. The King has consequently called on him to form a new Cabinet. Up to the present time he has failed to do so, and no one regards his success as possible.

If the King was personally in favour of the contested measure there would still be a chance for success. On the failure of General Durando to form a cabinet he might call on Mr Cavour to resume his place, and

create a sufficient number of new Senators to carry the bill. But the liberal party do not anticipate such a result. They regard the King as lost to them. The deaths of his wife, mother and brother have, it is said, seriously affected the worthy monarch and distress having compelled him to seek the consolations of religion, he is now believed to be under priestly influences. The *Monitorium* of the Pope against the bill is supposed to weigh heavily on his mind. Hence it is believed that when Gen. Durando notifies him of his failure he will send for Revel or some other eminent Retrograde; and the Progressive party, which includes nearly all the nation except the Church and a part of the Aristocracy will for a time be thrown entirely out of power.

As may naturally be supposed, in such a crisis, the public mind is very much excited. There has been no considerable disturbance as yet, but it was thought necessary to post detachments of cavalry in the public squares on yesterday. The sympathizing students of the University have waited on Mr. Cavour with banners, etc. but on his expostulating with them, they returned quietly to their learned retreats.

Meantime the Sardinian troops are leaving Genoa with omens sufficiently unfavourable. A huge steamer, the *Croesus*, laden with their provisions, clothing, etc. was destroyed by fire within twelve miles of Genoa. The crew was saved but the important cargo entirely lost.

I have presented several small claims lately against the Government here for damages etc. on the part of American citizens travelling through this Kingdom which I have succeeded in settling satisfactorily, but have had no affairs to transact of sufficient importance to find a place in this Dispatch.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 24*

Turin, May 5, 1855

Sir: I had the honour to inform you of the ministerial crisis here in my Dispatch No. 23. That affair is now finished. After a week of confusion and agitation among the people and of labour among the retrograde politicians, the latter have declared themselves totally unable to form a ministry which would have the chance even of seven days existence. The King therefore as a matter of necessity has recalled Mr. Cavour and the former Ministry. The Convent Bill will be passed,

and this final struggle seems only to place beyond all doubt the impotence of retrogradists, and the unanimity of the Sardinian people in favour of their Constitution and existent system of politics

*John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy*

*Dispaccio n 25*

Turin, May 25, 1855

Sir. I have had the honour to receive by last night's mail your Dispatch No 12 dated at Washington on the 4th of May, enclosing the President's replies to the four letters addressed to him by the King of Sardinia upon the late deaths in the reigning family of this country. In accordance with your commands I have this morning taken the necessary steps for their delivery.<sup>36</sup>

One of these letters, I observe, relates to the birth of a prince known as the Duke of Genevois.<sup>37</sup> This child is already dead, having expired last week, aged five months. Yet another of the young princes has been for a long time ill and can scarcely recover. It is supposed indeed that all the members of the present royal family are unhealthy, and numerous as it is, that it may become extinct. Like all other reigning houses it has pursued for a long time, the custom of intermarrying with its own blood, and suffers from the well known and inevitable consequences.

The political drama which has absorbed the public attention of this country since my arrival in it has at last come to a close. The curtain has fallen over the prostrate form of the mother Church and the triumphant ministry. In short, the Convent Bill has passed. It has been much modified in the Senate and the extreme liberals appear to be almost as much dissatisfied with it now as the high Church party. The most essential difference is however only a question of time. The original bill suppressed all the monasteries which were not engaged in education or preaching without delay: the present bill operates in a greater number of years, but

<sup>36</sup> L'istruzione n 12, Washington, 5 (non 4) maggio 1855, era soltanto una trasmissione delle risposte del Presidente alle lettere di Vittorio Emanuele II che gli annunciava la nascita del duca del Genevese, la morte della regina madre e del duca di Genova

<sup>37</sup> Vittorio Emanuele Leopoldo, duca del Genevese, ultimo figlio di Vittorio Emanuele II, era nato l'8 gennaio. L'istruzione n 13, Washington, 29 settembre 1855, trasmetterà la risposta del Presidente alla lettera del Re che gli annunciava la morte del principe

quite as surely, and establishes the principle of the State's right to do as it pleases with these institutions beyond all question. The nation at large hails it with delight, for they regard the result as a victory over Rome. Indeed the Papacy did exert its fullest powers to prevent the passage of this bill in any form, and the issue of the struggle renders its political impotence evident to all eyes.

I have never seen a great parliamentary battle conducted with more obstinacy or greater ability. In the press and the tribune the fight was fair enough until the last two months. But when argument had been exhausted and the people had fully made known their wishes, it took the form of intrigue, and gave rise to scenes less dignified but much more amusing than the debates which preceded [sic] them. Orators, monks, ministers, Pope, King, bishops and women were all mixed together in a medley of scandal, gossip and mystery which was sufficiently exciting, but not well calculated to excite the reverence of the people for either spiritual pastors or temporal masters.

Commodore Stringham, the commander of the American Squadron in the Mediterranean, has sailed from Genoa for the United States, in his Flagship and accompanied by the *Levant*. The *Saranac* Capt Long still remains at the above-named port.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 26*

Turin, June 2, 1855

Sir: On yesterday I delivered into the hands of the King of this country the four letters lately addressed to him by the President, which he received with many courteous expressions of regard for that high officer and for the United States.

On the same day I was officially informed of a new change in the Ministry. Since the resignation of Gen. Dabormida the Cabinet has indeed been always in a provisional state, and it is only now definitively reconstructed. Mr. Cavour has ceased to be Minister of Foreign Affairs and has gone back to his old Department of Finance—retaining always the Presidency of the Council, or Premiership. Mr. Cibrario takes his place as Foreign Minister. This gentleman has managed to keep some place in all the various ministries that I have seen here. He was at one time Minister of Public Works; at another of Instruction; now he has the Foreign Office.

This change has no political significance. Mr. Cavour goes back to the Department of Finance because he is the most competent person to manage it and Mr. Cibrario undertakes that of Foreign Affairs because nobody is at hand better fitted for it.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 27*

Turin, July 10, 1855

Sir: I have the honour to enclose the account and vouchers, of this Legation for the quarter ending June 30th 1855.

Little affecting American interests has occurred here since my last. The internal condition of the country is good, politics are quiet, and the population as yet free from the cholera, which has again commenced its ravages in southern Italy, and in Lombardy. But the state of affairs in the Crimea creates great distress. Of the 15,000 splendid troops which Sardinia sent there upwards of 1,110 are already *dead*. Among these last are numbered General La Marmora, brother to the Commander in Chief, and many gallant, aspiring, amiable young gentlemen well known to society here. It renders their friends and relatives more melancholy to remember that they have lost their lives, not by the sword, but by that miserable disease the cholera.

It is currently rumoured in certain circles that a marriage between the King of this country and the English Princess Mary of Cambridge is a very probable event. He goes next month to the Exposition in Paris, and it is supposed that the other party is to be also there at the same time.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 28*

Turin, August 6, 1855

Sir: The late action of the Papal Court in relation to the Convent Bill past [sic] by the last Parliament produces a decided sensation in this country at the present time. In a late allocution, the Pope has formally announced, that with incredible anguish of mind, he is contrained to declare that « all those who have been engaged in proposing the said law, » (the Ministry) « or who have approved it » (the Parliament) « or who have sanctioned it » (the King) « and all who have recommended,

favoured, or assisted in its origin or execution, have incurred the Great Excommunication with all the accompanying [sic] ecclesiastical pains and penalties announced in the Holy Canons, by the Apostolic Constitutions and General Councils of the Catholic Church »

But the thunders of the Vatican no longer shake down governments; and beyond the momentary fluttering and talk, no effects are to be looked for in consequence of this movement. Excommunication no longer shuts up churches, or cuts off marriages or stops the priest in his funeral rites. Bishops and priests are in public action now at least as much under the control of profane governments as under the sacred rule of the Papacy.

Meanwhile the monks make no opposition to the seizure of their houses, and while loudly protesting against the law as sacrilegious, make haste to give in their names for the pensions it awards

The Sardinian troops in the Crimea continue to be in a bad sanitary condition. The public here look upon them as men sacrificed to the exigencies of State, and take no interest in the war.

The cholera ravages northern Italy, including a large portion of this Kingdom. It prevails in Genoa again. Travel is interrupted, and for sometime past I have seen no citizens of the United States here, nor have I anything bearing directly on our interests to communicate.

P S. I have received the Circular of the State Department relative to the abuse of the dispatch bags in the conveyance of private letters, not written by agents of the United States

I do not know that this circular refers to this Legation; but while acknowledging its receipt think it right to say, that never, even in a single instance, have I so forwarded any private letters save those written by myself, and stamped with the seal of this Legation.

I have been frequently requested by American citizens in Italy to forward their letters with my dispatches, but have uniformly refused, on the ground that I should so abuse the courtesy of the Government which permitted me to send my own correspondence by that means of conveyance

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 29*

Turin, Aug. 26, 1855

Sir: I have already stated that the English Government has sent General Percy to this country for the purpose of raising troops for the



Crimea.<sup>38</sup> Under the auspices of the British Minister, this General has established his headquarters at Novara, a town situated on the frontier, between the Austrian territory in Italy and the Sardinian Kingdom, celebrated as the scene of Charles Albert's overthrow in '49, and always regarded as the door between Piedmont and Lombardy. The amount of the enlistment has not been great. An abundance of officers have presented themselves but very few soldiers. The political results of the movement have however been so considerable that I deem them proper to be noticed here. The Austrian Government has made a double protest against it, one to the Government of Sardinia and the other to that of England. It declares that Sardinia, by its permission of the English headquarters at Novara, gives cause of offence to Austria and encourages desertion from its army in Lombardy, and signifies to England that it regards the location of its troops so near the frontier in the light of a menace. It does not seem likely that either government is disposed to pay much attention to these remonstrances, and it is the general opinion that the location of this army was intended to be precisely what Austria understands it to be, that is to say a menace. Having failed to inveigle that government into their war, the Allies are now inclined to employ a different mode of procedure. On the other hand, Austria has lately refused to grant passports to Lombards desiring to go into France. While noting these indications I will add that it is the general opinion of well informed persons here that the plan of the war will soon be changed. Little hope of doing the work in the Crimea now remains, and should the war be made in some other way it will be hardly possible for Austria to escape again.

The Piedmontese troops in the Crimea continue to fare badly. Three weeks ago 2,004 were dead, and 2,400 more were in the hospitals. Since then it has been officially announced that 600 had fallen in the battle of the 16th inst. The number under arms at the present time therefore must be less than 9,000 men. There is no disposition in Sardinia to furnish more.

<sup>38</sup> Verso la fine del luglio 1855, il governo inglese chiese ed ottenne il permesso di reclutare una legione di volontari negli Stati sardi che fu conosciuta come Legione Anglo-Italiana. La legione fu organizzata dal col Percy e, per la parte italiana, da Ignazio Ribotti di Molières.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 30*

Turin, October 1, 1855

Sir: I have to ask your attention to a case gravely involving the rights of nationality.

Giacomo Zanoni, native of this country, after fulfilling all the requirements of our laws, was duly naturalized a citizen of the United States on the 7th of June 1852. In the past month of May he returned to Sardinia on a visit to his parents, and not having performed military service previously to his original departure, he has been impressed into the royal army.

I have represented his quality of American citizen to the Government, and claimed his exemption from military duty; but I regret to say that my reclamations have been ineffectual.

Your Excellency will be best informed on the details of the case by a perusal of the correspondence appended to this dispatch, consisting of the following pieces: 1st a letter from the undersigned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, relating the circumstances and requesting the interposition of the Government; 2d a reply from the Minister, declining to comply with my request and claiming the service of Zanoni on several grounds; 3d the rejoinder of the undersigned stating at some length the reasons on which the right of Sardinia to the said service is denied and protesting in form against the action of her authorities.

And being unable to change the determination of the royal Ministry, I now refer the case to your Excellency for the decision of my own Government.

***John M. Daniel a Luigi Cibrario***<sup>39</sup>

Turin, Sept. 15, 1855

Sir: It becomes my duty to ask your Excellency's attention to a more important case, seriously involving the rights of a large class of American citizens, which I hope will be treated in the spirit of equity and amity that has characterized the transactions between the Governments of Sardinia and the United States. A brief relation of facts will best explain the stress which I place upon the affair.

<sup>39</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 30 di Daniel.

Giacomo Zanoni, a native of this Kingdom, left it at the age of thirteen, and settled in the state of Tennessee. When he attained the years of discretion, he took the proper steps to be legally naturalized as a citizen of the United States. These steps were completed on the 9th of July 1852, when the Certificate of Naturalization was duly granted under the seal of the United States by its Court of Common Law and Chancery at the city of Memphis in the aforesaid state of Tennessee. From that date, Zanoni has been, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, a citizen, enjoying all the rights and privileges of other citizens. He continued to reside in his country until the spring of the present year when he came to Sardinia for the purpose of paying a brief visit to his mother, still living near Borzonasca (*sopra la Croce*) in this Kingdom. But no sooner had his arrival there become known, than he was told by the local authorities that he must enter the Sardinian army, or provide a substitute to do military duty for him. Zanoni had taken the precaution to come provided with the papers legally certifying his character as a citizen of the United States; he had also his passport, granted at Washington, signed by the Secretary of State, and duly certified by the Sardinian Consulate at Paris. The authorities however refused to view him in any other light than that of a Sardinian subject; and as such directed him to be present at Chiavari on the 16th day of this month, to comply with their demands, under the penalties of the Sardinian law in case of disobedience.

I pray your Excellency to observe that the action of the local Sardinian authorities in this case is a practical denial of the right of the United States to naturalize a man born in another country and of a human being to change his political allegiance. Such a right has always been claimed and practiced by the United States; and that privilege has again and again been distinctly admitted by most of the European powers—by England, by France and even by Austria. If it has ever been denied by the chiefs of the Sardinian Government, I am ignorant of the fact.

The place of birth, where in the tenderness of infancy protection is given, does decide to what government the correlative duty of allegiance is due. But it seems quite obsolete to deny, when manhood is attained, and infancy passed, a human being may not of his own will, in the pursuit of happiness, change his allegiance, by leaving the country of his birth and adopting another which he may prefer, when accompanying [sic] the transaction by solemn acts relieving his native government of the duty of protection and transferring that burden to the other.

I do not apprehend that your Excellency will deny this position,

and the papers which I have in my hands abundantly prove that Zanoni has conformed to our laws in his steps to obtain the quality of an American citizen. If he is a citizen of the United States he cannot also be a subject of Sardinia. If he owes allegiance to the first, he cannot owe military duty to the second.

I am therefore compelled to conclude that the local Sardinian authorities have been mistaken in their views of this case, and I beg the intervention of your Excellency to prevent the injustice which they contemplate. Owing to the late date at which this affair was brought to my notice, it is possible that the injustice may be done before that intervention can take effect, and that Zanoni will have been already drafted in the army or forced to pay for a substitute. If such should be the fact, I trust that the wrong will be promptly repaid.

I hold in my hands the legal papers certifying Zanoni's naturalization; also his passport granted at Washington and duly recognized by the Sardinian consulates at Paris and Marseilles, under whose protection he ventured to visit this Kingdom. They are at the service of your Excellency should you desire to inspect them.

*Luigi Cibrario a John M. Daniel*<sup>40</sup>

Turin, le 24 Septembre 1855

Monsieur le Ministre.

Par votre office du 15. de ce mois vous avez bien voulu me présenter des observations touchant les procédés des Autorités Royales envers un Sieur Zanoni Jacques né dans les Etats Sardes, qui étant dernièrement revenu dans ce pays, s'est vu obligé de satisfaire à la loi sur le recrutement, malgré qu'il ait obtenu la naturalisation aux Etats Unis, en se conformant pour cela aux prescriptions des lois Américaines. Vous m'avez en même temps prié d'interposer mes bons offices pour que le dit Zanoni soit délivré de toute contrainte relativement au service militaire dans les Etats du Roi.

Déférant au désir que vous m'avez exprimé, j'ai examiné cette réclamation avec une attention particulière mais je n'ai pas tardé à reconnaître d'après l'exposé même que vous me faites de la position du Sr. Zanoni,

<sup>40</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 30 di Daniel. Questo originale si trova negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 8, vol. 7, pp. 327-330.

que la conduite des Autorités Sardes à son égard est pleinement justifiée en présence des dispositions de nos lois

En effet, Monsieur le Ministre, votre office précité fait connaître l'âge de 13 ans chez ses parents, dont la nationalité Sarde n'est pas mise en doute; qu'il est ensuite allé s'établir dans l'Etat de Tennessee, et qu'il y a obtenu le 9 Juillet 1852 un certificat régulier de naturalisation délivré par l'Autorité Compétente de la ville de Memphis dans l'Etat de Tennessee.

Mais il ne résulte aucunement que le Sieur Zanoni ait sollicité ni obtenu l'autorisation préalable du Gouvernement Sarde pour se faire naturaliser aux Etats Unis, et, à défaut de cette autorisation, les lois de la Sardaigne le considèrent comme déchu, par le fait de sa naturalisation à l'étranger, de la jouissance des droits civils inhérents à la qualité de sujet Sarde, mais non pas délié de ses devoirs envers le pays qui l'a vu naître.

Au nombre de ces devoirs, est celui de satisfaire à la loi sur le recrutement, et le Sr. Zanoni, qui est, et qui doit être considéré malgré sa naturalisation en Amérique, comme tenu de remplir tous les devoirs attachés à sa qualité antérieure de sujet Sarde, ne saurait se dispenser de remplir personnellement ceux de la conscription militaire autrement que par les moyens qu'indiquent les lois et les règlements sur la matière.

Permettez — moi d'ajouter, Monsieur le Ministre, qu'en soumettant le Sr. Zanoni à ses lois, le Gouv<sup>t</sup> du Roi n'entend nullement mettre obstacle à l'exercice du droit des Etats Unis d'accorder la naturalisation à un individu né en pays étranger.

Seulement, pour ce qui concerne les effets de cette naturalisation, hors du territoire Américain, et en l'absence de stipulations internationales à ce sujet, le Gouvernement Sarde ne pense pas que cette naturalisation, obtenue sans que l'individu qui la reçoit ait été préalablement et régulièrement délié de ses liens originels et incontestables de sujétion envers sa patrie d'origine, puisse exempter cet individu des obligations que les lois de son pays natal lui imposaient, s'il rentre dans ce pays sans avoir régularisé sa position vis-à-vis de ces lois qui conservent envers lui toute leur force.

Je ne m'arrêterai pas aux exemples que vous citez de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Autriche, bien que je pense pouvoir me permettre de douter que les Gouvernemens de ces pays considèrent leurs sujets respectifs comme délivrés de tout devoir de sujet envers la mère patrie par le *seul* fait de la naturalisation aux Etats Unis. Les lois de la Sardaigne s'op-

posant, à ce qu'il me paraît, incontestablement à l'accueil de la réclamation du Sr. Zanoni, il ne me reste qu'à vous exprimer le regret, Monsieur le Ministre, de n'être pas à même de seconder le désir que vous m'avez témoigné à cet égard

Au surplus la loi sur le recrutement (du 20. Mars 1854.) a prévu le cas de contestation de cette nature et a prescrit, (Art. 14.) que les questions de nationalité qui surgissent à l'occasion de la levée militaire soient déferées aux Tribunaux Civils; conséquemment si le Sr. Zanoni croyait devoir persister dans sa réclamation, il devrait la porter devant les Tribunaux ordinaires à qui il appartient, d'après l'Article précité, de la juger en dernier ressort.

Agréez je vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***John M. Daniel a Luigi Cibrario***<sup>41</sup>

Turin, Sept. 29, 1855

Sir: I have received the reply you have thought proper to make in the case of Giacomo Zanoni, and I regret to perceive that your conclusions are widely different from my own.

While distinctly admitting his American citizenship, the Sardinian authorities violate in the person of this man the rights secured by our Constitution, by our treaties and by our laws, to every citizen of the United States. They compel him to do a military duty to them; while the United States does not admit that its citizens can owe such service to any foreign power. Nor can I regard the position assumed by your Excellency in defence of the act as either satisfactory or admissible. While declaring that Zanoni has lost all the privileges of a Sardinian subject by his naturalization in America, you still hold him bound to perform the tasks by which those privileges are compensated. This distinction does not seem to your present correspondent a possibility; for the protection which a State is bound to give its citizen and the service which that citizen is bound to render his State are reciprocal and inseparable duties; the one implies the other; and when a State refuses the first it necessarily surrenders the second.

<sup>41</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 30 di Daniel

With regard to the attitude maintained at present by some other countries, as to which Your Excellency expresses an opinion different from my own, I can only say—that the principle for which I contend was recognized in the correspondence between the authorities of Austria and the United States relative to Martin Koszta: — that in France as I have been informed by an authority which I cannot doubt, in cases similar to the present the naturalization of the United States has been recognized as a bar to all claims of allegiance on the part of the mother country; — and as to Great Britain, though I am aware that Government in former times claimed the right to impress into her naval service persons born British subjects who had been naturalized in the United States, yet since the issue which arose between the two countries on that point in 1812-14, that right has ceased to be exercised or asserted.

I am not unobservant of the fact that your Excellency lays little stress on the custom and practice of other States, and relies upon what is deemed to be the present disposition of the Sardinian laws. I have referred to them, only in support of the opinion which I held and still hold, that the principle on which this American citizen has been deprived of his liberty is obsolete in the practice of nations. But since you have based your defence on local regulations, I beg leave to call your attention to the fact that the treaty between the United States and Sardinia declares that when our citizens enter or sojourn in your territory they shall enjoy security and protection so long as they commit no offences against the laws. Zanoni is a citizen of the United States in the fullest sense of the word and as such is entitled to the same privileges when coming on Sardinian soil as any other American citizen can have here.

Your Excellency has been pleased to state with emphasis that the King's Government has in no wise the intention to contest the right of the United States to naturalize a man born in foreign parts or to place obstacles in the way of its exercise. But when you go so far as to force a citizen so naturalized into the ranks of your army and claim from him the highest and most burdensome service that a State can claim from any subject, it is deemed that you do practically nullify that right and render its exercise impossible. When a man receives the naturalization of the United States that Government promises in return for his allegiance all the privileges possessed by persons born on its soil. One of those privileges is an exemption from duty and service towards foreign governments. But when a foreign government claims from the man to whom that promise has been made his life and labour as a soldier, if able to enforce the demand, it renders the naturalization, so far null and void, and

asserts a pretension which I am convinced the Government of the United States will never concede.

I have therefore to protest against the action of the Sardinian authorities in this case, and having done so, shall refer the subject to the consideration of my own Government.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 31*

Turin, Oct. 14, 1855

Sir: On the 7th of Sept. I received a note signed by Gaspare Belcredi<sup>42</sup> dated at Arona, stating that he had been arrested at that place without having committed any violation of the laws, and without being informed of his offence. He accompanied his letter by his passport, granted by the Secretary of the United States Legation at Paris, and by a certificate from a magistrate at Arona stating that he had been guiltless of any known crime while in that town. I addressed myself without delay to the Minister of Foreign Affairs demanding the cause of this person's imprisonment, and his release if not an offender against the laws. Several days elapsed before I received an answer—a delay caused as I was informed by the necessary investigation of the case—during which Belcredi exhibited much impatience. Finally I received from the Foreign Office a statement, that the Minister had in his hands proofs that Belcredi was an agent of Mazzini; that he had come into Piedmont for purposes calculated to disturb its tranquillity; that he had already been turned out of Switzerland for the same causes, and that he had been formally forbidden to enter the Kingdom of Sardinia, that he had already been once turned back on the frontier, and that he had finally gotten in by eluding the vigilance of the police. But nevertheless in consideration of his claim on American protection he should be set at liberty unharmed provided I would give the assurance that in two days he would quit this country.

I declined giving any such assurance, on the ground that I had no control or right to control the man's actions; but that I would communicate the proposition to Belcredi and he might accept it or not as he pleased. I did so, he accepted it; and was set at liberty. He went to Paris, whence I received several letters from him couched in very injudi-

<sup>42</sup> Gaspare Belcredi era stato implicato nei processi contro la *Giovine Italia* ed era riuscito a sfuggire l'arresto. Legatissimo a Mazzini lo assisterà sul letto di morte come medico.



cious terms, demanding that I should apply to the Government here for a removal of the interdict to return into Piedmont. Such a demand I do not, as present advised, feel justified in making. Every government I presume has a right to refuse a foreigner whose presence they deem dangerous to their tranquillity a residence on its soil—police laws, being founded on the right of self-preservation, necessarily over-riding all others, —and the authorities here having already adjudged his case it would be useless for me to hope for an alteration of their resolve by an unsupported request.

But as the said Belcredi is, I understand, disposed, on this account, to bring the grave charge of neglect against your representative here, and as in that case incorrect statements of his affair might possibly reach the State Department I have thought it best to give this brief account, and to enclose all the papers relating to it, from which the full details if desired may be quickly gathered.

Belcredi I believe was never in prison. He was simply detained at the hotel in Arona under the guard of a policeman while the correspondence was going on, and not subjected to any personal ill-treatment that I have ever heard of, beyond the fact of detention.

***Gaspare Belcredi a John M. Daniel*<sup>43</sup>**

Arona, 5th Sept. 1855 [*Traduzione*]

Sir: The undersigned, a native of Lombardy and exiled since the year 1833, is guilty of no other crime than that of having loved and still loving his native country. He is a citizen of America and consequently is fortified by an American passport in exact order. He has been in Piedmont many times, and as he has always respected the laws wherever his interests required him to travel, nobody has ever opposed his movements till yesterday when he was, without cause, arrested by the carabinieri at Arona; and up to the present moment he has neither been able to learn the reason of it nor what they want with him.

The undersigned has recourse as an American to your puissant protection, and prays that you will interest yourself in his behalf so that he may be set at liberty as speedily as possible. And thanking you, Minister, I have the honour &c.

<sup>43</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel Poiché non è stato possibile reperire l'originale, si dà la traduzione inviata a Washington dal Daniel

P. S. The writer has lived in Arona for more than a month and obtained a license to hunt in Piedmont. How can they arrest an honest man to whom they have granted permission to carry a gun and go to the chase? O! holy Liberty.

***John M. Daniel a Luigi Cibrario***<sup>44</sup>

Turin, September 8, 1855

Sir: I have been informed by Gaspare Belcredi an American citizen that he has been arrested at Arona by the authorities of Sardinia, and is now deprived of his liberty without being even informed of what offence he is supposed to have been guilty. He declares that neither in act, word or intention has he offended against the laws of this country, and in confirmation of his statement he has forwarded to me certificates of the Mayor and the Judge of the Peace at Arona which I send with this note. Having also received from him the proofs of his citizenship and consequently of his right to the protection of the United States, it becomes my duty to ask of your Excellency the reasons of his imprisonment, the charges made against him, and the proofs of those charges, if any there be.

Hoping that your Excellency will inform me at the earliest moment.

***Gaspare Belcredi a John M. Daniel***<sup>45</sup>

[Arona], le 11 Septembre 1855

Monsieur le Ministre,

C'est bien une chose incompréhensible pour moi de n'avoir pas encore été mis en liberté après six jours de détention, et plus encore de n'avoir aucune réponse. Toujours arrêté, ne connaissant pas le crime ou le délit, dont l'on m'accuse, je suis sous le poids d'une mortelle ennui et je perds un temps précieux pour mes intérêts, forcément arrêtés et endommagés pour la perte de ma liberté.

<sup>44</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel

<sup>45</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel. Questo originale si trova negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 8, vol. 7, pp. 306-307.

Il me semble que Vous Mr. le Ministre, à la vue de mon passeport régulier et appuyé aussi à un attestat de ma moralité et de ma parfaite innocence du syndic et du juge de Arona, auriez du à cette heure faire luire sur moi la splendeur de nos bonnes étoiles Américaines, et avoir obtenu pour le moins ma mise en liberté.

Je Vous prie donc de me renvoyer mon passeport; come Vous avez donné votre parole de faire à Mr. Gerelli, l'ami qui est venu appositément se rendre garant pour moi à Turin.

J'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Ministre, d'être avec toute considération,  
Votre Concitoyen

***John M. Daniel a Gaspare Belcredi***<sup>46</sup>

Turin, Sept. 11, 1855

Sir: I have received your note dated the 11th inst. and have to inform you that the impatience you exhibit towards myself is very ill-placed. All the steps which could have been taken in your favour were made by me on the first hearing of your case; and had you applied here before seeking protection elsewhere you would have had it earlier.

I cannot prevent the delays incident on the investigation of your case; but if no offence against the laws can be proven to have been committed, it may with safety be affirmed, that justice shall be done to you.

As to your passport, you sent it here of your own accord, and when you send some person to receive it, it is always at his service.

***Luigi Cibrario a John M. Daniel***<sup>47</sup>

Turin, 12 Septembre 1855

Monsieur le Ministre, Il résultait depuis longtemps et d'une manière très positive au Government du Roi que le Sieur Belcredi arrêté dernièrement et détenu à Arona est un des agents les plus actifs de Mazzini.

<sup>46</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel.

<sup>47</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel. Questo originale si trova negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie 8, vol 7, pp 309-311.

Expulsé à cause de ses menées révolutionnaires du territoire Suisse par une ordonnance du Conseil Fédéral, ce n'est qu'en éludant la vigilance de la police qu'il a pu traverser, pour se rendre en Piémont, le Canton du Tessin, dont il avait été déjà éloigné une fois et dont l'entrée lui était nommément et formellement interdite.

De récentes informations, sur l'exactitude desquelles on ne pourrait avoir de doute, ont non seulement confirmé ce qu'on avait appris de ses antécédents, mais fait connaître au Gouvernement que cet individu est venu en Piémont porteur d'instructions de Mazzini pour ses affiliés

Les certificats qu'il a pu se procurer et que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer, Monsieur le Ministre, par votre note du 8 courant, ne peuvent témoigner d'autre chose en sa faveur, si ce n'est que pendant son séjour à Arona il ne s'est point rendu coupable de délits communs, car ni le Syndic ni le Juge de paix n'ont la mission ni les moyens de s'occuper de la conduite politique, dont la surveillance et l'appréciation sont confiés à un officier spécial, le Délégué de sûreté publique.

J'espère, Monsieur le Ministre, que dans ces circonstances et dans ces renseignements vous puiserez la conviction, que l'arrestation du Sieur Belcredi a eu lieu pour des motifs plus que suffisants, et qu'il est du devoir du Gouvernement du Roi de ne pas permettre le séjour sur le territoire sarde à un individu dangereux pour la tranquillité de notre pays et plus encore pour les Etats voisins.

Cependant Mr. le Ministre de l'Intérieur à qui j'ai communiqué la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser, se disposerait par égard de sa qualité de Citoyen des Etats Unis à ordonner la mise en liberté du Sieur Belcredi aussitôt qu'on recevrait de vous l'assurance qu'il sortira des Etats Sardes dans le terme de deux jours, et à condition que le passeport dont il est muni soit remis au Gouvernement, qui l'expédiera à la frontière par où il déclarera vouloir sortir et lui fera tenir en échange une feuille de route obligatoire.

En attendant de votre complaisance une réponse qui mette à même le Ministre de l'Intérieur de donner les dispositions nécessaires, je saisis avec plaisir l'occasion de vous renouveler, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée

**John M. Daniel a Luigi Cibrario**<sup>48</sup>

Turin, Sept 15, 1855.

Sir While acknowledging your favour of the 12th inst., I have to decline giving pledges as to the future actions of Belcredi. I am cognizant of his case simply as that of a man claiming to be an American citizen who has been deprived of his liberty without being charged with any *offence* against the laws of this country. If your Excellency deems him to be a person dangerous to the safety of the State, I do not question your right to deny him a residence in it; but while I have no doubt that he will be exceedingly willing to avail himself of your permission to depart, I can do no more than communicate your Excellency's proposition to him, and inform you of his engagement to obey. His passport shall be then duly delivered into the proper hands

**John M. Daniel a Gaspare Belcredi**<sup>49</sup>

Turin, Sept 12, 1855

Sir The Minister of Foreign Affairs has this day informed me that he has in his hands proofs that you are, (to his own words) « an agent of Mazzini », that you have come into Piedmont for purposes which would be, if carried into effect, violations of her laws and which would embroil her with other powers.

In consideration of your quality of American citizen he has, however, agreed that nothing shall be further done in the case, provided I shall pledge myself that you will leave Piedmont within two days after you shall be set at liberty. Before giving this promise, it will be necessary for me to hear whether you are disposed to comply with it.

If you declare yourself ready to quit Piedmont *within two days*, I will communicate your assurance to the Minister, and your passport will be remitted to you on the frontier

<sup>48</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel

<sup>49</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel

[Arona], le 16 Sept. 1855

Monsieur le Ministre des Etats Unis d'Amérique, Mes intérêts me forcent d'accepter de sortir des Etats Sardes à la condition que l'on me *force* d'accepter.

I consequently declare to You, Sir, that I will leave Piedmont within two days after my liberty.

J'ai été, Monsieur, et je m'honore d'être encore l'ami de Mr. Mazzini, frère chéri du Christ, que les pharisiens ont poursuivi, abreuvé de fiel, et pendu: mais je n'ai jamais été son agent pour violer les lois d'aucun état Il y-a à peu près trois ans, Mr. le Ministre (je Vous le jure sur la Bible et sur la tête de mes enfants), dès que je n'ai ni écrit, ni parlé, ni vu Mr. Mazzini, duquel j'ignore même le domicile.

Si mes intérêts ne me talonnaient pas, je Vous assure que j'aimerais beaucoup Vous faire voir en restant arrêté tout le temps nécessaire pour prouver mon innocence, la qualité et la force des preuves que Mr. le Ministre de Piémont dit avoir dans ses mains et pour lesquelles on arrête ou persecute un honnête homme qui n'attendait qu'à ses intérêts particuliers: mais malheureusement ces mêmes intérêts, déjà de trop endommagés, réclament ma prompte liberté. donc je suis forcé d'accepter et de sortir.

Du reste, Mr. le Ministre, s'il y ait eu quelqu'un en Piémont qui tâchait de bouleverser les lois, il faut qu'il y a eu un autre qui portait mon nom et mes titres; car et pour le vrai, serais-je juste moi si parce que j'ai entendu maintes fois mon ami Mr. Mazzini nommer certain Mr. Avvocato Rattazzi (et bien d'autres aussi) comme un des ses amis en Piémont; serais-je juste si je disais que Mr. le Ministre de l'Intérieur est *Un Mazzimano* et principalement si e donnais à ce nom le sens de désordre et d'anarchie que les polices se complaisent tant de lui donner?? ... Mais c'est trop inutile de parler raison à la force. Il ne me reste donc M. le Ministre, que de Vous faire les plus vifs remerciements pour les peines que Vous vous-êtes données pour moi, en vous assurant que je sens dans mon coeur tout ce que je dois au Représentant de ma seconde Patrie, l'heureuse et libre Amérique.

Ce sentiment néanmoins reveille une douleur bien âpre dans mon âme; car il me fait penser à mes pauvres confrères d'exile, qui n'ont pas

<sup>50</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 31 di Daniel Questo originale si trova negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie 8, vol. 7, pp 320-322

le bonheur de se pouvoir dire Américains, et qui tombent sous la justice arbitraire des polices fondée sur les rapports du soupçon et de l'espionnage salarié... Oh! que le Bon Dieu fasse, que les Etoiles des Etats Unis puissent répandre leur lumière sur ma pauvre Italie!! et en Vous renouvelant, Mr. le Ministre, mes plus vifs sentiments de reconnaissance et d'estime j'ai l'honneur de Vous dire *Farewell*, et d'être pour toujours Votre très humble et affectionné Serviteur

***John M. Daniel a Gaspare Belcredi***<sup>51</sup>

Turin, Sept. 17, 1855

Sir. I have this morning received your note dated the 16th, and I have transmitted your promise to the Ministry Your passport according to the convention is now in the hands of the Ministry to be transmitted to you on the frontier by their agents. If in violation of their promise they fail to do so, *you will immediately inform me of the fact.*

I regret the annoyance and unjust suspicions to which you have been subject in Piedmont, and I have the honour to be

***Gaspare Belcredi a John M. Daniel***<sup>52</sup>

Paris, Sept. 25, 1855 [Traduzione]

The Minister Resident of the United States: The first use that I make of my liberty *is to protest with all the force of my soul* against my arbitrary and unjust detention in Piedmont, against my expulsion from the Piedmont, against my expulsion from the Sardinian States, and against the interdict to reenter them.

Whoever, Mr. Minister, if it be the King himself, that says any proof of culpability in my part exists, has lied and does lie impudently.

I demand therefore that you require the proofs of what has been

<sup>51</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel

<sup>52</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 31 di Daniel Poiché non si è potuto reperire l'originale, si dà la traduzione inviata a Washington dal Daniel.

Vi sono altre innumerevoli note in questa corrispondenza che sono state omesse perché inutili ripetizioni dei documenti che pubblichiamo. Tutti questi documenti si trovano con i dispacci di Daniel

said about my culpability, and I am very sure that you will find them nothing but the calumny of espionage. I am certain that you the Representative of the United States where Piedmontese are not arbitrarily imprisoned, will cause justice to be done a citizen of America

After a certain time, if my innocence is not recognized and the permission to re-enter Piedmont granted, it is my intention, Mr. Minister, to print my history and to accuse in public through the medium of the press those who have caused me to be arrested, detained, and expelled from Piedmont like a thief without proof of crime and without telling me the motive of all this injustice.

**John M. Daniel & William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio senza numero*

Turin, Oct. 17, 1855

My dear Sir: I sent you a week ago the correspondence between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself relative to Giacomo Zanoni, which you have without doubt received.

Since then I have obtained a piece of information which I feel it my duty to call your attention.

It appears that in the box of books last despatched to your legations there is a copy of Wheaton's International Law, purchased for distribution by act of Congress. This box has not yet reached me, but one of my colleagues, who has received it, writes me word that in Note A page 138 of the book above mentioned the following passage occurs, being an extract from a manuscript dispatch from Mr. Wheaton<sup>53</sup> to J. P. Knocke of July 24, 1840.

« A naturalized citizen of the United States on his return to the country of his origin cannot claim the interposition of the American Legation against the performance of the duties imposed on him as a native subject by the sovereign whose allegiance he has renounced. Had you remained in the United States or visited any other foreign country except your native country on your lawful business you would have been protected by the American authorities at home and abroad in the enjoyment of your rights and privileges as a naturalized citizen of the United States. But having returned to the country of your birth, your native domicile and national character revert so long as you remain in the Prussian dominions and you

<sup>53</sup> Su Henry Wheaton, vedi la n 8, a p 104 del vol I.



are bound in all respects to obey the laws exactly as if you had never emigrated. »

This passage has surprized me very much and would seem, if recognized as law by the Department to govern the case of Zanoni. Had my box of books reached me or had I in any manner known that an authority so high as Mr. Wheaton was opposed to my views I should certainly have hesitated before taking the ground which I did take in the case. I should have *hesitated*; because my own humble understanding leads me to a different conclusion. For when the United States naturalizes a foreigner, it does not, so far as I know, warn him of any exception to the general and implied promise of protection which he receives in return for his allegiance; and if it deserts him afterwards under any circumstances, it would seem to me an act incompatible with the justice and dignity of the nation. That foreign governments should take the view of Mr. Wheaton and seek to enforce it does not surprize me. It is a logical view for them to take. But our duties and principles render a contrary conclusion equally logical for us; and the natural result is one of those conflicts of law and right which must always remain an issue, unless settled by the retreat and surrender of one party or the other. Mr. Wheaton, it appears, thinks that it should be the United States who ought to cede the ground; but as the larger and more generous view of the rights and privileges of human beings is on our side, I cannot conscientiously agree with him.

### ***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 32*

Turin, Oct. 19, 1855

Sir: I have the honour to enclose the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending on the 30th of September 1855.

Also a packet received from the naval Storekeeper at Spezia, sent to me with a note stating that you wished it forwarded [sic] through this Legation

I take the opportunity to append a letter received from certain captains of American vessels now in the port of Cagliari (Island of Sardinia) setting forth the difficulties which, it is said, they encounter at present because there is no American consul or agent at that port, and petitioning for the appointment of one.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Effettivamente, secondo l'elenco del personale del Dipartimento di Stato, a Cagliari è esistito un agente consolare dal 1802 al 1810 e un console dal 1812 al 1825

***Abel Sawyer a John M. Daniel***<sup>55</sup>

Cagliari, 10th October 1855

Sir : The absence of a consul, or consular agent at this port representing the United States, places our vessels in a disagreeably anomalous position with the local authorities. These claim the representation of all nations not having consuls, or consular agents in the place, and persevere in requesting our delivering up our ships' papers to them, whilst we, the undersigned, have hitherto refused to yield to such a request, considering them both unsupported by any government regulation, and inconsistent with our duty.

However, to prevent any misunderstanding and more particularly so, as this port will probably be much frequented in future by vessels from our country for loading salt, provided they meet with quicker despatch than is experienced at present, it is desirable that the question at issue be set at rest.

We, the undersigned, beg leave also to say that Messrs. Josias Pernis & Sons are the only people in this place that speak English, or that do business for the American ships, and we should beg to recommend them to your notice as suitable men for commercial agents.

Ship *Seroto*, Abel Sawyer  
Ship *S G Hyde*, Anthony Snow  
Ship *Samaritan*, Joseph Small  
Bark *Mount Vernon*, N. Lesseps.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 33*

Turin, Oct. 27, 1855

Sir: It is proper to inform you that, in my belief, the close alliance between this country and the powers leagued against Russia has produced an essential change in its political tone and character. It was formerly rather timid and cautious in foreign policy, but exceedingly liberal in

nella persona di François de Navoni. Alla sua morte, avvenuta il 22 febbraio 1825, Fortunato Corvegna fu nominato viceconsole e occupò quel posto solo fino all'aprile dello stesso anno. L'agente consolare successivo fu Eugène Pernis nominato il 10 marzo 1863.

<sup>55</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 32 di Daniel

domestic management. It has now become arrogant towards weaker states and careless of offending all others except France and England. The first of these observations is singularly illustrated by a difficulty now existing between Sardinia and Tuscany—an affair the more especially deserving your attention from a piece of past history which I shall presently bring to your recollection.

Some months past, the Sardinian Government sent to Tuscany as attaché to its Legation at Florence a Mr. Casati,<sup>56</sup> whose name was most prominently connected with the Revolution of Lombardy in 1848—his father having been the chief of the Provisional Government. The Tuscan Government after some vacillation refused to receive this *attaché*, on the ground (as I understand) that his reception would produce difficulties with Austria. At this refusal the Sardinian Government has taken the greatest offence, and has even gone so far as to withdraw its minister from the Court of Florence. Attempts have been made by other legations at that Court to reconcile the parties, but they have failed and it is now definitely understood that the Sardinian Minister will not return there.

Your Excellency will recollect that in the year 1853, the President of the United States appointed Mr. Felix Foresti to be Consul at Genoa. The said Foresti some twenty years before had been connected with the politics of Lombardy and had incurred the displeasure of the Austrian Government. The Sardinian Government therefore refused to receive Mr. Foresti as an American Consul, and although the most temperate and earnest explanations were given by the American Government, persisted in that refusal, on the ground that the reception of Mr. Foresti would embroil it with Austria. This case seems to your correspondent a precise parallel with that of Casati and the Tuscan Government with the exception, that the Sardinian Government has seen fit to take offence at what the Government of the United States submitted. It will not permit its own rule to be applied in its own case.

It is my opinion that two years ago a much more moderate course would have been pursued had this case then occurred. But while subservient to France and England it has now become so confident of their support that temperance and forbearance has ceased to be part of its

<sup>56</sup> Antonio Casati (1828-1857), figlio di Gabrio Casati. Dopo aver combattuto nella guerra del 1848, entrò in servizio al ministero degli esteri sardo. Fu un fedele seguace di Cavour al quale dedicò il suo volume *Milano e i principi di Casa Savoia* (1853). Nel 1854 segretario della Legazione sarda a Costantinopoli, fu poi trasferito a Firenze, ma il Granduca si rifiutò di riceverlo. Ciò diede origine al conflitto diplomatico cui accenna il Daniel. In seguito fu inviato a Parigi e, infine, a Madrid dove morì poco dopo il suo arrivo.

policy. Sardinia is now embroiled with every other Italian state. The Papal Nuncio has been withdrawn from Turin, and the Sardinian Legation from Rome; it has sent away the Neapolitan Consul from Genoa and is consequently at issue with the King of the Two Sicilies. A Neapolitan *Chargé* still remains in this city, but (it is said) has no further communications with the Government than necessary. With Austria it has a fresh dispute growing out of the Convent Bill. Some of the monasteries suppressed in this country having been possessed of property in Lombardy, Austria took possession of it when its original owners ceased to exist. Of this course Sardinia complains and the difficulty is not yet adjusted.

On the other hand the alliance with France and England becomes every day more compact, and if things pursue their present course much longer, Sardinia should cease to be considered more independent of those countries than Tuscany is of Austria.

Though notoriously loth to enter upon the war, it now accedes to all the demands of the above-named powers and adopts their style and tone in all its dealings with foreign nations. The original contingent of troops, which was guardedly and unwillingly furnished, having been pretty well broken up by disease and the casualties of the campaign, it has been restored without a murmur, and new thousands are at this hour in course of embarkation at Genoa on English vessels. The influence of France over the internal police of the country will be best illustrated by one little incident retailed by the journals of the day. A country correspondent of a newspaper in a neighboring town gave place to the following paragraph in his letter:

« Your know, and you have related, that an attempt (farce!) was made on the life of Bonaparte a fortnight ago. But you do not know that, on the same day, and at the same hour, we killed a fine bear in the forest of St. Ujon. It was a superb beast. The curious coincidence alone causes me to revert to an affair already passed into the domain of ancient history »

For the publication of this unmeaning paragraph, the newspaper has been cited, on the demand of the French Minister here, before the tribunals, and will beyond question be punished with heavy fines and imprisonment.

In truth the liberty of the press, which was one of its most marked characteristics, has pretty well ceased to exist in Sardinia.

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 14*     Department of State, Washington, October 30, 1855

Sir: Your despatches to No. 30, inclusive, have been received. Cases similar to that of Giacomo Zanoni have frequently occurred in countries from which emigrants to the United States are much more numerous than they are from Sardinia. The accompanying extracts, one from an instruction of Mr. Everett to Mr. Barnard,<sup>57</sup> United States Minister to Berlin, of the 14th of January, 1853, and the other from one of mine to Mr. Jackson,<sup>58</sup> our Minister at Vienna, of the 10th of January 1854, will apprise you of the views of the government upon the subject.

The general principle is that the naturalization of a foreigner does not exempt him from the effect of contracts entered into or penalties incurred in his native country prior to his naturalization, whenever he may of his own accord revisit that country. Still it is our duty to see that the claim of the foreign government is well founded, and if it should prove to be otherwise, to demand amends for any act of oppression which may have been inflicted upon the adopted citizen in consequence of its assertion. Although the views which you have expressed in your notes to the Sardinian Minister for Foreign Affairs relative to the case of Zanoni do not precisely accord with the instructions above adverted to, it is not deemed necessary that you should at present address any further communication to him upon the subject.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 34*

Turin, November 3, 1855

Sir: The squabble between Tuscany and Sardinia about the refugee *attaché* Mr. Casati, takes a more serious appearance. As I informed you, Mr. Casati, a Lombard patriot, having been consigned to Tuscany in diplomatic position, that country refused to receive him from deference to Austria. Tuscany is nominally an independent country;

<sup>57</sup> Daniel D. Barnard di New York, nominato inviato straordinario e ministro plenipotenziario presso la Prussia il 3 settembre 1850; lasciò l'incarico il 21 settembre 1853.

<sup>58</sup> Henry R. Jackson della Georgia, fu nominato incaricato d'affari il 24 maggio 1853, ministro residente il 29 giugno 1854; presentò le credenziali il 28 settembre 1854 e lasciò il posto il 1° luglio 1858.

but its ruler is an Austrian Archduke, and is kept on his throne by Austrian power. To accredit an Austrian refugee to that court is nearly the same as to give him diplomatic position at Vienna. Hence it was natural for Tuscany to refuse him. But this refusal was taken so ill by the Sardinian Government that they immediately broke its relations with Florence. Since then Cibrario, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Turin, has addressed a note to his *Chargé* at Vienna, recapitulating the circumstances, arguing against the interference of Austria and directing the *Chargé* to communicate the whole to Count Buol. The *Chargé* endeavoured to carry out his instructions; but it is now known that Count Buol refused to hear the *Chargé* or to read Cibrario's note, on the ground that the Sardinian agents had used such language at Florence in the early stages of the affair that he could not hold further debate with them on the subject.

Thus the door seems shut against any adjustment of this difficulty, and it is said that it will cause the resignation of Mr. Cibrario, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs. I should think such a result probable, had not that gentleman held a place in so many different cabinets under so many previous difficulties with such remarkable tenacity of tooth.

The ground on which the Sardinian Government rest their action, is an assertion that the Florentine Government at one time consented to receive Mr. Casati and afterwards refused. But the Florentine Minister utterly denies this assertion. Mr. Casati, it appears, on his arrival in Florence, paid him a personal visit and he was received, but not in an official capacity. Further it is certain that a year ago, when there was first a talk of sending him to Florence as a diplomat, that power notified Sardinia that such an act would be disagreeable to it.

In conclusion I may repeat, that I should not have troubled your Excellency about the quarrels of these two little courts, had not the case been so nearly a parallel with that of Mr. Foresti in which we were concerned.

***John M. Daniel & William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 35*

Turin, Nov. 9, 1855

Sir: I have had the honour to receive your Dispatch No. 13, dated the 29th of Sept., enclosing a letter from the President of the United States to the King of this Country relative to a late death in the Royal Family, together with an open copy of the same.

In perusing the said copy, I find an error of sufficient importance to cause me to hesitate about presenting it in a country where great attention is paid to forms and titles.

The letter of the President purports to be a response to one from the King announcing the death of His Majesty's *younger brother*, Prince Victor Emanuel Leopold *Duke of Genoa*, on the 18th of May, and condoling with the monarch on that event.

In the Royal Family there has never been such a person. The *only* brother of the King was Leopold Duke of *Genoa*, who died last February and whose death has already been duly noticed by a letter from the President which I had the honour to present on the 1st. of June last.

The personage who died on the date in question (18th of May) was Prince Victor Emanuel Leopold, *Duke of Genevois*, the *youngest son* of the present King, and it is most probably this decease which the President wishes to acknowledge

I have therefore thought proper to delay the presentation of the letter until I could inform your Excellency of these facts, that you might be able to correct in a new copy these mistakes—if mistakes they are.

If you conclude to send a new copy you will please pay attention to the fact that it is not only the youngest son, instead of the younger brother of the monarch, who is dead, but also that the title is Duke of *Genevois* and not Duke of Genoa.

Parliament will be opened on the 12th, and on the 20th the King leaves for a tour in France, England, and Belgium.

### ***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 15* Department of State, Washington, November 10, 1855

Sir. Your despatch dated the 14th ultimo accompanied by a copy of the correspondence in the case of Belcredi, and your letter of the 17th of the same month have been received. I have also received a despatch from Mr. Fay,<sup>59</sup> our minister at Berne, concerning the same person.

<sup>59</sup> Sul Fay, vedi la n. 42, a p. 222 del vol. I Per ulteriori informazioni sul Belcredi diamo il testo del dispaccio del Fay al Marcy e quello del Fay al Consiglio Federale svizzero

« Berne, 8 November 1855

N 147

Sir I have the honor to acknowledge your despatches to N. 32 inclusive: The latter enclosing the authenticated document of John Bachmann

The authorities of Switzerland question the fact of Belcredi's naturalization and I have very little doubt that their suspicions are well founded. It is true he had a passport issued by Mr. Piatt,<sup>60</sup> late Secretary of the U.S. Legation at Paris, but I attach very little importance to that paper. I have reason to believe there has been great facility in issuing passports at some of our Legations. Besides it has come to the knowledge of this Department that many forged and surreptitiously obtained passports are in the hands of those who have never been naturalized, some of whom have never been in America.

Mr. Fay required of Belcredi proof of his naturalization and he show-

Referring to my N 145, I have the honor to enclose copy of a Note from the Federal Council, under date 19/29 October, explaining the reasons for not withdrawing the decree of expulsion against Dr. Belcredi. The Note is framed in a very friendly and equitable spirit and, in my reply, of which copy is also enclosed, I have felt bound to state my opinion that it is satisfactory.

From it you will perceive that the Federal Council entertains doubt as to Dr. Belcredi's right to the character of an American citizen. I have no proof of it except the passport granted by Mr. Piatt, of April 4 1855. I have requested Mr. Mason to give you what information he could upon that point, although not of much importance, for you will doubtless acquiesce in the just and moderate views of the Note of the 19/29 with regard to naturalized American citizens, as well as to those native born. I can have no pretention to protest an American citizen, any more than an Italian, in plunging the country, to which I am accredited, into war and revolution.

There are several undisputed facts. Desperate revolutionary movements, like the Milan insurrection of February 1853 are attempted to be organized in Switzerland. The position of this Republic requires perfect good faith with regard to the limitrophe countries. The safety of her own free institutions depends upon her energy and prudence. No choice is left as to her line of conduct. She is necessitated to remove certain individuals known or strongly suspected to be engaged, directly or indirectly, in the revolution. Dr. Belcredi, as appears by the Note of the 19/29, has, to a certain degree, justified at least suspicion and, in the face of the facts, I have not thought it proper to persevere in my request for the withdrawal of the decree of expulsion, particularly as the certificate of the police magistrate, Mr. Morosini, is stated to be in contradiction to his own previous report.

I trust, Sir, you will approve my original step in favor of Dr. Belcredi as well as my Note of the 8. The appeals to the Federal Council which I have several times made from a simple sense of duty to bearers of American passports, have demonstrated the desire of our government to protect our citizens abroad in their just and reasonable rights, but not to claim for them that of meddling in other peoples' affairs.

It is proper also to place upon record in the Department an official statement of such cases as Dr. Belcredi.

I shall not press his application farther without instructions from you »

« Berne, 8 November 1855

The undersigned, Minister Resident of the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the Note of the 19/29 October and to inform the High Federal Council that in face of the facts therein communicated, he does not consider it his duty to press his application in favor of Dr. Belcredi without further instructions from his government, to which the correspondence has been transmitted with the remark that he had nothing to answer to the Note of the 19/29 »

<sup>60</sup> Donn Piatt dell'Ohio, nominato segretario di Legazione a Parigi il 12 aprile 1854, esercitò le funzioni di incaricato d'affari *ad interim* dal 18 gennaio al 30 aprile 1855. Diede le dimissioni il 4 ottobre 1855.



ed him only what purported to be a certificate from Mr. Piatt stating that he had seen his, Belcredi's, certificate of naturalization. If Belcredi had such a certificate to show to Mr. Piatt why did he not present it to Mr. Fay? On such a certificate as that given by Mr. Piatt this Department would not have felt warranted in granting a passport. Before a minister takes as a matter of right and raising a national question any step in regard to extricating a person from difficulty in a foreign country, he ought to be satisfied that such person has a just claim to the interposition of his government. As Belcredi's case is presented by Mr. Fay, I have serious doubts as to the fact of his being a citizen of the United States. But taking it for granted that he has been naturalized, there still arise difficulties as to his claim to your interposition on his behalf.

The question to which your letter refers, the claim of a naturalized citizen, upon this government for protection against the operation of the laws of his native country on his return to it, was fully discussed by this Department in a despatch addressed to Mr. Jackson, Minister at Vienna, early in the year 1854. The purport of that despatch is stated in Wheaton's International Law, which had been sent but had not reached you when your letter was written. See page 136, Note. The work is probably by this time in your possession: it will therefore be unnecessary to repeat the view taken of this subject in the despatch referred to. But it may be proper to observe, that the conclusion therein arrived at is that this Government cannot rightfully interpose to relieve a naturalized citizen from the duties or penalties which the laws of his native country may impose upon him on his voluntary return within its limits. When a foreigner is naturalized, the Government does not regard the obligations he has incurred elsewhere nor does it undertake to exempt him from their performance. He is admitted to the privileges of a citizen in the country and to the rights which our treaties and the law of nations secure to American citizens abroad. In this respect he has all the rights of a native-born citizen: but the vindication of none of these rights can require or authorize an interference in his behalf with the fair application to him of the municipal laws of his native country when he voluntarily subjects himself to their control, in the same manner and to the same extent as they would apply if he had never left that country. A different view of the duties of this Government would be an invasion of the independence of nations and could not fail to be productive of discord: it might moreover prove detrimental to the interests of the states of this Union.

Suppose a slave should escape from one of the southern states into Canada and there become a naturalized subject of Great Britain — would this fact prevent the enforcement of the laws in regard to him on his voluntary return to his native state? Although he may have been admitted to citizenship in Great Britain or any other country, would not his old relations revive and the rights of his master be as complete as if he had never been naturalized? In that case could Great Britain rightfully demand of this Government the restoration of the slave because he had become a naturalized subject of that country? The answers to these questions must clearly show the course which the Government of the United States ought to pursue towards a foreigner who has sworn allegiance to it, and, afterwards voluntarily returned within the jurisdiction of the country of his birth. Naturalization does not afford the person who obtains it any claim to protection against punishment for offences he may have committed before he acquired the rights of an American citizen, or release him from any obligations then resting upon him.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 36*

Turin, November 17, 1855

Sir. I have had the honour to receive Your Excellency's Dispatch No. 14, dated the 30th of October, relative to the case of Zanoni I had anticipated the decision you have made, and have been for some time aware that the position I had taken was untenable in face of the past practice of the United States Government. The difference of opinion between the Sardinian Ministry and myself, will, however, produce no injurious effect. There has been no interruption of our intercourse, and in the various communications between us no further allusion to the case in question. By attending to Your Excellency's recommendation — that of letting it rest where it is —, the affair will remain without significance or consequence.

Parliament was opened by the King in person on the 12th inst., by the delivery of a speech, a translation of which you will find at the end of this Dispatch. No great question will be debated in this session, save that of taxation. The imposts are already enormous and as you will perceive from the speech aforesaid, the Ministry are compelled to demand another increase.

*Dispaccio n 37*

Turin, December 1, 1855

Sir: I have had the honour to receive your dispatch numbered 15, and dated on the 10th November, relative to the case of Belcredi & c; and have learned with surprise that Mr. Theodore S. Fay, Minister Resident at Berne, has made a communication to you relative to the said Belcredi, expressing doubts as to his naturalization, and giving good reasons for doubting it; in consequence of which you very justly tell me that « before a Minister takes any step as a matter of right in regard to extricating a person from difficulty in a foreign country, he ought to be satisfied that such person has a just claim to the interposition of his government. As Belcredi's case is presented to me by Mr. Fay. I have serious doubts & c. »

Sir, the reason why I took up Belcredi's case was chiefly that this same gentleman, Mr. T. S. Fay at Berne, who so presents Belcredi's case to your Excellency, gave *me* the fullest endorsement of his citizenship that could be given in writing.

In the first place, when Belcredi was arrested he sent me his passport, which was, as stated, from the Secretary of the Legation at Paris, but which was vised by Mr. Fay in his own hand and under the seal of his Legation. But further, a few days afterwards I received by the mail from Mr. Fay, with whom I had never had any previous correspondence, the following singular letter:

United States Legation, Berne, Sept. 15, 1855

« Dear Sir: A person whom I believe to be a worthy man, has been imprisoned in Sardinia for no other reason as I understand than that he was expelled from Switzerland. This expulsion was in reference to a very old political affair and I hope to have it cancelled. Mr. Belcredi, the person alluded to, is an American citizen and ought not to be detained in prison without a better cause than has been shown to me. I shall communicate with the Swiss Government upon the subject. In the meantime you will render an act of justice to Mr. Belcredi, and a favor to me, by your best exertions to procure his immediate release; and I will aid you by an application to the Sardinian Minister here.

I am, Dear Sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant

Theo. S. Fay ».

Meantime Belcredi was confined at Arona. I could not go there to give his case a minute examination. His passport seemed regularly issued by a Secretary of an American Legation, and his citizenship was certified by an American Minister, who professed to have personal knowledge of the man. If American legations are to place any confidence in one another, these papers seemed sufficient to satisfy me that I would be justified in mildly requesting the Sardinian Government to inform me of his offence, and to release him if he had not transgressed its laws. This is all that I did. The Sardinian Government gave me the fullest information, and then released the prisoner without further interposition on my part.

But I did not stop there. When Belcredi commenced his preposterous demands for redress, damages, free circulation & c, I thought the matter too serious to rest longer on the *prima facie* evidence before me. Suspicions that he had something to conceal arose from the fact, that fond as he was of letters, on his passage through Turin, after his release, he avoided a personal interview. Hence in a note to Mr. Fay I made the following enquiry:—« but even now I have some doubts whether he (Belcredi) has been duly naturalized. As I have never had an opportunity to examine him, perhaps you can give me some light upon his title to citizenship? »

The note, from which the foregoing is an extract, was dated the 28th of Sept. After a fortnight I received the following answer from Mr. Fay:

« Berne, 10th Oct. 1855

« My dear Sir: I have the pleasure to acknowledge yr. [sic] kind favor of 28. ult, which should have been answered sooner, but that I hoped to be able to give some precise information as to the naturalization of Mr. Belcredi. I had, I think, two interviews with him; and one of his friends has been several times to see me. If Mr. Belcredi *really be* an agent of Mazzini, he has deceived me with the grossest misrepresentations. He speaks English quite well, and has a passport, in perfect order, from Mr. Piatt, the Sec. of Leg. at Paris. Induced by the solemn asseverations of these gentlemen, I shall write a note to the Federal Council requesting to be made acquainted with the true state of the case, altho [sic] the note to you, of Mons. Cibrario, bodes no great success to my intervention. I understood Mr. Belcredi was under the impression you had neglected him, and I did *everything in my power* to correct his error. It appears to me you have done every thing possible & that he is indebted to you for his liberation.

Theo. S. Fay. »

What Mr. Fay learned on his application to the Swiss authorities he did not communicate to me. But after receiving the note given above, I wrote to Mr. Piatt, the late Secretary at Paris, giving an outline of Belcredi's case with my reason for suspecting him, and asking the grounds on which his passport had been issued.

Mr Piatt's answer was dated at Havre, Oct. 17, on the eve of his departure from Europe. Its tone forbids the supposition that he intended it ever to be part of a public document, and I do not, therefore, feel justified in quoting his words here. In substance Mr Piatt stated that he granted Belcredi the passport in exchange for one given by the mayor of some American town, and that afterwards, on being applied to, he had given a certificate of the fact. In doing so he believed himself acting in accordance to your Excellency's instructions, but placed little belief in Belcredi's claim to citizenship.

With regard to the rest of your dispatch No. 15, relating to the matter of Zanoni, I am bound to confess that your illustration drawn from the obligations imposed by the southern states on slaves, and their right to enforce them even though such slaves should be naturalized in Canada, seems to me a logical and legitimate parallel. But I had already been satisfied that my view of the law in that case was erroneous from an involuntary want of light. The box of books containing Mr. Wheaton's work, though forwarded July 24, has never reached me.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 38*

Turin, December 8, 1855

Sir: The Piedmontese Government has just published a general statistical report on the commerce of Piedmont during the year 1853. It presents nearly the same result as that of 1852 in so far as regards the general trade of the country, that is, if the transit trade be taken in account, but the special trade merely comprising exports of Piedmontese produce and imports for Piedmontese consumption, presents a considerable increase. The general importation amounted in 1853 to 333,942,000 fr., the exportation to 220,630,000 fr., the special trade comprised imports to the amount of 188,020,508 fr., and exports to that of 95,004,264 fr.—being, compared to 1852, an increase of 21½ millions on the former head, and of 5½ millions on the latter. The imports comprise, in round numbers. cottons, 34 millions of francs; colonial produce, 25 millions; corn, 22 millions;

silks 20 millions; wollens, [sic] 18 millions, & c. The exports comprise silks, 43 wine and oil, 10 millions, rice, 8 millions, cattle, 4 millions, & c. The countries with which Piedmont carries on the largest trade are: France (imports, 48 millions; exports, 46 millions); England (imp. 39 millions, exp. 3½ millions); Switzerland (imp 14½ millions, exp. 13 millions), Austria (imp. 10 millions, exp. 16 millions), Russia (imp. 17 millions, chiefly corn, exp 163,000 fr.); and the United States (imp. 13 millions, exp. 531,000 fr.). The customs' revenue amounted in the same year to 18,234,064 fr.

The direct importation from United States in 1852 was only 7,725,362 fr. In 1853 it was 13,891,561 fr—an increase of nearly cent per cent. Meanwhile the exportation has been nearly at a stand-still. The increase of importation has been chiefly on cotton. About one third of the 34,000,000 imported comes direct from the United States. Of the remainder, some undoubtedly comes from Algeria, but the greater part still comes indirectly from the United States through England, Holland, & c.,

The first bill offered to the present session of Parliament by the Sardinian Ministry proposes a new loan of thirty millions of franc—in addition to the fifty millions borrowed last year—that loan even with the increased taxation being insufficient to meet the expenses of the war.

But this serious want does not attract so much attention as a visit which the King is now making to the Emperor of the French—this ceremonial is mortifying to the people, and is thought to be disagreeable [sic] to the Monarch, because it is in some sense compulsory. There is an odd rumour relative to its antecedents, which is generally credited, to this effect. When the Queen of England visited Paris last summer it was arranged that the King should be there at the same time. This plan was set aside, after it was formed, from the discovery that the King would have to take precedence of Prince Albert, and that such a procedure was always offensive to the Queen. During a celebrated visit to Russia, she is said to have made quite a scene at a dinner because some German Grand Duke, being a sovereign, was compelled by the laws of etiquette to precede her beloved Consort on the way to the table. To avoid a repetition of these *desagrégements* the visit of the Sardinian King was postponed, and then he became naturally unwilling to go at all. The negotiation was ended by an autograph letter of invitation from the Emperor himself. The politic Ministry would not permit their master to resist such an expressive hint that further resistance would be ill-received. Hence this visit, which is probably the more unpleasant to the Sardinian Monarch from the fact that he is plain in appearance and manners, more familiar

with the manoeuvres of cavalry than with the laws of ceremonial, and more attached to his stables than to his court. On public occasions, like the present, he shows poorly and knows it. It is therefore more than possible that he would have willingly declined the equivocal honours proferred [sic] him in France, if he had had his own choice; his people all think so at least; and the affair is, therefore, generally regarded as a simple tribute to the pride of the new prince, who is at this day the master of France and of Europe. The King is accompanied by an extensive suite, in which figure the Chevalier D'Azeglio, the great artist and literary man of this country, who was also at one time its Prime Minister, and the Marquis of Cavour, who is Prime Minister at the present time. The King went to Paris by Genoa and Marseilles. His reception at Genoa where the rule of Piedmont has always been and is still barely tolerated, is said to have been cold. Not a hat or a cry was raised. As for Cavour who is particularly disliked by the Genoese, his appearance would have possibly produced less equivocal marks of popular disfavour. But he did not accompany the Court in that part of the route. He went through Savoy, on the plea of sea-sickness, joining the King at Lyons within the French territory. After a few days in Paris the whole party went to England, thence they have returned to Paris without as yet visiting Belgium, and will return to Piedmont by the 12th of December.

*Eight Hundred Thousand Francs* have been set aside for the King's expenses during this journey. This sum comes from the pocket of a poor nation, deeply in debt, and who have to meet their present expenses by foreign loans. Surely they pay dearly for the show of royalty; for after all, the officer known as the King in this country is only a pageant. Parliament has all the power in its hands. The monarchical portion of this Government seems but little else than an exceedingly expensive species of theatrical entertainment. But as an European people will not be satisfied without such addenda to their political drama, it is, perhaps, the part of wisdom to preserve it. Italy appears at the present moment to be perfectly tranquil. The very echoes of revolution have ceased, and the movements of war and diplomacy seem rather to quiet mankind, by engrossing their attention, than to excite the turbulent with hopes of opportunity.

Sir: In the *General Personal Instructions to Diplomatic Agents*, sent to me with my Commission, it was recommended that these agents should transmit to your Department whatever political, historical and statistical information, not generally attainable in the United States, that might be deemed illustrative of the character and condition of the countries into which they have been sent. I propose to occupy the present, and a succeeding paper, in accordance with this request. The order which is thought most convenient is as follows:

I—A brief review of the past history of this country, II—The existing Constitution of the Sardinian States; III—Statistics of their material and social condition, IV—Their policy and public men. The difficulty which I, myself, experienced in my endeavours to gain some information relative to the past history of Sardinia, and the nonexistence of any work upon it in the United States are the causes which induce me to give the brief glance at its chief landmarks which succeeds this paragraph.

1. - The agglomeration of states, now known as the Kingdom of Sardinia, dates from the Congress held at Vienna in 1815 after the fall of Napoleon. Most of these states have, however, been in possession of the reigning House of Savoy for much longer periods; and one of them is identified with the fortunes of that family from the epoch of its historical origin in the 11th century to the present time.

The country now known as Piedmont and Savoy was the Cisalpine Gaul of the Romans. The capital, Taurinum or Turin, was a fortified town in the time of Hannibal, and of sufficient strength to turn the march of that conqueror when he entered Italy through the neighbouring passages of the Alps. After the fall of the empire it became part of the Lombard kingdom, and suffered all the vicissitudes of that monarchy. After its final dissolution, the country was sometimes nominally subject to the French kings; but its real sovereigns have been generally the local marquises, counts and dukes, who held a *quasi* independence in the feudal system, and who divided the territory as lords of Vercelli, Ivrea, Saluces, Montferrat & c. The daughter of Manfredi, one of these *seigneurs*, the Marquis of Susa and Turin, married Otho sovereign-count of Maurienne, and by this marriage the House of Savoy gained its first footing in Italy.

This House of Savoy is, perhaps, the oldest reigning family in Europe.



It has of course a fabulous and legendary antiquity, mounting to the days of Odin and beyond them; but it is an historical fact that in 1033 « Humbert of the White-Hands » was a Marquis in Savoy, then subject to the German Emperor Conrad. The neighbouring country having rebelled against their masters in that year, this Humbert assisted Conrad in reducing it to obedience, and in reward was created sovereign-count of Maurienne, then the principal town of the province. Otho, who married Adelaide the daughter of the Susan lord, as above mentioned, was the Grandson of this Humbert, called Humbert of the White-Hands, who is reckoned in history the founder of the House of Savoy.

The extension of their sway over the province of Piedmont was an early idea in the policy pursued by successors of these personages, but their undertaking met with a doubtful and vacillating success for several centuries. Success, however, in general they certainly enjoyed; so that after many reverses and rebuffs after innumerable petty wars and noble alliances, we find the son of the famous Green Count of Savoy, the greatest of all their medieval princes, possessed of a territory in Savoy and Piemont nearly identical, if Genoa and its province be excepted, with that over which the kings of Sardinia at this day rule. It was only in 1416 that the Emperor Sigismund converted their countal coronet into a ducal crown; but long previously they were reckoned among the most powerful of minor sovereigns and henceforth their history is interwoven with all the wars and movements of modern Europe. « One king, one count and one duke » was the Spanish proverb of the last age. The king was of course the king of Spain, the count the county of Orange, and the duke he of Savoy. Their first claims to royal rank were made in 1459 when the son of the reigning duke Louis married Charlotte [sic] of Lusignan, heiress of the last king of Cyprus. This princess also brought her husband the title of king of Jerusalem. The latter was an empty name, but in 1459 the son of the duke of Savoy was really king of Cyprus. He was able to maintain his right for a few years only; but the family have held fast to his honours ever since; and the coins of this country are still stamp'd [sic] with the words « King of Cyprus and Jerusalem ».

A period of minorities and female regencies, however, soon diminished the power and prestige of the country. To crown its misfortunes the plains of Piedmont became in the early part of the 16th century the arena on which Francis I and Charles I struggled for European Empire. In the end, it was entirely subjugated by the French, so that the great hero of the House, Emanuel Philibert, at the death of his father, Charles II, in 1553, found himself without a foot of land in his own country. After

a series of wanderings he took service in Spain, and entered his states at the head of a Spanish army, defeated the French in a great and signal battle near St Quentin on the 10th of August 1557, and by the treaties which followed regained possession of his crown. But the influence of France over Piedmontese politics did not cease there. During the succeeding reigns it was always evident and we found Victor Amadeus II, great grandson of Emanuel Philibert, holding relation with Louis XVI much resembling those of a vassal to a sovereign. Louis XIV commanded him to persecute his Vaudois subjects and he did it; to make war on the Austrian Emperor and he did it. But when the European sovereigns formed their great league against the ambition of the French autocrat towards the close of the 17th century, and Louis XIV commanded the Duke to join his armies to those of France, justly conceiving the League the strongest [sic] of the two, he resitated to obey. Thereupon Louis put the Piedmontese ambassador at Paris in the Bastille, and sent a powerful army into Piedmont. A long and bloody contest ensued. The Piedmontese monarch defended himself manfully, but he was overmatched, after several terrible defeats he was finally besieged [sic] in his capital. The end was not doubtful, when the famous Prince Eugene of Savoy entered the country from Lombardy at the head of a German army. Effecting a junction with the beleagured Duke, this couple gave the French a complete overthrow on the plains of Turin and pursued them to the frontiers. The Peace of Utrecht, in 1713, gave Victor Amadeus many advantages. Among the additions to his territory was the island of Sicily with the title of King. Five years afterwards he exchanged his island of Sicily for that of Sardinia and then took the name now so well known—King of Sardinia, Cyprus and Jerusalem, Duke of Savoy and Prince of Piedmont.

Victor Amadeus was a man of intellect as well as heroism. Not only did he establish the independence of his country and erect it into a second-class kingdom, but he gave his people a code of better laws than they had ever before known. In 1730 seeing everything prosperous and finding himself old, he married a beautiful subject and abdicated the throne. His subsequent fate was melancholy. On the plea that he repented of his abdication, his son separated him from his wife and placed him in a confinement, where he remained till death, from rage and mortification, released him two years after. Victor Amadeus was a modern Lear.

The French Revolution revenged him on his descendants. Piedmont was partially conquered by the generals of the republic, and wholly subjugated by Bonaparte, who made its plain of Marengo the theatre of a memorable exploit. The entire continental territory was annexed to

France, and the reigning monarch, Charles Emmanuel IV, driven off to die in the island of Sardinia. But the great Treaty of Vienna in 1815, according to the customary fortune of the House, not only restored all its old dominions, but added to them the city and territory of Genoa. At that date the kingdom took the proportions it has since held. But with this territorial aggrandizement commenced the internal alteration of political character. The leaven of the French Revolution created a popular demand for a constitution. In 1821 the country attempted to enforce the demand by an appeal to arms. Its reigning sovereign, Victor Emanuel I, abdicated rather than grant it. Carlo Felice, his brother, put down the insurrection with the strong hand. He died without children, and Charles Albert, the head of the cadet branch of the family, the Princes of Carignan, ascended the throne in 1831.

This man is one of the problems of history. It is difficult to say whether he was, as the people still believe him to have been, a hero and a martyr, or a faithless egoist. The most probable solution is that he was a ruler who had conceived an idea too great for his capacity of execution. That idea was the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy and the establishment of a great Italian kingdom. Twice he led the constitutional party, and twice deserted it. But when the revolutionary ideas of 1847 and '48 began to ferment, he conceived his time to be come. He placed himself again at the head of its memorable movement, and this time set his crown upon the chance, for he engaged his country in a war against Austria. The Lombards received him as their saviour. Parma, Modena and Lombardy were declared part of the Piedmontese Kingdom, and the appeal to arms was at first rewarded with brilliant success. But the King of Naples and other despots who had at first seconded him, under the pressure of their people, deserted the cause so soon as they were able to do so; the feeble forces of Piedmont were found no match for those of the Austrian Empire, and the equivocal talents of the Sardinian King were ciphers in the field when fairly weighed against the genius and experience of Marshal Radetzky. Defeat and retreat soon became the chronicle of the day, till the hope of Italian independence was finally extinguished in the bloody rout of Novara.

Failing to find the death which he eagerly sought throughout that famous field, on which he had concentrated all his force, Charles Albert abdicated his throne in the evening of the battle, and without returning to his capital, went away unattended (it is said) even by a servant—to what destination no one at the time knew. Two years afterwards he died in Portugal of a broken heart.

The last act of this monarch's reign was the promulgation of a constitution, which had been demanded by the popular voice for thirty years. His son, Victor Emanuel II, the present monarch, ascended the throne with an oath to observe it. Up to that moment the King had been the sole power of the State. Since then, that officer has been only a stately cipher. The Government is now in the hands of the people, guided by an oligarchy. Their rule has been beneficial to the country. Railroads have been extensively built, and the religious and civil institutions, improved. The new reign was inaugurated by a treaty of peace with Austria by which Sardinia was bound to pay seventy millions of francs towards the expenses of the war, but by which, according to the invariable fortune of the House on all similar occasions of general pacification, the independence and the territory of the Kingdom was preserved intact. A fierce contest with the Church of Rome and the religious corporations of the country, which once pressed more heavily upon it than on any other in Italy, was early undertaken and has been lately terminated wholly to the advantage of the State. Up to the last year all had gone well with the Constitutional Kingdom. But within the past twelve months its politicians have thought proper to engage it in a war with a great power, that has never injured it heretofore and is debarred by distance from endangering it in the future. The calculations which induced the step may be just; but they may all be overthrown by the chances of war, and at the moment they cost the treasury a heavy sum.

In the foregoing pages I have merely catalogued the chief epochs in the history of the Savoyard Monarchy. To give even a concise abridgement of that history would occupy several volumes. It comprises the reigns of forty sovereigns and a period of eight hundred and fifty-two years: and it is involved in nearly every general war and treaty of Europe during all that time. The strongest kingdom in Europe has not been more active than this poor and weak monarchy. Indeed, unceasing energy and care have been the conditions of its existence. And it is even wonderful that any industry could have kept up such a State for so long a period, undefended by natural boundaries and surrounded by powerful and lawless neighbours. Such success is, however, partially accounted for by the hereditary ability and courage of the reigning family, which was long unique among royal races. Their uniform cleverness was once the general remark of writers on European politics. Montesquieu, in the spirit of laws, renders them a splendid eulogy: and Robertson<sup>61</sup> explains the suc-

<sup>61</sup> William Robertson (1721-1793), storico scozzese, autore di *History of Scotland*

cession of great princes by the fact that enveloped on all sides by ambitious neighbours their little kingdom would only subsist by the force of intelligence and tension of nerve on the part of its rulers. It may be added, that the Salic law, early put in force, has had something to do with the perpetuity and renown of the family. In 1329, the reigning count having died without male issue, and the States-General of Savoy having assembled to select his successor, his daughter, then Duchess of Brittany, demanded the sceptre. But this assembly of bishops and nobles decided to unanimity that « never should the crown of Savoy fall from the lance to the distaff », and this response has since been a fundamental law of the monarchy.

In a subsequent paper, I shall proceed to give a brief analysis of the existing Constitution.

*John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy*

*Dispaccio n 40*

Turin, January, 1, 1856

Sir: In prosecution of the design indicated in my last dispatch, I now propose to make a brief statement of the fundamental law of this country.

Previously to the year 1849, the Constitution of Piedmont was a very simple affair. It consisted of two points: 1st The government was an hereditary, unlimited, Salic monarchy; 2d The King alone had the power of making, abrogating, and publishing the laws.

But the written Constitution, promulgated by Charles Albert, which was a copy of the French Charter of 1830, reduced the monarch to an executive, and placed the legislation in the hands of two chambers, reserving to the king, however, the power of recommending, sanctioning, or vetoing the laws passed by the said chambers. The monarchy remains hereditary in the House of Savoy by the Salic law. Every monarch swears fidelity to the Constitution on ascending the throne. His person is inviolable. The King declares war and makes treaties. He is the commander-in-chief of the forces, & c.

The King is irresponsible, but can only act through his ministers; and these ministers are responsible to the chambers. The chambers consist of the Senate and the House of Deputies. The number of the

*during the reigns of Queen Mary and of James VI until his succession to the crown of England, 1759, History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, 1769*

Senators is illimited. They are appointed by the King and hold their places for life; *but* they must have forty years, and be selected from certain categories—such as are all archbishops and bishops, all deputies who have served in three legislatures; the ministers; the ambassadors, and the chief law-officers; general officers of sea and land, all who have illustrated their country by eminent services and merits, and all persons whose direct taxes amount to three thousand francs per annum, & c. The Senate has the power of proposing laws equally with the Chamber of Deputies, excepting, however, that laws imposing taxes and otherwise raising money must first pass the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate is the High Court of Justice for the crime of treason, and for judging the ministers in case of their impeachment by the Chamber of Deputies.

The Deputies are elected by electoral colleges, chosen by that portion of the people which has the right to vote. All subjects have a right to vote who have attained their majority and who pay a certain amount of taxes—forty francs in Piedmont, twenty francs in Savoy, Nice, and other provinces. A deputy must have thirty years of age. He represents the Kingdom in general, and not the district by which he has been elected. The number of electoral colleges is limited to 204, and each college elects one deputy. The deputy is elected for five years. The power of impeaching the ministers belongs to them.

The King is bound to convoke the Parliament every year. He has the power to prorogue its sessions and to dissolve it; but in that case he must order a new election within four months. The King appoints the President and Vice President of the Senate, but the deputies choose all their own officers. Neither senators nor deputies have any salary. Neither chamber can assemble, or sit, without the other. Their session is public. Every law must be passed by both chambers before it can be offered for the King's sanction. Every subject can petition, but no one can present his petition in person. The Italian is the official language of the Kingdom, but the deputies from provinces, in which the French is the vernacular, have the privilege of using it in debate.

All subjects are equal before the law. They contribute towards the charges of the State in proportion to their fortunes. The individual liberty of every one is guaranteed [sic], save in cases provided for by the law. The domicile is inviolable. The press is free. But bibles, liturgies, & c., can only be printed with the permission of a bishop. No tax can be levied which has not been imposed by the chambers. All property, without exception, is declared inviolable; but every one can be required to abandon his property if it is legally proven that the inter-

est of the State requires it. Private assemblies without arms are permitted. Titles of nobility are preserved, but confer no superiority of political right.

The judiciary is appointed by the King. The judges are irremovable after three years of tenure. Tribunals and extraordinary commissions are declared unconstitutional. (The Code of Laws in use is based upon the Code Napoleon, with slight alteration. Facts are proven by jury.)

By the first clause of the Constitution, the Roman Catholic Faith is declared to be the religion of the State—but other forms of worship, *then existing* in the Kingdom, are to be tolerated. As all subjects are equal before the law, a dissent from the established religion does not carry with it political, civil, or military disability.

But one of the first uses which the Piedmontese people made of their liberties, was to commence a war on the Catholic Church. There were good reasons for it. In no country, except the Roman States, had that Church such power. In this country there are still 23,000 ecclesiastics—or one clergyman to every 214 inhabitants. In Belgium the proportion is one to 600—even in Austria it is only one to 610. The proportion differs in the states of the Kingdom—in Piedmont it is one to 227; in Savoy one to 420; while in the barbarous island of Sardinia it is one to 127. The Church revenue is 17,000,000 of francs—four times that of Belgium—nearly half that of France, though Belgium has about the same population, and France eight times that of Piedmont. Its forty-one prelates alone have a revenue of 1,012, 742 francs, nearly equal to the stipend of all the French prelacy, and ten times that of Belgium. Some single bishops enjoy a revenue of 100,000 francs, equal to that of all the Belgium prelates put together. Piedmont has still 71 monastic orders, 604 religious houses, 8,533 monks and nuns, with an acknowledged revenue of 2,282,851 francs. Some parish priests have a revenue of 12,000 francs—more than the stipend of a French bishop—while there are 2,540 parish priests with stipends below 500 francs.

None of these clergymen were formerly liable to military duty or the charges of the State. They had the educational institutions of the country in their hands. They had ecclesiastical courts, with civil and criminal jurisprudence supported by temporal power, whose action was a source of excessive annoyance and continual vexation. Piedmont was in short a Paradise of Priests, and it is not surprising that the first utterance of the people should demand the limitation of clerical power.

On the 9th of April 1850, by the act known as the Siccardi law, the ecclesiastical courts were abrogated. By another law, in the same year,

ecclesiastical and other corporations were incapacitated from the purchase of property without permission of the government. The next step was a complete sepeira [sic] of the civil and ecclesiastical power in the proposed Civil Marriage Bill. But at this point the hierarchy aroused itself, and made such resistance that the bill was beaten. It became then evident, that nothing further could be done, until the Church was stripped of its numbers and wealth. The domestic struggle, the various phases of which I have noticed in my dispatches for the past two years, has been directed to this end. The number of prelates has been essentially diminished by non-presentation to sees vacated by death and other causes, and by the famous Convent Law passed last year, many clerical orders were suppressed, and their property applied to the maintenance of the poorer ecclesiastics, that were formerly charges on the State. This has been the last act performed, but it is not the last of the drama. Step by step the Government will proceed until the Church of Sardinia is reduced to the point at which that of France and Belgium now exists:—a dependent and salaried agent of the civil power.

In a succeeding dispatch, I shall give a brief statement of the material statistics, resources, and debts of this Kingdom, in completion of the design marked out in my last.

Note 1. The famous sect of Waldenses or Vaudois in the mountains of this country number in all at the present time about 25,000 souls. It is, as all know, a relic of the ancient Christian Church who hold the same doctrines and practices that prevailed in the fourth and fifty centuries of the Christian era, and have always protested against the authority and innovations of the Bishop of Rome. They are no longer molested or aggrieved by the Government, and are an excellent population, but do not perceptibly increase. In creed and worship there is no difference between them and our own Protestant Churches.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 41*

Turin, January [?], 1856

Sir. I propose to give a brief view of the statistics of this country.

Sardinia has a territory of 1372 geographical square miles, of which the island of Sardinia contains 439 and the terra firma 933. No census of the population has been taken since 1848. The population was then



4,916,084 inhabitants. During the previous ten years the increase had been 265,709. But since 1848, owing to the vast emigration into these states, the establishment of railroads, the revival of commerce & c., this rate of increase has been more than tripled, and the whole population cannot now be less than five and a half millions. This population is distributed as follows: Savoy 583,812; the island of Sardinia 547,112; Genoa and its territory 545,174; Nice and territory 242,990, the rest in Piedmont proper.

This last division contains the real strength of the country. The Genoese provinces are thrifty, but are a perpetual source of anxiety of the government on account of their insubordination. Savoy is barren, the people are French, and desire annexation to France. As for the island of Sardinia, it cannot be classed among civilized countries. It yields a revenue less than its expenses. Piedmont proper is thickly settled with an intelligent and orderly people. It is extremely fertile. Lombardy and Piedmont produce more raw silk than all the rest of the world together. The manufactures are flourishing. Piedmont produces considerable quantities of rice. There are magnificent cotton-mills where our own raw material is perfectly well wrought. The silks and velvets made at Turin now, rank with those of Lyons.<sup>62</sup>

We have full returns of its commerce no later than 1853. In that year the imports were to the value of 333,942,414 francs; the exports 220,630,402. With the United States, the imports are 13,360,475; the exports 531,086. This was an increase of nearly cent per cent over the returns of our commerce for 1852. In the last named year, France took the first rank, England the second, Lombardy the third, Switzerland the fourth, South America the fifth, and the United States the sixth; but in 1853 we took the fourth place, and since then our commerce with Sardinia is known to have received a vast increase. The war has done us a great good in this respect; and it is probable that this country now has more commerce with the United States than with any other, save England and France.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> A great drawback to this country is the difference of population and language between the sections which compose it. The people of Savoy speak French, the people of Novara and Casale Lombard, the people of Piedmont speak Piedmontese, in Genoa and the Riviera, Genoese. In the island of Sardinia there are several patois. All of these dialects are completely distinct. A Genoese cannot understand a Piedmontese, an inhabitant of one parish in the island of Sardinia cannot understand the speech of a neighbour. Italian is the official dialect of the country, but it is nowhere the vernacular, and can be comprehended only by those who have a certain amount of education [*Nota di Daniel*].

<sup>63</sup> The commercial marine of Sardinia comprises 3,153 vessels gauging together 177,832 tons, and employing 30,252 sailors, captains, and workmen [*Nota di Daniel*].

At the date when the late war with Russia commenced, Sardinia was burdened with a debt of 615,993,429 francs. Since that date the debt has been increased by the two English loans, one of 50,000,000 and the other of 30, 000,000—making a total of 695,993,429 francs. The expenses of the government in the two years 1854 and 1855 taken together has been 291,226,121; the receipts during the same years, including the English loans have been 291,034,565, leaving a deficiency at the end of 1855 of 191,556.<sup>64</sup>

More than three-fourths of the above-named debt has been incurred since 1848. With the constitution came a new financial policy. The Sardinian rulers arrived at the idea that they could never enrich the state by an economy of its small revenue, but by developing its resources they might double its product. Hence they have entered largely into the railroad system. They have built one great road, commencing at Genoa passing through Turin and running as far as Novara on the Lombard frontier. Here it will one day connect with the roads of that country, and unite the two seas, the Adriatic and the Gulf of Genoa. From this chief route shorter lines branch in every direction. At the close of 1855 there were 548 kilometres [sic] of railroad open and in operation in this kingdom. At the present time 296 other kilometres [sic] are in process of construction. The war and financial pressure have not checked these operations in the slightest degree.

It is not, however, by railroads or by commercial enterprise that Sardinia hopes to become a great nation. It would be a futile hope if she did. The territory is too small. It is already one of the most thickly settled and highly cultivated countries in the world. Carried to its utmost point of development, it could only be another Holland or another Belgium.<sup>65</sup> It can only become great by politics and arms, by wars and annexation. With the addition of Lombardy with Genoa and Venice, protected by the Alps and commanding the two seas, it would enter on a large career. This bright vision has dazzled Sardinian eyes for many hundred years. They have not realized it yet, and perhaps never will. But their belief in the future renders them patient under the heavy army and navy with which they have always been burdened and which they are now increasing and improving. With a population of five millions,

<sup>64</sup> About fifteen millions only of the Sardinian revenue is collected at the custom houses. The rest is obtained by internal imposts [*Nota di Daniel*].

<sup>65</sup> The island of Sardinia is an exception to these remarks. In ancient times it was one of the granaries of Europe. It has one of the most productive soils in the world, immense mineral resources, and might easily maintain an agricultural population of two millions. It has only some five hundred thousand [*Nota di Daniel*].

this country maintains a regular army of fifty thousand men. These troops are now reckoned among the very best in all Europe. Since the mortifying defeat at Novara, in 1849, the army has been reorganized and disciplined in a manner which might be imitated with advantage by any country in the world. The artillery is the best I have ever seen. The navy is far from contemptible. There are four first class sail frigates and four powerful steam ships, four corvettes, three brigantines, one brig, and ten smaller steam vessels—in all forty sail, 2860 men, and 900 cannon. Their officers, both of army and navy, are educated in academies similar to our West Point and Annapolis. I again repeat that these preparations are not to be despised. In the next general contest, this country will surprise those who imagine that there is no more capacity for war in Italy.

I have said that the Sardinian standing army consists in round numbers of fifty thousand men. In exact figures it has 50,039 soldiers, and 4,448 officers; in all 54,487. Besides this army, there is a reserve of an equal number of disciplined men in *cong  *, who can at any moment be called into activity. The entire expense of this army, ordinary and extraordinary in the year 1852-3, which may be taken as a fair average, was 31,183,265 francs. For 1856 the expense is calculated at 34,000,000—the addition being due to the return of the troops in the Crimea. This is considered heavy in a country like Sardinia; but it seems sufficiently small in American eyes. For the year ending July 1853, I find that the expense of the Army proper of the United States was \$ 7,314,491—say in round numbers 36,000,000 of francs. Yet the whole army of the United States was only 10,329 men. Thus it actually costs nearly a million of dollars more to maintain ten thousand soldiers in the United States than to keep fifty-four thousand in Sardinia. The whole expense of the War Department of the former country including fortifications surveys, academies, & c, for that year I find to be 9,947,290 *dollars*; while the whole expense of the War Department in Sardinia, including the same purposes greatly extended, was only 41,018,538 *francs*. This vast difference is not owing to any superiority in the arms, dress or provisions, of the American force. No troops in the world have a more complete equipment than the Sardinian army. It is partly due to the higher prices in the United States, but principally, almost entirely, to the difference of pay. A few parallel details may be curious. A major general of the Sardinian army gets (rations included) 7,200 francs per annum—about 1400 dollars; a major general of the American army gets (rations included) 4,512 *dollars*—that is to say 22,560 francs. A colonel in com-

mand of a Sardinian regiment of infantry gets 6,000 francs—less than 1200 dollars: a colonel in command of an American regiment gets 1,972 dollars—about 10,000 francs. A Sardinian infantry captain gets 2,100 francs—less than 420 dollars: an American infantry captain gets 817 dollars. A Sardinian first-lieutenant gets 1450 francs—less than 300 dollars: an American first-lieutenant gets 730 dollars. The disproportion increases in the lower ranks. A Sardinian soldier gets 40 centimes (8 American cents) per diem—*two dollars and forty cents a month*—and this is considered here a high pay.

Between the two navies the disproportion is even greater. The captain of an American frigate gets 3,500 dollars per annum: the captain of a Sardinian—frigate gets 4,500 *francs*. A Sardinian naval lieutenant gets 2,200 *francs*, and a sous-lieutenant only 1,400: while all American lieutenants get 1,500 dollars.

This strict economy is to be observed in the salaries of all civil officials. Otherwise it would be of course impossible for five millions of people to keep up a government as complete and as numerous as that which transacts the affairs of our extensive republic. There is only one remarkable deviation—the king and his family receive a salary of 5,000,000 francs every year of his life. His duties are *nil*. The President of the United States gets \$ 25,000 for four years, and the duties of that office generally destroy the lives of those who occupy it. Such is the difference between monarchical and republican organization.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 42*

Turin, Feb. 1, 1856

Sir: The all-absorbing topic of the last fortnight here, as elsewhere in Europe, is the peace. The prospect is hailed with joy by all the nations of Europe save two—the English and the Sardinian. The English are ill-pleased to see the war ended at this juncture, because hitherto their arms have reaped nothing but disgrace;—but the politicians of Sardinia are dissatisfied for more substantial reasons. This country was compelled to go to war with Russia, a power which has never interfered with it, at the pleasure of France and England. It was a great sacrifice. If any country in the world has reason to desire tranquillity, it is this. It has need of it to consolidate a new political system. Peace and commerce are necessary to it for the payment of a heavy national debt. Hence it

was exceedingly unwilling to assume the load of trouble and expense which two arrogant neighbours chose to put upon it. There was only one thing to reconcile Sardinia to its entrance upon this scene—it was the prospect of gaining something from Austria at the conclusion of the affair. But if the war ends now, this hope is completely eclipsed. Austria has to be rewarded, not to be taxed, by the allies. Sardinia has not the slightest chance for the smallest advantage. Her labour will be paid by additional debt. Her troops have been decimated by disease and the sword, and will come home wearied, inglorious, and dissatisfied. It is a most lame and impotent conclusion that all parties have come to; but that one which has least to boast of, is surely this small state.

With regard to the probabilities of peace at present, there are other diplomatic agents of the United States abroad who are better situated to inform you than myself. My opinion is that an unsatisfactory peace is about to be concluded. I have long expected it. When I left the United States, many well-informed persons looked upon the war then commencing as a parallel to those which followed the French Revolution. But a brief review of the condition of Europe convinced me that these ideas were baseless. For a general war, a season of popular unhappiness and material suffering is necessary. At present the world is glutted with gold, labour is employed by abundant capital, and, although the people of Europe always suffer, their sufferings at the present time are too slight, comparatively speaking to produce that general uneasiness and animosity which would be necessary for such wars as those which opened this century.

Hence the present struggle has been conducted by statesmen and soldiers. The masses have been indifferent. The politicians have long seen that they were so matched that neither side could hope to gain signal advantages, and are now, generally speaking, with the two exceptions above noted, desirous to end it. The probabilities of peace therefore seem to me very great. If intrigue and pride should break up the approaching conferences without result, we may expect to see the contest continue in the same indecisive style, and come to conclusions not more important at some future time.

The celebrated chevalier Massimo D'Azeglio will represent Sardinia at the Conference. He is a man very dear to all parties here, though possessing neither fortune nor great titles, nor great political talents. He is esteemed, because of his amiable and high-toned character, and for his literary and artistic genius. He has pursued neither literature nor art as a profession, but is nevertheless the best painter and most distin-

guished writer now living in Italy. He was, it is true, the first prime minister under the new constitution, having been selected as the sole person possessing the confidence of all parties, to put the machine in motion. After having displayed but moderate abilities in that high post for some time, he quitted it without loosing the esteem of either opponents or friends. The present prime minister, Cavour, is a far abler statesman, and if the country hoped to gain any material advantages in the approaching conferences, he would be sent there to represent it. But as there is no chance of that sort, all that it cares for is to be represented with dignity and personal worth in the presence of Europe, and, for this end, D'Azeglio is the person best adapted by his estimable character, and distinguished deportment.

You will please receive herewith the account of this Legation for the last quarter of the year 1855.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 43*

Turin, Feb. 9, 1856

Sir: I informed you last week that Massimo D'Azeglio had been appointed to represent Sardinia at the Conference which will meet in Paris on the 2th inst. Since then, this appointment has been changed. D'Azeglio does not go. Sardinia will be represented by Count Cavour, the Prime Minister of this Kingdom, assisted by Villamarina, the Piedmontese resident at Paris

The reason publicly alleged for this change is the personal indisposition of D'Azeglio to figure in this assembly at the French capital. But the better understood cause is the fact that every other Power will be represented, not only by an envoy, but by a cabinet minister, and a great feeling of alarm has arisen as to the position which Sardinia would occupy in the Congress. It has been generally argued by the foreign press that Sardinia, not being one of the Great Powers of Europe recognized at the Congress of Vienna, had really no right to appear in the proposed conferences at all, and that, if admitted, she would at any rate hold a secondary and subaltern position. The appointment of a simple envoy to represent her interests while the great powers have each a cabinet minister, has been received as an admission and a confirmation of this view. Hence, the presence of Cavour at the conferences was eagerly demanded in Piedmont

Sardinia will, therefore, be represented like France, Austria, Russia, England; but the presence of her Prime Minister will help her cause but little. The nearer the time approaches, the less are her hopes, and the greater are her apprehensions. It is now not only deemed certain that she will get nothing, but a deep and general fear prevails that this country will be compelled, by some pretext of equilibrium and general pacification, to make large sacrifices on her Lombard frontier. The war is admitted to have been a deplorable miscalculation; or rather a sacrifice, which could have been avoided had its Government possessed the nerve to defy the diplomatic menaces which drove it on the sword.

The Turkish Minister who will partly represent the Porte in the conferences is now here; it is said, for the purpose of concerting some plan by which these two weak powers may, by union, make some weight against Austria whom they both dread.<sup>66</sup>

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 44*

Turin, Feb 16, 1856

Sir. I have had the honour to receive, by last night's mail, your Dispatch No, 16. enclosing the commission of Robert H. Leese appointed Consul at Spezia.<sup>67</sup> I have this morning sent a note to the Foreign Office asking the usual *exequatur*, and when it shall be received, will transmit the same with the Commission to Spezia as you have directed.

The last week has been one of diplomatic ceremony. Turin has been visited by a Turkish ambassador, the first officer of that rank who has shown himself here for a long period of time. He preserved the somewhat antiquated forms of his position as personal representative of a crowned head—visiting nobody save the King—holding a sort of Court at the Hotel d'Europe—and informing the resident corps of diplomats and the cabinet that he would receive them altogether at a fixed hour. Large dinners were eaten; but whether the strength of Turkey or Sardinia at the Conferences has been otherwise increased by the connexion, may be doubted.

General Lamarmora, the chief of the Sardinian army, has returned from the Crimea. He has visited Paris and London and is now here. He

<sup>66</sup> Si tratta di Mehemed Djemil bey

<sup>67</sup> L'istruzione n. 16, Washington, 23 gennaio 1856, comunicava solamente la nomina di Leese.

has been received with marked honour by the people and the Parliament. All are satisfied with the conduct of the Piedmontese troops in the east, where they have certainly shown themselves good soldiers.

The leading persons here regard the peace as already made. It is a fixed fact that both France and Russia are bent on ending the war. The discontent here at this result is general and evident. Unwilling to enter on the contest, Sardinia was partially reconciled to it by the hope of diminishing the power of Austria. She comes out with nothing but new debts while Austria will undoubtedly gain immense advantages. If she does not succeed in keeping the territory she has occupied on the Danube, it is certain that she increases her influence in the east and in the west. She gains what Russia loses. On the other hand, every accession of strength to Austria is a matter of just uneasiness to Piedmont. It is probably a wish to conciliate the common feeling on this point that Austria has lately promulgated an act pardoning the political offenders of 1848-9-50, permitting the exiles to return, and removing the sequestration from their estates in Lombardy. Many a Lazarus is made Dives by this act. Piedmont is full of Lombard nobles who have been living here in poverty because of the sequestration of their possessions who will now return to their homes and re-assume the luxuries of their original condition.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 45*

Turin, Feb. 24, 1856

Sir: The *exequatur* of Robert H. Leese has been duly signed by the King and I have forwarded it, according to your direction, to the Consulate at Spezia.

The amended copy of the President's letter of ceremony relating to the death of the Duke of Genevois, received at this Legation some time since, has been duly presented to the King during the past week.

The Conference at Paris which meets tomorrow absorbs all attention. Within the last few days the certain reliance upon the peaceful result has been much shaken. It has been long known that England would insist on several additions to the terms already accepted by Russia, and that she would be supported in her demands by Sardinia. But it was not supposed that she would be able to carry France with her. Hence a peace was regarded as inevitable. But within the last week it is said



that France has yielded, and will act in complete accord with the cabinet of Great Britain. The allies will demand not only the abandonment of Bormasund, and foreign consulates in the Black Sea, but the destruction of Nicolaieff also. The political circles at Turin think it impossible that the Czar will agree to such humiliations, and hence are now inclined to doubt a solution which was a little while ago regarded as a fixed fact.

I give these rumours because at such a season they have their importance. I think however that the expectations of this country are somewhat biased by its hopes. It has always looked upon a peace which will give Sardinia nothing as a greater calamity than a continuance of the war; and lately its new loan of thirty millions has been taken up in London. With a replenished treasury it is doubly bellicose. My own belief is that Russia will make peace even at the price of Nicolaieff. It will be a humiliation, but will not diminish her strength, and there is scarcely any sacrifice of pride which she will not make to break the alliance.

Meanwhile the enlistment of men in the Anglo-Italian Legion continues with remarkable activity. Since the prospect of peace it has been found exceedingly easy to obtain volunteers. It is already between three and four thousand. A curious incident occurred three days ago. The English authorities keep one of their stations at Novara on the Austrian frontier for the purpose of getting deserters. One of these being caught by the Austrians, they took care to have the poor creature dressed for his execution in the complete uniform of the British service, and pierced his red coat with a dozen balls.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 46*

Turin, March 1, 1856

Sir: In the early part of this week, I received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs a communication stating that two soldiers from a Sardinian regiment quartered at Genoa had deserted, carried off the musical instruments of their regiment, been received on board the American squadron and enlisted there as musicians; that Commodore Breese<sup>68</sup> had been duly applied to and had refused to do anything in the case. Hence

<sup>68</sup> Samuel L. Breese, guardiamarina il 14 maggio 1846; guardiamarina anziano l'8 giugno 1852, sergente il 15 settembre 1855; luogotenente il 16 settembre 1855, luogotenente comandante il 16 luglio 1862, comandante il 14 aprile 1867, capitano il 26 aprile 1878, collocato a riposo il 30 marzo 1888. Morì il 18 luglio 1899.

the Minister requested my interposition. He referred me to the clause in our Treaty which declares that sailors deserting from American vessels on the Sardinian coast, or from Sardinian vessels on the American coast, shall be delivered up by the respective authorities. He argued that this clause was applicable to soldiers deserting to the ships as well as to sailors flying from them.

I am far from thinking this interpretation of the treaty a just one, though it is favourable to us—giving a right to claim our fugitives from labour should they find their way to the decks of Sardinian ships. But at all events it seemed certain that the American squadron in the Sardinian ports should not become an asylum for deserters. I interrogated Commodore Breese, therefore, without loss of time; and had the pleasure to find the charge to be unfounded. No such persons were on the vessels of the squadron, or had ever been there. The commanding officer never refused to surrender them, but, on the contrary, had offered every facility for investigation. The entire affair was a mistake on the part of the Sardinian Government.

It is a matter of no great importance, but as the rumour that we were sheltering deserters made some little stir among the officials here, it is deemed proper to send this statement to the Department with the correspondence appended.

Mr. Leese, the new Consul at Spezia, passed here yesterday on the way to his post.

***Luigi Cibrario a John M. Daniel*<sup>69</sup>**

Turin, le 24 Février 1856

Monsieur le Ministre: Le Ministre de la Guerre me fait connaître que ces jours derniers à Gênes, deux soldats musiciens du 3<sup>me</sup> régiment d'infanterie en garnison dans la dite ville, les nommés Codazabetta Antoine et Alessio Félix, ont déserté en emportant des instrumens de musique appartenants les uns au régiment, d'autres à leurs camarades, et se sont réfugiés à bord des bâtimens de guerre des Etats Unis présentement stationnés dans le port de Gênes.

Mon Collègue ajoute que jusqu'ici les démarches faites au nom de

<sup>69</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 46 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 9, vol. 8, pp. 82-87.

Mr. le Commandant Général Militaire de la Division de Gênes auprès de Mr. le Commodore de l'escadre Américaine pour obtenir la remise des déserteurs susdits et la restitution des instruments qu'ils ont emportés avec eux n'ont pu avoir le résultat désiré.

J'ignore, Monsieur le Ministre, les motifs qu'a pu avoir Mr le Commodore de se refuser à seconder cette demande des Autorités Royales; tout comme j'ai peine à comprendre comment dans le port même de Gênes on ait pu accueillir à bord d'un bâtiment de la *Marine de Guerre* des Etats — Unis des déserteurs de l'Armée Royale, ou du moins les y garder du moment où leur véritable condition a été connue du Commandant de ce navire.

Quoi qu'il en soit, je m'empresse, Mr le Ministre, de porter le fait à votre connaissance en vous priant de vouloir bien interposer vos bons offices auprès de Mr. le Commodore pour obtenir qu'il consente à la remise des déserteurs susdits aux mains de l'autorité, dans le cas où il ne jugerait pas préférable de les engager à retourner volontairement sous les drapeaux. Je vous prie à cette occasion de vouloir bien remarquer, Mr le Ministre, qu'aux termes de l'article 17 du traité du 26. Novembre 1838. entre la Sardaigne et les Etats Unis, les Autorités Sardes seraient tenues et ne se feraient pas faute de faire arrêter et mettre à la disposition des Agents Consulaires des Etats Unis, à la suite de demande régulière, les individus appartenant à l'équipage d'un bâtiment Américain soit *de guerre* soit *marchand* qui auraient déserté de leur bord et se seraient réfugiés à terre, et qu'une pareille disposition est applicable par réciprocité aux déserteurs des navires Sardes aux Etats Unis.

Si donc les bâtiments Américains qui sont à l'ancre dans le port de Gênes pourraient à bon droit réclamer et obtiendraient sans peine, le cas échéant, l'extradition de leurs déserteurs, j'aime à croire que cette circonstance vous paraîtra, ainsi qu'à Mr. le Commodore, un motif de plus de ne pas permettre que les dits navires servent d'asile à des déserteurs de l'armée Royale

En invoquant au surplus à l'appui de ma demande les relations d'amitié et de parfait accord qui unissent nos deux Gouvernements, ainsi que la réciprocité de bon procédé dont useraient inmanquablement en pareille circonstance les Commandants des Navires de Guerre Sardes dans un port Américain, j'attendrai avec confiance, Monsieur le Ministre, le résultat de votre obligeante intervention à cet égard, et je vous prie en attendant d'agréer les assurances réitérées de ma considération très distinguée.

Turin, Feb. 29, 1856

Sir. I have delayed this reply to your note dated the 24th inst.—containing the grave charge that two deserters from the Sardinian Army, carrying with them the musical instruments of their regiment, had been received and protected by the American squadron now lying in the port of Genoa, and that all steps for their recovery had been disregarded by the officer of the United States in command—for the purpose of demanding and receiving the explanations of the said officer relative thereto.

I now have the honour to inform you, that the Minister of War, on whose authority the charge is made, has, in my belief, arrived at his conclusions on erroneous information.

The American Commodore declares that he has personally examined all the vessels in the squadron under his command, and assures me that no such persons as those described and named by your Excellency are there, or have ever been there.

The details of this investigation will be found in the extract from his letter to me which I shall append to the present communication. Hoping that they will sufficiently satisfy the Sardinian Government that the said squadron has not « served as an asylum for deserters from the Royal Army, »—and availing myself of the occasion to renew the assurances of my distinguished consideration

**Samuel L. Breese a John M. Daniel** <sup>71</sup>

[Genoa, February 1856]

... I fear the necessity for any communication on the subject is attributable to my omission to reply to a note addressed to me by the *U.S. Consul* here on the 18th inst. in the matter, in which he apprises me of the desertion of two musicians from the Sardinian service, the *belief* of the authorities that they had been received on board one of the vessels of the Squadron, and a request from such authorities that I would cause them if found to be delivered up. Ever desirous to do all

<sup>70</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 46 di Daniel

<sup>71</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 46 di Daniel

that might be proper and consistent with duties, to conciliate, and in an especial manner not to permit any act that might justly be deemed offensive to the Sardinian Government, the hospitalities of whose port we have for a series of years enjoyed, I immediately addressed to the Commander of each vessel of the Squadron the following order—

« Genoa, Feb. 19th 1856:—

Sir. I forward [sic] for your perusal a communication from the U.S. Consul at this place, which please return to me. Should persons answering this description, or who you have reason to believe may be bound to service to the Sardinian Government present themselves for enlistment, you will refuse to receive them and give the requisite notice to the police. Great care must be observed here and elsewhere on this point, to avoid controversy and trouble ».

Learning from the commanders that no such persons were shipped or had presented themselves for that purpose, I thought no more of the matter, until the receipt of your communication this morning. I have now made again, *personally*, a strict enquiry, and beg through you to inform his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs that saving some six or seven *American* seamen discharged in this port, properly certified by the U.S. Consul, none have been enlisted or received on board any of the vessels of the Squadron, except two Italians, Denegri Alessandro [sic] & Ferrari Giacinto, who entered no longer since than *yesterday* on board the *Saranac*, each of them provided with a *passport*, vised by the *police* here, and *certified* to in the usual manner by the U.S. Consul. But that there may exist no doubt on the minds of the authorities here that these two *last* named are *not* the persons in *question*, I have suggested to the Consul my wish that an officer of the regiment might be sent on board to recognize them as such, if by possibility they have *forged passports*, which is not *probable* I think.

In conclusion, I beg you will, with this statement of the circumstances, assure the Sardinian Government that the Commander of the U. S. Squadron here is too jealous of his country's credit, and regards too highly the preservation of the friendly relations existing between it and Sardinia, to permit the exercise of any act by those under his orders that may be construed as offensive to treaty stipulations, municipal regulations or the courteous conduct that each has a right to expect from the other, and which I am happy to add has been constantly observed toward us by the authorities here

Sir. The important result of the Conference at Paris has been received without emotion or comment in Piedmont. The particulars of the Treaty are not yet officially known, nor has Mr Cavour yet returned to Turin. When the whole subject is fully exposed, more will doubtless be said. The Piedmontese plenipotentiary, above named, is said to have written to his friends, that the compact made at Paris is most advantageous to this country. But what he rests on in making this assertion is difficult to understand. Mr Cavour and his party will put the best face on the matter; but the truth is manifest, that Piedmont has gained nothing but the esteem of France and England. It is true that the public expected little, the undertaking of this war was compulsory; and under existing circumstances it was impossible to obtain any material increase of power. Various schemes of aggrandizement were, it is true, circulated in the political circles; such for example as the proposition to give the Danubian principalities to the Duke of Modena; the Duchy of Modena to the Regent of Parma; and Parma to Piedmont. But these schemes were all impracticable; and it is rumoured here that when Count Cavour attempted to broach the condition of Italy in the Conference, Buol, the Austrian Plenipotentiary, arose to say that he had come there to settle the Eastern not the Italian question; that he had no powers on the latter point, and that he protested against its introduction. Count Cavour was, in consequence, compelled to confine his communications to the ear of the French Emperor, where it is probable they effected little.

Meanwhile the State of Parma is again in semi-revolution. Since the murder of the late duke it has never been tranquil, and the animosity of the people has taken the form of organized assassination. Three of the ministers have fallen beneath the knife. Each of them received a formal notice of his doom; and several others are said now to have been similarly warned. All attempts to detect the murderers having failed, the authorities have put the city in a state of siege, and filled the prisons with the most respectable people of the Duchy.

The American squadron in the Mediterranean, comprising the *Congress*, *Constellation* and *Saranac*, are still at Genoa where they have passed nearly the whole of the past winter.

*Dispaccio n. 48*

Turin, April 13, 1856

Sir: It is now known that Count Cavour, by the cooperation of the French Emperor, has succeeded in forcing the Conference at Paris to hear from him a memorial relating to the state of Italy.

After describing the backward condition of the peninsula and attributing it principally to the misgovernment of the Church, he proposes, as a remedy, to limit the authority of the Pope to ecclesiastical affairs; to form a constitutional government at Rome, with parliament and responsible ministers; to separate [sic] the states of the Church now known as the Legations from the rest, and to form them into a new Italian principality under an independent, hereditary and constitutional ruler.

So much of this Piedmontese plan as refers to the abolition of the papal authority is at once intelligible. But the second part, the formation of another little Italian dukedom, seems at first sight a strange way to strengthen a country whose chief weakness is its division. It is therefore necessary to mention that the Legations, above mentioned, though parts of the papal territory, have been for sometime occupied by Austrian troops, and that this may be deemed the easiest way of clearing them out. Austria and the Church are the great bug-bears of the Italian reformers, and eternal obstacles in the way of change. The Piedmontese plan, if carried into execution, would at once annihilate the latter and place the entering wedge in the power of the first.

Count Cavour's memorial contemplates no immediate action. But it is probable that France and England permitted him to present these ideas to Europe because they are not unwilling to make use of them at some future day. The quarrel with Russia is over; and some lofty foreign project is always useful to keep the people in a good mood. A re-organization of Italy would be a fine bauble; and this memorial may be the first step of a considerable movement and change in this peninsula.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 49*

Turin, April 20, 1856

Sir: Please receive herewith the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending March 31, 1856.

The Austrian forces in the Duchy of Parma have taken possession of all the military points between that territory and the Piedmontese frontier. The Sardinian troops now returning from the Crimea are to be confronted to them along the line. Collision between these people is not impossible.

It is the universal dictum here that the present state of affairs cannot endure, and that ere a year is ended there will be wars in Italy. I can see no reason why the present arrangement of the peninsula cannot continue, except that every body says it cannot. When people get convinced that there will be a change, it is easy to make one. The Piedmontese government may succeed in getting up a disturbance within the time named, as it is now the dearest wish of its heart.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 50*

Turin, May 20, 1856

Sir. The excitement and speculation relative to the late war have pretty well disappeared. In another month it will be as if it had never been. The Sardinians have quietly settled down to the conclusion that they are just where they were before.

It is not to be supposed, however, that this fact has at all injured the internal prestige of the Sardinian Government. Never has the Ministry been so powerful and popular. There is literally no opposition since the war. When Count Cavour returned from the Conference, he made in Parliament a very ingenious and able statement of his mission. He explained the bearing of his proposition to secularize the government of those provinces of the Church known as the Legations—namely to weaken the temporal power of the Pope, which he proclaimed to be the great bar to Italian independence. He dwelt much on the fact that the cause of this country and the evils which flow from the occupation by foreigners had been deliberately stated in the face of Europe and received its apparent sympathy. At the conclusion of this speech, the Premier



received an unanimous vote of approbation. All factions unite in his praise. Yet I can see no foundation for his new glory, save a few bold words. It is probable that others share this opinion; as I observe the caricatures of the day represent the Premier, who is a remarkably stout gentleman, climbing to the skies on a ladder of smoke.

Meanwhile, the public has been a little alarmed by the rumours of a secret treaty between France, Austria and England, about which little is certainly known. But whether such a treaty exists or not, nothing is more evident than the fact, that Sardinia and England are bound together for better and for worse, and that this pair are bent on making mischief in Italy if they possibly can. The Emperor of the French, however, limits their power for evil. The Austrian troops can never be forced out of the Papal States while the French are there; and there is not the slightest probability that the latter will be removed to gratify the wishes of Sardinia. Every day brings forth new proofs of an understanding between France and Austria. It is not likely, therefore, that the inclinations of England and her Italian satellite will come to acts; and the present political arrangements of the peninsula may, and I think will, outlast our time. The feeling between Austria and Sardinia has however lately reached such a pitch, that there is now a possibility that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires may be withdrawn from Turin.

Meanwhile there is one curious fact in view—that since the war has been ended a Russian party has sprung up in this country <sup>72</sup> The ground on which it advocates a close alliance with the Emperor Alexander is their common hatred to Austria.

A Russian envoy has been here to give the official notification of the said Emperor's accession to the throne, and Sardinia is preparing an important embassy in return. It is undecided whether the ambassador shall be the Prince of Carignan (uncle to the present king) or General Dabormida, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The salary of the new mission has been declared the same with that at Paris, to-wit 80,000 francs (\$ 16,000).

Another change has taken place in the organization of the Cabinet. Mr. Cibrario has retired from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has

<sup>72</sup> Nel 1848 la Russia aveva rotto le relazioni diplomatiche con il regno di Sardegna, ma, quando i rapporti russo-austriaci peggiorarono durante la guerra di Crimea, la Russia cominciò a dimostrare tendenze più amichevoli verso la Sardegna. Le relazioni divennero più cordiali anche per la simpatia personale che nacque durante il congresso di Parigi fra Cavour e Orloff, il rappresentante russo. Il ravvicinamento russo-sardo portò alla ripresa delle relazioni diplomatiche fra i due paesi e, nell'agosto del 1856, alla designazione del conte Stackelberg a ministro plenipotenziario a Torino.

taken the office of First President of the Court of Appeals, the highest legal tribunal of the kingdom Cavour resumes the Foreign Office, retaining as before the Ministry of Finance and the Presidency of the Council.

As a sequel to this change, Mr Mossi, so long the agent of the Sardinian Government in the United States and who has been Assistant Secretary of State at Turin since the commencement of my residence here, gives way to the Count de Salmour (a tool of Cavour), and is sent to Constantinople as Minister Resident. This change is not to be regretted. Mr. Mossi has exhibited anything but good feeling towards the United States since he has gotten back to his native soil. He it was, and he alone, who prevented the acceptance of Foresti, as Consul of the United States at Genoa, three years ago.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 51*

Turin, June 7, 1856

Sir: If credit is due to the press of Sardinia, Belgium and England, Italy is on the eve of a revolutionary explosion. But I am much deceived if there is the slightest foundation for the rumours of that nature now abroad. So far as I can see, the Italian people were never less disposed to uproar than at present. The restlessness is confined in the circle of statesmen and rulers. It is the ambition of the Sardinian oligarchy to drive out the Austrians and take their territory; it is the earnest desire of the Austrian empire to preserve its present position. The Sardinian politicians believe the present moment apt for the accomplishment of their long-cherished designs. Hence they endeavour to spread the belief that the Italian people are suffering and excited, which is true to a certain point, but not more true now than it has been for the last thousand years, Italy having been governed by strangers and discontented with them during all of that time. The manoeuvres of the Sardinian Government will produce no revolution, nor even a war, in Italy, because liberal Italy is dependent on France, its revolution must commence in Paris if it ever commences at all; and France is contented under her able despot.

What we are really about to witness, is only a great diplomatic war, which has already commenced, and will continue to furnish rumours to the public for a long time; the Sardinian Ministry began it at Paris, and the Austrian diplomats have not been idle since the Conference. In Italy

their main policy seems to be the excitation of the jealousy and distrust between the various nations, which compose that geographical denomination, which has always been their common characteristic, and one great cause of their national imbecility. The Cabinet of Vienna has addressed to its Legations at Rome, Florence and Naples, a circular, the chief idea of which is contained in the following paragraph « We admit the condition of Italy is not now all that could be desired; but the real Italian question is this—should that condition be attributed to the governments now in possession of the country or to the late efforts of its revolutionary parties?—The latter supposition is the true answer, and the accusations uttered by Count Cavour at the Conference are only the more surprising when one asks on what right does Sardinia set herself up in the position of protectress of all Italy? If that assumption is founded on a policy more or less conformable to that of the Italian revolutionary party, no pretence should be more profoundly deplored, or can be less consistent with the continued tranquillity of Europe. »

Diplomatic notes of the same tenor seem to be passing in every direction. In one, addressed to the government at Paris, allegations of so grave a nature have been made against the Piedmontese Cabinet, that it is now said that the Premier Cavour is about to undertake a second journey into France for the purpose of combatting them. This rumour is, however, but uncertain. In the meantime, the Sardinian Government openly encourages the expression of popular feeling in its own territory on the side it has assumed. All the newspapers published here are now more or less influenced by the Ministry, and they all play the same tune. Banquets of students have been held at Genoa and Turin, at which an uproarious patriotism has been but gently repressed. On the other hand, a paper in the hands of the clerical party having commented too freely on these demonstrations, and having nicknamed the students « *bimbi Italiani* »—baby patriots—its editor has been fined three thousand francs, and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment.

One great obstacle to those who desire confusion lies in the financial excitement which prevails in all the countries connected with France. The Emperor has set his people on fire with his credit-mobilier. The spirit of speculation and the lust of gain are nearly as rife in France now as they were in the days of Law.<sup>73</sup> Sardinia is strongly infected by

<sup>73</sup> Il riferimento è a John Law, avventuriero scozzese che promosse in Francia un fantastico schema finanziario attraverso il quale egli attribuiva a sé e alla sua Compagnia delle Indie Orientali la sovranità su tutto il territorio della Luisiana alla sola condizione di un legame formale al re di Francia e dell'offerta di una corona d'oro di

the same influences. Efforts are being made to create a corporation similar to that of France, above named, here in Turin, to operate over all Italy. Meantime the most gigantic schemes of internal improvement are under discussion in Parliament. One of them is a tunnel through the Mt. Cenis, to connect the railways of France with those of Piedmont, no less than eighteen miles long.

For the moment, the ovation of General Lamarmora, the Sardinian commander in the Crimea, furnishes some distraction. He has no end of honours—on Sunday the King himself gives him a dinner at the palace, at which the members of the diplomatic corps (who wear uniforms) and other functionaries of State are to be present, while the populace are to be treated to a free banquet on the Champ d'Armes. But this is not all. Parliament has granted him fifty acres of land within the walls of Turin, which, when built on, will constitute for the General's family a great hereditary fortune. His old place in the Cabinet, the Ministry of War, is vacated for his re-inauguration there. It is hard to say what he has done to deserve all this. He has marshalled no field, gained no victory, conquered no country. In the Crimea, he did his duty in a comparatively subaltern position. All that can be said in his favour is, that he kept his troops in good trim and suffered no disgrace. But the Italians have so long seen their armies come back to them in piteous plight, that when a general goes to the wars and returns as well off in name and fame as he has, they are suddenly intoxicated with his glory.

Your dispatch No. 17, dated at Washington May 19, 1856, informing me that a box of documents was forwarded [sic] to this Legation from the Department, has been received.<sup>74</sup> About the present period in the last year, I had a similar intimation from the Department, but the box then indicated never arrived. I hope that the present package will have better success; but I should mention that the reason why the other miscarried, is most probably the imperfect manner in which such things are generally directed. Boxes of books for American legations in Europe have to pass through many custom-houses in which English is never understood, and in all of which the officials are exceedingly stupid. Unless the direction

trenta carati all'inizio di ogni nuovo regno. Dal 1716 al 1720 l'intera struttura finanziaria francese rimase coinvolta negli schemi di Law e quando egli fece bancarotta, l'affare fu chiamato *Mississippi Bubble*. Vedi *Great Events by Famous Historians*, vol. 13, pp. 1-15

<sup>74</sup> L'istruzione n. 17, Washington, 18 maggio 1856, informava Daniel che le casse inviate contenevano una parte dei documenti della I sessione del 33° congresso e, completi, quelli della II sessione. Un'altra cassa, indirizzata al governo toscano, doveva essere consegnata al console degli S.U. a Livorno.

is clearly made, and without abbreviations [sic], the missive will never be heard of again. For instance, few French, and no Sardinian, *douamer* will ever comprehend that « U.S. » means « United States ».

P. S. I append a translation of the official text of the Austrian note above referred [sic] to, published since this dispatch was written. It differs in form, but not in essence, from the extract previously given.<sup>75</sup>

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 18*      Department of State, Washington, July 29, 1856

Sir. Some of the powers which were represented in the late Congress of Plenipotentiaries at Paris, have presented to this Government, for its concurrence therein, the principles and propositions respecting neutral rights contained in Protocol [sic] 23 and 24. Pursuant to the direction of the President, I have replied to that application on the part of France by a note addressed to the Count de Sartiges, the representative of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French to this Government.<sup>76</sup> With a copy of that reply you are herewith furnished. The views of the President on the subject are presented in that note. He finds himself unable to agree to the first principle in the « Declaration », contained in Protocol No. 23— which proposes to abolish privateering, or to the propositions in the Protocol No. 24, which declares the indivisibility of the four principles of the « Déclaration », and surrenders the liberty to negotiate in regard to neutral rights except on inadmissible conditions. It cannot have been the object of the governments represented in the Congress at Paris to obstruct the adoption of principles which all approve and are willing to observe, unless they are encumbered by an unrelated principle to which some governments cannot accede without a more

<sup>75</sup> Allegato vi è il seguente ritaglio di giornale datato Vienna, 18 maggio, in inglese, e il testo ufficiale della nota austriaca riguardante la Sardegna

« Besides drawing up the treaty of peace, the Congress of Paris settled moot points in international law. The plenipotentiaries all agreed to the doctrines. First, privateering is and remains abolished. Second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. Third, neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag. Fourth, blockades in order to be binding must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy's coast. The United States of America did not subscribe to this convention »

<sup>76</sup> Conte di Sartiges, inviato e ministro plenipotenziario francese a Washington. Presentò le credenziali il 29 maggio 1851, lasciò l'incarico il 20 maggio 1859.

extended application of it than that which is proposed by the Paris Congress

You are instructed by the President to propose to the Government of Sardinia, to enter into an arrangement for its adherence with the United States, to the four principles of the Declaration of the Congress, provided the first of them is amended, as specified in my note to the Count de Sartiges. Without such amendment, the President is constrained for many weighty reasons, some of which are stated in that note, to decline acceding to the first principle of the «Declaration». The President, however, will readily give his assent to the remaining three principles. He entertains the hope that the powers represented in the Congress at Paris, will take early measures to release each other from the restrictions imposed by the Protocol No. 24. He is much encouraged by the recollection that France as well as Russia and Prussia, has heretofore, favored liberal doctrines in regard to neutral rights and the freedom of the seas, in the hope that these powers will concur in the course suggested in the note addressed to Count de Sartiges.

The solicitude of the President to maintain the most friendly relations with the Government of Sardinia, makes it also important for him to know what will be the treatment of American privateers upon the high seas and in Sardinian ports, in case the United States should unhappily be at war with any other power which has acceded to the Declaration. It is not reasonable to expect that they will ever forego a resort to privateers in case they become involved in war with a commercial state. If such war should happen with a nation which has acceded to the «Declaration», proposed by the Congress at Paris, will the neutral nations which may have also acceded to it, treat our privateers in any respect differently from the manner in which they have been heretofore treated by them? Will the privateers of the powers which do not become parties to the Declaration receive the same immunities in all neutral ports which have been heretofore accorded to such privateers? To prevent future misunderstanding, it is important that on these points this Government should be furnished with the views of the governments which have agreed to that «Declaration» or may accede to it. You are therefore instructed by the President to make these enquiries [sic] of the Government of Sardinia.

Though the President does not seriously apprehend that the rights of the United States in regard to the employment of privateers will be affected directly or indirectly by the new state of things which may arise out of the proceedings of the Congress at Paris, yet it would be gratifying

to him to be assured by the Government of Sardinia, that no new complications in our relations with it are likely to spring from those proceedings. He trusts that, so long as Sardinia is, and he anxiously desires she should ever be, a friendly power, her ports will be, as they heretofore have been, a refuge from the dangers of the sea and from attack as well for our privateers as for our merchant vessels and national ships of war in the event of hostilities between any other European power and this country

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 52*

Turin, July 31, 1856

Sir: Enclosed you will please receive the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending on the 30th of June 1856.

I have written nothing for the past month, because no occurrence of sufficient political signification has transpired here to require notice. The « Italian question » has disappeared from the horizon,—no one seems to know how. The truth is, as I have always stated, no real question ever existed. The present state of affairs in Italy will probably outlast our time.

During the past week, some seventy or eighty misguided persons in the neighborhood of Spezia made an armed inroad into the Modenese territory, under the impression that the population needed only a signal to rise against the Austrians there.<sup>77</sup> But as is always the case, the combination came to nothing. The population remained perfectly tranquil, and the party were glad to retreat into the Sardinian territory and to fall, as they did, into the hands of the Piedmontese police. I mention it as a specimen of Italian politics.

At present the king is at a country seat, and the ministry is amusing itself on Lake Maggiore.

I have had several pieces of business to transact on behalf of Americans, but they have been too unimportant to detail in dispatches. The two most considerable were the case of the American ship *Lebanon*, seized and fined four thousand francs on a charge of smuggling tobacco; and

<sup>77</sup> Ci si riferisce alla banda capitanata da Ratti che il 26 luglio da Sarzana passò il confine estense a Parmignola, senza trovare, però, le bande del Carrarese. Disarmarono alcuni doganieri, interruppero la linea telegrafica Sarzana-Massa e poi furono dispersi dagli Estensi a Ortanova. Ventuno insorti furono arrestati in territorio sardo e tradotti a Sarzana.

that of William Jones, a citizen of the United States confined in the jails of Genoa on insufficient evidence. I got the fine of the ship reduced to two hundred francs, and I demanded and obtained the liberation of Jones the moment the facts came to my knowledge. His imprisonment having been an aggravated one and wholly unjust, I should have demanded damages in his behalf, had he evinced the slightest disposition to pursue the matter further. But he seemed so well satisfied with his escape that he would make no application, and the affair ended with his release.

P.S. The lines of ocean steamers, which will connect the commerce of this kingdom directly with that of America, will go into actual operation this fall. Two steamers will run between Rio, the capital of Brazil, and Genoa; and two others between New York and Genoa. The first line will commence its course in October, the second in November. This event would have taken place a year ago, but for the war. The steamers have been up to this time employed in the transportation to and from the Crimea.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 53*

Turin, August 25, 1856

Sir. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's important Dispatch No. 18, dated the 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1856, enclosing four copies of the reply made by the Government of the United States to the proposition of the Allied Powers relative to privateering. I shall hasten to open a correspondence with the Sardinian Ministry on the points named in the said dispatch, and will in due time communicate the result.

I have also to acknowledge the receipt of two boxes of public documents and volumes from the State Department directed to this Legation, a list of which may be found at the end of this dispatch. (Appendix A).

A new difficulty between the master of an American ship, the *Ellen A. Parsons*, and the custom-house authorities at Genoa on the usual point—smuggled tobacco—has been brought before this Legation. Some other business of the same character has been transacted here during the past month, but of too little importance to obtain a further notice.

Of Italian politics there are no real news. All is quiet. The rumours of approaching revolutions in this peninsula, circulated by the



European and American press, are, as I have repeatedly remarked, without the slightest foundation in fact or probability.

Indeed the whole of Europe seems to me unusually calm. The subject which attracts most attention is the struggle now in progress in the United States. It is impossible to conceive the exultation with which it is everywhere watched by the partizans [sic] of the existing system of European governments. Everywhere I find they flatter themselves with the conceit that the last day of the Republic is at hand. Never until now, did I know with what uneasiness they have regarded our existence and prosperity. The belief that their dangers are now over has induced them to throw aside the disguises of indifference and hauteur, and to show plainly that they have ever calculated our good as their evil.

### *Contenuto della cassa*<sup>78</sup>

*Spedizione 24 luglio 1855*

Excutive Documents	Vols. 1 in 2 p'ts, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 in 2 p'ts. 8.9.10.11.12.13.14.16	Vols
1st Session, 33d Congress 1853-54	17.19—in all	20
Ex. Docs—Maps accompanying Message.		1
Senate Documents	Vols 1.2 3.4.5.6. in 2 p'ts. 7 8	
E st Sess 33d Congress.	1853-54 9 10.11.12. in 2 p'ts 13—in all	15
Sen. Docs: Maps		1
Senate Reports	1853-54 Vols. 1.2 in 2pts. in all	3
Senate Miscellaneous	1853-54	1
Senate Journal	1853-54	1
Senate Jourl 2d Sep. 33d Congress	1854-55.	1
House Repts of Committees, 1st Sep. 33d Congress	1853-54	3
Hous (sic) Miscellaneous	1853-54	1
Hous Journal	1853-54	1
Hous Jourl 2d Sep. 33.	Congress 1854-55	1
Annals of Congress	1813-19 inclusive in all	8
Wheaton's Elements of International Law		1
		<hr/>
		Total Vols: 58
		continued

<sup>78</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 53 di Daniel

*Spedizione 19 maggio 1856*

Executive Documents	Vols 15 p 'ts 1.1 2	Vols	
1st Sess. 33d.	Congress 1853-54	vol 18 p'ts 1.2.4 in all,	6
Ex. Docs. 2d Sep. 33d	Congress 1854-55	Vols 1 in 3	
	p'ts. 2.3.4.5.6 7. in 3 p'ts 8.9.10.13.14—in all		16
Senate Documents, 2d Sep. 33d	Congress 1854-55		13
Senate Miscellaneous	1854-55		3
Senate Reports	1854-55		1
House Miscellaneous, 2d Sep. 33d.	Congress 1854-55		1
House Reports of Committees	1854-55		1
House list of Private claims from 1st to 31st	Congress		
	Vols 2 3 in all		2
Annals of Congress	1819-23	inclusive—in all	6
			<hr/>
Total Vols:			49

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 54*

Turin, September 30, 1856

Sir: I have yet received no definite communication from the Sardinian Government as to the course it will pursue towards privateers in future wars. It is probable that Count Cavour waits orders from Paris or London. There is great reason to believe that the Congress of Paris will re-assemble. Such is the current rumour. The condition of Europe gives to it a certain probability. The late revolutionary attempts in Switzerland, the continued occupation of Greece, the protests of Russia, the disputes between that power and England, and more than all the dictation to the King of Naples attempted by the Allies, furnish sufficient matter for such a movement. If a new Congress is contemplated, your agent here will get no assurances from the Sardinian Ministry until after its meeting. Even if there shall be no such Congress, I am satisfied that Sardinia will take no important step or commit itself to any definite course of future action, except in concert with the two leading powers whose satellite it has become.

Meantime the movement against Naples, of which your ministers nearer the centres of action have without doubt given you full accounts, absorbs public attention, and is in fact the most important affair that has

had place in the peninsula since I have been here.<sup>79</sup> The king of Naples is much detested in this region, yet all intelligent persons unite in condemning this attempt on the part of foreign nations, whose interests are unaffected by the political condition of that country, to interfere in its domestic arrangements. If such a precedent is set what becomes of international law? What country that is weak can consider itself secure from similar interference?

It is nevertheless commonly believed that if the French and English ministers are withdrawn and their squadrons sail for the Bay of Naples, they will be accompanied by a Sardinian frigate, and that this little country will again play the part of the pilot fish to the sharks. A considerable activity has been of late observed in the naval department at Genoa, and there has been a continual passing and repassing of couriers between Paris and Turin. The Sardinian Minister in France was the other day recalled here by a special train; and after a brief interview with the Premier returned to his post with the same speed. The Sardinian press looks unfavourably on the project, but that does not render it less probable.

But it is my own belief that no squadron will ever be sent against Naples from any quarter. The measure is too high-handed and outrageous for our times. Public opinion will call back the governments of France and England. The universal fall in public securities shows how much a new disturbance of the present brief tranquillity is dreaded. The Neapolitan affair will end in a new Congress at Paris, which will be only a little more wordy and indecisive than the last.

The American affairs to which I have had to attend during the past month, have been too trifling to require a notice here. They have been principally marine disputes at Genoa.

The Empress Mother of Russia visits Nice. The King is there and his Court will receive her there; and it is expected that the Emperor of the French will take opportunity to return the visit of the former to Paris last year. A Russian Legation has been established at Turin; the first that has been seen here since 1848 and the change in the Government which then took place.

I take the opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, dated the 15th of this month, relative to the provisions made by Con-

<sup>79</sup> Per il testo del dispaccio di R. D. Owen del 4 ottobre 1858 da Napoli al segretario di Stato Marcy concernente l'argomento vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations* cit., pp. 330-331.

gress for the payment of Ministers Resident. The act of Congress therein referred to has never reached this Legation.<sup>80</sup>

*John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy*

*Dispaccio n. 55*

Turin, October 11, 1856

Sir: The Sardinian Government has kept for some days at Genoa a squadron ready to sail at a moment's notice. It consists of the *Carlo Alberto*, screw frigate of 60 guns; the *Governolo*, side-wheel frigate of 16, the *Euridice*, a sail frigate of 40 guns; with the *Tanaro*—a large transport steamer for munitions of war. This squadron (it is believed, and I think with reason) was destined for Naples, and kept in readiness to join the French vessels the moment they left Toulon. But within the last few days all idea of an exhibition against Naples seems to have been abandoned; and to-day it is announced that these vessels have other destinations.

Some English ships of war have made their appearance in the Mediterranean; but no French vessel has left the harbour of Toulon; and it is currently reported in well-informed circles that the Emperor's intentions have become averse to the English plan.

In the meantime, I have not received a word of reply from the Sardinian Government to my communications on the subject of privateering. On all minor topics their answers are speedy. I am daily confirmed in the opinion, expressed in my last dispatch, that this with many other interesting questions will be reserved for a new Congress of plenipotentiaries which will assemble in Paris. No authentic declaration of such a scheme has yet appeared; but the *on dit* takes every day more consistency. The last Congress, assuming to itself a general legislative power, naturally made as much work for the future as it settled for the past; and if its probable successor acts on the same system, it may be expected to become a species of semi-annual assembly.

The political circles of Turin are just now engrossed with a piece of social scandal. I have never thought it proper to relate any of the innumerable private histories that are always in circulation here, about the public persons; but regard the present an exceptional case, from the importance it holds in the popular estimation. The late Duke of Genoa,

<sup>80</sup> La circolare senza numero, Washington, 15 settembre 1856, riguardava lo stipendio di Daniel

brother to the king and head of the family which will inherit the throne should the king's children die before him, left a widow, daughter of the king of Saxony, who is by the law of royal succession guardian to the Duke's heirs. This amiable lady has hitherto been remarked as an instance of great piety and extraordinary virtue at the « gay » court of a decidedly « gay » country. It has been, however, lately rumoured that the widowed Duchess was pregnant,—and that the cause of it was an obscure citizen without the slightest pretensions to rank, or noble blood. All this was regarded as an accident which might easily have been denied and forgotten. But the lady's unfortunate regard for morality and religion induced her to seek one of the bishops, who are opposed to the government and therefore always ready to do anything that the Ministry would dislike, and got him to celebrate a private marriage between herself and the father of her child. So well and promptly did she act, that it was all over before the Ministry got wind of the affair, and the steps which they took to prevent it were anticipated by the fact. The procedure is visited by the severe censure of the higher circles and may entail some disagreeable consequences on the Duchess. That she had so peculiar intimacy does not seem to be the point on which her conduct is condemned—it is the legitimization of her affections, only, that is reckoned wicked—and this is supposed to be so deep a fault that the Council of the Family will probably deprive her of the guardianship over her own children—The consideration she has hitherto enjoyed will of course be lost—Such is the « noble » view of the case. But the middle classes seem inclined to give it a milder air,—while the populace receive the story as a new proof of the democratic tendencies of the reigning family of Piedmont.<sup>81</sup>

### ***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 56*

Turin, Nov. 8, 1856

Sir: The Sardinian Government still delay their reply on the privateering question. As I am informed by Mr. Mason, the American Minister at Paris, with whom I correspond, and who has made communications to the French Government on this subject similar to those with which I was charged, that he has experienced a similar reticence on the

<sup>81</sup> Il Daniel si riferisce al matrimonio di Elisabetta di Genova col cap marchese Niccolò di Rapallo

part of France, it becomes evident that the allied powers have taken all this time to concert a general reply. I once thought the matter would be brought before a new Congress at Paris; but the probabilities of such an assembly have latterly grown less, owing, it is said, to an unwillingness in England to encounter the diplomatic subtleties of the continent on such a field again.

I take this opportunity to forward the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending Sept. 30, 1856.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n. 57*

Turin, Nov. 10, 1856

Sir: I have received a letter from the Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs of which a translation follows:

« Turin, 8th November 1856

« The Minister of the United States,

« Sir: The exceptional condition of the laws in the United States relative to the admission of foreigners into their territories, is the subject of an important communication which I have received from the Chargé d'Affaires of His Sardinian Majesty at Washington.

« Nearly all the Sardinian vessels which go to the United States for commerce carry there emigrants of every class and condition. It frequently happens that the local authorities, after permitting the disembarkation, make complaint against the captains of these vessels on account of the said emigrants, and impose on them exorbitant fines which cause the owners the greatest embarrassment, even if they have the good luck to escape the ruin which the full payment would produce.

« It is not possible that these captains or that the Sardinian consuls should know the financial condition of every Sardinian emigrant, and still less is it practicable that they should be informed as to their personal morality to an extent enabling them to declare to the local authorities that the new arrivals are neither *paupers nor liberated convicts*. It is therefore impossible to guard our commerce and navigation against the injury and inconvenience which the transport of emigrants now cause them.

« An argument between Sardinia and the United States to determine the conditions of admission of their respective subjects would put an

end to the discussions that arise from time to time upon the rights and duties of international relations which should be reciprocally and distinctly declared. But that plan was rejected by the Government of the United States when proposed by Belgium a few months ago. However there still exists a means of correcting a state of things so vexatious, which is to require the emigrants from Sardinia to procure the visa of the American consuls resident in the ports from which they depart, where the said consul, under orders from their Government, may require certificates proving their morality and their means of subsistence. This rule may be easily applied: and if the Government of the United States has, I hope, no difficulties in giving it their sanction, I shall hasten to impose on the local Sardinian authorities directions to second consuls aforesaid to the utmost of their power.

« I have therefore the honour to pray you to favour the proposition with your good offices.

« I must also beg you to be so kind as to inform me of the answer which you will receive in the matter, and seize the occasion to assure you of my very distinguished consideration.

Signed for the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

De Salmour. »

In forwarding the foregoing document I beg leave to make one or two remarks.

The plan proposed by the Sardinian Minister would undoubtedly give us the means of stopping to some extent the present transport of criminals and paupers from Sardinia into the United States. Unless the American consul should be satisfied that the emigrants were honest he could refuse his visa, and if supported, as proposed, by the Sardinian authorities, that would be an effective prohibition of the embarkation [sic]. But it would seem to me injudicious to make an arrangement which would render the consular visa and certificate a document behind which the local authorities at home could not go. The Minister says that it is impossible for the Sardinian captains and consuls to know the American consuls to ascertain it with any great degree of surety. Certificates may be forged and false information easily gotten up which would impose on them while they would easily be seen through by a native of the country. While, therefore, the plan proposed by the Minister may do good, it seems highly proper also to keep up the present punishment of the Sardinian captains who carry unworthy individuals to the United

States. They profit by their operation and it should be at their risk. If they find that they lose by conveying convicts to our country they will ascertain with care the character of their cargoes; and their own investigations, sharpened by self-interest, will be worth double that of any other official. On the other hand, should the certificate of the consul be made a bar to ulterior proceedings, it is my belief that these captains and the local Sardinian authorities themselves would be the first and the most active in deceiving the American consuls as to the character of emigrants they are anxious to export.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 58*

Turin, November 27, 1856

Sir. The news of Mr. Buchanan's election <sup>82</sup> has but lately reached this part of the world. The intelligence was not transmitted by telegraph from London. For it is a trait curiously illustrative of Europe, that while the telegraphic reports of the Italian press are every morning laden with such important details as the pleasure trips of Ex-Queen Christina, or how Ismail Pasha has got the decoration of the White Eagle, or how some young lord has been made attaché to a Legation in St. Petersburg, it was not thought worth while to pay for the transmission of such an insignificant fact as the election of a chief to rule for years the destinies of the republic of the United States. That trifling circumstance has, however, in the process of time been made known by the arrival of the ordinary mails; and it has been received with ill-concealed dissatisfaction by the politicians. The election of Mr. Fremont <sup>83</sup> was earnestly hoped for by the people who rule in European countries. The supremacy of an experienced statesman like Mr. Buchanan, pledged to a policy which will preserve the United States from the influence of

<sup>82</sup> James Buchanan della Pennsylvania, fu presidente dal 4 marzo 1857 al 4 marzo 1861. Vedi nota 47, p. 225 del vol. I.

<sup>83</sup> John Charles Fremont (1813-1890), esploratore, uomo politico e soldato. Fu designato come candidato alla presidenza a Filadelfia nel giugno del 1856 dal nuovo partito nazionale repubblicano. Non possedendo alcuna sensibilità o attitudine politica, giocò un ruolo passivo nella campagna elettorale, durante la quale si arrivò ad ingiuriarlo per la sua nascita illegittima e per la notizia, falsa, della sua appartenenza al cattolicesimo. La sua sconfitta per opera di Buchanan con una votazione elettorale di 174 voti contro 114 e un suffragio popolare di 1 838 169 contro 1 341 264 fu dovuto specialmente alla paura della secessione sudista e in parte alla mancanza di fondi. Vedi ALLAN NEVINS, *Fremont, the West's Greatest Adventurer*, 1928.



foreign leagues, and which will continue their internal prosperity, is distasteful to these men for the sure and simple reason that they wish to see us crippled in our foreign relations and disjointed by discord at home. If any new government of the United States should set its heart on European laudation, it can obtain that end only by an extreme deference to the alliance of aristocrats and despots who control this continent, by checking and cramping the growth and extension of the United States, and by furthering the schemes of a sectional party among us, whose increased power is here regarded as the best instrument for demolishing a fabric which is a perpetual source of jealousy and fear to every court in Europe. If an American Government pursues a contrary course it may expect to be denounced in the name of civilization, and must look for justice only in history, which will forever applaud the rulers who increase the power, preserve the unity, and extend the territory of the states entrusted to their care.

Of Italian affairs I have little to say. The important changes which the Emperor of Austria is about to make in the constitution of Lombardy during his present visit to that province will doubtless be related by your Minister at Vienna. The matters which have chiefly occupied the public attention in Turin have been the quarrels between Mazzini and his former associates in Sardinia. You are perhaps aware that the arch conspirator is now permitted to reside at Genoa. When Cavour gave him leave to do so, it was regarded as a simple act of humanity towards a man who was no longer to be feared. Events have shown that the astute Italian premier had perhaps an ulterior object. Mr. Mazzini's former friends have all renounced republicanism and become constitutional monarchists. As such many of them have been elected to Parliament, where they form a part of the moderate opposition to the government. On Mr. Mazzini's return, finding himself neglected and repudiated by these people, he soon commenced a war upon them. He has published their old letters, given the details of their youthful conspiracies, told how they borrowed money, and daggers from him to come in disguise and assassinate the late king Charles Albert, and how they failed to fulfil their promises and to repay his loans. The effect of these publications has been the destruction of these members of Parliament. Public opinion has been so hard on one of them—Mr. Gallenga, the historian of Piedmont—that he has not only been compelled to resign his place, but also the order of chivalry with which he has been decorated by the present king and to leave the country. Such singular termination to the career of Mazzini the Patriot! The light of time shows that vanity

has been at the bottom of all his professions and actions. He will never be heard of again.

The probabilities of a Congress at Paris are now thought to be much greater than when I last wrote. The Swiss and Prussian quarrel seems to render such an assembly or a new war the only alternatives of the future.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 59*

Turin, Dec. 2, 1856

Sir: A question has arisen at Genoa between the officials of the city and the United States Consul which merits a notice. Orloff Peter Wilson, a Swede by birth, but serving as a common sailor on an American vessel though never naturalized, was afflicted with a slight swelling on his forefinger while the vessel was waiting for her cargo in the above-named port. His malady was insignificant and its treatment well-understood on shipboard; but as there was no business at the time, it was thought best to send him to the hospital. When the ship was ready to leave, the captain ordered the man on board. The sailor refused to go; and the director of the hospital sustained him in this refusal. The captain then applied to the Consul, who after seeing the man and being satisfied that he was perfectly able, demanded him of the Intendente. The Intendente not only refused to send the man on board, but wholly sustained the Director and the sailor in their resistance to the captain.

The ground which both the Intendente and the Director took, was the fact the seaman himself refused to leave the Hospital, and the pretence that he was not recovered of his sickness and might loose [sic] his forefinger if sent on shipboard. As they had the force in their hands, the vessel was obliged to leave without its seaman; but not however before the Consul had informed the officials that if they kept him, they would have to take charge of him afterwards

A day or two after the vessel departed, the man turned out and became a vagabond in the streets. The Intendente has since demanded his maintenance from the Consul, who naturally refused to pay a cent on his behalf. At this stage of the proceedings the case was sent to me. I was, and am, decidedly of opinion that the Genoese officials were in the wrong and the American Consul in the right. If the officers of a foreign country can detain one man on such pleas as these they can detain any number,

and the authority of their captain and consul becomes a farce. The plea of humanity is absurd in such a case. The consul is the proper judge of what humanity is due to the people of his nation; he is their protector—not a parcel of foreign officials. It is the obligation of the local authorities to support the consul in such differences as these instead of the deserter. As to their subsequent demand for the maintenance of Orloff Peter Wilson, it seems to me without the shadow of justice. That man is now at Genoa and without means of subsistence, not by want of care on the part of his captain or any act of his, but by the act of the authorities at Genoa. *They* detained him when his vessel demanded him; *they* enabled him to set his consul at defiance. It appears to me a monstrous demand, and I cannot do otherwise than approve the determination of the Consul.

As I thought the powers arrogated by the Genoese officials if persisted in calculated to inflict serious inconvenience on our commerce, I have stated the case to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and requested his decision on it. I have not yet received a reply. This Government's disposition to evade and procrastinate in all cases, but particularly in those wherein the wrong is on their side, is quite remarkable. One of their favorite methods is, when questioned on such a subject, to give an answer to some other question, entirely different, which had been asked long ago. Thus, when I wrote to them about the treatment our privateers would hereafter receive in their ports, they forthwith sent me a letter of thanks for some books I had presented a month before. When I wrote the other day about this dispute at Genoa, they answered with a note deciding the case of an American vessel accused of smuggling, on which I had previously appealed. When some new business comes up, I shall probably receive an elaborate communication on the conduct of their Intendente.

I have thought proper to append the correspondence between the Intendente and the Consul, from which you may gather, if such be your pleasure, further details than I have myself given.

[Genoa, September 11, 1856]

Sir. I am under the necessity of asking the interposition of your authority in a matter which materially concerns the commercial relations of the United States of America with this city. These interests have, to some extent, been placed by my government under my supervision. The question at issue is, whether the Director of the Hospital *Pammatone*, at which sick marines are usually received, can in his discretion detain a seaman belonging to a merchant-vessel of the United States, against the consent & contrary to the order of the commander of the vessel, or of this Consulate? A case has recently occurred involving this question. On the 25th ult., a seaman, named Orloff Peter Wilson, belonging to the American ship *Sheffield* under the command of Capt. G. W. Nelson, having a *whitlow* on his finger, which prevented his being useful on board, was, by an order from me, sent to the above-named hospital, to be attended at the charge of this Consulate. The said seaman I have reason to believe was in his usual bodily health, except the sore finger. On the 10th inst., Capt. Nelson being ready to leave this port requested that the seaman should be discharged from the hospital and sent on board. This request was made in the usual way, but the Director of the hospital would not permit him to leave. I then addressed a note to the Director stating that the vessel was about to depart, & it was necessary this man should go on board,—that I conceived I had a right to take seamen, belonging to vessels of the United States, from the hospital whenever it was thought necessary whether cured or not, and if the said seaman was not discharged according to my order he must be retained at the expense of the hospital. The seaman was detained in the hospital, & the ship went to sea without him. I am warranted in considering this a capricious exercise of authority on the part of the Director, as seamen have been repeatedly discharged under similar circumstances. A much stronger case may even be cited of a seaman with a broken leg who was carried on a *litter* to the steam Frigate *Saranac*, when about to leave for the United States. The assumption of authority complained of would in many cases be productive of serious inconvenience; and in cases where several seamen are sent to the hospital with ailments of a trifling character, ships might be detained in port at heavy expense & to the great injury of the owners. In the pre-

<sup>84</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 59 di Daniel

sent case, the seaman would have been nearly as well on board as in the hospital. It was not intended he should do any work immediately, but it was desirable to have him on board so as to be ready to do duty whenever his finger should be well enough. At any rate, & under all circumstances, I claim entire control over seamen belonging to vessels of the United States in this port, subject and limited only by the instructions which I receive from my own Government. The question resolves itself into this point only—viz; whether I, as Consul of the U States, shall have control over the seamen,—or whether the Director of the Hospital shall be permitted to set my authority at defiance, & thereby embarrass our commerce at his pleasure? I consider such an assumption as contrary to custom among commercial nations, & contrary to treaty stipulations between our respective countries.

I respectfully request that such instructions may be given to the Director of the hospital as will in future prevent his exercising the authority claimed by him in this case, and leave the seamen of the United States subject to the control of this Consulate.

***Alfonso La Marmora a A. Herbemont*<sup>85</sup>**

Genova, 14 settembre 1856

Ill.mo Signore, Non possedendo io abbastanza la lingua inglese nella quale è scritta la lettera da V. S. Ill.ma indirizzatami sotto la data dell'undici corrente, dovetti innanzi tutto procurarmene la traduzione per aver piena contezza del contenuto della medesima.

Come fui informato dell'oggetto della di Lei rappresentanza mi rivolsi tosto al Sig. Presidente della Giunta Speciale degli Ospedali di questa Città affinché mi fornisse intorno il fatto medesimo i maggiori necessarii schiarimenti.

Il predetto Sig. Presidente mi riscontra ora essere assai dispiacente che una causa puramente umanitaria abbia potuto assumere il carattere di una questione di diritto internazionale. A spiegare come avvenne il fatto lamentatosi il Sig. Presidente mi ha trasmesso l'unita relazione del Sig. dottore Chiassone chirurgo principale della sala, dove era ricoverato il marinaio Orloff Peter Wilson. Da questa relazione appare che se egli

<sup>85</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 59 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n 9, vol 8, pp 245-250

fu d'avviso non potersi permettere l'uscita da *Pammatone* del Wilson sì è solamente perché eravi grave pericolo d'amputazione del dito; oltreché del resto lo stesso marinaio avvertito del bisogno di cura in cui si trovava a rischio altrimenti di perdere la mano o quanto meno parte di essa, si rifiutava di partire. Osserva inoltre il Sig. Presidente che alla lettera da V.S. Ill.ma rivolta al Direttore dell'Ospedale essendo stato risposto coll'inviarle una attestazione comprovante il pericolo che correva immanicabilmente lo stesso marinaio se non restava in cura, credeva con ciò che le fossero state date sufficienti spiegazioni del temperamento che l'amministrazione dello Spedale erasi trovata nella necessità di adottare e che è tuttavia giustificato dal trovarsi sempre il Wilson minacciato di amputazione del dito.

Osserva pure che questo temperamento era poi anche consigliato dalla circostanza che a bordo di un bastimento mercantile non poteva il Wilson ricevere tutta quella cura ed assistenza di cui abbisognava e che è più facile avere in un legno da guerra; il che, mentre spiega perché non si fece alcun ostacolo al rilascio del marinaio del *Saranac*, il quale ad ogni modo non si trovava nello stato del Wilson, non avendo più d'uopo che di riposo, deve maggiormente persuadere che in questa pratica si era ben lungi dal voler contestare al Sig. Console il diritto che gli possa competere, e soltanto si agiva per puro spirito di umanità.

Sembrandomi questi riscontri abbastanza soddisfacenti, io mi reco a premura di dargliene questa partecipazione, portando fiducia che essi non riescano meno ad appagare V.S. Ill.ma ed a rimuovere affatto gli insorti dubbi.

Colgo poi la congiuntura per proferirmi con particolare considerazione e ben distinta stima.

« Dall'ospedale, 13 settembre 1856

L'inscritto Chirurgo principale all'Ospedale di *Pammatone*, sala feriti, richiesto dall'Ill.mo Sig. Deputato Gentili, di una dichiarazione del fatto successo nella pratica del marinaio americano Peter Wilson, riferisce quanto in appresso: — Alla insita delle cinque pom dei 9 corr., l'interprete degli Americani richiedeva allo scrivente una dichiarazione qualmente il suddetto marinaio non era in istato di partire per lungo viaggio. Si lasciava una carta ciò comprovante.

All'indomani mattina si presentava all'inscritto un capitano americano e l'interprete americano, domandando che fosse rilasciato libero il marinaio perché nella giornata doveva partire per l'America. Credendo inutile ripetere quanto si disse, lo scrivente domandò al marinaio che

piangeva, se desiderava partire· indicandogli il pericolo che correva, replicatamente rispose che voleva essere curato della mano affetta... e che non voleva partire. Il direttore della sala si credé in pieno diritto di rinviare al proprio letto il marinaio, il quale affetto come era da un pateruccio osseo, con carie incipiata del dito indice sinistro, aveva bisogno di tenace cura, onde non correre pericolo di perdere anche una parte della mano, poich  quasi di certo alla fine si dover  amputare il dito affetto.

E. Chiossone ».

***A. Herbemont a Alfonso La Marmora*<sup>86</sup>**

Genoa, 15th Sept. 1856

Sir: I had the honor to receive your answer to my communication of the 11th inst., on the subject of the detention by the Director of the Hospital of a seaman, belonging to a vessel of the United States, in opposition to the order of this Consulate. The plea of humanity made by the Director is totally unfounded, and predicated upon alleged facts which did not exist, foreign to the question, and evasive of the true issue. I cannot submit to be controlled in my official acts by what he may imagine are the claims of humanity. I choose to decide such question for myself.

The question to which I beg your attention and to which I respectfully ask a categorical answer is,—whether the Director of the hospital shall be authorized, at his discretion, to refuse to allow a seaman of the United States to leave the Hospital when ordered by the United States' Consul to go on board the vessel to which he belongs?

***Alfonso La Marmora a A. Herbemont*<sup>87</sup>**

Genova, 20 settembre 1856

Ill.mo Signore, Io portava fiducia che dopo le spiegazioni somministratele colla mia responsiva del 14 corrente n. 2413 V.S. Ill.ma avrebbe al pari di me ravvisato conforme ai dettami della prudenza ed

<sup>86</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 59 di Daniel

<sup>87</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 59 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 9, vol. 8, pp. 253-255

agli usi costantemente praticati coi consoli d'altre nazioni la condotta dell'amministrazione dell'Ospedale di *Pammatone* a riguardo del marinaio americano Orloff Pietro Wilson

Ho all'incontro veduto dall'ultima di Lei lettera, del 15 detto, come Ella insiste nella sollevata quistione di diritto internazionale, quistione però che, nei termini in cui venne formulata, farebbe, a mio avviso, compiutamente astrazione dalle circostanze speciali del caso

Per attribuirle un carattere di quesito di diritto internazionale parmi che siffatta quistione debba essere invece posta nei seguenti termini, cioè se il Sig. console americano possa, dopo aver chiesta ed ottenuta la ammissione e cura di un marinaio della propria nazione nello Spedale sardo, costringere il medesimo, contro la sua dichiarata volontà, a restituirsi a bordo della sua nave quando l'ufficiale sanitario incaricato della cura dichiara per iscritto che vi sarebbe grave e presente pericolo di amputazione di un membro; e se le R. autorità sieno tenute in tal caso di assecondare la richiesta del predetto Sig. console sinché perdura il dichiarato pericolo.

Posta in questi suoi veri termini la questione, dovetti riconoscere non avere io attribuzioni per discuterla e deciderla ed ebbi perciò a riferirne al mio Governo, il quale non poté non approvare pienamente egli pure la condotta degli amministratori del detto Pio Istituto.

Mi reco ora a debito d'informarne la S.V. Ill ma affinché possa, ove lo crede conveniente, procurarsi dal medesimo nei modi diplomatici le relative ulteriori spiegazioni e colgo con piacere la nuova congiuntura per ripetermi con sensi di ben distinta considerazione.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 60*

Turin, Dec. 23, 1856

Sir. In Dispatch No 59. I gave some account of a difference between the Consulate at Genoa and the authorities of that city relative to a seaman named Orloff Peter Wilson, serving on an American merchant-vessel. This seaman had been placed in the hospital to be cured of a slight malady. When his vessel was ready to leave, both his captain and the American Consul deemed him able to go on board and ordered him to do so. He refused, and the Genoese authorities supported him in his refusal.

Since then a case nearly similar has occurred. A seaman named



A Lowes, Swede by nationality, serving on board the American ship *Albus*, together with two others, was placed in the hospital to be cured. When the ship was ready to sail, the captain found one of these still sick, and deposited funds for his maintenance and cure. The two others were well enough for duty, and one of them went on board when ordered. The third, the aforesaid Lowes, refused to go and was supported in his refusal by the hospital authorities. The Consul addressed a note to the Director informing him of these facts and declaring that if he detained the man, the American Consulate would not be charged with him when the ship was gone.

No attention was paid to this notice, and the ship sailed without Lowes. After it was gone, he was dismissed from the hospital. The authorities then required the American Consulate at Genoa to take charge of him and support him, or to pay his passage to the United States. The Consul declined to do this. As Lowes was a Swede by birth, who had never been naturalized or taken any step towards naturalization in the United States, he had no claim as an American citizen on the Consulate; and, as he had not been *discharged* from an American vessel in Genoa but had wilfully deserted it, he had no claim as a seaman serving under American colours. Nor was there any obligation towards the Genoese authorities; as they had supported and abetted him in his rebellion with their eyes open, and after having been fairly warned of the consequences. Hence the Consul refused the demand upon him, and, after a considerable correspondence on the subject between himself and the Intendente, the case was referred on one side to the American Legation, and on the other to the Sardinian Ministry in Turin.

I have addressed a note to the Government, reviewing both cases, and received a reply. These letters are to be found in the Appendix to this dispatch. The Sardinian Government supports the Genoese authorities, and concludes by requesting me to induce the Consul to take charge of Lowes. My opinion is decidedly that the Genoese authorities have no right to interfere between the American Consul and seamen serving under our colours; and when they have done so, and thereby kept on their shores a foreigner bound to service in our vessels, that it should be at their own cost. Hence I have made no reply, but left the matter partially open, so that if my own Government should decide against, I may be able to retrace my steps.

Turin, Nov. 20, 1856

Sir: I have forwarded to my Government, with such additional observations I deemed proper to make, the letter received from your office, dated the 8th Nov. and signed by M. de Salmour, containing your plan for correcting the abuses in the present system of emigration from Sardinia to the United States.

I now have to solicit your attention to a question between the Consul of the United States at Genoa and the authorities of that city, insignificant in its origin, but involving a principle which gravely affects the commercial interests of the United States in Sardinia, and which may equally embarrass your own vessels and your own consuls in American ports, should our authorities adopt and apply it there.

On the 25th of August last, Orloff Peter Wilson, a seaman on board the American ship *Sheffield* lying in the port of Genoa, complained of a swelling on one of his fingers, known as « whitlow ». This slight malady is common among seamen, and its treatment well-understood on shipboard; but as the vessel would continue to be at Genoa for some time, it was thought proper to place him in the hospital *Pammatone*. When the vessel was ready to leave, the captain sent for his seaman, but the Director of the hospital refused to give him up. The captain then stated this fact to the U. S. Consul at Genoa; and the Consul addressed a letter to the Director of the hospital demanding the surrender of the seaman. The Director again refused. The American Consul then made application to the Intendente of the city, who supported the Director in his refusal; and the vessel was compelled to depart, leaving its seaman in the hands of these officials.

The ground on which the Intendente justifies this action in a plea of humanity. He says, on the authority of the Director of the hospital, that the seaman continued to be sick and that his case could not be properly attended to on shipboard, and that the seaman was himself unwilling to leave. Yet seamen have been repeatedly on previous occasions delivered up on the demand of their officers from this same hospital, while still sick; and on one occasion, a sailor, belonging to the ship-of-war *Saranac*, having a broken leg, was sent on a litter from this hospital to that vessel when it was found necessary to depart before he was

<sup>88</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 60 di Daniel

cured. It may also be mentioned that the vessel, to which the seaman Orloff Peter Wilson belonged, was going no farther than Hyères, where it would remain many weeks and where there is also a hospital in which he could receive the most elaborate treatment if necessary. And what further proves that this plea of humanity was wholly unfounded is the fact that a day or two after the departure of the vessel this seaman was dismissed by the Hospital authorities themselves, and became a vagabond in the streets of Genoa, whose support at the cost of the American Government the authorities there are now demanding from the U. S. Consul.

But, Sir, it seems to me that all discussion as to whether this plea of humanity was well or ill-founded is gratuitous on my part. It is wholly irrelevant to the question. That question is simply this:—whether the Intendente and the Director had a right to detain a seaman *on* such a plea, founded or not, against the wishes of his commander and in defiance of the demands of the Consul of his nation? My own opinion is decidedly negative. The Consul is the judge of what humanity is due to a seaman of his nation—not the local authorities of a foreign city. It is chiefly for the protection of these seamen that the Consul is sent abroad, and for his conduct in the discharge of his trust he is responsible [sic] to his own Government, and local authorities have no title to interfere between them.

It is scarcely needful to remark on the abuses which may be made of the powers arrogated by the officials at Genoa. If they can detain one seaman on such a plea as this, they can detain twenty. If they can support one sailor in rebellion against his commander and in defiance of his Consul on discretionary grounds, they can interfere in almost any case of difference between such people. Suppose, Sir, that this discretion was assumed by the authorities of a port in the republic of the United States and applied to European, to Sardinian, vessels, sailors, captains and consuls? Suppose that your seamen should place themselves in the hands of such authorities, and they should refuse to return them on the plea that they thought it *inhumane* to send them on board again? Your vessels might be for indefinite periods in those ports; and when they have found the means to depart, the sailors so detained will become a burden on your consular authorities, from whom their support will be demanded as that of Orloff Peter Wilson has been demanded of the American Consul at Genoa by the authorities of that city.

Your Excellency may think that I am drawing extreme conclusions from an isolated incident, which will not probably again occur. In that

light I myself at first viewed it; and you will perceive by the dates that this case occurred nearly three months ago. I have been silent until now, because I was unwilling to address you on a matter insignificant in itself should it not be made a precedent for future conduct. But I have lately learned that the silence of the American agents in Sardinia is received as an endorsement of the views of the officials at Genoa, and that not only have they demanded from the American Consul the support of Orloff—whom they themselves detained contrary to the wishes of his captain,—but another case of a similar character has since transpired

I am compelled, therefore, to ask your judgment on the question,—whether the Genoese authorities did or did not act in their right? So far as the seaman Orloff is concerned, the case is beyond remedy. But it is desirable that the American agents should be informed whether they surrender their authority over their seamen when they place them in a Genoese hospital until such time as its Director shall think proper,—or whether these said seamen can be recovered when their captains and consuls choose to demand them.

Accompanying this note Your Excellency will be pleased to receive the correspondence between the Intendente and the Consul, in which the merits and details of the case may be more fully seen.

*Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel*<sup>89</sup>

Turin, le 3 Décembre 1856

Monsieur le Ministre: J'ai reçu la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 20 du mois dernier, et par laquelle vous appelez mon attention sur la correspondance qui a eu lieu entre l'Intendant Général de Gênes et le Consul des Etats Unis dans la dite ville au sujet du nommé Orlof Peter Wilson, matelot du navire Americain *Sheffield*, qui n'a pu partir de Gênes avec ce navire, parceque la Direction de l'Hôpital *Pammatone*, où il avait été placé pour y recevoir les soins de l'art, n'a pas cru pouvoir le forcer à quitter l'établissement le jour, où le Capitaine du *Sheffield* et le Consul des Etats Unis l'ont réclamé, et cela uniquement par la raison que le chirurgien chargé des soins à donner

<sup>89</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 60 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 9, vol. 8, pp. 336-345

à Wilson avait déclaré itérativement que celui-ci n'était pas encore en état de sortir de l'Hôpital.

Ainsi que vous avez bien voulu le remarquer vous-même, Monsieur le Ministre, il serait maintenant superflu de renouveler une discussion à ce sujet. Je me permettrai toutefois de vous dire franchement, que je ne saurais partager l'opinion que vous exprimez touchant la conduite des Autorités de Gênes dans cette circonstance. Ni M. l'Intendant Général, ni les Directeurs du *Pammatone*, n'ont pu avoir l'idée de méconnaître le moins du monde les droits du Commandant du *Sheffield* et du Consul des Etats Unis à l'égard du marin Wilson; leur seule intention, leur seul désir a été de remplir jusqu'au bout les devoirs de l'humanité envers cet étranger, que le Capitaine et le Consul avaient confié de plein gré au dit Etablissement pour y être soigné; et si, lorsque ces derniers ont voulu réclamer Wilson, il ne s'est pas rendu à leur invitation, ce n'est point qu'on ait voulu le *retenir* en opposition aux droits des Autorités desquelles il relevait, c'est simplement parce que les Directeurs de l'hôpital n'ont pas cru pouvoir renvoyer de force ce malheureux, qui demandait instamment à rester, et dont la blessure n'était point encore, de l'avis des hommes de l'art, suffisamment en voie de guérison. C'est pourquoi, tout en m'abstenant d'émettre un avis sur l'insistance de M. le Consul des Etats Unis en cette occasion, je pense Monsieur le Ministre, que la conduite des Directeurs de l'hôpital et de M. l'Intendant de Gênes, qui n'a été et ne pouvait être inspirée que par des sentiments d'humanité, ne saurait mériter aucun blâme.

Votre communication précitée ayant du reste spécialement pour but, si j'en ai bien saisi la pensée, de provoquer des dispositions de nature à prévenir le retour des inconvénients qui se sont produits, soit à l'égard du marin Wilson, soit presque en même temps à l'égard d'un autre, je ne mets pas de retard à vous faire connaître, que reconnaissant moi-même toute l'opportunité de pareilles dispositions, j'ai prié mon Collègue au Département de l'Intérieur d'inviter l'Autorité Administrative de Gênes à se concerter avec les Directeurs des Hôpitaux de la dite ville dans le but d'adopter pour l'avenir, relativement à l'admission des Marins Américains dans ces établissements, un système qui tout en se conciliant avec l'accomplissement des devoirs de l'humanité, et avec les égards dûs aux citoyens d'une nation amie, évite aux Autorités Sardes des réclamations et des embarras comme ceux dont les marins Wilson et Lowes ont été innocemment la cause.

Quant à ce dernier, vous avez dû être informé, Monsieur le Ministre, qu'Abraham Lowes, matelot appartenant au navire Américain *Albus*

avait aussi été débarqué et placé à l'Hôpital *Pammato* comme atteint d'une maladie à la jambe gauche; qu'au départ de l'*Albus*, ce marin n'étant pas retourné à son bord, parce qu'il n'était point en état de le faire, ainsi que les médecins de l'Hôpital l'ont dûment constaté, le Consul des Etats Unis déclara qu'à partir de ce jour Abraham Lowes cessait d'appartenir à la marine marchande des Etats Unis, et comme sujet suédois il passait sous la protection du Consulat Général de Suède. Vous savez probablement aussi, qu'attendu l'absence de tout document établissant la nationalité suédoise du dit Lowes, et conformément d'ailleurs à ses instructions, le Consul Général de Suède s'est refusé obstinément à le prendre sous sa protection, et qu'ainsi à sa sortie de l'hôpital quelque temps après, Abraham Lowes, repoussé d'un côté par le Consul des Etats Unis, de l'autre par celui de Suède, et ne pouvant trouver à s'employer à cause de son mauvais état de santé, est encore actuellement à Gênes sollicitant et recevant des secours de l'Autorité locale à titre de commisération et à défaut de tout autre moyen honnête d'existence

Il me paraît cependant incontestable, que cet Étranger, venu à Gênes comme matelot sur un navire Américain, placé comme tel par le Capitaine à l'Hôpital *Pammato*, doit, d'après les usages, être considéré encore comme resté sous la protection du Consulat des Etats Unis, soit parce que l'on ne peut produire aucun titre qui établisse sa prétendue nationalité suédoise, soit encore parce que l'Agent Consulaire de Suède refuse de le reconnaître pour son ressortissant, et de pourvoir en conséquence à son retour dans sa patrie, ou pour le moins à son départ de Gênes, où il ne saurait continuer à rester à la charge de l'Administration Sarde.

En effet, Monsieur le Ministre, pour que le Consul des Etats Unis puisse alléguer avec fondement qu'il a remis à son Collègue de Suède le soin de la protection de Lowes, il serait indispensable, que ce soin eût été accepté par l'autre. L'Autorité locale n'a pas à s'enquérir de la manière dont s'opère le changement de protection d'un Consulat à un autre; elle n'a pas à se mêler des contestations auxquelles ce changement peut donner lieu, elle l'accepte comme un fait lorsqu'il est accompli, d'accord entre les deux Agents Consulaires, et se règle en conséquence à l'égard de l'individu étranger qui a changé de protection. Mais ce fait ne se vérifie point à l'égard d'Abraham Lowes, tant que le Consul de Suède refuse de le reconnaître comme appartenant à la Nation qu'il représente et de lui prêter une assistance quelconque; dès lors les Autorités royales ne sauraient insister à ce sujet auprès de l'Agent Consulaire Suédois en l'absence de documents constatant la véritable nationalité de cet individu.

Il en résulte que Lowes serait toujours légitimement à leurs yeux un matelot de la marine marchande des Etats Unis, bien que congédié du bord de l'*Albus*, et que comme il ne peut trouver à s'employer, et que d'un autre côté il ne saurait rester indéfiniment à la charge de l'Administration Sarde, celle-ci est fondée à bon droit à inviter le Consul des Etats Unis à pourvoir au départ de ce marin soit pour l'Amérique, soit pour toute autre destination qu'il jugera convenable.

Je dois conséquemment vous prier, Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien intervenir auprès de Mr. le Consul à l'effet d'obtenir qu'il défère aux sollicitations qui lui sont adressées dans ce but par les Autorités de Gênes, et je saisis en attendant cette occasion pour vous réitérer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n. 61*

Turin, Jan. 3, 1857

Sir: Through the Austrian Legation in this city, which is charged with the affairs of Modena, I have received from the Government of that neighboring Duchy a long memorial upon certain differences and disputes which have arisen between it and the American Consulate at Carrara. The Modenese Government have addressed me under the false impression that the American Minister at Turin had some sort of supervision over American consuls in the small states bordering on Sardinia in which there was no minister of the United States. It is needless to say that I assured the Austrian Legation that I had no such authority delegated to me by my Government; but I consented to be the medium through which Modena could make its complaint to your Excellency, and, in compliance with that engagement, append to this Dispatch a translation of the memorial in question. I have not translated, and do not send, a long correspondence between the American Consul and the Modenese Government for two reasons. 1st that those letters do nothing more than confirm the allegations of the memorial, and 2dly the originals of the letters are probably in English, while I have only the Italian translations: should I attempt to retranslate them into English, the sense might be varied by so many changes; while the originals may doubtless be obtained, should any question about them arise in your mind.

From these papers, the following specifications appear:

1st. In March, 1854, Mr. Franklin Torrey received the ordinary

*exequatur* to be Consul of the United States in Carrara, granting him the privileges of a *Consul*, according to general usage, and *not* those of a diplomatic officer.

2nd. In February 1855, Mr. Torrey, proposing an absence, charged a Neapolitan refugee named Stenore Capocci di Belmonte with the affairs of his consulate.

3d. The Modenese Government had objections to Capocci. Carrara was in state of siege, and the people at enmity with the Government. Mr Capocci was a devotee of the Italian revolutionary party, and was from that reason an exile from his own country. But as Mr. Torrey stated that his absence would be short, they consented to recognize Mr Capocci temporarily, not as a Vice-Consul of the United States, but as a sort of private agent of the Consul himself

4th. Mr. Torrey then left Carrara (Feb 1855), took up his residence at Leghorn, and has never returned. As soon as he was gone, Signor Stenore Capocci di Belmonte made the chief hotel of the city his abode, hoisted the United States arms over the front door, and, though only two upper rooms were occupied by him, declared the whole building to be the American Consulate and entitled to privileges which are not allowed to any Consulate but only to diplomatic residences. These pretensions were made known to the Modenese Government in the following and told the police, it seems with considerable emphasis, that they had no the guard, managed to cross the Modenese frontier without passports. When they reached Carrara, they went to this hotel. The police followed them there to ask for their passports. Whereupon Mr. Capocci came out and told the police, it seems with considerable emphasis, that they had no right to ask who was in *his house*, or even to enter there. An angry altercation ensued, which ended in a correspondence between the Modenese Ministry and Mr. Torrey. The latter defended the conduct of his agent and complained of the police on the ground that the Government of the United States clothes its consuls, in all countries where there is no American minister, with certain diplomatic privileges, and hence they were in certain sense *chargés d'Affaires*. On this pretension he argued that his consular residence had diplomatic immunities which were violated by the police in the case above-cited. The Modenese Ministry replied that whatever might be the duties imposed on Mr. Torrey by his own Government, they had received him as an ordinary Consul only, and did not accord him any privileges other than those allowed to the consuls of other nations.

5th While this affair remained unsettled, the Modenese Govern-



ment suffered a series of griefs from Mr. Capocci. He employed under him other refugees even more obnoxious to the Government than himself, and claimed for them all the immunities which he arrogated to himself. According to the Modenese statement, Capocci and his employees were wont to place themselves at the windows and doors of their hotel, and jeer at the military and the police when they passed. Capocci was found by the police hunting with a gun without the necessary permit, and the gun was taken from him; whereupon he menaced the Modenese Government with the vengeance of the United States. Lastly he involved himself in the private intrigues and quarrels of Carrara, in which he went so far as to send a nobleman of the city a fiercely-worded challenge to fight a duel. This challenge went to the police; and it constituted an offence punishable by fine and imprisonment.

For these and other similar reasons, the Modenese Government think they would have been justified in sending Mr. Capocci out of their territory. But from deference to the United States, they have not adopted so decisive a measure. They frequently besought Mr. Torrey to come back to Carrara. But, as he has never done so, they appeal to the United States' Legation at Turin.

The foregoing is a brief analysis of the memorial. The document itself, though long, is not tedious. I have addressed a brief note to Mr. Torrey, in which, while disavowing any direct authority over the affairs of his Consulate, I have offered my services, as the Minister nearest the scene, in arranging the dispute.

### ***Dichiarazione del Ministero degli Affari esteri di Modena***<sup>90</sup>

Modena, November 21, 1856

In his note of March 1854 to this Ministry, the Hon. Mr. Torrey, of Boston, enclosed the Commission by which the President of the United States of America appointed him American Consul for the city of Carrara with the surrounding localities, and demanded the necessary *exequatur*.

As Mr. Torrey succeeded to Mr. Walton, who had previously exercised the functions of U.S. Consul in Carrara to the full pleasure of this Government, and the Commission which he presented not according him

<sup>90</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 61 di Daniel. Non esiste, negli archivi di Washington, l'originale.

fuller powers than is customary, and especially not empowering him to appoint vice-consuls, this Government had no doubt as to the new consul's place of residence or the nature of the relations to be held with him.

Premising therefore his instructions, the Commission together with the Royal *exequatur* were returned to him with a note, dated April 10th 1854, declaring that « henceforward he should be recognized by this Government as Consul of the United States of America for the city of Carrara and the surrounding maritime shore, *and should enjoy all the privileges and distinctions that are accorded here to Consuls of friendly Powers* »

At a later date, in his note of Feb. 12th, 1855, herewith enclosed, the said Mr. Franklin Torrey informed this Ministry that, being obliged to absent himself from Carrara for a short time, he had charged Mr. Stenore Capocci of Belmonte with the affairs of the Consulate, and enclosed Mr. Capocci's signature that it might be recognized when necessary.

This communication, which was not preceded by any confidential notice and which seemed the more irregular from the fact of there being an antecedent case in the consular archives that might have afforded him the necessary information as to the proper manner of proceeding, was replied to on the 23d of the same month in the following terms from this Ministry.—

« By a letter from the Ministerial Delegation of the Interior in Massa directed to your Consulate under date of Aug. 31. 1853, *written in pursuance of instructions I had transmitted* the said Consulate was informed of the practice followed in these states, when a Consul wishes to absent himself from his post and desires that the person delegated to represent him should be officially recognized by the local Modenese authorities. In reply to your note of the 12th inst., I am absolutely compelled to ask *your particular attention to the above-cited letter, so that the relations the Consulate may have occasion to hold, during your absence, with the local authorities may not suffer from irregularity* »

Now, here is the letter to which Mr. Torrey's *particular attention* was invited, and which was addressed on the 31st of August 1853 to Mr. Walton, then American Consul in Carrara:—

« The appointment conferred on your nephew, Mr. John Goddy, *of Vice-Consul*, independently of any agreement whatever—even private—with this Government, besides the want of other formalities, cannot be recognized as regular for when a Government gives its consul the power of absenting himself from his post and appointing another person charged *ad interim* with the Consulate affairs, it is incumbent upon the

said foreign consul to forward due information of the fact to the Government near which he resides, and, if the latter does not object to the person proposed, it approves him and so informs its subaltern authorities, that they may recognize him as such and place faith in his signature.

« Nevertheless, from certain circumstances in your favor, *and in the hope that for the future you will conform to the above-mentioned practice, which is also that of the neighboring Tuscan Government*, I recognize the appointment made by you;—but at the same time must inform you that the Modenese Government, conformably to the Commission addressed to it by the President of the United States, for which alone an exequatur was granted, *cannot on its own part regard Mr. Goddy as Vice-Consul, but only as temporarily charged with the Consulate, and under such title alone* am I enabled to inform the provincial authorities who may have official connexion with you. »

In the present case, to the reluctance caused by seeing this hint to conform to the ordinary usages forgotten by the Consulate within the short space of 17 months, was added the further displeasure of not being able to recognize in the individual proposed those special circumstances of favor which in the antecedent case had caused the irregular appointment of Mr. Goddy to be approved. Far from Mr. Stenore Capocci being an American citizen, he was a Neapolitan emigrant known for his adherence to the principles of 1848 that convulsed Italy, and it was reasonable therefore to suppose that his residence in Carrara, where the assemblage of emigrants had only too much developed national germs, would be, if not dangerous, at least inconvenient

However, in view of the circumstance that the charge was supposed to be of short duration, and not wishing to place full credit in the allegations made against the agent, but on the contrary desiring to act in a conciliatory sense, the necessary instructions were issued, as in the antecedent case of Goddy, to the Royal Delegation at Massa, whereupon the latter thus addressed the American Consulate on the 3d. of May, 1855.—

« To Mr. Stenore Capocci of Belmonte, charged ad interim with the American Consulate in Carrara.

« The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs me, in a note of the 26th ult., that you have been recognized as charged temporarily with the American Consulate in Carrara during the absence of the Consul, Mr. Franklin Torrey. Having instructed the local authorities of your appointment, you can now communicate with them when you have occasion to do so. I forward you this communication by order of the said Ministry

in answer to the demand addressed in by the American Consul on the 12th of last February. »

It remained then settled that Mr. Capocci was neither proposed nor accepted *as American Vice-Consul in Carrara, but only as fulfilling temporarily the functions of the American Consul during his absence* and consequently, as he only replaced the Consul in his residence and did not represent American interests elsewhere, he was a private agent of the Consul—not a Consular Agent of the United States.

Such being the state of affairs, the Modenese Government soon had occasion to repent the deference paid Mr. Torrey.—being informed that Capocci, unmindful of the instructions received from his principal and fancying himself clothed with some sort of imaginary privileges, obstinately refused to recognize the regulations of the state of siege existing in Carrara, kept the Consular archives in the hotel where he dwelt—one of the most frequented in Carrara, called *la Novella Paros*,—raised the U.S. Flag over the door and, though only some of the upper rooms were occupied by him, claimed the entire hotel as his privileged residence. ,

In the hope of seeing the temporary command of Capocci cease on the return of the Consul to his post, the Government did not pay any attention to this report; but, on the contrary, allowed its own authorities to treat him with all those personal regards compatible with justice and the ordinary usages.

But, on the 28th of May last, three Tuscan gentlemen, being at Pietrasanta without passports and desiring to visit Carrara, induced the Granducal Delegation to supply the defect by giving the coachman who was to convey them a pass bearing their names as well as his own. On their arrival at Carrara, they went to the hotel where Capocci dwelt. The Royal Dragoons, visiting late, as is usual, the public hotels in order to see about foreigners, observed the irregular pass at the hotel *Novella Paros*, and, supposing that the three Tuscans had their passports with them, asked to speak to them. On being informed that they had gone up to Capocci's apartment to visit him, Louis Franchini, Brigadier of the Dragoons, had them invited by the host to come out on the stairway so as to have an explanation on the subject. Instead of the Tuscans, Capocci came out,—told the Brigadier that the Dragoons had no right whatever to know or to see who were in his house: it was sufficient for them to know that they were foreigners—his friends—and that the rest didn't concern them. The Brigadier courteously observed that the house was a public hotel;—that he himself was in the exercise of his duty; that the foreigners were Tuscans;—that the apartment taken by them was not

in the Consular apartment;—that he, Capocci, at any rate, did not represent Tuscan but American interests; and that, therefore, he did not understand what he had to do with the affair. Capocci went into a furious passion, told the Dragoons to depart immediately, and declared that the foreigners should not leave his apartment. The Brigadier, rather than use his right, preferred prudent measures, and, having left on the stairway two Dragoons to hinder the three foreigners from escaping, because having voluntarily refused his courteous invitation they had thereby rendered themselves suspicious, made a report of the occurrence to his superior officer.

In the meantime Capocci went to the Commandant of Carrara and asked him for a written order to remove the Dragoons from the hotel. After a brief interrogatory, which ended in showing the injustice of the demand, the Commandant abstained from employing forcible means and endeavored to convince Capocci of his error—but in vain. The latter, deluded in his hope of engendering strife between force and force, went away threatening. Having re-entered the hotel, he ceded his own apartment to the Tuscan foreigners—who regularly installed themselves in it—and went himself to sleep in the rooms prepared by the host for the said foreigners. The Brigadier returned to the hotel with his officer. The latter, being informed of what had occurred in the interval and wishing to lay all responsibility [sic] of the matter on Capocci and not leave him any pretence [sic] for continuing the scandal of which he seemed so desirous, took the pass of the coachman with him, withdrew the Dragoons and abandoned the hotel, being content to make a report of the case to his superiors—which report, together with others of the local authorities, lately reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Ministry thought of referring the affair to Consul Torrey and of asking him to discontinue such a troublesome provisority [sic], when most unexpectedly, on the 23d of May, 1856, a note was received from Mr. Torrey, which is herewith annexed.

The ill-concealed tenor of said note, the fact of reparation being demanded for an occurrence wholly caused by Capocci, and perceiving that an excuse became a reclamation under the influence of ill-obtained prerogatives, compelled the Ministry to forward the annexed reply to Consul Torrey, on the 11th of the following June.

In the meanwhile, other reports reached the Ministry. From these it appeared that Capocci had employed as secretary a certain Mario Tarfarelli Fulignate of ill-reputed moral conduct,—that he even pretended that this person was entitled to exceptional regards from the mili-

tary, incompatible with the regulations of the state of siege then existing:—that he protected Modenese subjects indicted as hostile to the actual state of things—and that, on the 8th of June, having in his apartment an assemblage of persons, he permitted himself to insult by laughter, gesticulations and hisses the Royal Dragoons, and especially Brigadier Franchini, while they were passing quietly in the street before the *Novella Paros* hotel.

The Modenese Government, being persuaded that Consul Torrey, who had delayed a reply to their statement of the facts, would cause every motive of difference to cease on his return to his post, and believing that Capocci would then cease to be his private agent, refrained from taking any steps to put a stop to the grievance.

It was therefore with great surprise that the Government received from the American Consul on the 3d. of Sept. a note, dated the 14th of the past July, which instead of practical conciliation contained some very impractical theories. It is herewith annexed (See note 2).

The Modenese Government never entered into the examination of the duties imposed on U.S. Consuls by their own Government, thinking itself in nowise concerned by them, but only asked for the fulfilment of those belonging to any consul recognized by international law. It was not then a question of duties, but of Consular privileges and prerogatives, which depend upon the usages of the country where Consuls are admitted to exercise their functions—if special conventions do not interpose by reason of reciprocity. The Modenese usages relative to consuls scarcely differ from those of Tuscany—they were enacted and received the sovereign sanction when foreign consulates were first established in this territory, and it is the duty of consuls to conform to them and not to prescribe others. The Modenese Government is always ready to give a copy of these usages when they are asked for, and, if it did not offer them in the present instance, it was because, knowing them to be similar to those of the neighboring territories, it did not even imagine that it would be called to enter in discussion upon matters only regarding itself, and which, in any event, might be diplomatically modified to answer a common interest,—though not through the exorbitant demands of only one of the parties interested.

This Ministry desired, therefore, to set right for once the ideas of the American Consul, and to ask his attention to the true point of difference, eliminating all the above-mentioned theories, when fresh irregularities of Capocci came to its knowledge.

The latter having become intimate with Count Charles Lazzoni of

Carrara, it appeared to the family of Count Emilio, brother of the above-mentioned, that Capocci was endeavoring to induce their old father to favor the former to the loss of the latter. Whereupon Count Emilio let some angry words escape him about the foreigner, whom he was entitled to suppose a meddler in his domestic affairs.

Without deciding on which side the wrong was in this delicate affair, it is certain that all friendly and legal means were afforded Capocci either to justify himself or to suppress such a calumny—but he preferred to end the matter with his own law, and sent a bitter challenge to Count Emilio, thereby committing an offence expressly punished by our laws.

Capocci's challenge fell into the hands of the police of Carrara, and should that authority have desired to act, as it had full right to do, it had only to open the *Police Guide of the Modenese States*, published and rendered obligatory by sovereign decree of February 12th 1854, and turn to paragraph 201, where it is said that « he who first challenges or provokes another to duel, shall be punished with from 2 to 6 months of imprisonment, and fined from 100 to 300 francs. »

The police delayed movement in the matter and sent the challenge to this Ministry. The latter, on replying to Consul Torrey's letter above-cited, enclosed a copy of it, that he might see anew the irregular conduct of his agent, the tolerance of this Government, and the necessity of putting a stop to these irregularities.

Scarcely had this letter departed, when Capocci was found hunting with a gun within the limits of the state of siege without a written permission from the competent authority, and it was taken away from him. About this matter Mr Torrey's agent raised a great clamour, and after having uselessly threatened the police in his own name, threw out other smaller threats in the name of the U. S. Government, which he had no right to represent. Immediately afterwards, a note was received from Consul Torrey—who was at Leghorn, where he had fixed his residence,—from which it appeared that his agent had been permitted to hunt by Cavalier Casoni, Commandant of the state of seige anterior to the present—but the permission being only *verbal*, was neither known to, or obligatory upon, Cavalier Casoni's successor. But as this Government did not wish to confound the real misdeeds of Capocci with those apparent, and judging such his last act, (being satisfied that the verbal concession had been really obtained) it verified the grant of said concession and replied to the American Consul accordingly.

The Government, however, having good reason to believe that the

American Consul wished to continue the correspondence, which had become nothing more than an idle exchange of theories,—and presuming that he therefore desired to prolong his absence indefinitely from the Modenese States and continue Capocci's temporary charge of the Consulate—whose signature was only recognized temporarily and whose person was never held in an official character by the Carrara authorities,—should have declared to Consul Torrey, that if he did not return to his post or replace himself by a worthy person, Capocci would be furnished with his passport and an intimation to quit the Modenese territory within three days. Such a measure would have doubtless been the most moderate which could have been taken towards a Neapolitan emigrant, who, not of good conduct in the past, had not been able to cause that fact to be forgotten by his present conduct, but who had actually rendered himself amenable to local punishments and pecuniary fines

Nevertheless, the Modenese Government, near which no U.S. Minister is accredited, desiring to act as is usual in a conciliatory sense, has thought proper to cause the present memorandum to be drawn up, and to beg His Imperial Royal and Apostolic Majesty's Government to be so good as to interpose, through the diplomatic means at its disposal, its good offices near the U.S. Minister in Turin, who has probably control over the consuls in the neighboring Modenese territory, that he may forward such instructions to Torrey as, while rendering Capocci's removal voluntary, may arrange the present state of affairs, no longer either fruitful to American interests or to be further tolerated by this Government.

NOTE 2. [Extract from a letter addressed by Mr. Torrey to the Modenese Ministry, in defence of Mr. Capocci's claim for the immunity of the hotel at Carrara: re-translated from the Italian translated correspondence accompanying the foregoing memorial.]

Leghorn, July 14, 1856

Your Excellency's dispatch of the 11th ult reached me in due time, and, having obtained information from the U. S. Ministers at Paris and London, I think proper to offer some remarks touching my rights and privileges as Consul of the United States at Carrara.

The Government of the United States recognizes consuls in all civilized countries *not only as consular agents*, but clothes them with cer-



tain diplomatic duties, and hence they can compare themselves to *Chargés d’Affaires*.

The Government of the United States especially distinguishes consuls from commercial Agents. The former are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and receive their commissions bearing the U. S. Seal; while the latter are commissioned by the Department of State under its seal, and their recognition is not *always* necessary on the part of the « Government that sends them, and no *exequatur* is required by the Government near which they reside. The U. S. Consuls are authorized by their Government to appoint *Consular Agents in any port of their jurisdiction*, where American interests may demand it, and they are recognized by the Department of State on the recommendation of the consul. When the appointment has received the approbation of said Department and the consul has been informed of it, *the agent has the power to act officially*; but all correspondence with his own Government, or with that near which he resides, must be made through the Consul, and for all the official acts of his agent the consul is personally responsible [sic].

The title used when I appointed Mr. Stenore Capocci of Belmonte was acting-consul, which is equivalent to that of *vice-consul*—so recognized by the Department of State. The title consular agent is applied to consular officers employed within the consular district. A U. S. consul is obliged by his instructions to appoint citizens of the United States, if there be any in his consular jurisdiction competent, to be his agents or vice-consuls; and, in default of his compatriots, he can appoint *whomsoever else he believes capable for such charge*.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 62*

Turin, Jan. 9, 1857

Sir: You are probably aware that for some years the United States' Squadron in the Mediterranean has occupied as a depot of naval stores certain buildings at Spezia belonging to the Government of Sardinia. I have received a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs which puts an end to that occupancy. The Government is about to move its Navy to the Gulf of Spezia, and needs those buildings for its own purposes. A translation of the Minister's letter is appended to this dispatch. Three months are allowed for the removal of the United States Stores. I have informed Commodore Breese of the facts. He has

replied that he can rent private buildings at Spezia, suitable to the preservation of the property, and will be able to surrender the Sardinian ware-houses at the end of the designated time

***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel***<sup>91</sup>

Turin, 2 Janvier 1857

Monsieur le Ministre: L'expérience ayant fait de plus en plus reconnaître l'insuffisance des locaux affectés jusqu'ici aux différents services de la Marine Royale dans le port de Gênes, mon Collègue au Département de la Marine a cru devoir proposer dernièrement, et le Gouvernement de S. M. a approuvé, une détermination, d'après laquelle les navires à voiles de la Marine Royale se sont rendus, et auront dorénavant leur station à la Spezia.

Cette translocation entraîne la nécessité d'occuper la plupart des bâtiments du Lazaret au Varignano pour les destiner, au moins, provisoirement, aux logements, aux bureaux, ainsi qu'aux ateliers et magasins, qu'on doit y établir pour les exigences du service de la flotte.

M. le Ministre de la Marine m'écrit en outre, que la Commission, chargée du projet pour le nouvel établissement de la Marine Royale a constaté l'impérieuse nécessité d'utiliser aussi pour les besoins de ce service les locaux dont l'usage avait été, il y a quelque temps temporairement accordé à l'Escadre Américaine de la Méditerranée, laquelle y a établi des dépôts d'effets et de matériel.

Tout en exprimant ses plus vives regrets, mon Collègue au dit Département me prie de faire prévenir M. le Commandant supérieur de la Division Navale des Etats Unis afin qu'il veuille bien prendre les dispositions nécessaires pour que le local occupé par les dépôts de l'Escadre soit évacué et rendu aussitôt que possible à l'Administration Sarde.

En même temps M. le Ministre de la Marine ajoute, que comme il ne se dissimule pas la difficulté que pourrait rencontrer le prompt accomplissement des opérations de transport des dits dépôts dans une autre localité, il se borne à exprimer le désir que l'Autorité Américaine compétente veuille bien faire en sorte, que les locaux, dont il s'agit, soient évacués

<sup>91</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 62 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 10, vol. 9, pp. 17-20

et rendus à l'Administration de la Marine Royale dans un délai de trois mois, c'est-à-dire, à la fin de Mars prochain.

Je viens, en conséquence, vous prier, M. le Ministre, de porter ce qui précède à la connaissance de M. le Commodore de l'Escadre des Etats Unis, et dans la persuasion que vous apprécierez les motifs impérieux qui forcent le Gouvernement du Roi à ne plus pouvoir laisser à la disposition de l'Escadre Américaine les locaux qu'elle occupe présentement au Varignano, j'ai l'honneur de vous réitérer les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

**John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy**

*Dispaccio n 63*

Turin, Jan. 26, 1857

Sir: On the 31st day of October, 1856, a circular from your Department was addressed to this Legation, stating that a box containing Audubon's *Birds* and Audubon's *Quadrupeds of America* had been despatched hither for presentation to the Sardinian Government <sup>92</sup> That circular was duly received, but the box mentioned has never been heard of, although I have had enquiries of it made at Genoa and Marseilles. As three months, nearly, have now elapsed since the date of your circular, I think it proper to mention the fact. The box is probably still lying at New York, if it has not been lost altogether.

My last dispatch was devoted to the complaints of the Modenese Government against the U. S. Consul at Carrara, or rather against his Neapolitan deputy Signor Stenore Capocci di Belmonte. I addressed a note to Mr. Torrey stating that complaints had been made, and, while disavowing any authority over his Consulate, advising him as a fellow official to visit Carrara and re-establish peace. I have received a reply from him, and, as I have sent you the Modenese story, I think it justice to send Mr. Torrey's letter also. He expresses himself with considerable warmth against the Modenese Government, and completely identifies his cause with that of his subaltern; but I do not perceive that his statements of fact greatly militate with those of the Modenese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Torrey seems to have taken a mistaken view of some passages in the volume called *General Instructions to Consuls &c*, Appendix,

<sup>92</sup> Per informazioni riguardanti la spedizione di questi lavori di John J Audubon, vedi H R MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations* cit, vol II, pp 350, 356.

pages 144-5-6, in which certain diplomatic duties are attributed to consuls in states where we have no ministers. He has confounded these duties with privileges, and, in his correspondence with the Modenese ministry seems to have taken ground that he was in some sort a *Chargé d'Affaires* having diplomatic rights.

To the appended letter I have made no reply, because the only thing that I could say to Mr. Torrey would be that he was wrong in his views and that he should take the business of his Consulate out of Signor Capocci's hands. As I have no authority over an American consul in Modena, I cannot tell him so, and have therefore made no reply. I am pleased to see, however, that my note has induced him to go to Carrara, as his letter is dated from that place.

I may mention that in the verbal communications which I have received from the Modenese people, they stated that they made no complaint against Mr. Torrey himself; on the contrary, they have expressed a very high personal regard for him. It is only to his Neapolitan agent that they object.

***Franklin Torrey a John M. Daniel*<sup>93</sup>**

Carrara, 31st Dec. 1856

Sir. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 27th inst. The question between the Modenese Government and myself has been for a long time pending, simply because the Minister of Foreign Affairs has *never* replied *directly* upon the point in question; but on the contrary has returned an evasive answer. I have never considered the question of sufficient gravity to refer to any one but those with whom I am personally acquainted and have therefore have asked the opinion of our Consul at Leghorn, Mr. Binda, and Commodore Breese. The former argues with me that the authorities have greatly infringed upon the rights and privileges of this Consulate, and satisfaction should be demanded from the Government of Modena; the latter declined giving his opinion or interfering in any manner. As yet I have received no reply to my several letters wherewith I can make any conciliatory offer, but, on the contrary Count Forni has the audacity to insinuate that he has the right to dictate to the United States, the laws, rights & privileges

<sup>93</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 63 di Daniel.

pertaining to the Consulate, because, as he observes, there is no existing treaty with the United States. I proposed to abide by the same laws as those in the German States, which in my opinion ought to extend to this Duchy but the Minister of For. Affairs thinks no government has the power to make laws for him.

I am led to infer from the tenor of your despatch, that the correspondence which I have had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been laid before you; but in what light I can only conjecture by the replies to my letters.

Permit me to give you a few leading facts. Mr. Stenore Capocci di Belmonte is a Neapolitan who has resided at Carrara about 2½ years—and during this time he has never been heard to express his views on any question, or take part in any political insurrections which have several times taken place since his residence here,—the only *crime* in this part of the country noticed by the authorities. Mr. Capocci was *officially recognized* by this Government in Febry, 1855, as my Vice-Consul, and not until he was so unceremoniously assailed by the authorities, did he have any notice that any change had taken place. In May last, whilst I was absent from my residence (where Mr. Capocci also resides), three Italian gentlemen from Tuscany visited him, but took up their abode at the hotel. In the evening they took tea with Mr. Capocci, and at about 10½ o'clock, as they were about to retire to the hotel, they were sought by the dragoons (who act as police) at the door of my residence. Mr. Capocci was assured that their passports were in order and at the *police office*, & therefore requested them to wait a few moments as they were just on the point of leaving the house. The Brigadier replied that the public force would wait for no man, and very arrogantly demanded to see them immediately. Mr. Capocci remonstrated at such language and requested them to respect the place they were in. At this moment one of the gentlemen desired to go with them to the police office, to have an explanation, but he was pushed back into the house saying no one should leave until an order from them or the commander of the forces should be given them.

They told Mr. Capocci that they did not recognize any Consulate, nor had they received any instructions respecting them. They ridiculed him when he protested against their proceedings and said if he did not comply to their commands, force would be used. An order however came from the commander, & they went away. I made a complaint to Modena, but, instead of giving me satisfaction, Count Forni said that the police had the right *to go where they please, and no limit could be*

*given to them* On the contrary, he *censured* them for not having *forcibly entered my house*.

Again Mr Capocci had a few friends to dine with him, among which were some of the most distinguished ladies of the town The day following, these *gentlemen* were all called before the police and interrogated as to the nature of their conversation whilst at dinner.

Early in April, 1855, Mr. Capocci asked permission to enjoy with many others the pleasures of the chase—which was readily granted by the authorities and confirmed by the Duke at a private audience when he visited Massa. Notwithstanding, he was arrested by a lieutenant for having fire-arms in his possession, when returning from the chase The same officer, who was also hunting with another and a soldier, in the morning of the same day, met Mr Capocci they stopped and exchanged the compliments of the day and wished him success, etc. When Mr. Capocci was arrested, he asked the officer why he did not inform him in the morning of his intentions; and he replied that when it pleased him to do his duty, he did so. And he had no orders respecting consuls or consulates

The question now is, are such proceedings as the above to be tolerated without a single murmur? Have the officials of *Carrara* the right to dictate to me their laws, regardless of those established by treaty between the adjoining duchies and the United States. I say *Carrara*, because the subalterns act as they please, however outrageous it may appear, and every act is sustained by the Government I repeat if I am not to have the protection which an American citizen can claim, there is no other alternative for me but to send in my resignation to the Department, for certainly no American born and educated under free laws and free institutions can quietly submit to such an infringement upon our national rights. Should a treaty be concluded between this Government and the U. States, undoubtedly greater respect would be shown to our countrymen and all farther controversy be avoided.

I am greatly obliged to you for your kind intercedence in my behalf, and hope and trust that through you the question will have a favorable termination for me.

*Dispaccio n 64*

Turin, Feb 3, 1857

Sir: This day I had an interview, by appointment, with Count Cavour, the chief Minister of Sardinia, for the purpose of arriving at a clear understanding of Sardinia's position on the Privateering Question. Our conversation was of considerable length, covering the whole subject, but particularly referring to your proposed extension of the principles enunciated by the Congress at Paris so as render all private property on the ocean secure from belligerent rights. On this chief proposition of the American Government, the declarations of the Sardinian Minister were explicit. He said that he not only regarded it as a very just and logical deduction from the original ideas of the Paris Congress, but also as an arrangement by which Sardinia, a weak power with an easily blockaded coast, had everything to gain. He gave it his cordial approval; and, if the Congress should re-assemble, he would there be a warm advocate for the proposition of the American Secretary of State. At the same time, he could not give a separate or official assent to it at this time, because Sardinia having signed jointly the Declaration of Maritime Law promulgated by the Congress, was bound not to modify it without the accord of the other parties represented.

This accord had not been obtained, and therefore his reply to my letter had been retarded. He seemed to think that it could not be obtained at all, until the principle suggested by Mr Marcy had taken a long and deep root in the popular mind. On questioning him however somewhat closely, I found what I knew before, that the only opposition to the American principle in the world is made by England.

As to the second subject, on which I have been directed to get the sense of the Sardinian Government,—to-wit the treatment our Privateers may expect to receive in its ports should our proposition be refused and should we become engaged in a war with another of the powers represented in the late Congress, I failed to get so clear a response. The Minister seemed to be confused in his ideas on the rights of Privateers in general, and as to the point particularly proposed, he said the question had never been raised or thought of in the Congress, and at present his mind was not distinctly made up as to the answer he should give. He promised to examine the matter with care and shortly inform me. If he does not, I shall return to the matter in another interview.

***William L. Marcy a John M. Daniel***

*struzione n. 19*

Washington, 9th February, 1857

Sir. Your despatches to No. 42 inclusive have reached the Department.

The conduct of Consul Torrey is entirely disapproved, and his commission revoked for the reason assigned in the despatch to him of the 5th instant, which is enclosed, open for your perusal, and to be transmitted to him at Carrara, or Leghorn, the Department having no certain information of his place of residence.

You will take the earliest occasion to communicate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the steps which the United States have taken in the premises, and which are conceived to be due to the friendly relations existing between them and the Sardinian Government.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 65*

Turin, March 1, 1857

Sir: In dispatch No. 62, I informed you that the Sardinian Government had given us notice to discontinue by the end of March our occupancy of their public buildings at the Lazerretto [sic] in the Gulf of Spezia. When I communicated this notice to the American commander, he seemed to be perplexed as to the true intention of the Sardinian Government. He was not certain whether they wished him to leave the Gulf altogether, or only the public buildings now used for the preservation of our stores. If the latter view was correct, he wished for a longer time than that allowed by the Sardinian Government to make preparation in private buildings for the reception of our public property.

As I was unwilling to ask further indulgence unless satisfied that the public service required me to do so, I visited the Gulf of Spezia in person. It is an immense piece of water with seven bays or indentations. The Sardinian navy does not require more than one of these bays, and I found that their works would not commence before the 1st of June. Hence on my return to Turin, in an interview with the First Minister, Count Cavour, I asked and obtained all that could be desired. The Sardinian Government not only has no wish to expel our Squadron from the Gulf, but it is even anxious that it should stay there: they will give



us Panigaglia Bay, which is one of the best, for our entire use. On its shore there are two ruined convents which can be put in proper repair by the 1st of June, and until then our stores can remain in the public buildings which they now occupy.

On my return to Turin I received your dispatch No. 19, enclosing the note to Mr. Torrey revoking his commission as Consul, which I have forwarded to him at Leghorn. Also I have, according to your direction, communicated a knowledge of the fact to the Modenese Government through their *Chargé d'Affaires* in this city.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Marcy***

*Dispaccio n 66*

Turin, March 7, 1857

Sir: In Dispatch No. 64, I gave account of a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the new principles of Maritime Law proposed by the Congress of Paris and amended by the United States. I have had a second conversation with the Minister on that branch of the subject which concerns the treatment which our privateers may expect to receive hereafter in Sardinian ports, should the United States refuse to abolish letters of marque [sic] and become involved in war with some third power represented at the Congress. I was again unable to get a definite answer to your questions. The Minister said that such enquiries had never been suggested at the Congress of Paris, and that he found great difficulty in making up his mind as to what answer he ought to give. I stated some reasons why it would be desirable to know our relative positions on the point in question with as little delay as possible. He replied that if the slightest prospect of a war should appear, he would hasten his decision and give a full reply to my official note on the subject; but as the United States seemed to be at present on the best terms with the rest of the world, he thought that full time might be afforded to give the matter a complete consideration.

In the desultory remarks which followed, I gained some view of what was passing in his mind. He said that if the United States did not choose to accept the proposition of the Paris Congress, their privateers would without doubt always have the right to take refuge in Sardinian ports from inimical cruisers; but it was questionable whether, after Sardinia's adherence to the Declaration of the Congress, they could be permitted to sell their prizes there and make the port a basis of oper-

ation against the enemy. I replied that the Declaration of Maritime Law was a *proposition*, not an act of *legislation* for the world, but that if the alliance undertook to deprive those powers who could not accept it of the privileges they have hitherto enjoyed, it should be considered in the latter category. Further, if our privateers should not be allowed to leave the ports for their operations after they once entered them, they would be imprisoned, not protected by Sardinia—The Minister said it could never be intended to detain them as prisoners, but that nothing was yet clear to him, and he begged me to consider none of the ideas he had stated on that point as yet fixed.

From circumstances known to me I am satisfied that the uncertainty of Count Cavour's mind arises from the arguments and interference of the British Minister here, who busies himself in opposition to the American scheme. The British Government does not desire to see our amendment, rendering private property free from the devastation of war on sea as on land, pass into a principle of international law. At the same time they wish to force the United States to give up the right of privateering, or if they shall be unable to do so, render that right valueless by depriving us of the privileges we have hitherto enjoyed in neutral ports.

It has occurred to me that if in the private conversations which I hold with the Sardinian Premier, I should be permitted to suggest that there might be counter-measures on the part of the United States, he might be assisted in arriving at a just decision. For instance, it might be hinted that if Sardinia deprives our privateers of the rights which they have hitherto enjoyed in her ports and changes the condition of international law in that regard, the United States might place Sardinian vessels-of-war—their national vessels—when in our ports on the same footing which they give to our privateers.<sup>94</sup>

I should not take upon myself to make such a suggestion unless my superiors should think it advisable; but if it is thought useful, it might be done in a manner which would not commit the United States' Government, and still have a possible effect on the Minister's judgment.

<sup>94</sup> Vedi MOORE, *Digest of International Law*, vol. VII, p. 535 sgg. In base alla Dichiarazione di Parigi la pirateria veniva abolita. Gli SU non furono d'accordo. La Gran Bretagna (p. 569) annunciava che avrebbe richiesto i danni per ogni perdita subito dai sudditi britannici « in conseguenza di azioni dannose » dei pirati.

*Dispaccio n 67*

Turin, March 26, 1857

Sir. Diplomatic relations between Austria and Sardinia have been broken. The Austrian diplomatist at Turin, Count Paar,<sup>96</sup> has been recalled, and the official journal of Sardinia announces the speedy return of the Piedmontese Minister from Vienna.

Your Excellency has been informed of the settled animosity between these two countries, growing out of the Austrian domination in Italy and embittered by the wars of '48. The apparent peace between them since that time has been only a long diplomatic war. The present incident in the quarrel arises from circumstances attendant on the late visit of the Emperor to Milan. The Sardinian press naturally made every fact which transpired the theme of bitter comment, assailed the private character of all Italian families who appeared at the festivities of the occasion, and possibly went into some misrepresentations as the conduct of the Imperial household. Hence Count Buol, the Austrian Prime Minister, addressed an angry note to Cavour, President of the Sardinian Cabinet, setting forth their griefs and demanding punishment on the Piedmontese journalists. Cavour retorted by a defence of his press, and referred the Austrian authorities to the tribunals for redress. Not willing to take the step recommended, and treating it as a refusal of satisfaction, the Austrian cabinet withdraws its representative at Turin.

The event has no serious significance, both parties being so situated that they cannot come to arms. The French and English ministers busy themselves about the matter, and it is not improbable that the broken relations may be resumed in a short time.

<sup>95</sup> Lewis Cass del Michigan. Fu segretario di Stato dal marzo 1857 al 14 dicembre 1860.

<sup>96</sup> Conte Ludwig von Paar Segretario di Legazione e incaricato d'affari *ad interim* a Torino nel 1856. Nella primavera del 1857 egli fu richiamato in seguito alla rottura delle relazioni diplomatiche austro-sarde. Paar fu poi nominato ministro residente a Parma e Modena, ambasciatore nell'Essen, in Sassonia e Danimarca ed infine ambasciatore a Roma.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 68*

Turin, March 31, 1857

Sir I have had the honour to receive your communication, dated the 9th of March, informing me that the President has called you to the head of the State Department of our Government, and that you have accepted the duties of that high office

Permit me, Sir, while hastening to acknowledge its receipt, to express the pleasure with which I learn that a statesman of ability and experience has undertaken the responsible and important task of conducting the foreign relations of the United States.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 70*<sup>97</sup>

Turin, May 2, 1857

Sir: The only public business worthy of note which I have had to transact here during the past month has relation to our new establishment of naval stores in the Gulf of Spezia. Despite the consent and wish of the Sardinian Government, its officials in the neighbourhood of that place have opposed and retarded our removal to Panigaglia, and I have had some days of employment at the departments in Turin in obviating their objections.

The only detail which I think needful of statement here is as follows. At Panigaglia, which is a desert cove, there is no custom-house. The Minister of Finance will place a special officer there to watch our stores, provided the squadron will pay an indemnity of 200 dollars per annum to the custom-house at Spezia for his maintenance. This proposition seemed to me just and I have so informed the officer in command of the Squadron. Panigaglia is the only place in the Gulf suitable to our purposes. But if we go to that place, the Sardinian Government must incur the expense of an additional employe wholly on our account. It seems, therefore, right that we should pay the indemnity above-named, which is the annual salary of a *douanier*. I will add that, while informing the Commodore of this proposition and of my opinion on it, I took

<sup>97</sup> Il dispaccio n. 69, Torino, 30 aprile 1857, trasmetteva i resoconti finanziari della Legazione per i trimestri con scadenza al 31 dicembre 1856 e 31 marzo 1857

pains to make him understand that I neither directed nor authorized its acceptance by him, as I have no control over the expenses of the Squadron, and that I left the arrangement open for his acceptance or refusal as he thought proper.

In the meantime, the Parliament of Sardinia is engaged in a protracted and excited debate over the Government Bill by which it is proposed to remove its own Navy from Genoa to the spot formerly occupied by the American Squadron in the Gulf of Spezia. The bill meets with an opposition of unexpected force. It has been chiefly stirred up by the city of Genoa, which is naturally disinclined to lose the advantages it has hitherto enjoyed from the station of the Royal Navy and docks in its port. The feeling of the people there is so strong, that there have been several tumults. On one day, the National Guard refused to do duty and something like a general revolt seemed in preparation. This tendency was, however, soon put down; and it is most probable that the Government in the end will have its way in the matter, both in and out of the Parliament.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 71*

Turin, June 15, 1857

Sir: Appended to this Dispatch is a note from the Sardinian Government, containing a general complaint against the mercantile marine of the United States trading in Sardinian ports. It appears that an American vessel styled the *Neneveh* arrived at Palermo from Genoa sometime since, having on board two Genoese youths who bore no papers and were not inscribed on the ship's lists. By the Captain's account, they had secreted themselves on board; by their own statement, they came to assist in the lading, and the ship sailed without warning them to leave. The Sardinian Consul at Palermo sent them home; and the Sardinian Minister writes me a letter in which he makes the case a basis of general charges against American mercantile vessels. He says that such things frequently occur; and requests me to call the attention of American consuls in this Kingdom to the fact.

This I have done; but I do not think the incident justifies the general accusation. If any other similar case could be proven, they would certainly allude to it. I send the letter to your Excellency not as one requiring your practical attention, but simply as a paper illustrative of

a sentiment towards our marine existing in many foreign countries It seems to me that there is an indisposition to allow our ships and captains fair play. They are watched as no other commercial vessels are watched, and the slightest circumstances are made pretexts for carping and fault-finding. The example seems to have been set in Great-Britain, where several American vessels have been severely dealt with in the past twelve months, and there is the same tendency in this country, which is always a satellite of England.

***Ruggero Gabaleone di Salmour a John M. Daniel*<sup>98</sup>**

Turin, 31 Mai 1857

Monsieur le Ministre. J'ai été informé, à la suite de rapports parvenus au Département Royal de la Marine, que le navire marchand des Etats-Unis *Neneveh*, capitaine *Arthur Prince*, parti de Gênes à la fin d'avril dernier, est arrivé le 7 de ce mois dans le port de Palerme (Sicile), ayant à bord deux jeunes marins qui n'appartenaient point à l'équipage, n'avaient ni passeport ni d'autres papiers, et n'étaient pas mentionnés sur les expéditions du Capitaine, savoir: les nommés *Ronco* Emmanuel, de Gênes, âgé de 18 ans, et *Cestini* Louis, également de Gênes, âgé de 12 ans. La Police de Palerme ayant constaté cette irrégularité, après avoir entendu les explications du Capitaine et celles des deux jeunes gens, ne crut pas pouvoir permettre à ceux-ci de rester plus long temps à bord du navire *Neneveh*, et les fit descendre à terre et conduire en lieu de sûreté, invitant ensuite le Consul de Sardaigne à pourvoir à leur retour dans les Etats du Roi qui a eu lieu ces jours derniers.

Pour se justifier, le capitaine Arthur Prince a déclaré que les jeunes Ronco et Cestini s'étaient cachés, à son insu, dans la cale du navire tandis qu'il s'apprêtait à quitter le port de Gênes, et qu'il ne s'aperçut de leur présence à bord que lorsque le bâtiment se trouvait déjà en haute mer; poussé par un vent favorable, de sorte qu'il n'aurait pu les remettre à terre sans se détourner de son voyage. De leur côté, Ronco et Cestini ont prétendu qu'ils n'étaient montés à bord du *Neneveh* dans le port de Gênes, que pour aider aux préparatifs du départ, mais que le navire ayant mis à la voile, ils furent obligés, malgré eux, d'y rester.

<sup>98</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 71 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n 10, vol 9, pp 176-182 Il Salmour firma per il Ministro

Sans vouloir rechercher laquelle de ces deux explications contradictoires est la plus conforme à la vérité, je me bornerai à vous faire remarquer, M le Ministre, qu'il est de fait que le navire *Neneveh* a pris à bord à Gênes deux jeunes sujets Sardes dépourvus de tout titre régulier de voyage et les aurait gardés si la Police de Palerme, s'apercevant de cette irrégularité flagrante, ne les eût fait débarquer et renvoyer dans leur pays.

Si ce fait était isolé, tout en le regrettant sans doute, le Gouvernement du Roi n'aurait probablement pas cru devoir y donner une suite. Mais comme les rapports des autorités de Gênes font connaître qu'il s'est déjà présenté d'autres cas où des navires marchands des Etats-Unis ont embarqué des jeunes gens sujets Sardes, dont le départ n'était nullement autorisé en conformité des lois du pays, je ne saurais, M. le Ministre, m'abstenir d'appeler spécialement votre attention sur l'incident relatif aux nommés Ronco et Cestini, pour vous prier en même temps de vouloir bien inviter les Consuls de votre nation dans les ports Sardes à veiller rigoureusement de leur côté à ce que les capitaines marchands Américains s'abstiennent d'embarquer, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, des individus qui ne seraient point munis d'un titre de voyage ou d'un permis régulier de l'autorité compétente.

En vous adressant cette demande, M. le Ministre, j'aime à douter d'autant moins de vos dispositions à la seconder, que je suis bien persuadé de la ferme intention du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis que les commandants de navire de la Marine marchande respectent en toute occasion les lois des pays amis auxquels ils abordent; et je me permettrai de vous faire remarquer au surplus qu'il est dans l'intérêt même des Capitaines de s'abstenir avec soin d'embarquements irréguliers tels que celui des jeunes Ronco et Cestini, qui peuvent les exposer à des grands inconvénients non seulement dans nos ports, mais aussi dans les ports étrangers, et quelquefois même dans ceux de l'Union.

Agréez, M. le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très-distinguée.

*John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass*

*Dispaccio n. 72*

Turin, July 1, 1857

Sir An insurrectionary outbreak has occurred at Genoa, so disconnected with passing events, that I deem it worth a notice. It seems that during a period of profound quiet a number of persons conspired to

seize the fortifications of the city. They arranged their plans and prepared their arms without interruption, and a few days ago, a band of forty entered one of the chief forts and nearly made themselves the masters of it. The military assembling, the affair was ended without much bloodshed, and a hundred arrests made. The police is now occupied with the examination of the parties, and nothing is known by the public as to the cause or intention of the conspiracy.

Two days before, the mail-steamer *Cagliari* had sailed from Genoa for the island of Sardinia. The insurrection caused the police to remember that a number of turbulent characters had taken passage on that steamer, and the government then despatched in pursuit of her a war-vessel. The pursuit proved too late. The suspicious passengers had already risen on the Captain, seized the steamer and turned her course to Ponza, an island belonging to Naples on which the king of that country keeps one of his political prisons. Landing there, they stormed the prison and set at liberty three hundred captives. With these they marched against the Neapolitan forces of the island. A collision ensued, in which the patriots were beaten. Most of them have fallen into the hands of the authorities, by whom they will be, probably, severely treated.

No clear explanation of the affairs has yet been given, but it will probably turn out to be only another of those insane conspiracies which always exist somewhere in Italy, beginning and ending in nothing.

Meantime, the session of the Sardinian Parliament draws to a close. It has been signalized by the assumption of one of the most remarkable enterprises ever undertaken by a nation—nothing less than a tunnel through the Alps which divide Italy from the rest of Europe. A bill finally committing the government to its immediate execution and appropriating twenty millions of francs to that end has been passed by the legislative body. The tunnel will pass under Mount Cenis and join the railroads of France to those of Sardinia. It will be over nine miles in length, all the way through granite rock, and, owing to the great mass of mountain above, it will be without shafts. It will probably cost five times the appropriation made, but, if finished, will perhaps be the most prodigious single piece of internal improvement yet executed by man.

The official business which I have had to transact in the past month has been too ordinary in nature to require notice here.



*Dispaccio n. 73*

Turin, July 25, 1857

Sir: The insurrection at Genoa, of which I gave a brief notice in my last dispatch, seems now to be clearly understood. It was the abortive explosion of an extensive conspiracy, taking in its scope France, Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany and Naples, gotten up under the auspices of Mr. Mazzini and his colleagues in London, having for its object the overthrow of the existing governments in all those countries, and the establishment of a republic on the Mazzinian model. This conspiracy was discovered at an early date by the French police, and the Imperial Government immediately gave warning at Naples, Turin and Vienna. It seems that Mr. Mazzini gained cognizance of this fact, and wished to put a stop to the movement. But the minor conspirators would not listen. Left to themselves by the elder heads, they made the abortive attempts, of which you have been notified, at Genoa, Leghorn, Pisa, and in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The result has been the loss of one hundred of their lives in a skirmish near Ponza, the killing of one sentinel sleeping at his post in Genoa, and finally in the arrest and imprisonment of all the persons actually engaged in these attempts, amounting to several hundreds. The chiefs, Mazzini and others, have kept out of harm's way.

The number of those inculpated in the affair is small in consideration of the ambitious and extensive design. They had little or no understanding with the discontented inhabitants of the countries in which they rose. They seem to have acted under the idea that a spark was everything needful to set the land in conflagration. This conception is completely erroneous. Italy is badly governed and the people who think at all on political subjects are not contented; but they are very far from that point of exasperation which alone can render nations willing to encounter the turmoil and misery of a revolution. I have long given over all expectation of witnessing any change here. The present state of things will in all reasonable probability outlast our time.

The trials of the persons apprehended in this kingdom have not commenced. Among them is Miss White,<sup>99</sup> an English-woman of the strong-minded sort, who has been alternately a medical student and a popular lecturer in favour of revolutions, and who came to Genoa to try her hand at the practice of her theories. She seems to have been

<sup>99</sup> Jessie Meriton White (1832-1906), futura moglie di Alberto Mario

the chief contriver and leader of the miserable business there, and her trial is expected to be as amusing as that of some of her unfortunate dupes will be tragical.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 74*

Turin, Aug. 6, 1857

Sir: Certain citizens of Boston have collected by subscription a sum of money sufficient to purchase a fine cannon to be presented to Sardinia, and to serve as part armament of the great fortress at Alexandria which this country is strengthening for its defence in case of war with Austria. This cannon has arrived at Genoa under the care of a Mr. Leone Corelli Quarantotti, a naturalized citizen of the United States. This gentleman brings with him an address of the subscribers to the King; and also a letter of recommendation from a distinguished citizen of Massachusetts to myself. He desires to present his gift to the King in person and with considerable ceremony; he wishes the cannon conveyed to the palace with a band of music and that his audience should be public. I understand that Mr. Quarantotti would desire the American Minister in Turin to take part in this ceremonial. He has not yet seen me in person nor made this request directly. If he does so, I shall be obliged to decline it. I will place him in communication with the Foreign Office, and offer him such personal civility as may be in my power; but, in absence of instructions from my Government, I should not feel justified in taking an official part in making a gift of a character so warlike to a foreign government. My reasons are these.—The United States hold peaceful relations with both Austria and Sardinia. These two countries are not themselves at war. But that their relative position and unfriendly feeling render war always possible, is well understood, and this same castle and cannon of Alexandria are a preparation for that contingency. Now, my acts, as the representative of the United States here, have political significance. My appearance in the proposed ceremonial would doubtless for that reason be agreeable [sic] to the Sardinians, but would be considered as unfriendly by the other party, and by both as a departure from impartial neutrality on the side of the United States.

Hence I shall endeavour to render Mr. Quarantotti's request unnecessary; but, if made, hope that the foregoing reason, calmly stated,

will cause him to understand the propriety of the course which I shall adopt.

Nevertheless, it may be that neither he nor his friends at home may appreciate them; and that ex-parte representations of my conduct may be made to you. Hence I have thought best to inform you of the matter before-hand, so that you may be able to understand its true character, should it be brought to your hearing.<sup>100</sup>

For the present, there is nothing worthy of notice at Turin,—the extreme heats [sic] having driven the King and his Ministers to the country, and parliament having adjourned.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 75*

Turin, Sept 2, 1857

Sir: I have had the honour to receive your Dispatch of July 31st,<sup>101</sup> enclosing the memorial of Mr Morse. It will give me very great pleasure to advance the just claims of that gentleman in the manner your Excellency has indicated. I have long regarded the use made of his great invention by the governments of Europe and their disregard of his rights as a signal injustice. If I can aid him here, I shall be happy to do so, but I fear that little will be gotten from Sardinia. Italy in this age receives much money from the rest of the world, but of all countries it is that which least [sic] comprehends the idea of returning it. Sardinia is, under present rule, economical in expenditure to a degree that is best characterized by the homely but expressive adjective, stingy.

A good excuse for the close dealings which mark its financial policy is to be found in the vast enterprises of internal improvement which it has undertaken. Since my last note, the King and Court have been absent from the capital for the purpose of striking the first blow in the great tunnel through the Alps, which will connect the roads of France with those of Italy, and by that ceremony inaugurating in form one of the most prodigious works that ever has been attempted by man. After having done so, the first spade-full of earth was turned up further on

<sup>100</sup> Con l'istruzione n 21, Washington, 10 settembre 1857 il segretario Cass risponderà che il Dipartimento di Stato approvava completamente la condotta che Daniel si proponeva di seguire in questa questione.

<sup>101</sup> L'istruzione n 20, Washington, 31 luglio 1857, spedita identica anche a August C Dodge.

at Culoz,—the point where the Sardinian and French roads will actually connect. But this generation will probably have passed away before a second ceremonial shall declare its completion.

The chief political affair of the past month was the diplomatic dispute at Constantinople between Austria and England on one side, and Russia, France, and Sardinia on the other.<sup>102</sup> Full accounts of this will doubtless be furnished by your Minister in that city. I allude to it here simply to note the fact that Sardinia sided on this occasion with France instead of England, whose satellite she usually is. It is not to be supposed from this fact that the bonds which bind Sardinia to England have been loosened of late. The former country was here found in the company of France and Russia purely from its opposition to Austria. In the question of the principalities, it has no interest whatever.

The disputes with Naples over the Sardinian steamer *Cagliari*, which that Government seized on account of its involuntary share in the late insurrection, have been terminated by its liberation, after having nearly produced a breach of relations between the two countries.

I have mentioned Mr. Quarantotti and the cannon which he brought here from Boston for presentation to the Sardinian King. His mission has terminated to his satisfaction. He made no unreasonable requests of this Legation, and, on the instance of Count Cavour, the cannon was not brought to Turin.—The ceremonial of presentation took place at Genoa, and was conducted by Mr. Quarantotti on the one hand, and the Sardinian authorities on the other, without any participation by American officials.

### *John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass*

*Dispaccio n 76*

Turin, September 19, 1857

Sir. The Chamber of Commerce at Genoa has published in the newspapers a letter from the Sardinian Minister of Marine which merits a notice. In substance this letter is a warning to the shipowners of

<sup>102</sup> Dopo il congresso di Parigi il regno di Sardegna aveva desiderato di partecipare anche alla conferenza di Costantinopoli che era stata indetta per sollecitare il Sultano ad introdurre adeguate riforme nei Principati. Nonostante le fiere proteste del barone Tecco, inviato sardo a Costantinopoli, la richiesta fu respinta poiché la conferenza non aveva carattere ufficiale, si trattava di conversazioni amichevoli alle quali il regno di Sardegna non aveva alcun diritto di partecipare. In seguito Tecco fu richiamato da Costantinopoli per essere stato troppo zelante. Vedi NICOMEDE BIANCHI, *Storia documentata della diplomazia europea* cit., vol. VII, p. 249 sgg., FEDERICO CURATO, *Le relazioni diplomatiche* cit., vol. I, p. XCVII.

Genoa that, if they offend against the custom house laws of the United States, by the introduction of contraband articles not named in the manifest, their vessels will be confiscated; and that, if they arrive at New York with a greater number of passengers than the laws allow, they will be subjected to fines. This advice is based on the recent confiscation of the bark *Amalia Pratolongo* for the contraband introduction of brandy, &c, into the port of New York; and on the fine of another, the *St Giovanni*, for contravention of the laws relative to the number of emigrant passengers. A translation of this letter may be found at the end of this dispatch (Appendix. B).

Such a warning has long been needed at Genoa. The merchants and ship-owners [sic] there have for years been possessed of an idea that the Custom House of the United States is a non-entity; that all its laws can be broken with impunity; that they can introduce what they please into New York with a little bribery. It is hoped that this official declaration of their own Government will relieve them of these delusions.

The wholesome application of the law to the cases above named was eminently merited by the country at large. The utmost severity is used by the Government of Sardinia towards American vessels in its ports. The slightest irregularities on the part of our captains and sailors, even in cases where the cause of offence is beyond question mere ignorance apart from all wrongful intention, are punished by ruinous fines which are inexorably enforced. In more than one case I have been satisfied of a disposition in the Sardinian custom house officials to *entrap* our people purely for the reward which they receive. I think it is certain that there is at these ports an unwillingness to give American ship-owners and mariners the fair-play allowed to those of other nations. I have also continual complaints made to me by inoffensive American travellers of the brutality with which they are treated in passing the frontiers of this country, and the unjustifiable confiscations of their personal property to which they are subjected. As a fair specimen of these complaints, I append to this dispatch a note from Mr. D. L. Samson, an American gentleman whose statements are entitled to full credence. (Appendix A.)

Until a milder course is adopted here towards our own citizens, I would recommend that there should be no interference between the penalties of the law and Sardinian smugglers in the United States, on any solicitation.

Paris, June [?], 1857

My Dear Sir Having, as I think with every reason, a cause of complaint against the officials of the Savoien [sic] frontier, who in an unwarrantable manner seized the property of an American lady passing from Switzerland into France on her way to the U States, and, having stated the circumstances to M Mason in Paris, he has most kindly consented to introduce the matter to your attention while I solicit your good offices in behalf of the lady who is in great distress at her loss.

I will here state in as few words as possible the circumstances of the case On the 19th of this month, we left Geneva for Lyons, the route, for a small portion of the way, laying through a corner of Savoy, at the frontier of which, at the small village of L'Eluisset, greatly to our surprise a most rigorous search was made of the contents of the lady's trunk, which contained nothing but her private wardrobe and jewels—all of which were passed as of course among her jewels was found a broche painted by Lemonière, purchased in Geneva, executed expressly for her, and which is of great value especially as a work of art the officer on duty at once pronounced it confiscated although no attempt had been made to conceal it, and in fact the lady was ignorant of any law of this nature against articles strictly pertaining to her toilette. I showed our passports, as American citizens simply passing through the country—nothing however availed, I am glad to think owing to the absence of the chief functionary I obtained a receipt for the articles, stating my intention of appealing to you for their recovery I enclose the receipt which will be found annexed.

I cannot but feel highly indignant at the manner of the official coupled with what seems to me an unwarrantable confiscation of property, which at most should have been subject to a reasonable duty, and which duty if any I at once offered to pay, but which was scornfully refused, the whole proceeding seeming to be greatly to the delight of the officials I beg to call your attention to the receipt given for *five* broches, whereas there were but three, & two of these small indifferent affairs for children, of no value. this I think looks like a trick to defraud, as by a show of numbers to destroy the reasonable grounds for a demand of restitution. The painting of Lemonière is alone of value,

<sup>103</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 76 di Daniel

and its loss, if it really must be considered as such, will be long and deeply felt.

I am sensible, my dear Sir, of the trouble such a request as I am making will be to you, particularly as I have not the honor of being known to you personally; but, in thus praying your intervention, I am encouraged by the kind interest Mr Mason has so generously bestowed upon me and the misfortunes of the lady. With the highest consideration, I remain,

***Alfonso La Marmora alla Camera di Commercio di Genova***<sup>104</sup>

Torino, 31 agosto 1857

Si ha da Nuova York per rapporto in data 11 volgente di quel regio incaricato d'affari e console generale che a malgrado delle più serie avvertenze e calde raccomandazioni fatte ai capitani dei bastimenti nazionali per la esatta formazione del manifesto da presentarsi alle dogane, onde non incorrere nelle gravi pene comminate contro i frodatori, essendo essi specialmente da qualche tempo presi di mira, massime dopo il recente caso del capitano Ballestrino del brick barca *Amalia Pratolongo*, erano stati colti in contravvenzione il capitano Carlo Cichero del brick barca *S Michele* ed il capitano Gallo del *S Giovanni*, il primo per contrabbando di *brandy, chinina, abiti, sete e pizzi*, non dichiarati nel manifesto, e l'altro per eccedenza nel numero dei passeggeri; epperchè questi due bastimenti si trovano sotto sequestro, ed il mandato di arresto era stato spiccato contro il capitano Cichero ed il suo secondo di bordo Picasso, entrambi resisi latitanti, reputando l'autorità giuridica essere quest'ultimo l'agente immediato dell'armatore e proprietario sig. Michele Picasso considerato qual causa primitiva ed istigatore effettivo e responsabile del contrabbando, per cui stava per avvenirne la confisca del bastimento per parte del Marshal degli Stati Uniti, essendo già in corso le disposizioni per il congedo dell'equipaggio.

In quanto all'altro bastimento *S Giovanni* secondo le asserzioni del capitano Gallo, il suo *manifesto* sarebbe stato in regola meno uno sbaglio nella traduzione dall'italiano all'inglese che pare non fosse da accagionarsi a lui. Stava però la violazione della legge sui passeggeri per la

<sup>104</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 76 di Daniel Questa copia in italiano è conservata negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 10, vol. 9, pp. 279-283

quale era disposto a pagare le multe che gli sarebbero state inflitte per ognuno dei passeggeri in più del numero prescritto, essendosi a questo riguardo assunti quei suoi raccomandatari di rendersi garanti per esso.

È sommamente spiacevole che armatori e capitani consci come sono delle disastrose conseguenze del contrabbando nel recente esempio che n'ebbero dell'occorso al capitano Ballestrino del brik barca nazionale *Amalia Pratolongo*, si avventurino ad esercitare il biasimevole traffico pel quale sono dichiarati dalla legge marittima decaduti dalla protezione.

Accennando il ministero questi due nuovi casi alla Regia Camera di commercio, non dubita che sarà la medesima per apprezzare la necessità di dare avvertimenti agli armatori marittimi, affinché abbiano a desistere da fatti che compromettono i loro interessi e fanno lo scredito della marina nazionale all'estero.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 77*

Turin, October 1, 1857

Sir: I have the honour to enclose the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending June 30, 1857.

I have also the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of Dispatch No. [22] dated Sept. 10th.

To my own Dispatch No. 76, dated the 19th of September, I appended, as an illustration of the annoyances sometimes inflicted on American travellers by the Sardinian Custom-House, the complaint of a Mr. Samson. His case has been concluded by a note of the Foreign Office; and, as its beginning may have attracted your attention, I have thought proper to give its end, as exposed in the said note of the Sardinian Minister, in Appendix to the present Dispatch

### ***Ruggero Gabaleone di Salmour a John M. Daniel***<sup>105</sup>

Turin, 27 septembre 1857

Monsieur le Ministre. Le Département Royal des Finances, auquel je m'étais empressé de communiquer le contenu de l'office que vous

<sup>105</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 77 di Daniel. Questo originale si conserva negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n 10, vol 9, pp 286-290. Il Salmour firma per il Ministro.



m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 26 juillet dernier, vient de m'annoncer que le séquestre de quelques bijoux opéré le 19 juin par la Douane d'Eluiset, faute de déclaration à l'entrée, au préjudice de Madame Samson, a été réglé en voie de transaction moyennant l'offre de 15 francs et le paiement des frais de la procédure, qui seront de peu d'importance. Les objets saisis seront ainsi restitués à la condition qu'ils soient réexportés hors du territoire Sarde

En portant à votre connaissance, M. le Ministre, cette solution qui me paraît de nature à satisfaire la partie intéressée, je crois devoir remarquer que le reçu ci-joint, remis à Madame Samson lors de la saisie et qui avait motivé de votre part un reproche d'inexactitude à la charge des Agents de la Douane, n'avait point été formulé par ces derniers, mais par le Sieur Maurin, Expéditionnaire que Madame Samson avait chargé de la représenter auprès du bureau de la Douane.

La déclaration, également ci-annexée, de M. Maurin en fournit la preuve et vous fera connaître du reste la circonstance qui avait pu l'induire en erreur sur la quantité ou plutôt sur la nature des objets saisis.

Agréé, je vous prie, M. le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

*Ricevuta e dichiarazioni.*

L'Eluiset, le 19. Juin 1857

Mr. Daniel Samson des Etats Unis nous a laissé Trois Écrins, contenant bijouterie en cinq broches.

Maurin, P.<sup>r</sup> Grannois

L'Eluiset, le 14 Août 1857

Nous déclarons rectifier et expliquer comme suit le reçu que nous avons fait à Mr. Daniel Samson le 19 juin dernier des cinq objets saisis à son préjudice ce jour-là. Nous avons désigné cinq *broches* en trois écrins parce que nous n'avons fait qu'ouvrir les écrins, et avons pris deux boucles d'oreilles, assez grandes, pour deux broches, mais lorsqu'après nous les avons sorties, pour en constater le poids, nous en avons reconnu l'identité: ce que nous attestons avec d'autant plus d'empressement que c'est la vérité. Il y avait donc réellement trois broches et deux pendants d'oreilles.

Maurin, P.<sup>r</sup> Grannois

*Dispaccio n 78*

Turin, October 30, 1857

Sir The financial pressure which disturbs the commerce of the United States causes a similar uneasiness in this country <sup>106</sup> The chief staple of Sardinia is silk, which is exported in great quantities both in the raw and manufactured states. Want of money in the United States induces a retrenchment in the consumption of this luxury there, and a consequent fall in the price of the article here. At the same time the crop is and has been for years a short one. Hence the producers and the country at large will both suffer. As yet the result is only exhibited in a scarcity of money, and there have been no large failures. But these will presently come.

In Lombardy pecuniary difficulty has already reached a crisis, and Milan is in consternation. The oldest and greatest banking-house of that city has failed for the sum of twelve millions of francs. The distress is aggravated by the heavy rains which have fallen for a fortnight past, bringing with them the most extensive inundations that have been known either in Lombardy or Piedmont within the memory of this generation. The railroads are interrupted on all sides by the destruction of their bridges, which have been everywhere carried away and large tracts of country have been under water.

Meantime Parliament has been dissolved by proclamation of the King, and a new election ordered in fifteen days from the present time. This dissolution is not the result of disagreement between the Government and the present Parliament, but is the natural termination of its existence according to the Constitution. The new assembly will be in all events favorable to the Ministry; but in other respects a very different body from any the country has hitherto seen. This difference will be owing to the social position of its members. The nobility and landed gentry were opposed to the adoption of the present order of things, and have hitherto for the most part held themselves aloof from the politics of the country. Hence the legislative body has contained a large proportion of the professional classes. The nobility have however at last realized the

<sup>106</sup> La guerra di Crimea portò a una crisi nel commercio dei cereali e del bestiame che il regno di Sardegna importava dalla Russia e in quella della seta e dei tessuti che la Sardegna esportava in quel paese. Ciò spiega perché la guerra di Crimea fosse poco sentita dagli industriali e soprattutto dagli armatori genovesi che vedevano le loro prospere relazioni commerciali con Odessa seriamente compromesse. Vedi VINCENZO GULI, *Il Piemonte e la politica economica del Cavour*, Napoli, 1932, p. 179 sgg.

fact that existing institutions are destined to endure a long time, and have made up their minds to enter the field in large numbers.

But domestic affairs do not interest the public opinion of this country, or perhaps of any other in Europe, so much as the great tragedy of India, which occupies all tongues, and pens, and thoughts and has done so for six months past.<sup>107</sup> The general conviction is that British power will triumph for the present, but this rebellion will be the precursor of a long succession of others and the cause of endless troubles to England. I do not think there is any real sympathy for the English here or in any other country on the whole continent of Europe. Humanity obliges the press to condemn the atrocities of the revolt, and policy forces the government to express a favour for the British side. But both are hypocritical. Great Britain has been so long and so continually insolent, selfish, and interfering in its deportment towards all other nations, that they look on her present calamity with a satisfaction which they are yet afraid to express.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 79*

Turin, November 21, 1857

Sir. The result of the elections which have just ended has been a thunder-clap for the Cavour Ministry. Up to the last moment everything indicated that they had the matter all their own way. The clerical party gave no indications of life. But on the day itself it became manifest that they had not been the less active in that quiet way which the clergy so well understand. The whole Church and all its devotees came up to a man. One bishop appeared at the polls with two hundred and sixty priests behind him in procession. The result has been as serious as it has been unexpected. The clerical party in the next parliament will still retain a majority but a majority much diminished in strength and not always reliable. Should the opposition make a movement for a reconciliation with Rome, and make it with proper tact, the Ministry will stand in great danger of defeat. In such contingency, they make no secret of

<sup>107</sup> Nella primavera e nell'estate del 1857 gli Indiani si ribellarono, dando origine all'ammutinamento di Sepoy. La situazione a Lucknow divenne critica, a Jhansi la guarnigione fu massacrata, vittime innocenti si ebbero a Campore, Delhi e Lucknow furono difese. La riconquista di Delhi da parte degli Inglesi fu seguita da atti barbarici. I ribelli furono privati dei loro beni e fu restaurata la supremazia britannica. Al contrario, la Francia e gli S U non vollero associarsi alle misure contro la Cina.

their firm resolution to dissolve the parliament and appeal anew to the people. In short, the same scenes are now to be played in Piedmont which drew so much attention in Belgium last spring. It is quite probable that there will be new elections in less than six months.

Of foreign politics there is little to say. Mr. Cavour will probably again go to Paris to represent Sardinia in the new Congress to be held about the Danubian Principalities.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 80*

Turin, Jan. 10, 1858

SIR: I have not written during the past month because no events affecting American interests or the general politics of Europe have transpired here. The attention of the Sardinian ministers and people has been deeply engrossed with a parliamentary struggle between the progressive, or ministerial, and the retrograde, or Church, parties in the House of Deputies; but, however interesting to those concerned, such affairs do not seem to require more than a mention of their existence in these dispatches. The elections in November last gave an unexpected strength to the clerical faction in the new parliament then chosen. Since the meeting of that body, it has been wholly occupied with the verification of votes given in the electoral colleges. This subject has been made the test of strength between the Government and the opposition; and it has just been finished by the defeat of the latter.

In Belgium and in Piedmont parties have run parallel courses during the last six months, and in both the liberal organization has now obtained a temporary triumph.

The copy of Audubon's *Birds and Quadrupeds of America*, forwarded by the State Department to this Legation more than one year ago, has reached me during the last few days, and I have presented it in accordance with direction to the Sardinian Government

I avail myself of the occasion to forward the accounts and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending September, 30, 1857.

Sir. A singular incident has transpired at Spezia, which might have resulted in a disagreeable case for the Sardinian and United States' governments had not the American Consul there been an intelligent man.

More than a year ago, the American sailing-ship *Adriatic* and the French steamer *Lyonnaise* came into collision at night and on the open ocean. The *Adriatic* apparently got the worst of it—loosing her bowsprit and much of her rigging; while the steamer seemed to be unhurt and proceeded on its way without taking any notice of the vessel it had run down. Not till seven hours afterwards was the leak discovered from which, in thirty-six hours from the moment of the collision, the steamer sank. As for the sailing vessel, knowing nothing of this catastrophe, she continued her voyage to the French port of Marseilles. Learning her arrival, the steamboat company immediately brought suit against its Captain, who was also its proprietor, for the loss of their steamboat; lost, as they alleged, from being run down by this American sailing-vessel.

This suit detained the vessel in the port an entire year and occasioned great expense to its owner. It turned on the question whether the negligence which occasioned the accident existed on board ship or the steamboat. Being first tried before the Tribunal of Commerce at Marseilles, necessarily composed of maritime men, the American was not only acquitted but highly complimented for his measures and conduct in the affair. But it seems that the steamboat company appealed to a higher tribunal, composed of lawyers and landmen, who rendered a verdict like that of the fox in the fable. They declared the fault to rest with both parties, estimated the damage at a million and a-half of francs, and laid one half, or seven hundred and fifty thousand francs, on the plaintiff and the other on the defendant.

In consequence of this judgment the *Adriatic* was to have been attached, sequestered, and sold by the officers of the law. Happily they delayed taking possession till the day after the sentence, and, when the morning came, the *Adriatic* was no longer there. Her Captain, acting under the advice of his lawyers and with the approbation of his Consul, cut the cables in the night and by a marvelous piece of good-fortune got through the crowded port unobserved, passed the watch-boat at its entrance, and a few hours after was out of French water.

Whether his flight was strictly legal must be determined by the

fact whether his vessel had or had not been legally attached by the officers of the law. He asserts that no attachment was ever made, the Consul at Marseilles confirms his assertion, and what renders it certain is the fact that after leaving Marseilles his vessel was becalmed nine days in full view of Toulon. Had it been sequestered by the law, one of the steam cutters of that naval strong-hold would have pounced upon it like a hawk and carried it back in triumph to Marseilles.

The foregoing narration is based on hearsay. I give it as I learn it from Marseilles. Of the sequel I have more immediate knowledge.

The French police and the steamboat company furious at being thus out-witted, and knowing the *Adriatic*, unprovided as she was with water and provisions, would be obliged to put in some Sardinian port, telegraphed in the first place to the French Minister at the Court of Turin, giving their own version of the facts and requesting him to have the ship seized as soon as she arrived in a Sardinian port. Accordingly the Minister, Prince d'Auvergne, waited on the Count Cavour, told his story, and made the application for seizure. But the Premier prudently asked him for documents to prove the facts which he stated, and of these the diplomatist was unable to give any. He wished that the ship should at least be detained until the proofs of her attachment by the officers of the French tribunals could be obtained. But the Sardinian Minister declined to do that either. Bring me, said the Premier, the sentence condemning the ship, and proof that the sentence has been executed by sequestration of the property, and, then, according to treaty, I can seize the vessel and the Captain and give them up, but, on unsupported allegations, I can do nothing. So the French Minister went away, and never came back with the proofs demanded because they did not exist.

This statement of what passed I got from Count Cavour's own lips a day or two since; and here he gave me to understand the matter ended so far as the French Minister and the Government at Turin were concerned. But the authorities at Marseilles did not omit to set in motion the French Consul at Spezia also. He went to the Intendente, or Governor [sic] of the province, just as the French Minister did to the Premier at Turin, and found in the Intendente a more credulous listener than his superior had done in the Intendente's astute and prudent master at Turin. This Governor [sic] of Spezia gave orders to the Captain of the Port to seize the *Adriatic* as soon as she arrived. When she made her appearance, the American Consul made the usual application for pratique. As the ship was without clearance, bill of health, or papers of any kind, this of course could not be granted, but fortunately, in a note upon

the subject, the Intendente, while speaking of the ship and the Captain in sufficiently severe terms, informed the Consul of his order to seize her on the instance of the French authorities. The Consul had the good sense, instead of continuing the correspondence so commenced, to go immediately to the hasty officer in person and use all the arguments in his power to satisfy him of the unjustifiable nature of his course and of want of evidence in the case; but, finding him fully possessed with a belief that what the French authorities had asserted must be true, he sought for reasons of delay, and finally prevailed upon him to put off his action until the Government at Turin could be communicated with.

Accordingly the ship was not precisely seized on that evening, though an armed gunboat was stationed in a few yards of her all night. Next day the answer of Government came, and was in accordance with what I have above stated as its decision of the case. The Intendente was directed to countermand his order for the seizure of the ship; to offer her neither detention nor hinderance [sic], and, although being destitute of papers she could not be allowed pratique, she was to be permitted to take in water and provisions, receive her Consul on board, and remain in quarantine or depart as she saw fit.

But the Captain Durham's difficulties were not yet over. His crew, being naturally such off-scourings of Marseilles as he could pick up on the night of his departure, mutinied at Spezia, and, having come out of the French tribunals in a denuded condition, he had no money to purchase provisions. The Consul visited the ship and put his crew in order; and finally took upon himself the responsibility of supplying the vessel from the Naval Store of the United States at Spezia with food enough to last her the voyage to New York. The value of the supplies so given is declared by the Naval Store-Keeper to be \$ 127. The Captain gave his note for that sum payable at New York on his arrival there. If he neglects to pay it, the Consul will of course be bound to refund the money. At least such seems to be his belief at present, and I have not interfered with it; though I think the Government might view it as a justifiable expenditure for American seamen in distress.

On the 20th of January, the ship *Adriatic* sailed from Spezia for New York. She had arrived on the evening of the 18th. On the 19th, the Consul had dispatched a communication of the affair to this Legation and requested its interposition, but the whole matter was settled and the ship had sailed before his letter reached Turin, and I had nothing to say or do in the case. But, as soon as possible after learning the result, I went to Spezia in person and was there several days. The details I have

given were obtained on the spot. The conduct of the Sardinian Governor [sic] in ordering the seizure of that ship and his general conduct through the whole matter was not only unfriendly but illegal, and I have had some thought of making a formal complaint against him. Before doing so, however, I determined to have a conversation with the Premier on the matter, and I have received full proofs that the action of the Government itself gives no ground for question. They had a right to refuse pratique to a ship without papers, and that is all the Government did against the *Adriatic*. The Premier disclaimed the action of the Intendente, whom he declared, without circumlocution, to have done what he had no authority to do, and excused him on the ground that he had been newly placed in his office. After this conversation, I have thought it best to let the matter pass. The matter being well-ended, the only effect of a complaint against that Intendente would be to get the man a reprimand, which would dispose him to annoy us at Spezia should he ever get the chance.

The conduct of the American Consul at Spezia—Mr. R. Leese—seems to me commendable. Had he not acted with prudence and intelligence in the first place, the ship would have been seized on the evening of its arrival and handed over to the French agent. The Captain and owner would have made his reclamation at Washington, and there might have been discussion between the two governments. This is one of the cases where the presence of a Consul seems to have been of some use and prevented further trouble.

I have given this lengthy account of an affair without results for the reason that it has attracted great attention in the continental journals. The French officials at Marseilles have taken their revenge therein. The newspapers of the French capital represent the American Captain as nothing less than a pirate and a thief. According to these statements, he ran down the *Lyonnaise* and left it to perish without offering assistance. / Afterwards, when the tribunals had decided his case and his vessel had duly become French property, he stole it and ran away. Some days since, they announced that the vessel had been overtaken and sequestered in the Sardinian port of Spezia; and only this morning they learn that the « Yankee », taking advantage of a violent storm, had again « escaped ».

As these strange stories are little creditable, and as they will without doubt reach the United States before the truth, I have thought it advisable, even at the risk of wearying your attention with an affair properly speaking inconsequential, to send the Department this statement of all the facts so far as they are known to me.



Spezia, 18th January 1858 [*Traduzione*]

Mr. Consul: Captain Durham has deceived you in his assurances that his vessel has not been legally sequestered, for I have before me the official instance of the French Consul for his detention.

Captain Durham has by his own action placed himself in a criminal position. The American Flag which he pretends to carry cannot cover a flagrant violation of international law and your Government is too worthily represented here for me to doubt that you will do your best to further the ends of justice. And in effect I should now inform you, Mr. Consul, that I have already ordered the military Commandant at Varignano to prevent by force the *Adriatic* from leaving her moorings or the Gulf, and I hope, Sir, that you will use your influence to dissuade Captain Durham from attempting a useless resistance, which will only gain for him a punishment which should be feared even by those who have, like Captain Durham, placed themselves beyond the protection of all powers, even that of their own Government.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 82*

Turin, Feb. 28, 1858

Sir: On the 20th of this month I was informed that a man named James Atkinson, suspected of being an Englishman but claiming to be an American citizen, had been arrested at Genoa and imprisoned here at Turin. I went immediately to see this man. There were certainly some reasons to suppose him an Englishman, both his appearance, manners, and peculiarities of pronounciation being those seldom seen save in the streets of London. He told me he was an « Hamerican » and was named « Hatkinson ». Yet he finally satisfied me that he had been born in Vermont, where he had lived till eighteen years of age. He then went to London, where, without doubt, he had learned the corruption of the English tongue. He had a passport granted by Mr. Bedinger at Copen-

<sup>108</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 81 di Daniel. Non esiste l'originale italiano negli archivi di Washington. Il barone Giacinto Tholosano era intendente del Levante ed aveva il suo quartier generale a La Spezia.

hagen.<sup>109</sup> Wishing to be assured of its authenticity, I telegraphed to that gentleman a description of the person and the date of the passport. Mr Bedinger, in reply, guaranteed [sic] the passport and the citizenship of the man

I then demanded of the Government the reasons of his arrest, which I found to be of the most frivolous character. These were:—1st That he had no visible means of support; 2d That he had no Sardinian visa on his passport. Both of these were sufficient reasons for reconducting him to the frontier, but neither justified his imprisonment for one moment. I called the attention of the Government to this fact, and they admitted it. But when I demanded his immediate release, which they did not refuse, they made delays, and the imprisonment endured altogether for more than a week. Finally, however, they carried the man back to his hotel at Genoa, paid all the expenses of every sort he had incurred, and gave him and his wife a free passage to Leghorn. I also furnished him privately with a small sum to continue his journey to its end, which was Malta.

The correspondence detailing these circumstances may be found in the Appendix to this dispatch, but that correspondence would give only the official and not at all the real character of this affair. That was discussed only in my personal conversations at the Ministry. Atkinson was arrested because of the late attempt on the life of the French Emperor,<sup>110</sup> and his is only an unit among thousands of other similar arrests which have been made all over Europe. For some weeks past, the number of arbitrary arrests and detentions made by the police on all the great routes leave no doubt that the hand of the French Government is on them. Against Atkinson there was not the slightest evidence of participation or connexion, direct or indirect, in that famous affair, but, as he seemed to be English and was unable or unwilling to give any clear account of himself or business, he fell into the suspicion of some detective, was immediately thrown into prison, and kept there until the telegraph could be brought into action and his antecedents well investigated.

It is this unavowed but certain feature in the case which causes me to detail it in this dispatch, and which made me take a personal interest in the man that he was far from otherwise meriting. I made a warm

<sup>109</sup> Henry Bedinger della Virginia fu nominato ministro degli SU in Danimarca il 29 giugno 1854 e lasciò l'incarico il 10 agosto 1858. *Register of the Department of State*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1874, p. 70.

<sup>110</sup> L'attentato Orsini. Sulla reazione americana vedi H. R. MARRARO, *American Opinion* cit., pp. 215-218.

representation of the illegality, impropriety, and unpopularity of such proceedings at the Ministry of the Interior, and, if the attempt had been made on some trumped up pretence to deliver him to the police of France, there is no step to which I could have prudently resorted which I would not have made to prevent it. But my fears of this were groundless, for I must do this Government the justice to say that it does not make arrests of this sort of its own choice, and that it evinced a disposition to proceed in the present instance as mildly as possible. My representations were well received. Beyond the fact of the unlawful imprisonment, Atkinson had no cause to complain. I saw his room; it was comfortable; they allowed him fire, good meals, wine, and the attendance of a physician.

I recount the affair because it is a practical illustration of what is now going on in Europe. Since the 16th January, the Government of France has been pursuing a most impolitic career and has created a revulsion of feeling against it. If the French chief had been content with putting to death those wretched and foolish men who attempted his life, and quietly continued his course, he would have had all the world on his side. But he has resorted to measures which indicate hatred and fear. He has divided France into five military satrapies. He has set the police of all Europe to watching, arresting, and vexing the passers-by. He has galvanized the old passport system, which is simply an ingenious method of annoying inoffensive travellers. His diplomacy has forced the hands of all the neighbouring governments. The ministries of England, Switzerland, Belgium, Sardinia, have all been obliged to propose the enactment of alien and conspiracy laws, which are everywhere an abomination. The people of England, who feel themselves strong, answered the proposition by suddenly overturning the Government that insulted them with it. Here, the country is obliged to disguise its sentiments. But the similar bill brought into the Sardinian Parliament is not the less distasteful, and, unless Count Cavour greatly modifies it, it will be defeated.

Turin, Feb. 21, 1858

Sir: An American named James Atkinson was arrested by the police at Genoa some days ago on pure suspicion and brought to Turin in custody. I have carefully examined the man in person and am satisfied that he is a citizen of the United States. He is the bearer of a passport from the United States Minister at Copenhagen, and I have ascertained by telegraph from the said Minister that he is fully entitled to it.

The police have no charge of crime against this person. They have not a particle of evidence on which to ground their suspicions, and after detaining him four days in custody they have found none. This American citizen has been wrongfully imprisoned, and is wrongfully detained, and I have to request of your Excellency his immediate release and restitution to the position in which the police found him.

While investigating his case, I have heard the statement that Atkinson was a vagabond, having no money or means of subsistence, and that the police had the right to arrest him as such. But this pretence rests on a false fact. At the time Atkinson was arrested, he had forty francs—a sum sufficient to carry him beyond the Sardinian States. He has no longer, it is true, the whole of that sum, because he has been compelled to disburse a part of it for his subsistence since he has fallen into the hands of the Sardinian police; but that he had the whole of it, and still has a part of it I have satisfied myself this afternoon in the presence of *the Questor of Turin, to whom I refer you for the evidence*. If so, the fault lies not with him but with the Sardinian gendarmes, whose duty it is to inspect and visa passports and who allowed him to pass without asking for his. Further, the fact that his passport was not *en règle* does not justify his imprisonment. The most that can be legally done with him is to reconduct him to the frontier.

Atkinson is now kept in prison not on any charge of crime, but simply to give the police an opportunity to find some plausible ground to make one against him. Against this procedure I utterly protest. It is sufficiently contrary to all known justice to put a man in prison against whom no charge has been brought. But to keep him there till some story can be raked up against him is a proceeding which can scarcely be tolerated by the Government of Sardinia

<sup>111</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 82 di Daniel

This is the most arbitrary arrest of an American citizen, and altogether the most unqualifiable case, which has ever been brought to my knowledge. Subaltern officials, when they have lightly made an arrest, are sometimes over eager to find grounds of legality for it; but I am unable to doubt that, when the personal attention of the President of the Council is brought to bear upon the arbitrary and unwarranted course which has been pursued, and is now being pursued, against this unfortunate man, he will hesitate to give him justice.

***Ruggero Gabaleone di Salmour a John M. Daniel*<sup>112</sup>**

Turin, le 22 février 1858

Monsieur le Ministre: En vous accusant réception de l'office que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date d'hier au sujet du nommé James Atkinson, je m'empresse de vous informer que j'ai porté sans retard cette réclamation à la connaissance du Département Royal de l'Intérieur afin que des dispositions soient prises pour le renvoi à Gênes et la mise en liberté de l'individu susnommé. Je me réserve du reste de vous faire connaître le résultat de cette démarche ainsi que de vous communiquer les explications que je recevrai en réponse aux observations contenues dans votre office précité touchant les circonstances de l'arrestation du Sieur Atkinson.

Veuillez agréer en attendant, Monsieur le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***Ruggero Gabaleone di Salmour a John M. Daniel*<sup>113</sup>**

Turin, 2 mars 1858

Monsieur le Ministre: J'ai reçu la Note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date de 21 février dernier pour réclamer contre l'arrestation d'un citoyen américain, le nommé James Atkinson, et demander sa mise en liberté.

Comme cet individu vient de partir muni du nouveau passeport et

<sup>112</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 82 di Daniel. Il Salmour firma per il Ministro

<sup>113</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 82 di Daniel. Il Salmour firma per il Ministro

des moyens que vous avez jugé à propos de lui fournir, toute discussion à son égard me paraîtrait sans objet si je ne devais tenir à justifier la conduite de nos Autorités des amers reproches que vous leur adressez, et qui, je l'avoue, ont dû nous causer une pénible surprise

L'irrégularité du passeport dont Atkinson était muni est hors de contestation, puisque vous-même, pour vous assurer de son identité, avez cru nécessaire de demander des explications à l'agent des Etats-Unis à Copenhague et, que de plus il vous a paru convenable de lui délivrer un autre passeport.

Du reste si les agents du Government à la frontière avaient peut-être manqué de vigilance en le laissant pénétrer sur notre territoire avec un titre de voyage irrégulier, leur faute ne pouvait aucunement infirmer le droit d'arrêter un individu soupçonné de vagabondage.

Mais ce n'est point le défaut de régularité de ses papiers qui seul ait appelé sur lui l'attention de la police et motivé son arrestation provisoire. Descendu à l'Hôtel de Ville à Gênes, il aurait été dans l'impossibilité de payer la note de ses frais si un ami, que l'on savait lui-même dépourvu de moyens de subsistance, ne s'était offert pour le tirer momentanément d'embarras.

Les réponses contradictoires d'Atkinson et de son ami Jackson, le projet qu'ils annoncèrent de vouloir se rendre par Malte en Egypte pour y être employés comme Ingénieurs mécaniciens tandis qu'ils n'avaient ni connaissances, ni lettres de recommandation, ni argent pour le voyage, durent naturellement éveiller des soupçons sur leur compte dans un moment surtout où de récents méfaits obligeaient les Autorités à redoubler de surveillance et de rigueur.

A ces soupçons s'ajoutaient enfin des indices assez graves pour faire croire que le mutuel appui que ces deux individus se prêtaient était un moyen d'exploiter la bonne foi d'autrui, et que, loin de s'être trouvés casuellement à Gênes comme ils le disaient, ils cherchaient d'abord à se procurer de l'argent en faisant circuler des listes de souscription où le nom de l'un d'eux figurait en tête pour engager d'autres personnes à leur donner quelques secours.

Si, au lieu de déferer, par un égard tout bienveillant pour la qualité de citoyen des Etats-Unis, à la demande d'Atkinson d'être envoyé à Turin pour se faire reconnaître, l'autorité de Gênes l'avait remis aux Tribunaux, ceux-ci auraient peut-être acquis les preuves des faits qui avaient éveillé les soupçons de la police, et alors la justice aurait dû avoir son cours.

Il me suffira, je l'espère, Monsieur le Ministre, d'avoir soumis ces

circonstances à votre impartialité pour que vous soyez convaincu qu'on n'a point procédé légèrement et sans de justes motifs.

Les facilités et les égards que trouvent chez nous les étrangers sont assez connus pour éloigner toute idée que les Autorités puissent se donner l'inconcevable plaisir de les verser sans but et moins encore d'inventer à la charge de qui que ce soit des imputations imaginaires.

Agréez, Monsieur le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 83*

Turin, April 24, 1858

Sir: Since the affair of Atkinson nothing worthy of remark concerning American interests has occurred here.

But the disputes between Sardinia and Naples relative to the seizure of the *Cagliari* steamer seem rapidly drawing to a definite point, and, in a few days, I hope to be able to give some view of their probable consequences.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of two cases of books sent to this legation by the State Department.

I have also to send the accounts of this Legation for the quarters ending the 31st December and the 31st March. The first named were delayed for the vouchers of John Miller.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 84*

Turin, May 3, 1858

Sir: As the disputes between this country and Naples may possibly have some serious result, I propose to recapitulate briefly the steps hitherto taken in that affair.

About a year ago, one Pisacane collected a party of revolutionists at Genoa to make a descent in the Neapolitan territory. In execution of this purpose, they embarked as passengers on the Sardinian steamer *Cagliari*, plying between Genoa and the *island* of Sardinia. So soon as the vessel was fairly out at sea, they rose on the crew, seized the ship and turned its course to the Neapolitan shore. Arriving there, the revo-

lutionists disembarked and left the *Cagliari* in the hands of its lawful officers. The Captain lost no time in quitting the coast for his regular route to Sardinia. But he was pursued, overtaken, and captured by Neapolitan vessels-of-war and carried captive to the city of Naples. Here the steamer was declared by the tribunals to be a pirate and therefore a lawful prize, while the officers and crew were cast into prison to await their trial.

The Sardinian Government, considering that the *Cagliari* had acted under duress, and that it had been captured illegally beyond the jurisdiction of Naples after that duress had ceased, determined to demand the rendition of the vessel and the crew. Two of the engineers were Englishmen, and the Sardinian Government has therefore hoped to engage the English Government in support of its claim. Hence it caused the Sardinian Minister at London to commence negotiations with Lord Clarendon for that end. In the correspondence which ensued, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed a note to Sir James Hudson, the British diplomatist at Turin, directing him to inquire of the Sardinian Government whether it was disposed to object to the seizure of the *Cagliari* on the ground that the said seizure was contrary to the law of nations because made in the open sea. Mr. Hudson wrote on the margin of this note the words « address note putting this question » and sent it to his Secretary Mr. Erskine. The latter prepared a draft in accordance with the note, which was read by his Chief, approved, and returned to the Secretary for transcription. But Mr. Erskine, in making the copy, changed the sense in a most extraordinary manner. He caused it to read « I am directed to acquaint you that H. B. Majesty's Government is disposed to object to the seizure of the *Cagliari* » &c. Sir James Hudson did not read the note so changed, but signed and sent it to the Sardinian Government.

On its receipt, naturally supposing that their position would be supported by the force of the British Empire, this Government proceeded to demand the rendition of the *Cagliari* in a high tone, and pressed the case for two months in a very positive and definite manner. Finally, however, finding that there was some misunderstanding, it caused the Sardinian Minister at London to ask explanations. In doing so, he laid before the Earl of Malmesbury, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, the original dispatch sent to the cabinet at Turin by Sir James Hudson. The Earl applied to the diplomatist to know on what authority he had written it, and this gentleman had to inform his chief of the circumstance that he never read the dispatch which he signed and by which he had committed



his Government. He accompanied his letter with a statement from his Secretary explaining the fact, that he had, in the name of the British Ministry, given a promise where he was only ordered to ask a question, as a simple slip of the pen in transcription. The Earl of Malmesbury replied to Sir James Hudson that « his explanation was unsatisfactory and the conduct of his Secretary wholly inexcusable. » At the same time he wrote to the Marquis d'Azeglio to disavow the position of his agent, declaring to support the Sardinian Government in the attitude it has assumed, as the law officers of the British crown were not of opinion that the capture of the *Cagliari* was illegal.

Sir James Hudson is retained in his mission. Mr. Erskine is suspended.

But the great sufferer is the Sardinian Government, which has been by their error induced to take an extreme position, in which it is now abandoned by their fancied friends. Meantime an answer has been received from the Government of the King of Naples—who firmly refuses to comply with each and all of the demands of Sardinia.

These two governments are now therefore at a distinct issue, and the next step must be taken by Sardinia. The Parliament is engaged in deliberation as to the course the country should pursue. Hostilities of some sort would be the logical outlet of the position. But I am bound to say that I think this result little probable. The hazards of war would be in favor of Sardinia. Both its navy and army are far more efficient than those of Naples. But the interests involved and the reward to be gained in case of success are by no means adequate to the cost of the undertaking. Sardinia is burdened with an enormous debt. It is engaged in costly works of internal improvement. There is, has been, and probably will be for years, a large annual deficit in its revenue as compared with its receipts. It is continually obliged to borrow money. Hence it is little probable that it will treat itself to that most costly of amusements—war, in the interest of the steamer *Cagliari*, its crew, and the professional diplomatists who have made much of nothing. This kingdom is ambitious and vain, but poverty forces it to conduct such affairs as these with some common sense. I think therefore that it may be safely anticipated that the quarrel will be decided by arbitration, and that there will be no war between Sardinia and Naples.

The bill on conspiracy against sovereigns, proposed to the Parliament immediately after the late attempt on the life of the French Emperor, which at one time threatened the existence of the Cavour Ministry, has after a severe struggle passed into the incipient conditions of a law.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 85*

Turin, May 8, 1858

Sir: I have this day had the honour to receive yours of the 19th ult, enclosing the commission of John Costa to be Consul at Nice.<sup>114</sup> I have demanded his *exequatur* from the Sardinian Government, and will in a few days receive, and transmit it according to your directions.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n. 86*

Turin, May 8, 1858

Sir: In January 1855, I received a dispatch from the State Department (No 11), informing me that representations had been made there of the fact that certain persons in this kingdom had assumed the title of consuls and vice-consuls of the United States without authority; that they performed consular acts, received fees for so doing, and sold passports to foreigners, and that the local authorities and police of the kingdom permitted these nefarious practices for the sake of sharing the money so obtained.

According to express orders, I addressed a note to the Sardinian Government, communicating this charge and sending a correct list of the only persons having consular titles from the United States within their confines. I requested them to take steps for abating this abuse of our name, and to order their own agents to recognize no other persons as consuls of the United States save those which I named.

After three months silence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a very warm reply, dated the 10th of April 1855. He stated that the list of names which I sent him should be duly observed; but he desired that the Government of the United States should furnish proofs of the charge which it had made against the local authorities and police of Sardinia. He (the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the Minister of the Interior, to whom he had referred the matter, possessed no evidence showing the existence of self-constituted consuls in their territories, and they had received the vague accusations made by the Secretary of State against the Sardinian

<sup>114</sup> L'istruzione n 22, Washington, 19 aprile 1858, trasmetteva la nomina di John B Costa del Texas a console degli S U a Nizza

police with « surprise and regret. » He demanded the *proofs* of the allegations so made, and, in their default, requested me to inform my Government that he felt himself obliged to « repulse » the unjust suspicions it had cast on the local authorities of Sardinia.

I communicated these observations to the Hon. Mr. Marcy, but he never sent me either evidence or details of his charge, being satisfied, in all probability, with the Minister's promise to recognize no other agents of the United States than those lawfully constituted and made known to him. I made search after the false consuls, but could find only one man who had once been a vice-consul of the United States and who preserved the ensign over his door. I could not trace any official act even to him, and I caused the ensign to be removed.

So the matter stood until lately. But within the last few weeks the Sardinian Minister of the Interior, (the same who protested so loudly against our « suspicions »), has issued a new edition of a work entitled the *General Calendar of the Kingdom*,<sup>115</sup> which is somewhat similar to our Blue-Book and contains the official register of all persons publicly employed in this country, both native and foreign. On turning to the chapter of consuls, I find not only three lawful consulates attributed to the United States—those at Genoa, Nice, and Spezia—but seven others, which are totally unknown to me.

This official Calendar, issued over the signature and by the authority of the Sardinian Minister of the Interior, is liberal enough to give us a Consul Regent at Cagliari in the island of Sardinia, one Antoine Thorel; a vice-consul at Oneglia, named Nicolo Marsucco, another at Savona, Marco Deamicis; another at Alghero, G. L. Sechi, another at Carloforte, Federico Rombi; also at Oristano, Efisio Busacchi; and, finally, at Sant'Antioco, we have Enrico Rombi for our Consular Agent.

None of these names are to be found on any consular list in my possession. There is no record in this Legation that *exequaturs* were ever obtained for them through the diplomatic agent of the United States in this kingdom. It is therefore certain that their pretensions are impostures.

On reading this surprising publication, I visited Count Cavour, who is at the same time Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior, and called his attention to the facts. He professed to be previously ignorant of them, and introduced me to the Secretary who has charge of consular affairs, who should show me the authority on which the Sardinian Govern-

<sup>115</sup> Il *Calendario Generale de' Regi Stati sardi* preparato dal ministero degli interni era più vasto del *Palmaverde* la sua pubblicazione si iniziò nel 1824

ment had published these names. But this officer could do no more than exhibit the manuscript records in his archives, on which I read all these names with the dates of their commissions. Naturally I asked to see the commissions, or the copies of them there referred to. These he could not produce. In their stead, he showed me certain lists of officials sent in by the governors of provinces in which the names of these false consuls were found, and this seemed to be the sole and only authority on which the Ministry has acted.

That there was collusion between the above-named local authorities and the pretended consuls can no longer be doubted. The suspicions of the late Secretary of State are more than justified by the Sardinian Ministry's own official documents.

I have in a note to Count Cavour reminded him of our previous correspondence in this subject, and referred him to his own *Calendario Generale* and the returns of his local authorities for the evidence which he desired me to give at that time. I have further requested him to inform his police and other local authorities that this Legation recognizes as consuls of the United States in Sardinia A. Herbemont at Genoa, John B. Costa at Nice, and R. H. Leese at Spezia, and that all other persons who assume that title here do so without authority from my Government.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 87*

Turin, June 8, 1858

Sir: I have received the *exequatur* of Mr. Costa to be Consul at Nice, and have forwarded it to his address at that place in accordance with your orders.

There was delay in the grant of the *exequatur*, because Mr. Costa was said to be a foreigner by birth and the Sardinian Government wished for information about him.

Their scrupulosity in this case contrasts strangely with the fact that they have officially recognized eight Sardinian subjects as consuls of the United States in their territories without the slightest authority from the American Government.

Appended to this dispatch will be found a communication addressed to them on this subject, to which I ask your notice. Count Cavour has

never made any official reply, and there are circumstances which cause me to think that he will not make any. Should he yet do so, I shall forward a copy.

*John M. Daniel a Camillo di Cavour*<sup>116</sup>

Turin, May [15], 1858

Sir: In a note dated on the 15th of January 1855, I informed your Excellency that my Government had learned from most respectable sources that there were persons in this kingdom falsely styling themselves consuls and vice-consuls of the United States, who received naval honours as such from our ships, exacted fees from American citizens for pretended services, and who sold passports to foreigners. The same informants represented the local police in certain parts of this country as wilfully permitting this injurious assumption of title and authority.

Hence my Government directed me to state that it commissioned three consuls only in Sardinia, whom I duly named in my note and requested His Majesty's Government to recognize no other persons pretending to have consular authority from the United States in your territory.

In his reply, dated on the 10th of April 1855, Count Cavour informed me that orders had been given that no other persons than those which I named should be recognized as having consular authority from the United States in this kingdom.

At the same time his Excellency stated that he was unable to conceal the surprise and regret with which he and his colleague the Minister of the Interior had received the accusation of complicity by the United States' Government. He requested me to demand of the Secretary of State the pieces proving these abuses, in default of which « Le Gouvernement de S. M. se croira en droit de repousser toute allégation de la nature de celles qui ont été adressées au Département d'Etat à Washington, et qui tendraient à faire peser injustement des soupçons sur des fonctionnaires publics Sardes. »

I communicated your Excellency's observations to the Secretary of State. The officer, being satisfied with the statement that no other persons than those which were lawfully constituted, would in future be recognized as consuls of the United States in Sardinia, did not think it

<sup>116</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 87 di Daniel

necessary to enter on any controversy as to the past and allowed the matter to drop

During the last few weeks, however, a document has been placed in my hands which renders it proper that I should again refer the subject to your attention. This document is entitled the *Calendario Generale del Regno pel 1858, compilato per cura del Ministero dell'Interno*. In this official publication I find the names of one consul and seven vice-consuls of the United States in Sardinia of whom I know nothing, and who are probably the persons against whom the Secretary of State made complaint. It is here stated that the United States have Antoine Thorel for Consul Regent in Cagliari, and the following vice-consuls: Sechi at Alghero; Rombi at Carloforte; Bossalino at Castel—Sardo; Busacchi at Oristano; Rombi at Sant'Antioco; Deamicis at Savona; Marsucco at Oneglia. None of these names are to be found on any official lists of the United States in my possession, nor have their commissions ever been seen at this Legation.

On reading them in the *Calendario Generale*, I waited on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and was referred to an officer having charge of consular affairs in your Department. This officer exhibited to me certain manuscript records on which the foregoing names were found with references to the dates, &c, of their commissions; but he was unable to show me copies of those commissions, although several of them were recent, or any other document supporting them save certain lists sent in by the intendants of Provinces, who declared these persons to be consuls of the United States in their respective territories.

It appeared to me that these statements of the intendants were all the evidence on which the Ministry of the Interior had inserted them in its Calendar.

Whatever pretensions these men may have had to be considered consuls of the United States previously to the 15th of January 1855, it is certain that they should have ended on the receipt of my note disclaiming them at that time. I now have again to request that the agents of the Sardinian Government may be positively informed that these men have no authority from the United States and that their actions should not be recognized as ours.

Finally, I give the following list of all persons clothed with consular authority and character in this Kingdom by the Government of the United States, to-wit: A. Herbemont, Consul at Genoa; R. H. Leese, Consul at Spezia, John B. Costa, (who has not yet received an *exequatur*) Consul at Nice.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 88*

Turin, June 20, 1858

Sir: During the entire period of my residence here as Minister of the United States I have neither asked nor received a leave of absence. I now ask permission to be absent from my post from the 25th of July to the 1st of September. During that period no public business is done in this place. Nearly all the members of the Government and the greater part of the diplomatic body are then absent. In all reasonable probability, there will be in that time nothing requiring attention at this Legation except a few passports. Such business I can leave with safety in the hands of Mr. Frederick Daniel, my private secretary, who has discharged his duty as such for four years to my satisfaction.

Praying an answer at your earliest convenience

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Personale*

Turin, June 27, 1858

Sir: I have not the honour to be personally known to your Excellency yet the facts that you are my official chief, and that your own residence abroad has made well known to you the necessities which sometimes arise in the affairs of one in my position, together with the character which you bear for amiability, have induced me to take the liberty of thus addressing you.

In my Dispatch No 88 dated the 25th and forwarded yesterday, I have asked for a leave of absence, to begin on the 25th of July, and to end on the 1st of September. As that request may pass without attention amid the pressure of more serious matters, I have taken this means of attracting your kind notice to it.

It is a matter of grave private importance to me, and it is the first, as it will probably be the last indulgence I shall ever ask from my superiors. I can assure of my sincere and reasonable belief that neither delay nor inconvenience in the public service can arise from my absence at that time. The official persons here all leave the city on account of its heats, affairs stand still, and there is no travel, I can leave an agent very competent to discharge the ordinary business of a chancellerie.

Should the request I make be granted, if you will expedite it without delay, you will do me a favour which I shall faithfully remember and for which I shall feel sincerely grateful.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 89*

Turin, August 4, 1858

Sir: I have received from the Sardinian Government a reply to the communication addressed to them by this Legation in relation to the pretended consuls and vice consuls of the United States in this kingdom, which may be found (appendix A) at the close of this dispatch

It appears that nearly all of these people received their title of vice consul from Antoine Thorel, in the island of Sardinia, who pretends to have been commissioned Consul General of the United States in 1838 and to have resigned in 1855. No trace of such a commission is to be found in the archives of this Legation, and, even if it had existed, the powers he conferred ceased at the time when I gave notice to the Sardinian Government that they were no longer recognized by the United States.

On this important point the Sardinian Minister does not touch; but, as he enters into a positive engagement to give no further credence to these men and to prevent them from assuming the false title of vice consul of the United States, it appears to me useless to prolong a controversy on such a point.

The cabinet is now broken up and the ministers all out of town. There is virtually no Government here during the month of August. Count Cavour has sent me a note declaring his inability to receive the diplomatic corps for some weeks, in consequence of his absence in France and Switzerland, which may be found in the Appendix B.

***Ruggero Gabaleone di Salmour a John M. Daniel*<sup>117</sup>**

Turin, 29 juillet 1858

Monsieur le Ministre. D'après les observations contenues dans votre note du 15 mai dernier relativement aux individus désignés dans

<sup>117</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 89 di Daniel. Il Salmour firma per il Ministro.



le Calendrier Général du Royaume comme Consuls et Vice Consuls des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, je me suis empressé de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour reconnaître à l'appui de quels documents les personnes dont il s'agit prétendent exercer des fonctions consulaires. Il est résulté de ces recherches que:

Antoine Thorel a été nommé Consul à Cagliari par Patente du 6 octobre 1838: qu'il a obtenu l'*exequatur* le 1er décembre 1838, et qu'enfin il demanda et obtint sa démission le 17 février 1855, époque à laquelle le Consulat des Etats à Cagliari a été supprimé.

Rombi Frédéric a été nommé par le dit Thorel Vice-Consul à Carloforte. sa Patente est du 10 août 1842 et l'*exequatur* du 11 août même année. Son fils Rombi Henry exerçait abusivement pour son père les fonctions d'Agent Consulaire à Sant'Antioco

Busacchi Efsio a été aussi nommé par le même Thorel Vice-Consul à Oristano par Patente du 24 août 1843.

Bossalino Domenico est nanti d'une Patente du dit Thorel qui, sous la date du 10 août 1842 l'a nommé Vice-Consul à Sassari et à Porto Torres: son *exequatur* porte la date du 11 août 1842.

Sechi Joseph Louis est muni d'une Patente sous la date du 8 janvier 1827 qui le nomme Assistant Vice-Consul à Alghero Cette Patente est signée par Fortunato Corvegla, qui était dans le temps Consul des Etats-Unis à Cagliari. L'*exequatur* est du 8 février 1827.

Marsucco Nicolas a été nommé Vice-Consul à Oneglia par M. Wilbor Consul-Général à Nice: la Patente est du 9 janvier 1851 et l'*exequatur* du 4 juillet même année

Deamicis Marcello a été nommé Vice-Consul à Savone par M. Baker, Consul des Etats-Unis à Gênes, par Patente du 13 novembre 1851, l'*exequatur* est du 3 septembre 1853.

J'ai sous les yeux la plupart de ces documents, et vous pourrez vous convaincre, Monsieur le Ministre, vous-même, si vous voulez prendre la peine de passer au Ministère, que leur authenticité n'est point contestable. Le seul Rombi Henry exerçait abusivement pour son père les fonctions d'Agent Consulaire.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est cependant loin de vouloir maintenir à ces individus le droit d'exercer des fonctions consulaires pour le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique: il regrette au contraire que, par suite d'une erreur bien facile à concevoir, les Intendants des Chefs-Lieux de Province aient cru que ces personnes continuaient à être chargés des fonctions consulaires et que de cette manière leurs noms se soient glissés dans le Calendrier Général.

Veillez remarquer, en effet, que la Patente d'un Vice-Consul n'est point frappée de nullité par la mort ou la révocation du Consul qui l'a nommé: qu'ainsi ces individus n'ayant reçu des nouveaux Consuls nommés récemment par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis aucun avis de révocation, et surtout n'ayant pas été remplacés par d'autres Vice-Consuls, ont pu persister dans l'exercice des fonctions qui leur avaient été régulièrement conférées. Cette même considération suffit évidemment pour démontrer la parfaite bonne foi des Autorités locales dans cette affaire.

Cependant comme il importe de faire cesser sans délai ce malentendu, je viens d'ordonner directement aux Intendants des Provinces de Gênes, Savone, Nice, Cagliari et Sassari de signifier aux individus dont il s'agit que tout exercice de leur part des fonctions consulaires au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis sera dorénavant considéré comme illégal et frappé des peines prévues par la lois.

Dans l'espoir d'avoir par ces explications satisfait à la demande contenue dans votre note du 15 mai dernier, je saisis cette occasion pour vous offrir, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

### ***Camillo di Cavour al Corpo Diplomatico***<sup>118</sup>

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Torino [10 luglio 1858]

Le Comte de Cavour a l'honneur de prévenir Messieurs les Membres du Corps Diplomatique que devant s'absenter demain de Turin pour quelque temps, il ne pourra avoir le plaisir de les recevoir comme à l'ordinaire jusqu'à son retour dont il s'empressera de leur donner connaissance.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 90*

Turin, August 5, 1858

Sir: I have received a communication from A Herbemont, until lately United States Consul at Genoa, to the effect that he has resigned his commission, that the said resignation has been accepted, and that he

<sup>118</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 89 di Daniel. La data è desunta da quella della partenza di Cavour per Plombières

has been ordered to place the affairs of his consulate in the hands of Felix Foresti, a naturalized citizen of the United States who has for some years resided at Genoa, pursuing the profession of the law in the Sardinian courts.

I have also been informed by the said Foresti that he has received orders from the State Department to take charge of the archives and to act as consul

In 1853 Mr. Foresti was appointed by President Pierce to this same post, and his *exequatur* was refused by the Sardinian Government. There is no longer any difficulty on that score, as the Ministry is not only willing to receive him but anxious that he should be appointed. Count Cavour has more than once introduced the name of M. Foresti into his conversations and urged me to recommend his appointment—which I have never done for reasons now needless to be mentioned.

In Mr. Herbemont, the United States loose [sic] one of their ablest and most conscientious consular officers. It would be impossible to discharge the duties of a public office with greater exactitude, with more constant regularity, or with more consistent judgment than he has executed those of the Consulate at Genoa for the last four years. He has not been a favorite with the Sardinian Government, because he has never ceded to the encroachments of their local officers; but he has not been the less respected by them for that; and never has he given cause for a single criticism by his personal course in any affair that has arisen in his path. He has been truly devoted to the interests of his country, and truly its representative—always an American and always a gentleman, while always an accurate interpreter and an unwavering executor of the laws. I trust that his successors may be always able to imitate his conduct

I have been induced to make these remarks upon the retiring consul purely by a sense of justice towards him and not at all by private friendship. I have seen but little of Mr. Herbemont in private, and have no intimate personal relations with him. But his official action has been necessarily often subjected to my supervision, has always obtained my respect, and often my admiration.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n. 91*

Turin, August 6, 1858

Sir: Having reason to believe that the President desires to make further changes in the diplomatic corps now representing the United States in Europe, and desiring to prevent all embarrassment relative to the office which I have the honour to fill, I beg leave to tender my resignation of the same.

I have ever entertained and expressed the opinion that the Chief Magistrate possesses and should exercise a complete, unlimited, and unquestioned discretion in the appointment of those officers who are to execute his orders; that he should put into place those persons who are best known to him and in whom he has most confidence; and I am far from desiring to be an exception to a general rule which I deem to be founded on right and reason.

You will do me the favour to communicate my request for letters of recall to the President of the United States; and, at the same time, I beg leave to state that I will remain here (if it be deemed desirable) for the discharge of public duty until the arrival of my successor.

**John Appleton<sup>119</sup> a John M. Daniel**

*Istruzione n. 23*

Washington, August 28, 1858

Sir. Your despatches to No. 91, inclusive, have been received.

The President accepts your resignation as tendered in the last despatch, and requests you to continue at your post until the arrival of your successor, who has not yet been appointed. A letter of recall will be duly transmitted.

A letter was addressed to Mr. Foresti, to the care of the Hon. Mr. Sickles, of New York, announcing his appointment to the Consulate at Genoa. This communication, of which a duplicate was sent by the Department to Mr. F. at Genoa, has no doubt been forwarded by Mr. Sickles. The commission of Mr. Foresti will be transmitted to the Legation at Turin for an *exequatur* as soon as he shall have filed the consular bond required by law.

<sup>119</sup> John Appleton teneva ora la corrispondenza del segretario di Stato. Aveva iniziato la carriera nel dipartimento di Stato, poi era stato incaricato d'affari in Bolivia, deputato per una legislatura e, infine, segretario di Legazione a Londra.

*Dispaccio n 92*

Turin, Sept. 17, 1858

Sir. I have received a dispatch signed by Mr. Appleton, as Acting Secretary of State, informing me that my resignation as contained in dispatch No. 91 is accepted.

The Acting Secretary gives me the first information that I have had the honour to receive directly from your Department of Mr. Foresti's appointment to be Consul at Genoa, and notifies me that his commission will be sent to this Legation so soon as he files his consular bond.

By reference to dispatch No. 90, you will perceive that I have already recognized Mr. Foresti as Consul, on evidence of his appointment presented to me by him. Without doubt you have also by this time received his consular bond framed and filed according to law; but it is no longer necessary that his commission should be forwarded to this Legation or that his *exequatur* should be demanded of the Sardinian Government, seeing that Mr. Foresti is dead and buried.

He died at Genoa three days ago, of dropsy, and was buried on the day after. The Consulate is at this moment in charge of his clerk. I go to Genoa this morning to arrange its affairs, and to provide for the discharge of its business until a new consul shall be appointed. According to the laws and usages in such cases, I believe it to be my duty to appoint a provisional vice-consul to take temporary charge of the place, and this I shall do if I find a proper person. Unfortunately, I know of but one American resident here, not already an officer of the Government, competent to such a duty, and, from motives of personal delicacy, I am indisposed to appoint that person even temporarily, if I can do otherwise.

Mr. Costa, the newly appointed Consul at Nice, will not stay there. He returns to the United States, and has placed the affairs of that Consulate in the hands of Wilbor, the former Consul. Mr Costa's letter on this matter will be found appended to this dispatch.

**John B. Costa a John M. Daniel**<sup>120</sup>

Nice, Sardinia, Sept. 11, 1858

Respected Sir: I have the honor to inform you that I have received my commission as Consul of the United States at Nice, Sardinia, with the *exequatur* of this Government.

I further inform you that I have declined to take charge of said office; I am led to this by the great desire of my family to return to the United States, and the willingness of Mr. Wilbor to continue in the discharge of the duties of said office, mainly for the pleasure derived by him from American visitors and the climate of this place, which is so beneficial to his present state of health.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 93*

Turin, October 16, 1858

Sir: I have the honor to transmit the accounts and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending June 30th 1858.

In my dispatch No 88, dated the 20th of June 1858, I made an application for a leave of absence. No answer to that dispatch has ever been received here; and until lately I have laboured under the impression that the Secretary of State had not seen reason to take notice of it. But in the *Union* of September 2d there appears to be a paragraph stating that I had resigned my position, and that a previous application for leave of absence had been granted. This paragraph leads me to suppose that one of your dispatches has miscarried; for, I repeat, no leave of absence has been received here.

The Consulate at Genoa remains in the care of one Guelfi, clerk to the late Mr. Foresti. As I have before stated, the only American citizen in this country, not already holding office and at all competent to discharge the duties of a consul, is Mr Frederick Daniel. The fact that he is a member of my family renders it impossible for me to give him even the most temporary appointment, without some indication from Washington that such a step would not be deemed improper.

<sup>120</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 92 di Daniel

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 94*

Turin, Dec. 16, 1858

Sir: The Sardinian Government has published a set of regulations on signals to be observed by all Sardinian vessels during fogs at sea—I am requested to transmit them to the United States' Government, and the pamphlet containing them will be found enclosed.

Your dispatch No. 24,<sup>121</sup> notifying me that a box of books for the use of this Legation and for presentation to the Government here had been forwarded by the Department, has been received; but the box in question has not been otherwise heard of.

I take this opportunity to transmit the account of this Legation for the quarter ending September 30, 1858.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 95*

Turin, January 11, 1859

Sir: During three months Italy has been agitated by rumours of war between Piedmont, France, and Austria. I have refrained from expressing opinions on the subject because I have been unable to perceive the force or foundation of a belief in such an event and I deemed it unnecessary to report what I certainly did not credit. But these rumours have of late become so generally accredited in the best informed circles, and have received such unequivocal sanction from official sources, that I can no longer refrain from calling your attention to them

The first serious cause of the present general apprehension was found in certain expressions which fell from the lips of the King of Sardinia some six weeks ago. At a review of some troops, he bluntly signified to a regiment defiling before him that there would be work for it in the spring. These words produced an immediate and great sensation all over Piedmont and Lombardy; but because the Ministry thought them premature or impolitic they were partially retracted and partially explained away by their official journals. Nevertheless the popular impression which they had caused remained in undiminished strength. Next came

<sup>121</sup> L'istruzione n 24, Washington, 15 ottobre 1858, è identica a quella n 4 indirizzata a E.Y. Fair in Belgio

the famous allocution addressed to the Austrian Ambassador at Paris on new-year's day by the Emperor of the French. Your able Minister in France has without doubt given full information relative to that singular occurrence, and has duly estimated the significance which should be attached to it. It is my own duty to furnish a link in the evidence even more decisive—the speech of the Sardinian King delivered yesterday at the opening of the Legislative Chambers.

This event took place on the 10th of January at 10 o'clock in the morning. All the ministers and diplomatists in Turin were in anxious attendance, and the following remarkable passage which concludes the address delivered from the throne produced a profound impression.

« Senators and Deputies, the horizon on which the new year now dawns is not altogether serene, but this will not prevent you from applying yourselves with your accustomed courage to your parliamentary duties

« Strong in our experience of the past, we will approach the eventualities of the future with resolution.

« That future must be fortunate, for our policy is supported by justice, and rests on the love of liberty and on patriotism.

« This our country, though small in territory, has acquired credit in the councils of Europe because the idea which it represents is grand and inspires sympathy. The present condition is not devoid of peril, for, while we respect treaties, we are not insensible to the cry of pain which so large a portion of Italy raises towards us

« Strong in concord, trustful in our good right, we wait upon the decrees of Divine Providence with prudence and decision »

This significant passage derives additional importance from the fact (believed well authenticated) that it was laid before the French cabinet previously to its delivery, has been retouched by them, and receives their full approbation. Considering these circumstances, the state of Italy at present, and the present expectations of the public mind,—the sonorous words quoted amount almost to a declaration of war against Austria. That she so regards it is plain. The telegraph brings news this morning from Vienna that a *corps d'armée*, 30,000 strong are already in motion to reinforce the enormous mass of troops now gathered in Lombardy. There will soon be two hundred thousand German soldiers in that province.

In the meantime the excitement of its population is as profound as anything can be with a race so shallow and unreliable as that which inhabits Italy. Every post brings news of repeated and violent provocation offered to the Austrian officers and soldiers by the populace. It appears



that the military have received strict orders to remain quiet under all circumstances, and they exhibit a forbearance and temperance quite proportionate to the turbulence of their puny adversaries.

It is the opinion of well-informed persons that there would nevertheless be an immediate outbreak in Lombardy were it not for the expectation of approaching war. This alone holds the people in check. In the spring, should France and Piedmont do nothing, there will inevitably be some insurrectionary trouble there.

Such are the facts which are worth your notice. It is proper that I should give what information I can relative to the causes and the probabilities of the crisis. Six months since the political horizon was more than serene—it has suddenly become dark with the clouds of war—yet it is difficult to say whence they have arisen. Nothing has apparently occurred to call up the present state of things—there are no questions of disputed territory or right between Austria, and France and Piedmont, nor do the chiefs of the two last named countries give any intelligible or admissible account of their motives. The Piedmontese declare they act from general opposition to foreign rule in Italy, the French from sympathy with the oppressed people of Lombardy. But these are not reasons for war at this time more than any other. Foreigners have possessed Italy for a thousand years; Lombardy is not more oppressed now than it was six years, five years, or four years ago. Indeed it has much less cause to complain than it ever had before, for during the past year the Austrian rule there has been very much relaxed. The Archduke and Emperor have both made every sort of effort to conciliate the Italian people, and the Austrian Government has been for sometime past promising general reforms. In present occurrences there, there is really nothing to justify the demonstrations made abroad. Nor can any reasonable explanation of this sudden manifestation of hostility be given beyond the mere facts that France has a large army unemployed and that Piedmont is always ready for war with Austria on any pretext from its gnawing ambition and rankling recollections of past disgrace.

Such grounds are so insufficient and impossible in the present state of the world, that I have hitherto treated lightly the rumours which have occupied the public here for sometime past. Official declarations have rendered it necessary now to notice the present threatening aspect of affairs, but I do not and cannot yet believe that Europe is to be plunged in hostilities without reasonable cause, and despite of all that has been said and done expect no important results from the present uproar.

*Dispaccio n 96*

Turin, January 28, 1859

Sir: Prince Napoleon, son of Jerome Bonaparte and cousin of the French Emperor, will be married to-morrow morning to Clotilde, eldest daughter of the King of Sardinia. The secrecy with which this significant matter has been kept has astonished every one. A fortnight since the projected marriage was unknown to the members of the King's own family, and when the news first burst on the world of Turin nobody believed a word of it. The whole affair was arranged by Cavour last summer in his visit to Plombières and kept to himself till Prince Napoleon was ready to enter the country. The first authenticated rumours of the scheme were cotemporaneous [sic] with the appearance of the bridegroom in Turin. He has been here only a week, the marriage takes place tomorrow, and in an hour afterwards the pair commence their journey for France by way of Genoa. This event at least puts an end to all doubt to the determination of the French Emperor to support Sardinia in its proposed quarrel with Austria. Persons who ought to know something of the truth have told me lately that the chances of war in the spring are as a million to one. I own that my incredulity has been shaken by the manifest and costly preparations in progress. All means of transportation are engaged in concentrating troops in Piedmont. The garrisons have been withdrawn from the island of Sardinia, from Nice, from Savoy. The Government has now 40,000 good troops in Piedmont proper.

Yet if hostilities commence, they must be made on the most absurd and empty prettexts. The real reasons can never be publicly avowed. They are simply that France, Sardinia, and other governments have been long keeping up military establishments greatly beyond their means. They have no more money, they have deficits continually increasing, it is impossible that their present course should be continued without arriving at absolute bankruptcy. Hence they wish to utilize their soldiers while they have got them, and, if the chances of war can turn against them, they will only be ruined a little sooner than they otherwise would be by the sure succession of events.

*Dispaccio n 97*

Turin, Feb. 28, 1859

Sir: Since my last dispatch the state of affairs has remained very much the same. Events continue to indicate war in the spring. The only question here is the possibility of a retrocession on the Austrian side. Not a doubt seems to exist in the minds of the Sardinian chiefs as to the resolution of Louis Napoleon to stand by them and keep his promise to support this country in immediate war with Austria. Such however is not the opinion of very many Frenchmen. Public opinion in France is most unfavorable to the proposed war, and the best informed people think that it is too strong to permit the Emperor to carry his schemes into effect.

At least one thing is certain that we are upon the eve of very considerable events. The Sardinian Government is so completely committed to war, and have spent so much money in preparing for it, that if Louis Napoleon deserts them and they should therefore be obliged to hold themselves quiet and renounce their ambitious projects they cannot maintain themselves. The Cavour Government will come to the ground, and the King, who is merely a pageant in reality, but is still the representative of the Government itself before the popular eye, may even abdicate the throne.

The crisis cannot pass without important results. War will change the face of Europe, peace will ruin Sardinia and do much to destroy the preponderant influence of Louis Napoleon in Europe.

The Chambers have decreed a new loan of fifty millions of francs to pay for the immediate armaments of the country. Who can tell how much more they will have to spend before they can find tranquillity again?

M. Cavour passes for a very adroit man. But he has certainly placed his country between war or revolution for no conceivable or pretended motive except that of ambition and the hope for aggrandizement [sic] by violence.

*Dispaccio n 98*

Turin, March 18, 1859

Sir: Outside of Piedmont it appears that the expectation of an immediate war is very much enfeebled. The general opinion seems to be that the French Emperor is personally very willing to set Europe in flames; that he has even committed his Government to the alliance of Piedmont against Austria; but that public sentiment in France is so strongly set against his courses and has so clearly manifested itself that he has been checked by it and compelled to abandon his design. On the other hand it is supposed that Austria is so powerful and Sardinia alone so weak, that the latter will never dare to move unsupported against her. Such however is not the prevalent idea here. The Piedmontese politicians and people are not now the whit the less confident of war this spring than they were a month ago, and, to speak truly, I share their belief.

They argue that Louis Napoleon is too completely committed to their policy to recede. This may be doubted. But I think them quite in the fact when they declare that Sardinia herself and the Italian people throughout the peninsula cannot go back from their present position even if they were so disposed. They must make disturbance now even if they incur a certain ruin.

To perceive the truth of this observation it is simply necessary to give a glance at their condition should there be no war and no cession on the part of Austria. The public mind has been prepared during many years for great action on the part of Piedmont at this epoch. All over Italy insurrectionary plans have been abandoned in the hope that organized resistance headed by Sardinia would accomplish the desire of the people. The Sardinian nation itself has made great sacrifices for warlike preparations. Everything that the Government has asked in money and power has been cheerfully granted. Supposing now that there should be no war—that Cavour should be obliged to tell the Chambers and the nation that all his and their plans have been frustrated, that their expectations were fallacious, that the King's speech must be withdrawn, and that they must be content with such diplomatic arrangement as the two Emperors should patch up for them,—the following events would surely come to pass.

1. The Cavour Ministry which has brought the country to this pass must go out, and with it all hopes of a liberal government on Italian soil.

2. The old aristocratic party which governed the country till 1848 must come back into power, there being no third body between the two in the public.

3. The new ministry would be forced to return to the ancient mode of governing. Even if they wished to do so, they could not continue the liberal system, for that keeps alive the desire for national independence and leads to incessant quarrels and broils with the foreign governments now in Italy. They would therefore be compelled to take away from Piedmont its liberty of speech and the press, reinstate the priests in their old place, put down the army, and change the representation of the Chambers, even if they did not find it necessary to do away with them altogether.

4 There would follow immediate popular revolt and insurrection, which would have to be suppressed with much bloodshed and followed by many horrible executions

5. All hopes of liberating Italy would have to be finally and forever renounced and the peninsula must make itself contented to live in the condition and position which it occupied fifty years ago, with this painful difference, that the Italian people then knew little of constitutional right and had but partial ideas of national independence; whereas they are now inspired by sentiments which must forever render them discontent when held under despotic rule by foreigners.

So fully persuaded are the Sardinian ministers of these inevitable consequences, that even should they be abandoned by France, as they now appear to be, it cannot be doubted that they will run the last stage and play the last cards alone. They will give the word for popular insurrection in Lombardy and attack Austria singlehanded. In such a conflict, should no other power come to their help, the defeat of the Piedmontese armies and the occupation of the Piedmontese territory by Austrian troops will be only a question of time. Such results are so sure and the disproportion of force is so great, that abroad it is thought impossible that Sardinia will ever provoke the issue. But those who so reason forget that Sardinia if defeated in the war will be no worse off than if she submitted to her fate without a blow. She could not be effaced from the map of Europe. France, England and Russia have all of them too much interest in the balance of power to permit that. At the worst, the Austrians could only over-run the country temporarily and force her to make the changes pointed out above. On the other hand, war once engaged who knows what may come of it and how many nations now tranquil may be dragged into the conflict?

Alone, or with France, Piedmont will provoke war, and there is much reason to believe that the final steps will be shortly taken. During the last few days, proclamations have been issued calling all her reserve and all discharged soldiers under 31 years of age again to arms. By this movement, the Sardinian army is at once doubled, and will reach very nearly one hundred thousand men. Fortifications are being put in order and military stores prepared with great diligence. All this leads to vast expenditure, and in a little while the 50,000,000 loan lately obtained will have to be renewed.

The populace is everywhere quietly expectant, but vast numbers of deserters come in from Lombardy. I was yesterday told by one in authority that more than six thousand young men from that province have come over and are now in the keeping of the Sardinian military. According to treaties now existing between Sardinia and Austria these deserters should all be surrendered on the demand of the latter Government. It has however as yet made no such demand; it being the Austrian policy at present to avoid all possible cause of quarrel and dispute, so that should hostilities commence, Sardinia should appear to be entirely the aggressor. They adhere to this system of forbearance with perfect tenacity, greatly to the regret and disgust of their adversaries, who wish for nothing so much as a grievance to begin with. Where they will find such a pretext, and how they will commence their quarrel, is still a mystery. But that they are fully determined to find it somewhere and act on the first plea that they can invent is no longer a matter of doubt.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 99*

Turin, March 26, 1859

Sir: I have had the honour to receive your Dispatch No. 25, dated March 7, 1859, enclosing the Commission of Demosthenes Walker to be Consul at Genoa<sup>122</sup>. I have sent it to the Sardinian Government with a demand for an *exequatur*, which, when received, I will send to the Consulate at Genoa.

At this moment all minds here are occupied by the prospect of a Conference to settle the Italian Question. It is proposed by Russia

<sup>122</sup> L'istruzione n 25, Washington, 7 marzo 1859 trasmetteva soltanto la nomina di Demosthenes Walker, del Mississippi a console degli SU a Genova

and has been immediately accepted by France. Whether Austria will agree to it is not yet officially known. The basis of the proposed settlement is the annihilation of all the treaties between Austria and Parma, Modena, Rome and Naples made since 1815, and a return on her part to the position which she occupied at that epoch, which was a simple possession of Lombardy. I do not believe that Austria will accept such a proposition unless she receive a guarantee [sic] from the rest of Europe that she will never be disturbed in the latter territory. The Emperor of Austria is a self-sufficient personage, he is surrounded by several soldiers and statesmen of a singularly hard and inflexible character, he has gone to great expense in putting his army on a complete war-footing, and as Austria must have a struggle sooner or later about her Italian provinces, I think she will prefer to have it at once to going through the expensive process of a new preparation at some future time.

M. Cavour went to Paris the day before yesterday. He wishes to have Piedmont represented in the proposed Conference. It will be impossible for Austria to permit Piedmont to appear there without a general representation of all the Italian states, and even then the movement may only be a means of setting aside the proposal of a Conference altogether.

In the meantime warlike preparations continue to be made with unabated vigour on all sides.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 100*

Turin, April 13, 1859

Sir. It is only on this morning that I receive the *exequatur* of Mr. Walker.—The delay has been verbally explained to me by the absence of Count Cavour in Paris. He left here on the very day that I sent in my demand, and on yesterday the first Royal Council that has taken place since then was held. On that occasion the *exequatur* was signed by the King, and enclosed in a note from the Premier to me which I append.

Turin, 12 avril 1859

Le Soussigné Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de S. M. le Roi de Sardaigne, a l'honneur de transmettre à Mr. le Ministre Résident des Etats-Unis à Turin le Brévet de nomination de Mr. Walker à Consul à Gênes, qui était joint à la note 26 mars, ainsi que l'*exequatur* que S. M. a daigné lui accorder et le prie de vouloir agréer les assurances de sa considération distinguée

*John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass*

*Dispaccio n 101*

Turin, April 16, 1859

Sir. I have received and presented three volumes of the U. S. Exploring Expedition sent to me for the Government of Sardinia, and Count Cavour has found time to address me a remarkably polite note of thanks which he requests me to transmit It will be found in the Appendix A

When I last addressed you on the state of affairs here, this gentleman had just been called to Paris by the French Emperor. He did not stay long and what passed between these two arch intriguers is only known to themselves Cavour since his return has declared himself perfectly satisfied with all he saw and heard; the friends of peace think his satisfaction affected and his disappointment great. He has published a Memorandum of the Italian grievances addressed to the Court of St. James, [sic] which has been extensively circulated. His account of the ills under which Italy labours is nothing new; but what is remarkable in his paper is the fact that he points to Lombardy as the sole place where the true solution of the difficulty must be sought He will not be satisfied with an evacuation of the dutchies and Rome—but insists on a Constitution and an Italian army in Lombardy,—things which no Congress will ever wring from Austria until a bloody war has gone against her.

Meanwhile the prospects of a Congress change from day to day. Last week Austria demanded the disarmament of Piedmont as a preliminary, and Piedmont positively refused to disarm. Since then Austria

<sup>123</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 100 di Daniel



has proposed a general disarmament of herself, Piedmont and France. The fate of this proposition is not yet distinctly known, but its failure may be safely predicted. I am every day better satisfied that either there will be no Congress at all held, or that it will be an empty mockery.

There is no solution to these difficulties. War seems every day more imminent and any hour may bring the news of it. Sardinia has now completed her preparations. She has seventy-five thousand men disposed along the line of the railroad from Genoa to Novara, which she can concentrate at the latter place in twelve hours. What the French Emperor has prepared is very much in the dark; but it is certain that he has twenty thousand men at Marseilles which could come to Turin in thirty hours; and he has thirty thousand more on the frontier of Savoy who could all pass the Mount Cenis and be here in two days. On the other hand, Austria has certainly not less than two hundred thousand men in Lombardy, and fifty thousand more are on the way there. Leaving a hundred thousand to control the population, she could enter this country with three *corps* of fifty thousand each.

The affair has been ably managed by Cavour. Neither Piedmont nor France desire at heart a Congress, yet he has succeeded in making it appear that all the difficulties come from Austria. He now wishes to force Austria to commence the actual hostilities, and I am of opinion that he will be equally fortunate on that point also. France and Piedmont, having more command of money, can maintain the present costly state of armed expectancy much longer than Austria. This latter country having failed in its loan is nearly bankrupt. Shortly she will have no more cash to pay the enormous force she has heaped up in Lombardy, and in that case her soldiers will desert. Her payments are already made mostly in small paper. She cannot wait when waiting costs her a million of francs *per diem*, and will be forced to cross the river and enter Piedmontese territory for self-preservation. She will thus appear to be the aggressor, but the reality is on the other side.

An order of the day just issued by Marshal Gyulai [sic] amounts almost to a declaration of war, and plainly tells those soldiers that they will soon be in Piedmontese quarters. I think the crisis imminent, but must add that the key of truth is not in Turin. It is in Paris, London and Vienna that the real state of things must be sought. Here in Turin all are before the scenes, even the King himself, with the sole exception of Cavour. I can only give you the publicly known facts and the universal opinion of all classes and all grades of people that war is almost immediate.

Turin, 14 avril 1859

Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai reçu avec la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 10 de ce mois les volumes 8 et 20 de l'*United States Exploring Expedition*, ainsi que le volume 1er de l'Atlas qui fait partie de cette intéressante et précieuse publication, destinés au Gouvernement du Roi Mon Auguste Souverain.

En m'empressant de vous remercier de cet envoi je vous prie d'avoir l'obligeance de faire parvenir à votre Gouvernement la nouvelle expression de la reconnaissance de celui de S. M., et je saisis avec empressement l'occasion de vous réitérer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 102*

Turin, April 21, 1859

Sir: At the present moment the real state of affairs is effectually concealed by the mazes of diplomacy. France and Piedmont have apparently accepted the *principle* of a general simultaneous disarmament, on condition that Piedmont and all the Italian states shall be admitted to the Congress on the footing of the great Powers. But I cannot regard this as more than diplomatic juggle. No *actual* disarmament will take place previous to the Congress, or after it, if Austria does not yield her position. Cavour and the Piedmontese are not unwilling that the Congress should meet if they are admitted on equal footing. Such a Congress would give them an opportunity to support their claims in the face of Europe and they would always be able to break it off if Austria holds out against them. Besides they would gain time. France, it is said, has not yet fully prepared for war and Piedmont acquires strength every day while Austria spends immense sums of money during this suspension of hostilities.

The true facts and history of these propositions will be better given from other quarters. I can only state what passes under my eyes, and the most remarkable feature of the present moment is the spirit mani-

<sup>124</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 101 di Daniel.

fested by the whole Italian people. They are evidently in greater hopes and more in earnest than they ever have been before. In previous troubles they were zealous in their cries for the *Indipendenza d'Italia*, but showed small disposition to go to the wars in person. But now the volunteers pour into Piedmont in numbers perfectly incredible. Two steamers from Tuscany brought into the single port of Genoa twelve hundred young men on Sunday and Monday last. I myself from my windows see five hundred file up the street from the railroad station daily, and the number increases. If the suspension of hostilities continues a month longer, Piedmont will nearly double her strength. Good authority tells me that twenty thousand of these volunteers are already enrolled and in barracks, besides the numbers rejected by the military commission from physical and other defects.

Count Cavour has addressed me a note about a brawl between some of our sailors and certain peasants at Spezia. I have made a simple reply expressing my regret and promising to refer the matter to the Flag Officer of the Squadron. The affair has little importance, as you will perceive by the letters of the Premier and the Minister of Interior which I append

***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel***<sup>125</sup>

Turin, 16 avril 1859

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le rapport dont j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint une traduction m'a fait connaître quelques actes de violence envers des habitants paisibles et de révolte à la force armée commis le 11 courant par des marins appartenant à l'équipage de la Corvette des Etats-Unis d'Amérique la *Macédonia* actuellement au mouillage dans le golfe de la Spezia.

Comme vous le verrez, et la source dont émanent ces informations en garantit l'exactitude, il s'agit de désordres fort graves, et il est dû à des circonstances purement casuelles s'ils n'ont pas eu de conséquences encore plus déplorables.

Bien que les officiers de la Corvette se soient empressés de déclarer aux Autorités que les marins coupables seraient recherchés et punis, je ne crois pas moins devoir vous en informer confidentiellement, Monsieur le Ministre, dans la persuasion où je suis que vous voudrez bien provoquer

<sup>125</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 102 di Daniel.

de la part du Commandant de l'Escadre des Etats-Unis dans la Méditerranée des dispositions pour prévenir le renouvellement de faits aussi regrettables.

Je vous prie en même temps d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

*Traduction d'un rapport du Ministère de l'Intérieur au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères en date du 15 avril 1859*

Le 11 courant, au moment que l'équipage de la Corvette Américaine *Macédonia* débarquait à la Spezia, un des marins, sans qu'il y eût la moindre provocation, porta un coup de couteau au nommé Zara Camille, émouleur âgé de 52 ans. Des carabiniers étant accourus ce même marin leur opposa, à coups de poing et de pied, la plus vive résistance et ce n'est pas sans danger qu'on parvint à s'emparer de sa personne et à le mettre à la disposition de la justice. Heureusement le coup de couteau porté contre le nommé Zara ne lui causa point de blessure, la lame ayant été arrêtée par les vêtements.

Le jour même à Fezzano, fraction de la commune de Portovenere, cinq ou six autres marins de la *Macédonia*, ayant rencontré quelque opposition de la part des propriétaires d'une embarcation dont ils voulaient se servir pour retourner à bord de la Corvette, ils les menacèrent immédiatement de coups de couteau, et l'un d'eux aurait donné suite à sa menace si l'on n'avait réussi à le désarmer. Mais, sur ces entrefaites, un canot Américain étant venu à passer près de l'endroit, les hommes qui le montaient mirent pied à terre et attaquèrent à coups de poing les habitants de Fezzano qui avaient empêché les autres marins de s'emparer de la barque. Il s'ensuivit une mêlée dans laquelle le nommé Blaise Re-bora reçut quelques contusions à la figure, et la femme de celui-ci qui était venue pour retirer son mari de la lutte fut grièvement blessée à la tête d'un coup de pierre lancé par un des marins de la Corvette.

L'Intendant de la Spezia, de concert avec les Autorités, a pris des marins Américains qui s'étaient permis une pareille agression, si par bonheur les hommes de Portovenere ne s'étaient trouvés absents, car les femmes mêmes avaient commencé à lancer sur eux, des fenêtres de leurs maisons, les objets qui leur tombaient sous la main, de sorte que les marins durent prendre la fuite.

L'Intendant de la Spezia, de concert avec les Autorités, a pris des dispositions pour prévenir d'autres désordres. De leur côté les officiers de la Corvette témoignèrent leur regret de ce qui s'était passée, et pro-

mirent de procéder à une enquête pour que les marins coupables soient punis

Il ne faut pas oublier que si les habitants de Fezzano s'opposèrent à ce qu'on prit une de leurs barques, c'est parce qu'il arrive fréquemment que des marins Américains, après s'être servis d'embarcations de particuliers, les abandonnent dans le golfe au lieu de les faire ramener à leurs propriétaires.

*John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass*

*Dispaccio n 103*

Turin, April 25, 1859

Sir: Negotiations [sic] are rapidly approaching their issue, and the war which I have announced in these dispatches during the last four months stands at the door.

In my last note I stated that France and Sardinia had accepted the English proposition for a general disarmament with admission of Piedmont, into the Conferences. In exact terms this proposition was as follows.—

« 1. That, as a preliminary step, a general and simultaneous disarmament should be effected.

« 2. That the said disarmament should be regulated by a military or civil commission, independent of the Congress.

« 3. That, as soon as that commission should have met and commenced its task, the Congress should assemble in its turn, and proceed to the discussion of the political questions

« 4. That the representatives of the Italian states should be invited by the Congress, on its meeting, to sit with the representatives of the five great powers, precisely in the same manner as took place at the Congress of Laybach in 1821. »

Such was the proposition of England accepted by France and Sardinia. It was thought almost certain that Austria would agree to it, that the Congress would meet and diplomacy would there have full hope to prove its own inefficiency in junctures like the present.

But on Friday evening last it was known that Austria had peremptorily refused this proposition, and that she had accompanied her refusal by a statement that she would send immediate summons to Sardinia to disarm without condition in three days.

This news was communicated by the English Embassy in Turin to the Sardinian Cabinet; and in consequence Parliament was convoked for

an extraordinary session on the next morning (Saturday 23 April.) At twelve o'clock, Count Cavour, the First Minister, addressed the Representative Chamber in a short but excited discourse. He stated that the Austrian *ultimatum* had not yet arrived, but that it was hourly expected and that the Sardinian Government would refuse to comply with it. In accepting the English proposition Sardinia had gone to the utmost length that it would go for the sake of peace, and that it was now his duty to inform the country that hostilities were most imminent, and that it should immediately make provision for them.

A committee of the House being named, it brought forward after a few minutes' deliberation the project of a law, consisting of two brief clauses, placing absolute and discretionary powers in the hands of the King and Government, enabling them to take all steps and execute all measures necessary to the safety and defence of the country by simple decrees, without consulting the Parliament, during the war; and giving the Government express permission to control the liberty of individuals and of the press as it should think proper.

This law, passed in a few minutes by an unanimous vote, converts Sardinia for the time being into the condition of the ancient Roman Republic during a period of dictatorship, or of modern France when governed by the famous Committee of Safety.

At five o'clock on the same evening an Austrian officer made his appearance at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presented the *ultimatum*. It was a simple demand that Sardinia should dismiss her volunteers and reduce her army to the peace-footing, and a declaration that non-compliance would be considered cause of war. The officer stated that he would wait in Turin three days for the reply. What that reply will be may be easily imagined.

The three days expire tomorrow evening, Tuesday April 26. Negotiations [sic] appear to be at an end, and it is certain that Austria has been damaged by them. That France and Sardinia have been and are always bent on war cannot be doubted; but they have managed Austria as the matador provokes the bull with red rag to rush on the naked sword which he holds ready behind it. It is Austria that seems the aggressor, and all the appearance of moderation and deference for other nations seems to be with her adversaries.

England has sent a hot protest against her course, and there are those who imagine that diplomacy may yet delay if not prevent the struggle. I am not one of those persons. There are no good reasons for the supposition. Neither party has the slightest idea of retreat, and

there is every ground for the belief that within four days from the date of this dispatch the plain of Piedmont and Lombardy will witness the first scenes of a sanguinary drama.

The French army of the Alps passed the frontier of Savoy this morning. It is even now at the foot of the Mt. Cenis and great preparations are made for its reception here the day after to-morrow. The Sardinian troops concentrate rapidly on the Ticino, which is the boundary between Piedmont and Lombardy. Another French army comes by sea from Marseilles and Toulon, and will land at Genoa whence it will be brought up by rail-road.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 104*

Turin, April 27, 1859

Sir. The war which is now joined promises to be bloody in its course and important in its results. The passions of the Italian and Austrian people are thoroughly engaged. Each has exasperated the other for many years, one by a barbarous oppression and the other by continual assassination and violence till their hatreds know no limits. The events of this war must also necessarily transpire in swift succession. A glance at the map will show that Lombardy and Piedmont form a great and beautiful plain, unbroken by mountains or considerable rivers. By rail the journey from Genoa to Venice can be completed in twenty hours, and hostile armies can manoeuvre all over the two countries in a week. It has ever been one of the fighting grounds of Europe, and the wars waged here have always been speedily decided because no natural obstacles prevent the immediate collision of opposing troops and the battles follow one another like thunder-claps.

The parties are not unequally matched, should Russia, Germany and England rest neutral. Many persons, arguing from the past, suppose that a war between France and Austria can have but one issue, the overthrow of the latter. They forget that in the past France was handled by the greatest military genius that has lived in the world since Julius Caesar. They also lose sight of the fact that for twenty years Austria has been ever increasing, reforming and improving her army until it has reached a point of perfection never known before and which could be with difficulty surpassed. The Austrian generals at the present moment are esteemed the ablest strategists in Europe. The French have no military men

with reputations like those of Hess and Gyulai. Their troops are however in admirable condition and the French are a military nation. The Sardinian army of seventy-five thousand is energetic and very well organized. The financial condition of the allies although not too good is altogether better than that of Austria. Thus, if the Confederation of Germany will save Austria from French attacks at home and if these two adversaries are left to fight out their quarrels in Italy, they would appear to be quite equally matched.

Should Austria be the victor, Sardinia will cease to exist, and thus may be a grave catastrophe in France. Should the other party succeed, their plan is said to be this—That Lombardy and Venice shall be united to the kingdom of Sardinia; that Savoy and Nice shall be ceded to France; that Tuscany with the duchies of Parma and Modena shall be erected into a separate government under the protectorate of France for Prince Napoleon; and that constitutions shall be given to Naples and Rome. I give this, the common idea of the political circles here, as a general belief and not as a statement of which I could give official proof.

Russia has had a great deal to do in the origin of these affairs. I am convinced that the first idea and plan was formed at Stuttgart in the interview between Alexander and Napoleon last year. Before that time no one heard of such schemes, and from that moment the rumours and movement between Paris and Turin commenced. The Grand Duke Constantin has since been a go-between of the parties. For six months he has been revolving from Cavour to Napoleon, and his visits have always been succeeded by some new step towards the war. For some months his work in this quarter has been ended and he went off to Sicily. There too his arrival was a signal for political commotion and at this moment that island is full of an insurrectionary spirit only a little controlled by the hopes of the King of Naples' speedy death. Sicily, be it remembered, has long been an object of Russian ambition. She wants a great naval depot in the Mediterranean as well as a resort and residence of her nobles; and should Russia take active part in this affair there is great probability that Sicily will be the Italian parcel falling to her lot on partition of the spoils.

The Austrian agent who brought the *ultimatum* left Turin yesterday evening, Tuesday, with the peremptory refusal of the Sardinian Government. Communication with Lombardy is now broken off, and what passes there can no longer be certainly known. But French troops are now arriving here from three quarters—by Genoa, by Briançon and by the Mt. Cenis. The Government has proclaimed Prince Eugene of Savoy



Carignan Lieutenant of the King during the absence of that monarch from his capital. He goes to Alexandria, which will be the centre of the war should it be waged on Piedmontese territory. Lamarmora, the general of the Sardinians in the Crimea, who has since been Minister of War, will be their Commander-in-Chief.

April 28. The telegraph brings most important intelligence. Revolution has been successfully commenced in Tuscany. Victor Emanuel has been declared dictator in that country, and the Grand Duke is about to leave it. His troops have fraternised [sic] with the people. On the other hand Russia has concluded an alliance offensive and defensive with France and Piedmont. The Austrian army has not entered Sardinian territory up to the time of writing, and in view of these facts it is doubtful, whether it will now come at all. It will have enough to do in defending itself at home.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 105*

Turin, April 29, 1859

Sir: I made allusion to a brawl between some sailors of our Squadron and the peasantry near Spezia in my dispatch No 102: at which time also I sent copies of the complaints made to me by the Sardinian Ministry. That affair was settled at the Foreign Office by agreement with me, that a small fine should be paid on the part of the Squadron for the broken heads and other damage to the peasants, that the American sailor arrested should be set free, and that the Sardinian authorities should give a release against all further consequences and liabilities. The fine (515 francs) was paid by the Consul at Spezia and the matter there ended.

But since then a woman wounded in the affray has died of the wound she then received from our men. The Sardinian Government has again addressed me, thanking myself and the Flag-Officer Lavallette<sup>126</sup> for the prompt measures taken, and again declaring themselves satisfied. Viewing the whole matter as settled, the Foreign Minister intimates that he has no intention of reopening [sic] the case; but, after mentioning the

<sup>126</sup> Su J. Augustus F. Lavallette vedi HR MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations* cit., vol. II, p 417 Per il testo della lettera del 9 maggio 1859 di Chandler a Lavallette e la sua risposta del 23 maggio 1859, vedi *ibid*, pp 418-421 Chandler era ministro americano a Napoli.

death of the woman, hopes that I will cause some soccours to be accorded her husband.

This letter, which appears to me worth your attention, is that numbered 2 in the Appendix A. I have no power to make any allowance on the United States to the husband for the manslaughter of his wife, though the fact that the sailor who did it is probably saved from the galleys by the speedy arrangement of the affair here before the death was known would render it desirable. I have however no doubt that the moral responsibility of the transaction will, as stated in the Consul's last letter found in Appendix B, numbered 3, be fully met by the voluntary contributions of the squadron. It certainly should be.

The Austrians have at length passed the Ticino and now stand on Piedmontese soil. No battle has however yet taken place. The first *fait d'armes* will probably occur this morning near Casale. The Austrians will never get to Turin. They have lost the last three days when a great blow might really have been struck by listening to a new proposition of arrangement made by England. This absurd delusion was encouraged by Louis Napoleon simply that he might have time to get his troops here. As soon as the telegraph informed him that fifty thousand of his troops were on the spot, he dismissed the negociators [sic]. It must be admitted that the Austrian Government has been fooled and outwitted in all these diplomatic matters to an extent rarely witnessed.

The statement of a secret treaty with Russia announced by telegraph the other day is contradicted by the Government here. But the successful revolution in Tuscany is confirmed, and has been followed by a similar affair in Modena.

I shall not attempt hereafter to give the rumours and details of intelligence which you learn more speedily by the telegraph and English press. If any facts come to my knowledge which are not likely to be known to you through that source, I shall hasten to communicate them.

***J. Augustus F. Lavallette a John M. Daniel***<sup>127</sup>

Flag Ship *Wabash*, La Spezia, April 22, 1859

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant bringing to my notice, by request of the Sardinian

<sup>127</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 105 di Daniel

Government, certain disorders said to have been committed by sailors belonging to a vessel of the U.S. Squadron under my command, with copies of statements addressed to you by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the occurrences.

The appended extract from a letter of our Consul at Spezia, addressed to me on the subject, will be explanatory of the circumstances and manner of its adjustment with the parties concerned. I beg you to say to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs that these occurrences have been productive of much mortification to me, that American seamen could be guilty of such gross outrage, and to assure him that steps are taken by myself and officers under my command to prevent the recurrence of such acts and to cultivate the most friendly relations between the subjects of his Sardinian Majesty and those under my command.

***Robert H. Leese a J. Augustus F. Lavallette***<sup>128</sup>

Spezia, April 21, 1859

Sir.: In reply to your note (this moment received) asking for information respecting the disturbances between some of the seamen U.S. *Macedonian* and citizens of this Gulf, I beg to state that they consisted of a drunken fight with a boat's crew of said ship and several of the inhabitants of the town of Fezzano, in which one woman was most severely and seriously injured and two men badly. Also at the wharf of the town of Spezia, Robert Johnson, O S of ship aforesaid, being very drunk, assaulted with a drawn knife one Camille Zara and a Brigadier of the Royal Carabinier Force.

In the 1st instance, the men escaped on board their ship. In the second, Robert Johnson was arrested and imprisoned.

Owing to the gravity of these cases, the local authorities could not deal with them and they had of necessity to be referred to the Minister Count Cavour at Turin; when governed by the extreme good-feeling existing on his and the King's Government's part, that distinguished personage ordered the seamen to be released on payment of an indemnity to the injured parties in both cases, the amount to be fixed by the Judge at Spezia.

In conformity therewith that official named the sum of 350 francs

<sup>128</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 105 di Daniel

to woman & husband, 150 francs to man at Fezzano, 15 francs to Camille Zara, and all concurrent expenses of Robert Johnson's imprisonment.

This money was paid by me in presence of the Judge, receipts & depositions & releases taken from all further claims or damages, and the affair finally disposed of.

***Robert H. Leese a John M. Daniel***<sup>129</sup>

Spezia, April 25, 1858

Sir: Flag-Officer Lavallette having informed me he had sent you a detailed account of the affray at Fezzano between several inhabitants thereof and seamen of the Corvette *Macedonian* on the evening of the 11th inst., it only remains to me to forward you a report of the result.

The woman Rebora died on Friday the 22d inst. from the effects of her wound.

Having legally disposed of the case some days previously, it only now assumes a moral liability which I am certain will be largely responded to by everyone connected with our squadron in these seas.

***John M. Daniel a Camillo di Cavour***<sup>130</sup>

Turin, April 26, 1859

Having communicated to Flag-Officer Lavallette the statements of your note dated the 16th instant, that officer prays me to « assure the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the great mortification these occurrences have caused him, and of his deep regret that American seamen could be guilty of such gross outrages, and to inform him that steps have been taken by himself and the officers under his command which will prevent the repetition of similar acts. »

The seamen engaged have been punished to the full extent of their offence and of the rules of our service, and I have received a letter from the American Consul at Spezia from which I make the following extract:

<sup>129</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 105 di Daniel

<sup>130</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 105 di Daniel.

« Owing to the gravity of these cases, the local authorities could not deal with them and they had of necessity to be referred to the Minister Count Cavour at Turin. Governed by the extreme good-feeling existing in the King's Government towards us, that distinguished personage ordered the seaman in the hands of authority to be released on payment of an indemnity to the injured parties in both cases, the amounts to be fixed by the Judge at Spezia. In conforming therewith that official named the sums of 350 francs to the woman and husband; 150 francs to the man at Fezzano; 15 francs to Camille Zara; all expenses of Robert Johnson's imprisonment. This sum was paid by me on the part of the United States, receipts and releases from all further damages duly taken ».

Hoping that this conclusion of the affair is satisfactory to the Sardinian Government, permit me to add that, while it is the wish of the United States that its citizens and employees should at all times observe the laws of this country, it is doubly their desire at a period like the present that they should avoid the least offence or embarrassment to any of its officials or subjects.

***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel***<sup>131</sup>

Turin, 27 avril 1859

Monsieur le Ministre. J'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer que le Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, vient de nommer M. le Commandeur Minghetti aux fonctions de Secrétaire Général du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, en remplacement de M. le C.te de Salmour qui se trouve présentement en mission à Paris et que S.M. se propose d'appeler à une autre destination.

Vous prévenant aussi, Mr. le Ministre, que le Com.deur Minghetti entre dès aujourd'hui dans l'exercice des fonctions qu'il a plu à S.M. de lui confier, je saisis l'occasion de vous réitérer les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

<sup>131</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 105 di Daniel.

**Marco Minghetti a John M. Daniel**<sup>132</sup>

Turin, 29 avril 1859

Monsieur le Ministre J'ai reçu la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 26 courant pour m'informer des dispositions que M. le Contre-Amiral Lavallette s'est empressé de prendre afin de prévenir le retour de désordres de la part de marins de son escadre, ainsi que de l'entente qui a eu lieu pour accorder des indemnités aux individus qui avaient eu à souffrir des violences commises par quelques hommes de la frégate *Macédonia*.

Le Gouvernement du Roi ne peut qu'être satisfait de ces mesures non moins promptes que spontanées. Il l'est d'autant plus que vous avez bien voulu en accompagner l'annonce de l'assurance de sentiments et d'égards qu'il apprécie hautement, surtout dans les circonstances actuelles. Je n'aurais donc qu'à vous remercier, Monsieur le Ministre, si une triste nouvelle ne m'était parvenue en même temps que votre précitée. La femme Reborà qui avait été blessée d'un coup de pierre lancé par un des marins du *Macédonia* est morte le 22 courant des suites de sa blessure.

Je crois devoir vous en informer, Monsieur le Ministre, non point pour revenir sur cette malheureuse affaire, mais pour le cas où, comme j'en ai la confiance, vous y verriez un motif de faire accorder au mari de la défunte quelque soulagement en dehors de l'indemnité qu'il a reçue lorsqu'on ne prévoyait pas encore la perte qui vient de le frapper.

Je saisis l'occasion de vous renouveler, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 106*

Turin, May 15, 1859

Sir. Both the Allies and the Austrians preserve great secrecy as to the strength of their forces as well as the movements of their armies. The press is silenced and the telegraph taken from the public. Under such circumstances it is difficult to state facts with confidence. As nearly as I can ascertain, however, the Piedmontese regular army, exclusive of the volunteers, is 80,000 men in the field. The French have at least

<sup>132</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 105 di Daniel Minghetti firma per il Ministro.

150,000 of their best troops already here, with nearly 200 pieces of the new rifled cannon, and sixty thousand more on the way. The allied army will number three hundred thousand men. The Austrians have, it is said, three hundred thousand at this moment in Lombardy, and many authorities say fifty thousand more. Gyulai, a general who never commanded in chief during war, heads them still; but it is expected that Hess, a much abler and more experienced man, perhaps the best general in Europe, will sooner or later supersede him. The French Emperor commands the Allies. He is now at Alexandria, where he has established his head-quarters, and near which fortress the bulk of the allied army is encamped. His landing at Genoa two days ago was signalized by illuminations, festivals, and enthusiasm indescribable and unsurpassed even in Italy, the land of pageants. These people, looking on him as the long promised Liberator who should deliver them from the foreign yoke, received him with honours such as might have been paid to the Divine Messiah in person.

Gyulai entered Piedmontese territory eighteen days ago with 120,000 men, supported by another hundred thousand on the frontiers. Thus, armies such as have not been seen in Europe since the great days of Leipzig and Moskova confront one another, with outposts sometimes in sight, on a plain where both masses might be brought together by a day's manoeuvre. Yet up to this moment there has been nothing but trifling skirmish to record. The Austrians march and countermarch, take up positions only to abandon them, and the Allies do nothing except accumulate additional force. Indeed their attitude has for sometime furnished plausibility to those military critics who pretend there is not a general now living in Europe capable of handling an army of 200,000 men in the field. Certain it is that those who have seen such an army are all superannuated, and forty years of peace have rendered such concentrations for destruction happily unknown to the present generation.

But on one point all are agreed: that from the commencement of this affair up to the present moment Austria has done everything that her adversaries could wish her to do. She has played their game in diplomacy and war. By blundering precipitancy in the negotiations, [sic] she lost all the advantage which the position really gave her,—that of a country at peace with all nations attacked by two others on vague pleas and general accusations having no foundation in public law. The *ultimatum* by which she brought war abruptly on Europe might however have been excused in point of policy and expediency, at least, had she acted with celerity and decision after it. Everyone expected to see Gyulai in Turin forthwith. There was nothing then to prevent the Austrian from over-running

nearly all Piedmont, levying vast sums of money, and taking up exactly the ground which he liked best. The Piedmontese army was not enough to oppose effective opposition, and the French had not come. But for three days after the declaration of war, the Austrians did not move at all. Then they passed the Ticino with every species of precaution and slowly occupied the territory between that river and the Dora, all left open to them, without a solitary soldier, by their adversaries. Since then they have made several feeble demonstrations of attack against the Sardinian lines, from all of which they have turned back after the slightest show of resistance on the other side. In every skirmish they have had the worst of it, and in one affair they lost a quantity of boats and other material which they had prepared for passing the Po. Judging by the movements of their columns they have vacillated between further invasion and retreat, and have severally made and given over plans for attacks on Turin, Alexandria and Novi. Everything indicates divided councils at Vienna and in the camp. At the present moment they are withdrawing their troops from all sides and concentrating them about Mortara and Piacenza, where they now pretend to await the French.

The exactions which they have made, the requisitions of cattle, bread, money, &c, which they have drawn from the Piedmontese towns and population during this brief and inglorious occupation have been very great; the King of Sardinia, who occupied himself with the outposts and does little with the plans of the campaign, is said to have lately written a note to Gyulai to know if he had to deal with soldiers or brigands;—and this is absolutely the only advantage they have gained from the movement. On the other hand, they have sown little hatreds in the population, have dispirited their troops by their want of energetic action, lost their confidence by plans so often changed, and, worst of all, given the French Emperor time to bring over his army. The Austrian General excuses himself on the plea of bad weather and inundated fields. But the weather on the Mt. Cenis was worse than on the plains of the Po, and neither snow nor torrents prevented or delayed the French from coming. I myself saw thirty thousand pushing on over that pass, white with snow, but in the highest spirits, only a few days ago, and cannot but give credit to them for the good-humour and energy which prevailed among them.

All the French officers think the campaign will be short. The whole will be over by September, if they are to be believed, at which time there will not be an Austrian in Italy. The Emperor, it is said, openly expresses the same opinion, and invites people to hunt with him at



Compiègne in October. If the Austrian army is handled throughout as at present, this belief may be easily realized. But it may be reasonably expected that the Austrians will fight and fight obstinately when they fall back on their own lines. They have in Lombardy a position of great military strength—the famous triangle formed by the three great fortified cities of Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera. Ensnared in this retreat, it will be very difficult, and perhaps take a longer time than the French think, to drive them out.

Tuscany is now governed by a Sardinian Commissioner, who is no other than the Sardinian Minister Resident at Florence when the revolution took place. The disturbances in Parma and Modena have been quieted, and the ancient rulers still hold their places. The Allies are far from desiring revolutions in the Italian states. It would at present only be embarrassment to the organized action of their armies. The event which they most fear, indeed, is a revolution in their favour at Rome. Should the great question of Papal authority be brought on the stage at this juncture, it could not fail to do them greatest injury.

Meanwhile a system of considerable repression is exercised here in Piedmont. It will be recollected that power to control the liberty of the person and of the press was given to Government by Parliament on the opening of the war, and it is not slack in using that power. Several arbitrary arrests have been made, the press is absolutely silenced on political and warlike topics, and the only information allowed the public is to be found in a meagre « official bulletin ». I append two communications made to myself by the Foreign Office in illustration. The first, which was sent to this Legation and the British Embassy,—I do not think to others,—declares the intention of the Government to admit no correspondents of newspapers abroad to enter their lines, and was induced by the apparition of several *attachés* of the English and American press of late at Turin. The second communication, sent to all the legations alike, cuts [sic] the diplomatic corps from the use of the telegraph. Even communications in cipher, direct to the sovereigns represented here, are not allowed.

Turin, 30 avril 1859

Monsieur le Ministre, S.A R. le Prince Eugène, Lieutenant Général du Royaume, en vertu des pouvoirs que S M. le Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, lui a délégués, a rendu le 28 de ce mois un Décret Royal, tendant à régler la liberté de la presse pendant la durée de la guerre contre l'Empire d'Autriche.

Le Décret, inséré dans la *Gazette Piémontaise* d'hier, défend la publication de toute nouvelle, rapport ou polemique ayant trait aux mouvements des armées alliées à l'exception de ce qui serait communiqué au public par le Gouvernement.

Comme conséquence de la mesure adoptée et pour atteindre plus complètement le but qu'elle a en vue, le Gouvernement du Roi a cru devoir en même temps décider que les correspondants des journaux étrangers ne pourront être admis au camp ni à suivre les opérations militaires.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à toute bonne fin cette détermination à votre connaissance, M. le Ministre, et je vous prie d'agréer les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

Turin, 4 mai 1859

Dans les conventions télégraphiques conclues entre les différents Etats de l'Europe, auxquelles la Sardaigne a pris part, chaque Gouvernement s'est réservé expressément la faculté d'interrompre le service de la télégraphie internationale pour un temps indéterminé soit pour toutes les correspondances *soit seulement pour certaines natures de correspondances*. Dans ce cas il a été convenu que le Gouvernement qui aurait adopté une mesure de ce genre devra en donner immédiatement connaissance à tous les autres Gouvernements contractants.

Les graves circonstances dans lesquelles se trouve le Piémont, dont le territoire vient d'être envahi par l'ennemi, ont déterminé le Gouvernement du Roi à faire usage de la réserve susnommée, et il a par conséquent donné ordre que la correspondance télégraphique chiffrée soit temporairement interrompue.

<sup>133</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 106 di Daniel Minghetti firma per il Ministro

<sup>134</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 106 di Daniel Minghetti firma per il Ministro.

Le Soussigné President du Conseil, et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, en portant cette détermination à la connaissance de M John M. Daniel, Ministre Résident des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, s'empresse de lui donner l'assurance que la mesure dont il s'agit n'a été adoptée par aucune considération particulière, mais seulement dans l'intérêt général de la situation. Elle est en même temps communiquée à toutes les Légations Etrangères à Turin.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de renouveler à M John M. Daniel les assurances de sa considération très distinguée

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 107*

Turin, May 23, 1859

Sir: Count Cavour has sent me copies of a declaration containing certain principles of maritime law which will be observed by the Sardinian Government during the present war, which I think worth communicating. The following is a translation <sup>135</sup>.

The original documents are appended. I also send in a separate envelope, but by this mail, the new consular law of this country, it being the wish of the Foreign Office that I should do so. It is in principle drawn from our own, a copy of which was borrowed from this Legation at the time of its preparation.

***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel*** <sup>136</sup>

Turin, le 22 Mai 1859

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de présenter ses compliments à Monsieur le Ministre des Etats-Unis en même temps qu'il s'empresse de lui remettre deux exemplaires de la Déclaration que le Gouvernement du Roi vient de publier dans le *Journal Officiel* d'hier.

21 maggio 1859

Il Governo di S. M. il Re di Sardegna ha già pubblicamente dichiarato che nella condotta della presente guerra s'informerebbe a quei prin-

<sup>135</sup> Vedi l'originale in allegato, per questo omettiamo il brano tradotto nel dispaccio

<sup>136</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 107 di Daniel.

cipii di moderazione e di umanità che onorano i tempi moderni, quantunque le violenze e le rapine di ogni maniera operate dall'esercito austriaco nel nostro territorio possano dargli il diritto di usare di rappresaglia e di retorsione.

Il Governo del Re, il quale ha contribuito alla dichiarazione di diritto marittimo fatta dal Congresso di Parigi il 16 di aprile 1856, ha pure manifestato il suo intendimento di osservarne scrupolosamente le prescrizioni

Volendo ora rinnovare in modo più esplicito queste assicurazioni nell'interesse delle popolazioni e del commercio, dichiara ad ogni buon fine che.

1. I sudditi austriaci che si trovano nei Regii Stati possono continuarvi la loro dimora sempreché e fino a quando la loro condotta non darà luogo a richiamo.

2. Sarà concessa l'entrata nei R. Stati a quei sudditi austriaci che ne otterranno speciale e preventiva autorizzazione dal Governo del Re.

3. La corsa rimane interdetta.

4. La bandiera neutrale coprirà la merce nemica, eccettuato il contrabbando di guerra

5. Non sarà catturata la merce dei neutrali sotto bandiera nemica, eccettuato il contrabbando di guerra

6. I blocchi saranno effettivi.

Il Governo del Re infine avendo notizia che la fregata austriaca *Novara* ha intrapreso un viaggio di circumnavigazione nell'interesse della scienza, dichiara che essa andrà immune dalla legge di cattura durante il suo viaggio e che già furono date a tal proposito le convenienti istruzioni alla R. Marina

Quanto alla cattura delle navi austriache sulle quali fu posto l'embargo, il Governo di S. M. dichiarò già che si riservava di statuire, e farà conoscere in appresso la propria deliberazione.

### ***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel***<sup>137</sup>

Turin, 9 mars 1859

Monsieur le Ministre: La nouvelle loi sur l'organisation consulaire de Sardaigne et le règlement concernant l'exécution de cette loi, qui

<sup>137</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 107 di Daniel. Si omette il Regolamento Consolare pubblicato il 21 maggio sulla *Gazzetta Ufficiale*

doivent être mis en vigueur le 1er Avril prochain, venant d'être publiés, je me fais un plaisir d'en mettre les deux exemplaires ci-joints à votre disposition, et je vous prie d'agréer en même temps, M. le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***Lewis Cass a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 26*

Washington, May 25, 1859

Sir: Your despatches to No. 105, inclusive, have been received.

The prompt settlement which you were enabled to effect with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the affray between the sailors of the *Macedonian* and the peasants at Spezia, the occurrence of which is much to be deplored — has given satisfaction to the Department. In regard to the unfortunate event which followed your speedy and satisfactory arrangement of the affair — the death of the woman Rebora — it is hoped, that the very proper suggestion made by the Consul at Spezia to Flag Officer Lavallette will be favorably responded to. The moral effect of such timely aid voluntarily contributed, would be far stronger than would be likely to result from a tardy allowance granted on application. Should the Consul's suggestion, however, not be acted upon, the expediency of making an application to Congress in behalf of the object, will be taken into consideration.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 108*

Turin, May 31, 1859

Sir. Those who expected the present war to be conducted with the rapidity which characterized the old campaigns of a French Emperor and army on the same ground have been much disheartened and disappointed by the perfect repose of the last fortnight. Since the date of my last dispatch, the French and Austrian lines have remained without movement until yesterday. The French say they have waited for their baggage and *matériel* which is immense, the Austrians have waited for the French to begin. There was, it is true, a sharp action at Montebello on the 20th between 15,000 Austrians and 10,000 French, resulting in the triumph of the latter. The Austrians lost 1,283 men, and the Allies between

800 and 1,000. But this action decided nothing for either party. It was merely the result of a reconnaissance by an Austrian column, and no position was gained or lost by either party. Though much has been said of it in the press, therefore, it may be assumed that the new battle of Montebello had no further significance in the campaign than that of a bloody tournament would have had in the wars of the 12th century. But on yesterday the French appear to have commenced a general movement which approaches their lines to those of the Austrians, extending by Mortara, Pavia and Vigevano. This movement is regarded by many authorities as the true opening of the campaign, and a great battle is expected between Pavia and Mortara, that famous plain of ominous name (*Mortis ara*) which has in all periods of history witnessed the bloodiest scenes of war.

Un to the present moment, however, much the greater interest of this campaign is due to Garibaldi, the famous partizan chief who defended Rome in 1848, and who has since then resided a long time in the United States<sup>138</sup>. He has command of a body of volunteers having no connexion with the regular army, reporting to the Minister of the Interior and not to the Minister of War. The explanation of this peculiarity is as follows — Lamarmora, the Minister of War, is violently opposed to the volunteer system and refused to incorporate the vast numbers that came here in March and April into the Sardinian service, except as regular soldiers serving six years as all others and subject to the ordinary organization. With the other volunteers, who desired to engage for the war and serve as volunteers, he would have nothing to do. After in vain endeavouring to remove the prejudices of his military colleague, M. Cavour, the Minister of the Interior, took them under his own care, into the service of his own Department, and gave the command to Garibaldi. This chief has done wonders with them. It should also be said that volunteers of such a class as these have rarely been seen. Men of the greatest fortune, birth and education in all Italy serve in the ranks as common soldiers and the whole corps have conducted themselves with a quiet order which is seldom seen in that species of troops. After two months' training Garibaldi has boldly marched into Lombardy on the northern line so as to take away from the Austrians the command of the lakes Como and Maggiore and to enable the province of Milan to rebel.

<sup>138</sup> In realtà, Garibaldi risiedette a New York, Staten Island, per meno di un anno dal luglio 1850 all'aprile 1851. Vi ritornò di nuovo per una brevissima visita nel 1853. Vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Garibaldi in New York*, in *New York History*, a XXVII, aprile 1946, pp. 179-203. Id., *American Opinion* cit., pp. 165-169.

In this hardy movement he has been perfectly successful. His troops of two months' standing have met the Austrian regulars with triumphant results. He has taken all the steamers on the lake of Como, and has driven the enemy from the cities Arona, Varese and Como. The satisfaction of the Italians at this great success, achieved by a corps peculiarly their own, is naturally unbounded; and it must be admitted that Garibaldi is as yet the only military leader on either side who has shown decided talents or gained decided advantages. In a few days more, however, it is highly probable that we shall know who is the master—for great fighting cannot be much longer put off.

That the French and Piedmontese will win the fields I have no doubt. It is a fact to be noticed that, in not one of the many small engagements which have yet taken place, have the Austrian soldiers stood a charge of bayonets. But those who predict the evacuation of Lombardy by Austria after one campaign will probably be disappointed by the progress of this war, which, from the vast fortifications to be reduced, must take time. And from the movements hitherto made, and indeed all the events of the past month, it may be safely anticipated that the Emperor of the French commanding in chief is not, in war at least, the reproduction of that famous First Consul Bonaparte who once figured on the same fields. It is indeed difficult to conceive of Napoleon I with 250,000 men under his hand, on the level plain of Alexandria, with an Austrian army of no greater force before him, lying still there from the 30th of April to the 30th of May without a battle, lost or won.

June 1st.—Even while this letter was being written a bloody action was fought at Palestro, on the road between Turin and Novara, between the Piedmontese wing of the allied army and the Austrian force collected there, which has resulted in a complete victory for the former. The loss has been great on both sides, the numbers are not yet known, but they are in thousands. The Piedmontese have taken one thousand Austrian prisoners and eight pieces of cannon. It may safely be anticipated that this is the first of a series of battles which will now follow each other in swift succession.

*Dispaccio n. 109*

Turin, June 8, 1859

Sir: A great battle has been fought. On Saturday, June 4th, the French and Austrians met in full force at Magenta on the Lombard frontier and then and there did their best and worst. The victory rested with Napoleon. It was as complete and as bloody as any Bonaparte could ever desire, for out of 120,000 Austrians who took part in the combat 20,000 were killed wounded and 7,000 taken prisoners. Cannon, flags and munitions in great quantities fell into the victor's hands and at the latest news the Austrians were flying towards the Adda in complete rout.

The official bulletin declares that only five thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded. But I can hardly give credit to this statement. The verbal report says that in the first part of the battle the French were worsted and three of their new rifled cannon taken. This event caused a profound emotion in the French ranks. The cry *Il faut les reprendre! il faut les reprendre!* ran through the army, and they charged with such fury that the Austrian lines were everywhere broken. Such is the current rumour. No official account of the details has yet appeared.

At the date of my last dispatch, I said that the French had commenced a general movement which must necessarily produce decisive results. This movement was a rapid march from Voghera to Novara to turn the Austrian flank and pass the Ticino at Buffalora. Its first result was a battle at Palestro where the Piedmontese gained a victory and an important position. The Austrian made a determined attempt to retake it next day, but the Piedmontese being then reinforced by a regiment of Zouaves, they were beaten with great slaughter.

The great movement of the French army of 200,000 men from Voghera to Novara was executed with extraordinary skill and celerity, occupying only two days. The Austrians were completely outgeneralled and their defeat at Magenta was a necessary consequence.

Military men say that the consequences of this defeat are very great. The Austrian army has nothing left for it but to fall back on its fortress beyond the Mincio. Their best hope now is to be able to make this retreat without another battle, and it is the aim of the French to cut them up again before they get there. But the result of operations in the field is no longer doubtful. The rest is only a question of time. Austrian domination in Italy is doomed.



Milan has been evacuated in great haste. The Municipality has declared the province annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia. Yesterday the King made a triumphal entry into that great city. The Ministry left Turin the day before to be present there. Here we have a *Te Deum* in the cathedral and illuminations in the streets.

In the battle of Magenta, as in all the other combats of this war, one singular fact comes prominently forward—that the new inventions in fire-arms, the rifled cannon, the conical balls, & c, have had for their chief effect an unprecedented recourse to the bayonet. The fire seems to have become so fatal that the soldiery will not stand it and eagerly rush forward with the steel to get rid of it. What was once the most desperate resort of battle has now become the less of two evils.

Several American citizens who have desired to follow the operations of the army have importuned me to make applications to the Government for leave to do so. I have refused to comply with their request for two reasons. 1st. That the commanders have forbidden all strangers and non-combatants to enter their camp, and the Government here has made known its indisposition to interfere. Officers of all nations have been turned back, 2d. Such applications on the part of a neutral power might possibly be misinterpreted.

But I have made one exception which I think proper to mention. Lieutenant Carr, of the 9th Regiment, having obtained from the military authorities of the United States a leave of absence for the purpose of visiting the scenes of this war, brought me a letter of recommendation from Mr. Secretary Floyd.<sup>139</sup> In this case I thought myself authorized to do something in his behalf, and I asked of Count Cavour a safe-conduct for him to go to Headquarters and accompany the Piedmontese Army. This request was most promptly granted. The Minister not only gave him a safe-conduct, but also letters to General Lamarmora and others, requesting them to give him all facilities of observation in their power, and stated that he would be happy to do the same for any other officer of the U.S. Army whose application should be similarly supported.

<sup>139</sup> Era ministro della guerra

*Dispaccio n 110*

Turin, June 14, 1859

Sir: The Government here has communicated to this Legation the following statement of its intentions relative to the Austrian vessels under *embargo* in its ports. As all decisions relative to maritime law are interesting to us, I give a translation:

« The Government of the King has declared that in the present war it intended to be guided by the liberal principles introduced into International Maritime Law by the civilization of modern times, reserving only to itself the right to decide according to its free will relative to the *embargo* laid on the Austrian vessels in its ports.

The outrages of all kinds perpetrated by the Austrians in the provinces occupied by them give to Piedmont the incontestible right to convert that *embargo* into *capture*, on the ground of reprisal.

Nevertheless the Government of the King, wishing to alleviate so far as rests with it the evils of war suffered by the populations, prefers to renounce that just right and to leave the conduct of Austria to the judgment of civilized Europe.

Hence, since the enemy have been chased out of the State, H R H the Lieutenant of His Majesty has deigned to order that the vessels lying in the Sardinian ports at the declaration of war, and which were then placed under sequestration, shall be left at liberty to depart, and furnished with safe-conducts to enter the Austrian waters.

The Government of the King further declares that it will not consider coal to be contraband of war. »

The French Emperor has issued from his Headquarters at Milan the following very remarkable proclamation:

« Italians, the fortune of war has brought me to the capital of Lombardy, and I shall now say why I am here.

When Austria made an unjustifiable invasion of Piedmont, I determined to sustain my ally the King of Sardinia. The honour and the interests of France imposed that duty upon me. Your enemies, who are mine, have endeavoured to diminish the sympathy which Europe feels for your cause by declaring that I have entered on this war from personal ambition and to increase the territory of France. But if there have been men who did not understand the times in which they lived, rest assured that I am not one of them

In these days public opinion is so strong that one becomes great rather by moral influence than by sterile conquests, and this moral influence is what I solicit with eagerness by helping to set free one of the most beautiful portions of Europe. Your reception of me proves that you have understood me. I come neither with a preconceived system for your future government, nor to impose my will; my army occupies itself with two things—the defeat of your enemies and the maintenance of order. It will not place any obstacle in the way of the free manifestation of your sovereign will

Providence accords both to nations and individuals opportunities when they can become great in an instant, but on this indispensable condition that they shall know how to profit by those opportunities. That wish for independence you have so often expressed, and which has been so often disappointed, will now be realized if you show yourselves worthy.

Unite then for the sole object of liberating your country. Organize yourselves for war. Flock to the banner of King Victor Emanuel who has so nobly shown you the road to honour. Remember that without discipline there is no army, and lighted by the flame of patriotism be nothing but soldiers now. tomorrow you may be the free citizens of a great country »

These words seem to be frank and wise. Should the resolutions here expressed be carried out history will not reckon this man as one of those who have taken « the vulgar road to greatness. » But there are those who remember that the same personage made promises of a similar character to the people of France, and in that and in many other occasions failed to fulfil the expectations which he raised

The events which have followed the battle of Magenta have been rapid. The Austrians have retreated on the Mincio with a speed which resembles that of a panic. All the great fortresses which they have built in western Lombardy at a cost beyond calculation have been evacuated without a blow. Piacenza, Pavia, Pizzighettone, Brescia, Cremona have been left so quickly that the fortifications have been scarcely touched, and millions in money, munitions, and supplies, have fallen into the hands of the Allies.

Gyulai is no longer Commander. Hess is now at the head of the Austrian army. The plan of these two generals was always widely different. Gyulai was for offensive war. But Hess declared from the first that the only plan possible was to fall back on the fortress of the Mincio

and await the Allies there. There, it seems, he will soon see them; for the French have already passed the Adda and are advancing to the plain of Montechiaro where considerable masses of the Austrian troops are concentrating. As an episode in this retreat there has been a battle at Marignano where the French and the Swiss met in the time of Francis the First. The Austrians were again defeated and lost 2,500 men.

Meanwhile the Italian revolution is spreading. The Legations of the Church have been evacuated by the Austrians and have declared for Victor Emanuel. The Duke of Modena and the Duchess of Parma have fled and their dominions are governed by Piedmontese commissioners with full powers. Lombardy is also ruled by a similar agent. The Duchess of Parma excites sympathy. She was no Austrian tyrant but a wise and amiable lady who sought the welfare of her subjects. They were well governed and but little taxed. Her subjects have now the glory of forming part of the new Italian empire; but they will also have to bear a burden of expense four times what they have hitherto known.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 111* <sup>140</sup>

Turin, June 20, 1859

Sir: The war has rolled away to the Mincio. A glance at the map will show that there are two great strategical lines in Italy, that of the Ticino & Po and that of the Mincio. The first depends on the great fortified cities of Pavia, Piacenza, Pizzighettone; the second on those of Mantua, Peschiera and Verona. Between these two lines the Austrians had many other strong places, and on the south they had powerfully fortified Bologna, Ferrara, Ancona and Ravenna, stocked them with vast quantities of military stores and provisions, and apparently made all preparation for long sieges in each of them. But by the single battle of Magenta they have lost them all. The powder, the cannon, the food and clothing collected in those places have been thrown into the rivers, the walls and batteries which have cost countless millions to erect are all blown up and deserted without a blow, and the whole of the great empire which the Austrian Government ruled to the west and south of the Mincio has been evacuated without a struggle. The battle of Magenta was

<sup>140</sup> Con l'istruzione n 31, Washington, 14 luglio 1859, Cass accuserà ricevuta di questo dispaccio scrivendo che il punto di vista espresso sugli affari italiani « era particolarmente esatto ed era stato letto con molto interesse »

very great and bloody, but the loss of twenty thousand, or even twenty-seven thousand, men does not explain such an astounding result. When the first Bonaparte conquered at Marengo, effects exactly similar followed the defeat of the Austrians. They evacuated all Italy in the greatest haste to retire on the Mincio where they fought well and long afterwards. But at that time the fortifications of Piacenza, &c, did not exist. The country was all open. When the Austrians built these places in the western part of Lombardy and seized on all strong places in the Legations, it was supposed that this the ordinary course of war on these plains would be wholly changed, and that each and all of the fortified cities would require siege and be each a pivot for manoeuvres. That they have been all evacuated like so many open towns, as well as the extraordinary precipitation of the retreat, proves that the Austrian army was demoralized by the defeat at Magenta to an extent neither anticipated nor provided for nor yet acknowledged. The Austrian party explain the retreat by a change of commanders and a consequent change of campaign. But no strategical reasons can explain a surrender, so hasty and shameful, of ground and position carefully prepared and arranged during ten years of peace for long and deliberate resistance. Panic among the men, despair among the commanders, and a general conviction of their inability to resist the charges of French bayonets, and the ravage of the new cannon, are the only means to my mind that will satisfactorily account for such a deplorable flight.

But the allied sovereigns are in Brescia, their advanced posts are on the plains of Montechiaro, or bridging the Chiese, and the Austrians are fairly on the Mincio. Here they promise to make a long stand and to give a decisive battle under the eye of their Emperor. I think that they will keep their word. There are those, however, who regard the war as over, that Austria, having failed to make any coalition in the north and having satisfied herself that she is incapable of resisting France single-handed, will yield without further struggle. Diplomacy is already at work to accomplish that result, and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs has been called to Verona. But this view tallies ill with the well known tenacity of that Government. In previous wars it has often been worsted, but has never yielded so long as contest was possible. And the military movements of late have not indicated peaceful intentions. True, there has been an apparent pause for the last week in the actual struggle. But it is evidently for the purpose of bringing up additional forces on both sides. Never, not even at the beginning of the war, has the transport of material and the march of French troops

over the Mt. Cenis been so active as at the present time. It is said that the Emperor is bringing 100,000 men into the peninsula beyond the force on which he originally calculated. What that force really is seems to be a carefully guarded secret. Troops have been introduced on so many sides, from Tuscany, by Marseilles and Genoa, by Toulon and Nice, over Mt. Ginevra and by the Mt. Cenis, that it is impossible to arrive at a positive result. 150,000 have, it is believed, come by Genoa alone. At present the chief passage is by the Mt. Cenis, and never, since the days of the great Gothic invasion down to this day, have such myriads of armed men swarmed over those hills. Neither Charlemagne, nor Barbarossa, nor Francis, nor Napoleon I, ever brought with them such infinite force.

On the other hand, we hear of great columns of Germans passing the Stelvio or flowing by Innsbruck [sic]. The Austrians have too now the advantage of fighting in what is thought to be the strongest position in Europe. This is the line of the Mincio and the famous cities by which it is backed. The great lake of Garda, the largest in Italy, heads this line. On it the Austrians have an armed flotilla, and out of it flows the river Mincio. At that point is Peschiera, once a strong fort, but now enlarged into a fortified camp of great extent and strength. At that point the Austrians have a system of dykes and locks, by which they can raise the level of the lake at pleasure and throw through the river at a given time a body of water and a current which will sweep away in a moment any temporary bridge which the enemy can put over it. Following the Mincio to the south we find near the point of its confluence with the Po an enormous and impassable marsh, in the midst of which is the city of Mantua, approached by causeways 870 metres long, and considered on account of this position to be impregnable except by famine. Such is the « line of the Mincio ». But back of it, and within a day's march, lies Verona. An important strategical point even in the times of the Romans and ever since, it has been enlarged and strengthened by the Austrians within the last ten years till it is capable of sheltering a vast army. The batteries and forts are prodigious. I visited the place in March, and the preparations which then met my eyes caused me astonishment. Here the Austrians can leave their wounded, their provisions, their baggage, and their military stores in perfect safety, and march out to battle with the certainty of a safe retreat. Further to the south is Legnano, another place of the same kind, but of less extent, which prevents the position being turned by a march to the south of Mantua. The whole country abounds in defensible positions and has always given great trouble to invading ar-

mies When Napoleon I beat the Austrians in the west and got over to this region, he found himself obliged to do more fighting there than in all the rest of Italy put together Here are the fields of Castiglione, &c It was under the walls of Peschiera that Charles Albert lost all the advantages he had gained at Goito, and Novara was only the necessary sequence of that siege

The French are confident of their power to deal with the position and dispose of the fortresses with the same rapidity which has hitherto marked their course over Lombardy. They will concentrate at some point near Montechiaro and endeavour to burst through the Austrian square. When three or four hundred thousand are got in there, they ask, what can the fortresses help? They are also confident in their new artillery, which is said to breach at more than three thousand yards with certainty. On the other hand the Austrians pretend to be not at all convinced that they are incapable of withstanding the French charge All the blame of the disasters is laid on General Gyulai, their Commander, and Grunne,<sup>141</sup> their Minister of war These men no longer hold power The General of Artillery Hess is their ablest military man But this General has no favour at Court Had the country, the army, and public expectation been considered, he would have been the original chief in this war But even now that the result has proven his opposition to an offensive war well founded, he is still left in the back ground; for the telegraph brings the news that a certain General Shlick<sup>142</sup> is put into Gyulai's place As for the Emperor, that genuine scion of the presumptuous and obstinate House of Hapsburg, he is quite sure of ultimate victory and is said to have haughtily repulsed all offers of mediation. All things, then, indicate that the « smooth sliding Mincio, crowned with vocal reeds, » so famed in music and in song, is about to witness the bloodiest scenes of that sanguinary drama, the first act of which only we have now witnessed.

It is known that Prussia has called her people to arms. If this means the active intervention of Germany and Russia in the war, no one can safely hazard an opinion on the ultimate result. But up to the present moment there is no reason beyond the fact just stated to believe that any coalition against France, or to secure the Italian possessions of Austria, has yet been formed in any quarter. All things seem to have worked

<sup>141</sup> Karl Ludwig Grunne (1808-1884) primo aiutante generale dell'imperatore e capo della Cancelleria militare, fu rimosso da questo ufficio dopo la scelta di Gyulai a comandante in Italia, che egli stesso aveva sollecitata

<sup>142</sup> Franz Heinrich Schlick II (1789-1862), avrà un ruolo preminente nella battaglia di Solferino

together to secure the triumph of the French Emperor. His partizans have hailed the downfall of the Derby Ministry with great joy. They regard the accession of Palmerston as a gain equal to another Magenta. It is also known that the financial credit of Austria is now very nearly on a par with her military reputation, and both are approaching bankruptcy. She has just been obliged to issue 50,000,000 of paper-money, irredeemable, and passing as a forced currency in all of Lombardy that is left to her.

That she will make further struggle is probable; that she will eventually succumb, unless saved by one of those political miracles which have often appeared in her history, is almost certain. People are already beginning to think and ask what will come after all this? Is France going to pour out these floods of gold and blood for nothing? Is the French Emperor's proclamation to be literally received? Are we truly to regard him only as the honest watch-dog who comes to drive away the Austrian wolf that has broken into the Sardinian sheepfold? Shall his sole reward be « to read his history in a nation's eyes? »

There are many competent persons who do not hesitate to answer these questions in the negative. That Napoleon III does not seek in this quarter a territorial aggrandizement, and that he will, after assisting the Piedmontese Government in forming an Empire out of Northern Italy, withdraw to his own confines,—perhaps taking Savoy with him, is what all admit to be probable. Should he appropriate the Italy he has conquered, he would inevitably draw down on himself a European coalition and he is too well read in his predecessor's history to risk that contingency. But that French influences will leave Italy with the French soldiers is not to be expected. The new Italy will be the creation of France, and every stable Government which it can hope to have must necessarily be the creature of the House of Bonaparte. For the elements of discord and jealousy are so irradicable in the Italian nature, and the country itself so little adapted to centralization, that no such government can stand without foreign assistance. For this support it must look either to Austria or to France, and in such a choice there can be but one result. Thus the kingdom of Italy will be governed by French influence, and consequently on the French system. It has hitherto been ruled on the English plan. But a free press, a free Parliament, a constitutional ministry, and popular elections, in a great country bordering on the dominions of despotism, will be almost as dangerous to Louis Napoleon as to Francis Joseph. Italy must be organized differently. All parties indeed seem to admit that the Constitution must undergo alter-



ation, if Lombardy, Piedmont, Modena, &c., are to be fused into one, and that, if the new Parliament meets in Milan, it will be a different body from that which has hitherto held its free sessions in Turin. Hence thoughtful persons are generally of opinion that Sardinia in gaining an empire has lost its liberty. At present there can be no doubt that the privileges of this people are wholly suspended, that we are living under an absolute government the head of which is Mr. Cavour. Neither the press, nor the tongue, nor the hand, is free. One newspaper, for example, in publishing the telegraphic report of the battle put the Austrian loss at 2,000 instead of 20,000. The error of a cipher was almost certainly a typographical error. But the newspaper was not friendly to the Government and it was consequently suppressed on the pretext that it published false news. The police interfere with individuals in a way hitherto unknown here, and searches of houses, confiscation of manuscripts, &c., have become common occurrences. Piedmont has now a strong resemblance to France after the *coup d'état*. It is true that the crisis of war excuses such measures, but there are those who believe that they may continue when the war is over.

It is well known that Italian statesmen are of two parties. One wishes to see the states of Italy united into a confederation, preserving their local governments and having a federal head for foreign relations. The other is the party of fusion, who wish to see all parts of it welded into one consolidated unity. Up to the present moment all things point to the latter formation. The Government of Sardinia has coolly taken possession of Lombardy, Parma, and Modena, placed Piedmontese governors over them and administers their affairs as provinces. Its action has caused great disappointment to the federal politicians; and it is easy to see that, when the war is over and the question of organization comes fairly up, abundant elements of tribulation already exist.

At present, however, speculation on the future is lost in the din of conflict; hope and victory gild the scene, whose dark side I have briefly indicated in the foregoing paragraphs. The political movement now attracting most attention is that which passes in those provinces of the Church known as the legations. No sooner had the Austrian troops left Ancona, Bologna and Ferrara, than the people drove away the Papal authorities, formed a provisional government, and offered, as usual, the supreme authority to Victor Emanuel. Cavour has replied in a telegraphic dispatch, which they publish, expressing the hope that his Majesty will accept their proposition. Now this affair is important for these reasons. Napoleon has hitherto declared in many ways his firm intention to main-

tain the Pope in his possessions. It was believed that the Allies would regard revolutionary movements in that quarter as a great evil, fearing that if the question of the Pope's temporal power should come on the stage before the war was decided that it might produce a Catholic reaction in favour of Austria. Hence it is seen with surprise that they make no opposition to the Bolognese movement, but even encourage it. At the head of this revolution is the Marquis Pepoli, a cousin of the French Emperor, and it is not thought that he would be connected with it if his great relative was not favourable. There is also a fact which transpired two months ago, not much noticed at the time, that seems now to indicate the annexation of the legations as part of the original programme. This was the appointment of M. Minghetti to the chief place in the Foreign Office at Turin. This gentleman is an influential Bolognese nobleman, living for a long time at Paris and known as one of the intimates of the French Emperor. When Lamarmora, the Sardinian Minister of War, joined the army, Mr. Cavour took his Department in addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior. Hence he was obliged to place the Foreign Office in the hands of an influential secretary, and, instead of finding a Piedmontese to fill the post, M. Minghetti, then at Paris, was sent for, and has since then been the real Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as chief of the important bureau which controls the business of the annexed provinces. This appointment caused surprise at the time, as Mr. Minghetti had no previous connection with the politics of this country. But the last events at once explain it and give it great significance. His influence in the legations and his knowledge of the country were necessary to the Government, if they intended to annex it as now seems the case.

Tuesday evening, June 21

I give the latest news known here at the hour the post leaves.

The Austrian Emperor has taken command of his troops in person. He has reviewed two full *corps d'armée* at Lonato, a town on this side of the Mincio, in advance of Peschiera, and but a short distance from Brescia. He is said to have selected the neighbouring country as the scene of a decisive battle.

The Allied Headquarters are at Brescia, where they are bringing up immense forces.

The Austrians and Garibaldi's men have had an action on the river Chiese, in which Garibaldi was roughly handled.

The Corps of Prince Napoleon, 40,000 strong, which has been lying idle in Tuscany, now debouches on the Po.

A Sardinian fleet of six steamers has left Genoa to join the French in the Adriatic. A disembarcation of French troops in the neighbourhood of Venice, to take the Austrian position in the rear, is confidently expected.

It is generally believed that a diplomatic effort is now being made to end the war with a treaty that shall leave Austria in possession of the Venetian provinces, giving up Lombardy and the rest of Italy to the Allies. The German diplomatists declare that it is necessary for the security of Germany that the line of the Mincio should remain in the hands of Austria. The French and Sardinian politicians pronounce the proposition absurd, and recall the Emperor's first proclamation to the effect that « Italy shall be free to the Adriatic. »

It will be recollected that a similar proposal was made by Austria in the last war, that it was refused by Sardinia, and that this refusal was followed by the reconquest of Lombardy and the Austrian victory of Novara

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 112*

Turin, June 27, 1859

Sir: I have the honour to enclose the Account and Vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending March 31, 1859

While doing so, I send a brief note of ceremony informing me that the Court is to take mourning for the death of the King of Naples <sup>143</sup> Such things generally pass without notice; I send this one because it has attracted attention as the first notice officially given of complete resumption of intercourse between the two courts, so long suspended. It is the general remark, however, that if things proceed long in the way they are now going there will shortly be no more kings of Naples to be mourned for.

<sup>143</sup> Non esiste questo allegato Ferdinando II era morto a Caserta il 22 maggio. Vedi i dispacci del Ministro statunitense a Napoli, Chandler, in H R MARRARO, *Diplomatic relations* cit, vol II, p 406 sgg

Sir. On Saturday it was known that the French and Sardinian armies had fought the day before, Friday the 24th June, a great battle with the Austrian troops on the Mincio under the immediate command of their Emperor Francis Joseph. It was known that this battle commenced at four o'clock in the morning and lasted without intermission till eight in the evening; that the hostile line stretched over a space of twelve and-a-half English miles; that nearly four hundred and fifty thousand men with four hundred pieces of artillery took more or less part in the fight; that fortune went against the Sardinian wing of the allied force during the earlier hours of the day, but that the French, having beaten the Austrian left and cut their centre literally to pieces at and near the little town of Solferino, from which the battle will hereafter take its name, finally forced the Austrians to abandon all their positions and to repass the Mincio in the night. The Emperor Napoleon III slept that night in the same chamber of the same house that had been occupied by the Emperor Francis Joseph the night before. Six thousand prisoners, three banners, and thirty cannons rested in the victors' hands. Rather a meagre show for a combat so enormous. It is also remarked that no pursuit of the enemy took place; that they passed the river on their eighteen bridges without disturbance or interruption, and that the battle itself was ended not by a flight of the vanquished but by the want of daylight and the exhaustion consequent on a struggle of sixteen hours. It is plain that the Austrians fought on this occasion with perfect discipline and with unflinching valor. They were defeated in as much as they left the ground to the French, but they were not routed at all.

The foregoing facts were known by telegraph in Turin on Saturday the 25th, and, although three entire days of anxious expectation and enquiry have past, this is nearly all that is known at the hour of the present writing. A horrid silence prevails in the Ministry and at the telegraphic office. During these three days there have been no bulletins, no dispatches, no letters from the camp. Neither the strategical results, nor the losses, are known to any one. Rumour, it is true, has her story. The killed and wounded on both sides together are roughly put down at *eighty thousand*. This, I repeat, is rumour only, and must be, I think, an immense exaggeration. True, when four or five hundred thousand men have been fighting for sixteen hours on a beautiful plain with all those

terrible means of destruction that modern science has prepared, the loss of life must be naturally prodigious. But it is difficult to credit numbers so high as those given

They are not, however, proportionally greater than those of Magenta. So far from having been exaggerated, I am well assured that the killed and wounded in that battle were understated. I have learned on the spot that thirteen thousand corpses were buried by the local authorities on that field. With the usual proportion of wounded this would give a greater result than declared by the French bulletin. That document put the Austrian loss at 20,000, which may have been near the truth; but it is probable that they had as many mangled on their own side, though they admit a loss of only five thousand. Rifled guns and perpetual recourse to the bayonet render war a more terrible trade at this moment than it has been since the days of the Romans.

The battle of Solferino was fought on ground long since celebrated in military fastes. The Allies were at Castiglione and their lines extended to Goito. In the order of the day the Emperor compliments the Piedmontese troops, but they appear to have gained no great honour. They were indeed forced back to the river Chiese. Indeed, the Piedmontese, though they have proven themselves good troops, have not added to their ancient laurels in this war. Both at Montebello and Palestro they were saved only by the timely arrival of the French. At Magenta three divisions of Piedmontese were intended to have taken part in the fight; but it is said that they stopt [sic] on the way for two hours to cook their soup and did not get into that battle at all.

The Austrian bulletin and the French order of the day have been both received here. They do not essentially differ, and convey no facts beyond those stated in the foregoing paragraph. Neither hazards an indication of the loss in life.

On the morning after the battle, Count Cavour was called in haste to the camp of the two sovereigns. He left at a moment's notice by express trains. Rechberg, the Austrian Premier, has been for some days at Verona. This morning Cavour returned to Turin, but has been since invisible. But the presence of those two men has given consistence to the universal report that diplomacy is at work with determination to stop the war and patch up a peace which will save Austria from complete humiliation.

It is believed to be a proposition from Prussia that has caused the sudden cessation of action and of news from the Mincio. For two weeks the movements of that power have caused the greatest apprehension

and alarm in the political circles of Turin. Up to the fall of the Derby Ministry, Prussian influence was devoted to curbing the warlike temper of the rest of the Germanic Confederation. But its course has since then manifestly changed. The first fact that drew attention to Berlin was the sudden «mobilization» of the Prussian army, an operation not effected without great expense to the Government and great derangement of private affairs. Then came rumours, bearing great appearance of authenticity, relative to mediation between the belligerents on a basis that insured refusal. Then came the Prussian demand on the Government of Hanover for permission to send 30,000 soldiers to the Rhine over Hanoverian territory, news at first disbelieved but now receiving confirmation. Then the offer of the entire command of the Federal army said to have been made by the Diet to the Prince of Prussia. Lastly we have the declarations of the official gazette of Berlin, clearly stating that its Government can no longer remain indifferent to what is passing; that the war is ceasing to be local; that the Germanic Confederation must not only guarantee to Austria all the lands within her territory, but some other places and district which are not distinctly designated.

These are warlike symptoms [sic] and great anxiety consequently exists to know what the Prussian plan for peace may be. Diplomats keep their mouths closed about negotiations in which they are actually engaged, and official statements are as yet wanting. But various representations have been made in Turin by those more or less in a position to know the truth, from which I select the two made with most authority.

The first and most improbable version is to place Austria in the precise position which she occupied by the Treaties of 1815, thus leaving her Lombardy and Venice, with a renunciation on her part of all subsequent encroachment on, and a promise to abstain from future interference with, the rest of Italy. It is difficult to believe this the Prussian proposition; for no sane man could ever hope to see it accepted by the Allies.

The second and more likely account is the restoration of the Italian duchies to the dukes, the Pope's territory to the Pope, the union of Lombardy to Piedmont; to leave Venice in the hands of Austria; and, lastly, to place the line of the Mincio with its famous quadrilateral of fortresses in the hands of the German Confederation.

This notable project may be the work of imagination. I give it as the current story here in Turin at the present moment of doubt and darkness. What seems certain is that Prussia wishes to mediate in favor of Austria, and that, if that fails, is determined to give rein to the Confed-

eration and engage in war with France. If so, the war at once becomes general. In that case I am satisfied not only that you will hear by the first steamer that the Duke of Malakhoff <sup>144</sup> has seized on the Rhine boundary, but that Hungary is in flames and that Russian troops have entered Cracow. More than two months ago I stated my conviction that there is a perfect understanding between the Allies and Russia; and every indication which has come to my notice in Turin since then has confirmed it. As to Hungary, no sound of life has hitherto come from that quarter. The Hungarian people were desperately exhausted by the struggle of '48. That country was then seared with fire and sword, and many competent persons doubt the possibility of creating movement there. Her ex-dictator, Mr. Kossuth, is of a different opinion. He is here, with his best general, Klapka, and Count Teleki, another of his most active men. <sup>145</sup> Co-operation with him is openly avowed by the Sardinian Government, but I hear nothing about encouragement to him from Louis Napoleon.

The fear of general war, I am assured, will never cause the Allies to accept any treaty of peace which will leave Austria a foot of ground in Italy. They know too well the character of that power to have the slightest hope that she will desist from her claims while she can maintain them either by force or treacherous encroachment. She will easily renounce them by treaty; but should the fortresses of the Mincio be left in any German hands, they will be to her a gateway for re-entering Lombardy the moment she recovers strength and the eyes of Europe are directed elsewhere. Any peace made with Austria in Italy will be futile. All the Italian complaint and disturbance will commence again, all this terrible work will have to be done over again, and all the blood and money now spent will have been spent in vain.

Judging by the laws of nations it is difficult to justify France and Sardinia. They are the real authors of this war. At the opening of this year Austria was standing on her own unquestioned ground, her conduct in perfect accord with her treaties, governing her people by their own laws. France and Sardinia chose to say that her laws were bad laws, that she must change them or they would make her, and hence the war. It is impossible to justify it by international right or legal logic. It is also difficult to believe in the disinterested and new born zeal for liberty

<sup>144</sup> Jean Jacques Amable Pélissier (1794-1864), maresciallo di Francia, creato duca di Malakoff il 22 luglio 1856

<sup>145</sup> Giorgio Klapka aveva organizzato la Legione ungherese, Stanislao Teleki era colonnello dei Cacciatori delle Alpi

and humanity proclaimed by some of her assailants. But it is impossible not to witness with sincere pleasure the punishment of that bad power and the defeat of the detestable system that has so long rendered wretched many millions of men. It is necessary to live near to Austria some time to know how perfectly founded in truth are all the charges which history has brought against her, to witness the cynical reliance on pure force and fraud which her political men regard as the sole motors of the world, her settled determination to oppose everything like advancement or freedom, either among individuals or communities, and especially her presumptuous arrogance and perfect confidence in her strength to defy the hatred and do without the respect and confidence of all mankind. Her vast military organization is full of this spirit; the cruelty and brutality of her soldiery is only equalled by the cold, repellent pride and ill-bred swagger of their officers. To support their pretensions they should have had a great deal of skill, a great deal of courage; the world gave them credit for its possession; but the gleam of the French bayonet has lit up their true character in a way not soon to be forgotten.

Grave events in the States of the Church have lately transpired. From the beginning of the war the Emperor Napoleon III seems to have desired to keep the Romans quiet. Knowing the great hold which the Papal power has on the lower classes in all southern Europe, he has avoided everything resembling an attack on the temporal authority of the Pope. Nevertheless, as mentioned in my last dispatch, the legations of Bologna and Ancona have risen in revolt, cast out the legates, and sent delegates to the sovereigns in the camp and to the Government in Turin. The priestly party pretend that these people received a rude reception and rebuke from Louis Napoleon. For that I cannot answer. But it is certain that the movement has been encouraged by Cavour and the political people at Turin. Hence even Perugia, a city on the Roman plain itself, has followed the example of Bologna and by so doing has brought about an unexpected catastrophe. Two regiments of the Pope's Swiss guards arrived there under the command of Col. Schmidt, and, entering the town by aid of a convent of Dominican friars who opened for him a gate near their convent, beat the patriots and slaughtered a considerable number of the people. That the Pope should so maintain his authority has caused an outcry all over Italy, and the event places the Allies in a disagreeable position. If they side with the Pope, they place themselves in opposition to the Italian movement; if they support the Perugians, they attack the Pope. It is said here today that the real cause of Cavour's



sudden call to the Mincio was rather this dilemma in which his friends have placed the Emperor than any proposal of Prussia.

*Latest Intelligence*

Tuesday evening

A bulletin has been published which gives no new details of the battle except that the Piedmontese account for their « difficulty » by a violent storm of hail in their faces. The Austrian bulletin gives the same reason for their defeat by the French.

The Allies have not yet passed the Mincio. But they have possession of the highlands of Volta which dominate the Venetian bank. By placing cannon there, they can clear the opposite shore and pass when they please.

No authority for an estimate of the killed and wounded yet.

The Emperor of Austria returns to his capital, giving the command finally into the hands of Hess, who will now put in practice the defensive plan which he has advocated from the first.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 114*

Turin, June 30, 1859

Sir: The Sardinian war Office has just published a narrative of the Battle of Solferino furnished by their staff. I send herewith a translation.<sup>146</sup>

This evening they have issued a bulletin which professes to give accurate statements, of the loss suffered by the four Piedmontese divisions engaged in the fight. It is declared to be 5,525 in killed and wounded.

Up to this moment no estimate of the French or Austrian loss has reached Turin. Some official statements, however, cannot be much longer delayed.

It is proper to inform you of a fact often stated, and which I am now compelled to believe, that there is a strong disposition on the part of the three governments to understate the bloodshed in these barbarous

<sup>146</sup> È una traduzione del resoconto ufficiale della battaglia di S Martino e Solferino pubblicato sulla *Gazzetta piemontese* il 29 giugno 1859. Omettiamo questo allegato.

engagements. They do not wish to exaggerate the loss of the enemy and they carefully diminish their own.

I believe this to be certain because it is the universal opinion of the best informed people here and because notorious facts contradict the formal statements of the chiefs of the armies. For instance, the French gave their own loss at Magenta as about 5,000 and the Austrian at 20,000. Now there are 10,000 wounded men in the hospitals of Milan alone, and, judging from the melancholy crowds of convalescents which throng the streets of Turin, Vercelli and Novara, there must be as many more in Piedmont; while the local authorities of the country declare that 13,000 corpses were buried on the field, and at least as many of these were French as Austrians. These facts would indicate a much greater loss than any yet laid before the public. As the French and Sardinian governments have the press and the letter post completely in their hands carefully watched, it is of course easy for them to make uncontradicted statements.

Now as to that last battle of Solferino, the long continued silence and vague but sinister generalities which have as yet issued from Headquarters give reason to believe that the bloodshed was most extraordinary and will never be frankly acknowledged. Napoleon's order of the day is not marked by that tone of exultation which one would expect after a victory so splendid, and it concludes with a sombre hope « that so much blood has not been spilt in vain. »

In the telegraphic bulletins sent to Paris it has been repeatedly stated that « our loss, though great, was much inferior to that of the enemy. » In a letter from the American officer, for whom, it will be remembered, I procured permission to reside in the Sardinian army, and who was on the field of battle the whole day, written to me the day after, these lines occur. « In the morning of the 25th, after a cup of coffee which the polite officers of Fanti's Division offered me, I crossed the plain to Solferino and rode up it along the part where the battle was hottest. Everywhere the dead and sometimes the wounded strewed the ground. I could not compute the numbers, *but my impression is that the French loss greatly exceeded that of the Austrians*. Indeed from the strength of the position it must have been so. The French were torn by artillery which they could not reply to. I went down the plain on the east, but not so far as the place of the cavalry fight, and found dead and wounded all along the whole distance to the positions forced by the Sardinians two miles from the lake. The allies in the end carried all the points. »

I give these views of the relative losses because I think it may be interesting to the Government to know something beyond the official statements;—it is needless to add that, as these Governments do not wish anything to be made public beyond their own statements, the facts which I communicate should be kept in complete reserve.

As to the numbers of the troops engaged, I have yet seen no reason to depart from the estimate given in my last dispatch. The French generals state that they joined actual engagement with 150,000 Austrians. The Piedmontese show that they entered into conflict with 50,000 more. This would make the Austrian force under fire to have been 200,000 men. The Allies were confessedly in equal numbers to the Austrians, and, as the Guard and other reserves on each side not brought under fire are not counted in these estimates, the whole number of fighting men on that field could not have been far from 450,000 men.

No great generalship seems to have been exhibited. Indeed, from the official account appended, there was some confusion, and a whole Division of the Sardinian army was marching backwards and forwards all day under contradictory orders without doing any service. The conduct of the Austrians is really unaccountable. After evacuating all their strong positions and crossing the Mincio with their whole force, they appear to have changed their mind without reason and come back to give battle to the Allies on the abandoned ground and with a river in their rear. It is a curious example of the vacillation which has marked their course in diplomacy and war since the beginning of the year. They are rash and timid by turns, and, as long as they are governed by their present weak and presumptuous head, can meet with nothing but disaster—It is a common remark here that this is a war of soldiers rather than of generals.

The Allies passed the Mincio yesterday, June 29th, and appear to be closing on Peschiera. A number of heavy *gun-boats* have been brought in pieces from France which are intended for use on the lake of Garda. It is said that Peschiera and Mantua will be taken from the water side. This however is surmise. What Napoleon's plans with regard to these fortresses are, is still involved in mystery. Prince Napoleon's corps is slowly on the way to the scene of conflict. News from the Venetian coast are now anxiously expected.

***Lewis Cass a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 29*

Washington, June 30, 1859

Sir You will receive herewith a copy of a despatch, dated the 27th instant and addressed to the Minister of the United States at the Court of Paris. It contains, as you will see, the views of this government upon various subjects, connected with the existing war in Europe, in the prosecution of which important interests of the United States may be involved.

The President has deemed the occasion a fitting one to make known the opinions of this Government, respecting points of international law which it considers established, and also to endeavor by a general understanding with other Powers, to put an end to many serious causes of complaint which every war is sure to give to neutral nations, and to introduce important modifications into the code of international law. These you will find fully set forth in this despatch, and the President desires that you carry into effect with the Government of Sardinia the instructions it contains and he relies upon your best exertions to endeavor to accomplish the objects indicated, the importance of which to all neutral nations it would be difficult to overrate.

***Lewis Cass a John Y. Mason***<sup>147</sup>

*No 190*

Washington, June 27, 1859

Sir The Government of the United States has learned with much concern, that a war has broken out in Europe, which threatens in its progress to involve other Powers and to become one of the most eventful contests, in which modern nations have found themselves engaged. The policy of the United States is essentially pacific and upon the present occasion as heretofore, they will faithfully discharge their neutral duties, determined, so far as depends upon themselves, to preserve the most amicable relations with all the Powers engaged in hostilities. This determination will be communicated to each of those Powers, and you will make it known to the government of his Imperial Majesty, and in doing so you will take care and express the confident expectation of the United

<sup>147</sup> Allegato alla Istruzione n 29 di Lewis Cass

States, that their rights will be respected by France with equal fidelity. There is reason to apprehend, that in the progress of the war questions, affecting the rights of neutral nations upon the ocean may present themselves for consideration, and whose peaceable solution may require discretion as well as forbearance.

The tendency of modern civilization and improvement is to mitigate the calamities of war, and the progress of opinion has introduced important meliorations into the mode of its prosecution, especially upon land. But unfortunately similar beneficent changes have not been admitted into maritime wars, so that the code which regulates these contests, yet contains principles of action not adapted to the sentiments of the age in which we live. It is desirable that by the general consent of independent Powers modifications should be made in these objectionable principles, so as to accommodate them to the existing state of things, and also that the rights of Belligerent Nations should be restrained within reasonable limits, and defined with due precision.

This despatch will make known to you the views of this government weighty questions they involve, and that each of those Powers should be communicated to the Powers of Europe, principally interested in the weighty questions they involve, and that each of those Powers should be requested, not only to cooperate in the effort to accomplish this good work, but also, zealously to exert its influence with other States to induce them to concur in the proposed measure, which appeals by so many grave considerations to the feelings and judgment of the age. The various representatives of the United States to the European nations will upon all fitting occasions explain these views to the governments, to which they are accredited, and will invoke their aid towards the attainment of the objects indicated; and at the same time, they will communicate for their information the views entertained by this Country, of those points of International law, presented in this letter, which the United States consider established, and entitled to the support of all other Powers.

You are desired to carry into effect these instructions at the Imperial Court of France, and to keep this Department informed from time to time of the progress and prospects of this attempt to restrict the evils of war, and to enlarge and secure the blessings of peace.

It is obvious that the Commercial Powers of the world regard with no little solicitude the subject of neutral rights, and there is a general apprehension that pretensions may be advanced, during the existing war, which may imperil them. And it is equally obvious, from the temper of

the age, that the present is no safe time to assert and enforce pretensions on the part of belligerent Powers, affecting the interest of nations at peace, unless such pretensions are clearly justified by the law of nations. Altho' some of the provisions of that code have become harsh and unacceptable, yet there is a general sense of the duty of submitting to the obligations, it imposes. But those obligations, to ensure obedience, must depend, not upon doubtful construction, but upon clearly expressed language, defining with reasonable precision the rights and duties of the Independent parties, in the relations existing between them. It is unfortunate, that various claims have been advanced and enforced by belligerent Powers, in the prosecution of wars, for which it would be vain to seek any sufficient justification in the law of nations, and this consideration adds to the importance of some acceptable arrangement, by which this source of apprehension may be removed, and all danger of collision avoided by clearly defining the rights of the parties in all doubtful cases. If the belligerent Powers should substitute their own views for the fair provisions of the general law, the most serious consequences may be apprehended. It becomes all prudent governments engaged in hostilities to take into consideration the actual condition of public sentiment, whenever measures of doubtful character are proposed, and satisfy themselves not only, that they are theoretically right, but that they are also practically expedient.

There are three principal subjects, connected with the rights of belligerent and neutral Powers, which require the dispassionate consideration of all governments, desirous of preventing the most serious complications. These relate to the condition of an enemy's property found on board the vessel of a friend and to the system of blockades and contraband of war. With respect to the two last, the United States consider it of the utmost importance, that they should be so regulated and defined by general consent as to leave no doubt respecting the questions they embrace, when these call for practical adjustment.

With respect to the protection of the vessel and cargo by the flag which waves over them, the United States look upon that principle as established, and they maintain that belligerent property on board a neutral ship is not liable to capture and from existing indications they hope to receive the general concurrence of all commercial Powers in this position.

Whatever difference of opinion may have heretofore prevailed upon this subject, it is certain that the claim forcibly to enter a neutral vessel and to seize the goods found there, upon the allegation of their being the property of an enemy, was first urged at a period when the passions

of belligerents were little restrained by the dictates of humanity or religion, and when the question how an enemy could be injured or rather how his goods could be seized was a much more acceptable object of research, than why a friend should be spared. Almost from the first attempt to incorporate this doctrine into the maritime code of the world, it has been denounced by eminent publicists as fallacious in principle and unjust and dangerous in practice. And the repugnance to it has gone on increasing till its advocates, have almost disappeared. I believe that every modern commercial nation has practically repudiated it, by entering into treaty stipulations, either temporary or permanent, providing for its abandonment, and some of them, as the Baltic States, by the league known, as the armed neutrality, and by forcible resistance. The opposition of Holland to it has been almost unremitted. The principal Powers, engaged in the Crimean war, Great Britain, France and Russia, by formal public declarations avowed their adherence to the doctrine of immunity and their determination to respect it, France and Russia absolutely & without limitation of time, and Great Britain « for the present, » but for a reason equally applicable to all times hereafter, and which will at all times call for similar concurrence. This measure is adopted, says the British declaration « To preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, » etc. Experience has well shewn the justice of this designation and the wisdom of this precautionary arrangement. No disposition has been manifested, by any of the States relinquishing this pretension to resume its exercise, nor is it to be expected, that if such an effort were made it would be tamely submitted to. Contested and invidious powers are not to be thus authoritatively abandoned and then again called into service, at the interest or caprice of any nation. The Countries, engaged in the pending war have adopted a much wiser policy. They hold on to the power of the flag to protect both vessel and cargo from all violation, and have proclaimed by public declarations their determination to respect the principle of exemption so happily established. And well is it, in the general interest, that this tribute has been rendered to the opinions of the age. The stopping of neutral vessels, upon the High Seas, their forcible entrance and the overhauling and examination of their cargoes, the seizure of their freight at the will of a foreign officer, the frequent interruption of their voyages, by compelling them to change their destination, in order to seek redress and above all the assumption of jurisdiction by a foreign armed party, over what has been aptly termed the extension of the territory of an Independent State, and with all the abuses which are so prone to accompany the exercise of unlimited power,

where responsibility is remote — these are indeed serious « obstructions » little likely to be submitted to in the present state of the world without a formidable effort to prevent them. Such pretensions necessarily lead to the establishment of a police upon the great highway of nations, to the transfer of jurisdiction over its own vessels, from the Country to which it belongs to other Powers, who may exercise it for their own purposes. Far better would it be to encourage the freest system of Commercial intercourse, both in peace and war, than to encounter the calamities, which would be sure at this day to attend the attempt to revive this claim to *obstruct* the trade of the world.

This government is satisfied, that no such design is meditated, and under the circumstances, the United States feel justified in considering the freedom of neutral vessels from interruption when carrying belligerent property, an established principle of intercommunication which ought to be respected as such by all commercial nations.

But there is another aspect, under which this subject presents itself and which confirms this government in the resolution it has formed and in the expectation, that other Powers will cordially concur in its views. By the declaration of the Paris conference in its sitting of April 16, 1856, it was announced, on behalf of all the States who might become parties to that act that « The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. »

This mutual agreement protects the property of each of those States, when engaged in hostilities from capture on board a neutral vessel by an enemy a party to the same act. It is not necessary, that a neutral Power should have announced its adherence to this declaration, in order to entitle its vessels to the immunity promised. Because the privilege of being protected is guaranteed to belligerents co—parties to that memorable act, and protects their property from capture, wherever it is found, on board a vessel belonging to a nation, not engaged in hostilities. Were it otherwise, a very grave question would arise for the consideration of the government of the United States. The carrying trade is a branch of employment, very important to all neutral commercial Powers. It is peculiarly so to this Country from the enterprise of its citizens, and from the facility, with which they devote themselves to the pursuits of navigation. While conceding the authority of belligerent nations to relax the rigid principles of war, so far as regards their own rights, and to exempt other Powers from penalties, which might be enforced, but for such concession, whether this is done for a consideration or without it, those neutral nations, which are prevented from being parties to such an



arrangement have a right to insist, that it shall not necessarily work to their injury. This dictate of justice would be palpably violated, in the case of the United States, should this protecting clause of the Paris conference not enable their vessels, when neutral to shield from capture the property of belligerents carried as freight. Such an immunity, withheld from this Country would in fact operate as a premium, granted to other nations, and would be almost destructive of that important branch of our national industry — the carrying trade. It ought not to be expected, that this Country would quietly acquiesce in such an invidious distinction, and the expectation if indulged would be sure to be disappointed. The United States indeed declined to become a party to the Paris conference, tho' that circumstance does not affect the position they occupy. They did so for the most satisfactory reasons, because the propositions were not divisible and because they were required to surrender a mode of maritime warfare peculiarly adapted to their condition and pursuits, and essential to their defence upon the ocean. It was not that the propositions went too far, but because they did not go far enough, that this Country felt it to be its duty to withhold its concurrence from the acts of the conference. It concedes, however, that while claiming to participate, as a neutral Power in this exemption, it is bound, when a belligerent Power to respect the same principle, recognizing its general obligation. As far as reasonably practicable, the evils of war should be confined to the parties, engaged in it, and neutral nations have a right to demand, that their interests should not be affected, unless, when brought into contact with hostile operations fairly adapted to promote the submission of an enemy. This just barrier against the passions of nations has found little practical favor in the progress of their dissensions, and the result has been the introduction of other causes of trouble, which it were wise to examine calmly, with a view to avert the serious consequences which may be anticipated, if no such effort is made. The system of blockades, and the doctrine and practice touching contraband of war have been fertile sources of these difficulties, not only in consequence of the vague and contradictory manner in which the subjects are considered, as well in judicial decisions, as in received treatises, by elementary writers upon public law, but also in consequence of their peculiarly offensive character, and of the irritation, they are sure to produce.

Almost infinite have been the questions to which these subjects, more especially those relating to contraband of war have given rise, and human ingenuity has been exhausted in efforts to reconcile the unlimited seizure of neutral property and its appropriation to the purposes of the

captors with established general principles, loose, as they too often are, which while they recognize certain rights of belligerents, impose reasonable restrictions upon their exercise, in the expectation, vain it is too often found, of preventing their abuse. But the contest has been an unequal and a losing one between the power of confiscation and appropriation and the prohibition of the international code, appealing for its sanctions only to the consciences of nations.

The blockade of an enemy's coast, in order to prevent all intercourses with neutral Powers, even for the most peaceful purpose is a claim, which gains no additional strength by an investigation into the foundation on which it rests, and the evils, which have accompanied its exercise call for an efficient remedy. The investment of a place, by sea and land with a view to its reduction, preventing it from receiving supplies of men and material necessary for its defence is a legitimate mode of prosecuting hostilities, which cannot be reasonably objected to so long as war is recognized as an arbiter of national disputes. But the blockade of a coast or of commercial positions along it, without any regard to ulterior military operations and with the real design of carrying on a war against trade, and from its very nature against the trade of peaceable and friendly Powers, instead of a war against armed men is a proceeding which it is difficult to reconcile with the opinions of modern times. To watch every creek and river and harbor upon an ocean frontier, in order to seize and confiscate every vessel, with its cargo, attempting to enter or go out without any direct effect upon the true objects of war is a mode of conducting hostilities, which would find few advocates, if now first presented for consideration. Unfortunately however, the right to do this has been long recognized by the law of nations, accompanied indeed with precautionary conditions, intended to prevent abuse, but which experience has shewn to be lamentably inoperative. It is very desirable therefore that this constant source of irritation in time of war should be guarded against, and the power to interrupt all intercourse with extensive regions to be limited and precisely defined, before by a necessary reaction, its exercise is met by an armed resistance.

There can be no reasonable doubt, but the original theory of blockades was in conformity with the views herein suggested, that is, they were considered as military means to reduce invested places, and upon this narrow foundation, the immense superstructure, which now overshadows the commercial intercourse of the world has been erected from time to time, by belligerent Powers for their own purposes. One of the most eminent jurisconsults of this Country, both in character and position,

Judge Marshall, when Secretary of State, in his instructions dated September 30, 1800, to Mr King, then our Minister at London, lends his high authority to this view of the subject: « On principle », he said, « it might well be questioned whether this rule can be applied to a place not completely invested by land, as well as by sea. If we examine the reasoning on which is founded the right to intercept and confiscate supplies designed for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction that its extension to towns invested by sea, only, is an unjustifiable encroachment on the right of neutrals. »

The elementary writers abound with expressions, indicating a close connection between blockades and sieges. Vattel defines the right of a party, blockading or besieging a place to treat as an enemy any one who attempts to enter such place or to carry any thing to the besieged. And Lord Stowell, when speaking of a blockading force, as a besieging force, borrowed language, which had been thus previously used, and which left no doubt of its origin

But Lord Stowell has borne yet more direct testimony to the correctness of these suggestions. In a case decided by him, he said a blockade is « a sort of circumvallation, by which all correspondence and communication is, as far as human force can effect it effectually cut off, » etc.

It would be difficult for language to express with more precision the true character of blockades and the object, to which they are properly applicable, the reduction of invested places.

The restriction of blockades to the proper purposes of war would remove at once from the field of controversy the vast variety of questions, with which it is now encumbered, and which are sure to present themselves, peaceably or forcibly, as soon as a maritime war breaks out.

I have no disposition to undertake even their bare enumeration, for it would be a work of labor, beginning at the enquiry, when does a blockade rightfully commence, and ending with an equally important and sometimes difficult one, when does it terminate. And it would embrace all the intermediate questions which have been discussed with wonderful subtlety, and by whose aid an immense amount of property belonging to friendly merchants has been transferred from the peaceable owners to the armed captors. Such an enumeration, however brief tho' it might be, would exhibit in a striking point of view the uncertainty which rests upon this subject, and how much the questions, that arise depend, not upon well established principles, but upon the discretion, the will indeed, of the party interested in the extension of the system

of confiscation. But the principal subject of controversy relates to the extent of the force by which a blockade must be maintained, in order to be lawful. The received law of nations requires, that the force shall be an adequate one and the Paris conference fortified this requisition, or, in other words, gave in their adhesion to it, by incorporating it into their declaration. But experience has shewn how inefficient is such an injunction to stay the aggressive spirit of belligerents, and the history of paper blockades constitutes a memorable and most instructive chapter in the annals of modern warfare. Whole Countries have been declared in a state of blockade with as much apparent confidence in the justice of the measure as if their coasts could be hermetically closed by a single armed cruiser. If blockades were confined to places actually invested this source of dispute would disappear, for it would be in the interest of the investing Power to support its operations with a sufficient force, in order to bring the enterprize to a speedy termination.

The doctrine of contraband of war has been another prolific subject of dispute and animosity in the progress of the hostilities, which have latterly disturbed the tranquillity of the world. It is a rule touching the intercourse of nations, which even if divested of uncertainty, which surrounds it, and renders it a most dangerous instrument of mischief, would still be entitled to no favorable consideration. It should therefore be permitted to do as little injury, as may be, to the commerce of the world, and should be rigidly confined within the narrowest limits compatible with an honest belligerent policy, and in the opinion of this government, those limits ought to be made to include only arms and munitions of war. As a means of annoyance, this international prohibition against carrying to a Country, engaged in hostilities articles useful for military purposes is practically of little value to its enemy. It found its way into the code of nations, when the means of supply were much more restricted than at present, and before the progress of improvement had placed it in the power of almost every nation to provide itself with whatever it may want, either for offensive or defensive operations. No State will ever be reduced because its enemy may have it in his power to seize and confiscate supplies under the name of contraband of war. Unfortunately, if the value of this restriction as a means of military annoyance has passed away, it is still valuable for a different purpose. Blockades and contraband, even when enforced in strict conformity with the law of nations, give to Belligerent Powers the control of a vast amount of property, enabling them to convert much of it to their own use. But such a guarded exercise of their privileges is a rare event, at

almost all times, and often the limitations provided by the international law are palpably disregarded and at such periods, there are few of the articles of commerce, which belligerent Powers do not interfere with, even to their seizure and condemnation under one pretext or another. By these means the whole trade of the world is placed in jeopardy, and an indisposition to relinquish this formidable power, which it may be anticipated will be needed hereafter, probably contributes far more to the tenacity with which it is held on to, than the professed purposes, to which it owed its introduction into the maritime code of nations. These circumstances indicating the dangers, which during war beset all the nations, not taking part in it, indicate also the necessity for their joint concurrence in any reasonable effort to preserve the just rights of the world

The law of contraband is lamentably vague, and it is hardly possible, that an extensive war should prevail upon the ocean, for any considerable period, without an attempt on the part of the belligerents to draw into the class of contraband, articles of general consumption, which in the opinion of neutral Powers are liable to no such association, and the day is rapidly coming if it has not already come when such encroachments will be prevented, at the expense if necessary of an armed opposition. The signs of the times are not to be misunderstood, and ought not to be disregarded. Independent of the want of adaptation of this interdict upon the commerce of the world to its avowed objects, owing to the improvement in the general power of production and supply, there are serious evils, to which it is exposed, and which result from the entire neglect of precision, of reasonable caution indeed in the manner in which the subject is treated in the received expositions of the law of nations. There is no accepted enumeration of the articles, coming within the prohibition. And to add to the dangers of collision, the principle, by which they are to be tested, is so loosely defined that it is practically of little use, but to furnish a pretext, when one is wanting, to enable parties at war to enlarge the contraband list at their pleasure. Some of the later and approved writers upon the law of nations as Hautefeuille and Ortolan object to this power of extension *ad libitum*, and the former particularly confines the list to objects of first necessity for war and which are exclusively useful in its prosecution, and which can be directly employed for that purpose without undergoing any change, that is to say, to arms and munitions of war. In this absence of specific enumeration, and of a clear fixed principle, there is no method provided by which the disputes, inseparable from this state of things, may be amicably adjusted,

and the evils are therefore so obvious, that able commentators upon national law have proposed, that special treaties be formed between nations whenever practicable, in order to regulate these embarrassing questions, and thus obviate in some degree, dangers which in war must be always imminent. The United States have adopted this policy, and have omitted no favorable opportunity of carrying it into effect. They have entered into Conventional arrangements, with most of the other Independent States of America, *Viz.* with Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, New Granada, Guatemala, San Salvador, Peru and Mexico, and with some of the principal commercial Powers of Europe for the better regulation of these difficult questions, and in all cases it has been their object to circumscribe as much as possible the catalogue of prohibited articles, and to provide by specific enumeration against the recurrence of abuses, which have given so much just cause of complaint. But these partial arrangements, tho' useful as far as they go, are yet a very inadequate remedy for the evil, because they establish no uniform rule, each treaty prescribing its own regulations, and because they apply only to the parties themselves, leaving their relations in this respect with other Powers to be governed by the code, which has proved itself so unworthy of confidence.

The dictum, upon which this whole doctrine rests is that a neutral nation ought not to supply a Belligerent Power with articles which may serve him in the direct prosecution of hostilities. If this prohibitory declaration had been confined to arms and munitions of war, there would have been little difficulty in the fair adjustment of the questions, which might arise under it. But it presents no such tangible limit on the one hand, while on the other, it is conceded, that it does not embrace various articles, as clothing and I may add provisions, which are as essential to the efficiency of the soldier, as the arms he bears into battle. What then must be the effect of any article upon warlike operations, to authorize its classification, as contraband of war is a question, which has provoked as much angry discussion, as any other, with which modern nations have had to deal. Besides the difficulty, arising out of the want of precision in the terms employed, and probably not less out of the absence of any generally fixed views, there is yet another, which adds farther to the embarrassment and which requires the immediate consideration of the parties to the law of nations. This question of contraband is a shifting one, as Lord Erskine expressed it, embracing new articles, from time to time as they become applicable to military purposes, when the law shifts to accommodate itself to these progressive improvements in the

implements or means of destruction. But still the nature of such improvements, and the just title of the articles contributing towards them to take their places in the list of contraband is a subject of controversy, which is liable to be followed by the most serious consequences. The discussion, which at this time is going on respecting the military character of coal, and whether it is now excluded from general commerce as contraband of war is striking illustration of the tendency to enlarge this power of prohibition and seizure, and of the necessity of watching its exercise with unabated vigilance. Here is an article, not exclusively nor even principally used in war, but which enters into general consumption in the arts of peace, to which indeed it is now vitally necessary. It has become also important in commercial navigation. It is a product of nature, with which some regions are bountifully supplied, while others are destitute of it, and its transportation, instead of meeting with impediments, should be aided and encouraged. The attempt to enable belligerent nations to prevent all trade in this most valuable accessory to mechanical power has no just claim for support in the law of nations, and the United States avow their determination to oppose it, so far as their vessels are concerned.

It adds to the complications, arising out of the uncertainty, in which this subject is involved, that there is no common tribunal, empowered to decide between the Independent parties, when a belligerent nation interested in the measure, undertakes to add a new article to the catalogue of contraband, upon the assumption, that it has changed its character from a peaceable to a warlike one, in consequence of a change in the objects, to which it may be applied, either by a revolution in the mode of conducting war or by improvements in the implements used in its prosecution. The pretension of a prerogative on the part of sovereigns whether in peace or war, if indeed any such exist to decide these questions, except so far as relates to their own subjects, is utterly repudiated by the United States. They claim the right to decide for themselves, what is the law of nations, and they yield the same privilege to other Independent Powers. If positions are assumed by other Nations, which affect injuriously the rights of this Country, and which it believes are in contravention of the code of international law, its remedy is well defined and depends upon itself. A just deference is due to those differences of opinion which may honestly arise in the vast variety of subjects, involved in the intercourse of nations, and they should be considered in spirit of reasonable forbearance. But that limit passed, duty and honor equally enjoin resistance.

Sir I believe the war ended. An Armistice was concluded on the 8th of July between the Emperor Louis Napoleon and Francis Joseph which will endure till the 15th of August. The country between the belligerent lines is declared neutral. All military operations, including the works of attack and defence at Peschiera are suspended. The details of this armistice have been published over the signatures of Hess and Vaillant. Napoleon announced by order of the day his immediate return to Paris, and Marshal Vaillant is declared Major General of the army during his absence. Yesterday a personal interview between the Emperors took place either at Valeggio or Villafranca the results of which are yet unknown.

The present head of the House of Bonaparte has a decided taste for scenic representation, for melodramatic effect, surprising changes, and all that the French sum up under the generic name of *coup de théâtre*, and has given many striking illustrations of it. But at no period of his remarkable career has he so startled the world as in the present juncture. A fortnight ago he gained the great pitched battle of Solferino. In that battle the Austrian Empire put forth all its resources in the presence of the Kaiser himself. Their best troops, their best generals, on their own chosen ground of manouvre, were then defeated in all the ways that an army can be defeated. They lost cannon, and flags, vast numbers of men and officers were slain, and they were driven from every point of vantage without a saving exception the consequent demoralization of the Austrian Army and Empire was incalculable. When the Mincio was fairly past, their forces became ungovernable, and the chiefs became absorbed in bitter recriminations almost as dangerous as the despair of the Emperor and the indiscipline of the ranks. The French past [sic] the river without firing a shot in seeing a enemy on the horizon, and took up such positions as pleased them in the Quadrilateral of fortresses. Here, then, was the attitude of the parties on the 7th of July. Sixty thousand Sardinians had settled down to the siege of Peschiera, forty two thousand French and Tuscan troops under Prince Napoleon threatened Mantua, Garibaldi and Cialdini with the volunteers and a division of the Piedmontese army acted on the Stelvio, and bid fair to interrupt the communications through the Tyrolese mountains with Germany; a great fleet in the Adriatic was getting ready to disembark



another whole corps of the French army on the littoral of Venice, and the main body of the French under the Emperor in person advanced without encumbrance of fear in flank on Verona and the dispirited Austrian masses collected around it. This part of the French army amounted to some two hundred thousand men, and a great unbroken column of men, extending over the whole road from Lyons to the Mincio was pouring endless reinforcements into those ranks. Riding near the railroad depot at Turin on the evening of the 7th, I saw a train composed of seventy wagons coming in; each of those wagons contained twenty four soldiers, they had left Lyons forty eight hours previously, they would take their places in the French line twenty four hours later, and by enquiring of the employée of the depot near me, I learned that four such trains came in every day. Thus the French Emperor was bringing to bear on the remains of his enemy a force nearly irresistible. It then seemed that no possible contingency, and no earthly power could keep him from his prey. The Austrians would either have to fight him with the certainty of annihilation, or consent to a second capitulation of Ulm.

In this situation of affairs the following telegram from the French Emperor to the Empress fell on the world like a bomb.

« A suspension of hostilities has been agreed on by the Emperor of Austria and myself » July 7th 1/2 P.M.

« entre l'Empereur d'Autriche et Moi » The King of Sardinia, it will be observed is not taken into account. Indeed I can assure you that this piece of news was known here in Turin to M. Cavour by dispatch from the Sardinian Minister at Paris before it was dreamed of in the camp of Victor Emmanuel. It reached Cavour at two o'clock in the night of the 7th; it reached Peschiera next day when the Sardinians were just ready to open their fire on the place.

The sensation was prodigious and not all pleasant. The first thought of every Italian man as you are probably aware, on every doubtful occasion, is *treachery*; and suspicions of all sorts were freely indulged in Turin. The most common theory was that Napoleon III would give Austria easy terms in this hour of victory to secure her aid in certain ambitious projects relative to the Rhine boundary. Others suppose that his career in the Mincio has been peremptorily cut short by the threats of Prussia and of the German Confederation, that peace would be immediately [sic] concluded by the establishment of an independent government under an Archduke in the Venetian territory, while Lombardy alone would be liberated,—that is to say given up to Victor Emmanuel and the Piedmontese. The feeling of doubt was so great that the Government in Paris

seems to have thought proper to give explanations. By a note in the *Moniteur* it appears that the neutral powers made an effort at mediation immediatly [sic] after the battle of Solferino; that they found the French Emperor full of moderation and sincerely anxious to save an unnecessary effusion of blood; that being the victor he took initiative and wrote an autographic letter to the Emperor of Austria to ascertain his sentiments; that Francis Joseph made a highly favourable reply, and hence an armistice of five weeks to give negociators [sic] free scope and fair play. Through one of the semi-official organs also, the people are reminded that up to this time only one programme for the Italian campaign has been given to the world—it is contained in the proclamation made by Napoleon III on leaving Paris—that « Italy should be free to the Adriatic— » and that no one has yet good reason to suppose that this principle has been lost sight of. Here, in Turin, Government has thought it proper to permit stronger statements. As all their newspapers are carefully watched, it is reasonable to regard anything that appears in them at this time as partially approved by the Government, and I translate the following paragraphs from the Turin journals of yesterday evening:

« It is generally reported that the Emperor of Austria has shown himself ready to yield in every manner and on all points to the propositions of the Emperor of the French.

It is further stated that negotiations [sic] will be opened on the following basis: Cession to Piedmont of the territory on this side the Mincio, and of the dutchies [sic]; simultaneous evacuation of the Venetian territory by both armies, leaving the Venetian population full liberty to establish their future government by vote and according to their own wishes.

The King Victor Emmanuel will be present at the interview between the two Emperors at Villafranca, and the Emperor Napoleon will leave for Paris immediately after the interview, passing by Turin. » *Espero*, July 11, 1859.

If all this is true the armistice may be easily understood—there is nothing further to fight about. But any settlement less complete will be ineffective; for should any portion of the Italian peninsula be left under the Austrian yoke, tranquillity will never be attained, and all this bloody work will have to be done over again at some future period. It is however unreasonable to suppose that Napoleon III would have stopt [sic] his march in a moment when all his expensive preparations had just been

completed, and when success without alloy was certain, unless well assumed that all he chose to ask would be granted.

The Austrian Empire has motives to make peace in this moment at any price. Apart from the perilous position of its army and Emperor in Italy, it is now well known that the appeals of Kossuth and Klapka have had great effect in Hungary. The financial conditions of the Empire is scarcely veiled bankruptcy. On the other hand the great danger of a general war becomes daily greater. Count Pourtales,<sup>148</sup> the Prussian envoy at Paris, in spite of all the statements to the contrary is now known to be in the Austrian camp, and Napoleon III is said to be deeply impressed with forebodings of a coalition against him.

Now that the armistice is a settled fact the neutral powers will spare no exertions to render it a durable peace, and if necessary they will not fail to apply diplomatic coercion to Austria. That power must submit to the inevitable law of the vanquished.

The loss of troops engaged at Solferino is still somewhat in mystery. The authorities explain the long uncertainty in which they have left the public on that interesting point by the fact that several disconnected battles were fought along a line of miles in length on that day, and so many detached commands and disconnected corps were engaged that there is serious difficulty in ascertaining the whole result. The Austrian official journal admits, that so far as returns have yet been made, their loss was 2,352 killed, 10,642 wounded, and 9,288 missing, making a total loss of 22,282. The Sardinian War Office has published no addition to their original report of 5,525 killed and wounded. The reports of several French generals now published show a loss of some 13,000 killed and wounded. But it is not even pretended that their returns are complete. The commander of the Imperial Guard though making a report of his part in the action, does not state his loss. According to all sources of information, the French loss was much greater than the Austrian, in most places two to one. Many well informed persons think that the entire loss of all the armies, Sardinian French and Austrian was considerably over 50,000 men. So long as they were on the field, the Austrians fought with unflinching resolution. At three o'clock the King was in tears, and most of his generals regarded the day as lost.

<sup>148</sup> Albert conte von Pourtales nacque a Neuenburg il 10 settembre 1812, morì a Parigi il 19 dicembre 1861. Nel 1850 fu nominato ministro di Prussia a Costantinopoli, nel 1854 fu ambasciatore a Parigi. Vedi, su di lui, ALBERT MUTTUS, *Graf Albert Pourtales, ein Preussisch-Deutscher Staatsmann*, Berlino, 1933.

Sir At this moment the capital of Sardinia is in a state of great excitement which is probably shared by the rest of Italy. For the Emperor of the French has concluded a treaty of peace with the Emperor of Austria on the basis of the Treaty of Campo Formio. The war is ended and Italian territory rests still in German hands

This strange and depressing intelligence comes in the form of a telegraphic despatch from the Emperor Napoleon III to the Empress Eugenie, and sent from Paris to Turin by the Sardinian Minister. It is dated at Valeggio on the 12th inst. « Peace is signed, » says this despatch, « between the Emperor of Austria and myself—entre l'Empereur d'Autriche et Moi ». « Lombardy is ceded to France, and I give it to the King of Sardinia. » The dutchies are not mentioned, but an Italian Confederation is to be formed under the honorary presidency of the Pope. « The Emperor of Austria will keep Venice and its territory » [The fortresses of the Mincio included] « and will by that title form a member of the Italian Confederation. »

Up to the present moment the Government here has not printed this news, but it is generally known, and the words « treason » and « traitor » are of course on every Italian lip Yesterday they would have worshiped Louis Napoleon as a God, to-day they would tear up their pavements to stone him Yesterday Victor Emanuel [sic] was « King of Italy; » and that Italian Unity, that independance [sic] of the foreigner so long sought seemed at last found. But to-day those golden visions melt in the dull light of common reality.

Certainly, this is a most lame and impotent conclusion to a career of unexampled success. At the moment of completion the work is half undone, and difficult complications take the place of perfected simplicity. It cannot be denied that Italy gains much in the new arrangement. The territory, force, and population of Sardinia is doubled, and an Italian Confederation, so long the scheme and the hope of the best heads and strongest spirits of the peninsula, at last seems a reality. But the Italians expected so much more, and they had such good ground to expect more, that this half loaf now seems to them the rations of starvation.

In the Dispatch No. 115 forwarded yesterday I gave the details of that most unaccountable armistice which closed the victorious course of the allied armies. On the 7th of July the Allies held the Emperor Francis

Joseph and his army at their mercy. He was cut off by superior forces on every side and in front of him stood the most redoubtable antagonist that had ever settled on those plains. A single, certain, and glorious blow would have ended forever and completely the German domination in Italy. But then the Emperor Napoleon III chose to astound his troops, his enemies, his friends, and a world of spectators with a suspension of hostilities for five long weeks. Next day came the news of an interview between the two Caesars, and to-day this intelligence of an Austrian peace, concluded without apparent cause or connections, and certainly without consultation with the King and Cavour, and against the known wishes of the French army and the Italian people—a peace which leaves the work of war unfinished, and under which this peninsula will be not more tranquil in future than it has been in the past.

When Napoleon III left Paris, he proclaimed to an attentive world that « Italy should be free to the Adriatic ». In the famous manifesto of Milan these promises were repeated, and the highest expectations were formed on further declarations. « The Italian people, » said he, « shall decide their own future destiny—I have no preconceived system of mine to impose upon them. » Now these distinct pledges are distinctly violated in this treaty of peace. The wish of Italy was well known and unanimous. They chose Victor Emmanuel for their constitutional King, and they desired a united government. They have nothing of this sort. Victor Emmanuel is still a little King in northern Italy. The hated Pope is the head of an imaginary confederation, and worst of all Venice, the most gallant and beloved of all the Italian states, is sacrificed to the pride of a beaten tyrant.

Had such a treaty followed an unfortunate campaign, or even a lost battle, it could be received with reason. But under present circumstances it is natural that this country should feel and evince a great disappointment. The great prize of complete independance [sic] slips through their fingers at the moment they grasp it. All the present sacrifice of blood and treasure must be undergone again at some future time; and who can feel sure that when the struggle is renewed, fortune and circumstance will be equally favourable. The policy of agitation must be again inaugurated, with all its pains and risks at the moment when a real peace was within the reach of all.

The motives which have induced Louis Napoleon to throw away the splendid position which he occupied in the eyes of Europe can not be supposed at present. Whether it was the certainty of a general war, as made known to him by the diplomacy of Russia and Prussia, whether

he has, as the Italians say, ambitious views on the Rhine, which Austria my help him to fulfil, or whether he is seduced like his uncle by the splendour of the House of Hapsburg, and a desire to form personal friendship and alliance with the Kaiser,—these are all vague imaginations. That secret man lets no one into his real counsels.

News from the camp are not cheerful. The army and the King are quite as much disgusted as the people of Turin. Cavour left for the scene of action by express train at the first news of the armistice and has not since been heard from. It is believed here that he returned to Turin last night and that he remains retired in his house to—day. That gentleman may reasonably be supposed to be in a state of considerable disappointment and exasperation. Fortunately, however, both for himself and his King they are in no way responsible for the result. « L'Empereur d'Autriche et Moi » have done all that is done; and Sardinia is in no way taken into the account.

It is of course quite useless for Italy to fret. Louis Napoleon is master of the situation, and there is nothing left for them but to be very thankful for the real benefits which he has certainly conferred and make the best use they can of their increased forces.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 117*

Turin, July 15, 1859

Sir: I have had the honour to receive your Dispatch dated July 1st (No. 28) containing the commission of William L. Patterson to be Consul at Genoa.<sup>149</sup> I have transmitted the same to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a note asking the customary *exequatur*, but as the whole Government was changed almost at the moment I did so, and as the new Ministry is not yet organized for action, it may be some 'ways before I shall receive an answer.

I have also received your Dispatch No. 27,<sup>150</sup> enclosing the complimentary letter of the President to the King in answer to the notification of the marriage of the Princess Clotilde to the Prince Napoleon Bona-

<sup>149</sup> L'istruzione n 28, datata Washington, 14 giugno (non 1 luglio) trasmetteva la nomina di William L. Patterson del Mississippi, a console degli S U a Genova

<sup>150</sup> L'istruzione n 27, datata Washington, 8 giugno, trasmetteva una lettera del Presidente a Vittorio Emanuele II

parte. When the King returns to his palace I shall hasten to deliver it into his hands.

I have further to acknowledge [sic] the receipt of your Dispatch No 26, dated the 25th of May, touching the brawl between the American sailors and the peasants at Spezia in the preceding month. This dispatch seems to have been unnecessarily delayed. I received it through the Consulate at Spezia. The acting consul at that place informs me that it was left there by Captain Dornin, an officer belonging to the American Squadron in the Mediterranean, who said that he had not the time to bring it to Turin, a fact explained by the considerable period which seems to have been occupied by his journey from Washington to Genoa.

Permit me to acknowledge [sic] the pleasure which I have felt in reading the terms of your Excellency's notice of the affair at Spezia.

In answer to your enquiry, I have to say that no contribution whatever was made by the officers or men of the American Squadron for the family of the deceased woman Reborà.

The letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressing the hope that some such provision would be made and my own suggestion of its equity was duly submitted to the commanding officer of the squadron, Lavalette [sic], by the Consul at Spezia, but the communication does not appear to have been acknowledged [sic] by him. The evidence on that point in my possession is a letter from the said Consul in answer to my enquiries, which letter may be seen at the close of this Dispatch, Appendix A.

As your Excellency has said that if no provision for that family should be made by voluntary contribution, you would take into consideration the propriety of making a recommendation to Congress on the subject, I give the following brief recapitulation of the facts.

On the 11th of April 1859 a party of sailors from the American vessel of war *Macedonian* being on shore at Spezia in the Kingdom of Sardinia attempted to seize on a boat belonging to certain peasants of that country for the purpose of returning to their vessel. The peasants resisted, and a scene of violence ensued in which several of the peasants were wounded by knives and stones. A judicial inquest followed which fixed the blame of the transaction wholly on the sailors, and the fairness of that decision seems to have been acknowledged [sic] by the commander of the Squadron in a communication to the American Minister at Turin. Owing to some grave circumstances in the affair, principally a resistance to the police by the sailors, the local magistrates sent the case to the Sardinian Ministry at Turin. The Ministry settled it by the imposition

of certain trifling fines for the damages supposed to have been done, and granted a release from all further prosecution. Some days later however a woman named Rebora, wounded in the head while endeavouring to rescue her husband from the hands of the sailors, died in consequence of her wound. The Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a note dated the 29th April while informing the American Minister of this unfortunate result, stated that as the affair had been settled by diplomatic arrangement, he should not go behind that settlement to inflict criminal punishment on the homicide; but hoped as the fines imposed were wholly insignificant that some assistance would be given by the Squadron or by the United States to the husband and children thus bereaved of their wife and mother. No contribution having been made by the Squadron, it is thought that the Government might award a moderate sum in further damages to the family of the deceased.

***Robert Leese a John M. Daniel***<sup>151</sup>

*Copia*

Spezia, July 1, 1859

Sir. In reply to your note of the 30th ult, I have the honour to inform you that immediatly on the death of the woman Rebora, I addressed officially Flag Officer Lavalette and Capt Levy in the terms alluded to in the dispatch to you, but up to this date no acknowledgement of my letter has been sent to me, by those officers or in my knowledge have any steps been taken to assist the family thus bereft beyond the fine levied by the judge at Spezia, and previously stated of 350 francs

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 118*

Turin, July 16, 1859

Sir. Events succeed each other with such startling rapidity that the task of their chronicler becomes incessant.

In despatch No. 114 I stated that Mr Cavour shut himself from public view on the night of his return from the camp. He issued from that retirement, on the morning when peace was proclaimed by the

<sup>151</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 117 di Daniel.



telegraph, only to convoke the Council under the presidency of the Prince Regent. Appearing there for a few minutes, he informed the assembly that he had tendered his resignation to the King of Sardinia, who had accepted it, and that his chief reason for doing so was his unwillingness to sign and execute a treaty of peace which he regarded as a surrender of all Italian hopes and as ruinous to the rights of Sardinia; that all his expectations from this war had been disappointed, and, his calculations having been erroneous, he could not maintain himself before the country as the head of the Government. There were reasons other than those of a diplomatic character, he added, which rendered it altogether impossible for him to retain any position in the Ministry, that the King Victor Emmanuel had been informed of those reasons and had accepted his resignation in the camp. This example was immediately followed by all the other ministers, by the new Foreign Secretary Minghetti, and by several of the new governors of provinces, etc.

The Count Arese, a Milanese nobleman of enormous wealth, and chiefly known as the intimate friend of Napoleon III, at the urgent solicitation of that monarch and on the invitation of Victor Emmanuel, has accepted the position of First Minister and undertaken to form a new Government. But up to the present moment his efforts have been vain. D'Azeglio, Alfieri, and most of the other leading men to whom he offered position have excused themselves. They all know that a Ministry formed at this time can last but a brief period. It will have to execute the most unpopular treaty which ever was invented and so soon as their ungrateful task has been finished they will be dismissed as the embalmers of Egyptian mummies were wont to be turned away by the family of the deceased when their work was done. Cavour will, I think, eventually come back into power. At present he is completely chapfallen. No explanation can be gotten from him except the suggestion that Napoleon III is mad. The truth is Mr. Cavour is deeply mortified, and for cause. Artful, adroit, unscrupulous and audacious as he is, he has been used, outwitted, and played with, and made a tool of by one more artful, more unscrupulous, more audacious, and very much more profound than himself. For six months he has been the slave of Louis Napoleon. He has done everything he has been ordered to do, persecuted everybody who was not loved by his master; changed everything that did not please him in Piedmont, he has not moved a finger or wagged his tongue once of his own free will. Yet he fancied that in the main it was himself that was managing Napoleon and he that would be the great beneficiary of all the transactions between them. Naturally his dejection is great now that

his eyes are at last opened, and the conceit has all gone out of him in the presence of the humiliating certainty that he has not only been a dupe himself, but been made the instrument of duping and deluding the nation that fancied him the most cunning of men.

The diplomatic position in which the war leaves this country is a very difficult one, and it will be hard for any Ministry to extricate it with honour. It is known that Tuscany, having driven away its Grand Duke, is governed by a provisional Committee presided over by Boncompagni, the Sardinian Minister at Florence, and that its army is in the hands of a Piedmontese Commissioner. Parma and Modena have been *de facto* annexed to Sardinia, are governed by Royal intendants, enforcing Piedmontese laws. The Marches of Bologna and Ancona have declared themselves parts of Piedmont and this Government sent a Commissioner there but a short time since. But, according to the treaties, all these countries are to be reduced with « salutary reforms » to the *status quo*. The Sardinian Government will therefore be forced to withdraw its agents and desert these people who reclaim its protection. Further, in Bologna, in Parma, in Modena, in Tuscany, popular movements, protests, addresses to the King, etc., have made well known since the announcement of the peace the determination of the inhabitants to have no more to do with their former rulers. They declare in every public manner that they will not again accept their dukes and their Pope. Those rulers must therefore be re-instated by foreign force, if re-instated at all. Who is to apply that force? The Austrians? The chief end of this war was to force them from these very principalities. The French? The French army is still here, and seems likely to remain for sometime as they have rented their depots, houses, etc., for *two years*. But if the Ally of Victor Emanuel, the Liberator introduced into Italy by the Government of Sardinia, is to replace the worst form of the ancient foreign domination, it will in the beginning produce complications here in which no Ministry can stand up.

Apart from these difficult and dangerous contingencies, the position of Piedmont before Europe is very bad. By this movement it has gained the character of a disturber of the public peace for the sake of selfish aggrandizement. If it had succeeded, and become a strong kingdom, all would have been well. But it has gained no strength by this war. The part of Lombardy which falls to Sardinia contains 2,800,000 souls. It is not defensible in war. The battle of Magenta gave the whole of it to the French, and, had the battle of Solferino gone against the Allies, they would have been obliged to retreat into Piedmont. Between Mantua and Alessandria there is in fact no line of defense. A single battle has

always decided and will always decide the fate of the intervening plain. Now the Austrians not only keep the Venetian territory but also Mantua, Peschiera and all the line of the Mincio. In a single day they can enter Milan, and, on the first excuse, there is little doubt but they will do so. Sardinia has gained no military strength by the war, and the addition of one turbulent province will not compensate it for the loss of the quiet position and certain peace which she has hitherto enjoyed under the protection of all Europe — It is quite natural therefore that Arese finds it difficult to form a Ministry, for no Ministry could support the load which the responsible Government of this country must prepare itself to bear.

This great military drama of 1859 has closed, as it commenced, with an Imperial pageant. On the 15th inst. Napoleon III, accompanied by the King and followed by a vast and splendid cortege of generals, courtiers, guards, etc., arrived by railway from Milan and made a public entry into Turin. It is just two months since he made a public entry into Genoa, and the contrast between that pleasant day of May and this hot evening of July with its hurricane of wind and dust was as striking as a scene from *Richard II*. His apparition in Genoa was one of the most splendid spectacles of the century. The houses were draped with rich flowers, every eye gleamed delight on Napoleon III and every throat was hoarse with shouting his praise as he stood erect in an open carriage bowing acknowledgments on every side. In the hours which succeeded, he received honours which would have sufficed for the Divine Messiah himself, and, when he reached Milan, he found his two proclamations there moulded in bronze and hung in the great cathedral by the altar like the tablets of the ten commandments. But had he been a Polar bear he might have yet been chilled by the reception which Turin gave the victorious Napoleon returning from his work of liberation. Cannon, it is true, were fired on the citadel, but one at a time with the lapse of a minute between each discharge; they would have better signalled a funeral than a triumph. Official people assembled at the depot, but with visages like masks. Cavour and his ex-ministers stood in a knot and took off their hats—but Cavour did not approach the Emperor—that same Emperor who had thrown himself into the arms of « Mon cher Cavour! » on the quay of Genoa. Victor Emmanuel appeared by the side of his ally. The rotund face of that prince was clouded and elongated; his features had a decidedly pinched look, difficult to imagine in connection with them. The court carriages were there in a long scarlet line. The King mounted in the first, placing the Emperor at his right hand; the chief

personages of the Imperial following entered the others and the cortege proceeded at a slow pace to the Palace. The streets were lined with National Guards, but from the windows were none of the gay draperies which clothe the walls of an Italian city even on the most ordinary fêtes. The population assembled behind the lines of the Guards, evincing a natural curiosity to see the great enigma of the age, but with looks devoid of sympathy; and during the whole procession, from all that vast crowd, *not one* « *Viva l'Imperatore!* » arose. The telegraph will furnish a different account to the journals, but of this fact I can assure you from personal observation. My acquaintances stationed at different points all state the same thing. I myself left my carriage and took a place among the people near the Palace gate. The Emperor passed within a few feet. Some persons cheered the king—« *Viva il Re!* »—but not one, absolutely not one, mingled the name of the Emperor in the cry. It is my firm belief that if he had been alone no hat would have been raised. Napoleon received the marked slight with impassible composure. Once even he raised his hat at a cheer for the King.

« *Such is a nation's gratitude* » said the low voice of a priest close to me. But Italians deny with vehemence that they owe at present any gratitude to Napoleon III. They rose at his command and at his invitation, they made every sacrifice and every effort demanded; he excited hopes which have been desperately disappointed; he promised to liberate them from foreign rule and then to leave them the choice of their political destinies, he had the power to keep those promises; and he has not only left the Austrians here, but has « arranged their destinies, » without even consulting one of them and in notorious opposition to their wishes, by convention with their oldest and worst enemy. Before they throw away any more gratitude, say they, events must explain the incomprehensible treaty with which he has cut short their career. It is a treaty which can never be executed without the application of armed force. By it Italy is to be formed into a Confederation which must necessarily be intolerable to all its members. The Pope will never descend into such companionship with the little powers of Italy. The despotic King of Naples will never submit his actions to the decrees of its councils. Sardinia will never submit her laws to the vote of the Emperor of Austria, the tyrant of Venice, her eternal foe. A Confederation of such governments as those which *now* exist in Italy is wholly impossible if their will is consulted. One of two things must therefore follow,—either that portion of the treaty between the emperors of France and Austria must remain dead and of no effect, or they must place bodies of troops in the

centre of each state as at Rome, and control the action of these governments by armed influence. I have in conversation asked what would be the effect of such a movement in Italy? *In that case*, the invariable response has been, *Louis Napoleon will not live long*. This view is not expressed by hot-headed individuals, but by the most sober and responsible personages. Orsini has again become the Italian saint; his portrait replaces that of Napoleon III in the windows.

On the evening of the entry into Turin described above, there was a dinner of seventy covers at the Palace. Neither Cavour nor any one of the ministers would be present. The diplomatic body, with one or two exceptions, was not invited. The King sat gloomily at the table and ate nothing. It is said that this monarch has been as cavalierly treated by his friend in their intercourse of late that he has quite lost his spirits. The party broke up early. Next morning the Emperor gave audience at daybreak to his cousin the Marquis of Pepoli who came at the head of a deputation of Bolognese to express their dissatisfaction at the prospect of returning to the arms of their Holy Father and to the tender mercies of the Colonel Schmidt. At six o'clock the Emperor and his suite departed on the Susa railroad for his own dominions, leaving behind him here in Italy a sentiment of popular hatred which can hardly be over-stated and with difficulty be imagined by more reasonable races.

Meanwhile the Italian journals indulge in phillipics against his policy and his person characterized by a virulence that surpasses all description. Up to the day of the treaty the newspapers were held in the closest subjection. Fines, imprisonments, suppression, followed the slightest remark that did not indicate the most lively satisfaction at every public fact great or small. There has been no change in the law, yet the press has suddenly recovered its liberty to an extent unheard of before in Europe when the persons of sovereigns are the subjects; and the free violence of their expressions about the late demi-god very far excels anything we are accustomed to see in partizan [sic] newspapers of the United States, even during a presidential canvass. The Government here does not interfere, but their course will soon be checked by reclamations from the Tuilleries [sic].

The transition of Italian sentiment is very great, but it is not greater than the change of policy that has provoked it. Up to the 8th of July Napoleon pursued one course of action with an *abandon* the most complete. On that day he stopt [sic] short in the road and commenced a new series of steps in the opposite direction. The most ingenious imagination fails to discover a reason of this change wholly satisfactory. His

own proclamation places it in the imminent danger of a general war. But no facts that have yet leaked out justify the supposition that this danger, although great, was so very sudden and near as to give solid cause for a movement so abrupt. Many suppose that there was dissidence between himself and Cavour as to the policy pursued in the States of the Church. But I have ascertained that this was not the fact. Cavour sent the Piedmontese Commissioner and other officers to Bologna after the affair of Perugia by the advice of Napoleon given in the camp after Solferino. Others suppose that the French sovereign was displeased by the revolutionary movement in Hungary. But here again my investigations lead to a contrary conclusion. Kossuth, Klapka and the rest are here in Turin by Napoleon's wish, and had received from him direct request to raise Hungary.

The Piedmontese politicians who believed in the chivalrous and disinterested enthusiasm of their ally are reduced to the improbable supposition that his brain has been injured by the hot weather. But those who took an unfavorable view of the man from the first are less astonished than others. They account for all on the theory of selfish calculation successfully accomplished. Napoleon, say these, had three ends in view: to satisfy the army that he was a great general, to convince the French that their sovereign was the most powerful in Europe; to destroy the increasing power of Austria in Italy and to get for himself a preponderating influence in the peninsula. At the date of the armistice all these ends had been accomplished, and the extraordinary and unexpected unanimity with which all Italy declared for annexation and Victor Emanuel satisfied him that, if he went farther, he might build up at his side a liberal kingdom so strong that it would cause him trouble. Hence he made a peace with the Austrian despot which leaves him all the glory and all the influence of the war, while providing for his ally sufficiently to render the result supportable; and, having gotten out of the affair all the benefit possible, he leaves off, caring as little for the hasty execration of the Italians as he did for their extravagant admiration.

It must be also recollected that he had ended the easy part of the campaign and only arrived at its real difficulties. So long as the war was in the field, French soldiers and generals beat the Austrians with satisfaction and glory. But the battles were over and the sieges were now to commence, and we know how long it takes sometimes to reduce fortresses defended like Sebastopol on the modern system of earthen batteries sending three cross fires on every point of ground within a mile of their lines. Rifled cannon might reduce them, but not in one glorious

day. Meanwhile the heat has become phenomenal. The thermometer shows a hundred degrees in the shade. The Quadrilateral stands on the hottest and most unhealthy spot of ground in Italy. The blue lake of Garda breeds some other things than swans, the « vocal reeds » of the Mincio are the hot beds of typhus fever. If the French army had to settle down into trenches for two months, they would lose more men by ignominious malady than if they fought a battle of Solferino every week, and might become tired not only of the war but of their general. « The Gauls, » says C. J. Caesar, « are quick and full of ardour for war, but they are also most easily discouraged by unexpected difficulties and cannot support reverses. » L. N. Bonaparte knows the character of the French too well not to see a great resemblance between them and those Gauls. He has plucked the laurel in the morning of its freshness, without waiting to witness the effects of noon-day on its glittering leaves.

Such are briefly some of the speculations most common here at this time and on these affairs. But certainty is not yet attainable, and it is prudent to let events explain the singular treaty concluded before pronouncing opinions on the motives of those who have made it.— It is now said on great authority that *there will be no Congress*. The two emperors have determined to arrange all details between themselves, and then have the treaty signed by their ordinary ministers to meet at Zurich.

### *Postscriptum*

July, 19

Count Arese has found it utterly impossible to form a Ministry, and M. Urban Rattazzi has been called up to do the disagreeable work.

M. Rattazzi is a politician of the liberal party who was sometime a member of the Cavour Ministry. Two years ago he was obliged to retire from that position on account of personal unpopularity in the country, arising, it is said, solely from a disagreeable manner and temper. He has been probably selected now because he has less to sacrifice than any other leading man.

But he appears to find as much difficulty in the task as Count Arese, and up to the present moment there is no Ministry.

Count Cavour retains position *ad interim*. When a new minister is found, he intends leaving the country to travel for sometime in the mountains of Switzerland. So says his organ at least.

*Dispaccio n 119*

Turin, July 24, 1859

Sir: The *exequatur* of W. L. Patterson to be Consul at Genoa has been signed by the Prince Regent and transmitted with his commission to the Consulate of that port. Mr Patterson will find it there on his arrival.

I have had the honour to receive your dispatch No. [29], dated at Washington the 30th of June, enclosing a paper addressed to the Minister of the United States at Paris partly on the conduct to be observed by the agents of your Government in Europe during the war which has unexpectedly ended. That portion of your dispatch has been rendered inapplicable by the march of events. But a much larger portion of the document addressed to Mr. Mason relates to certain general principles which the Government of the United States wishes to see introduced into the code of nations. You have directed me to present those principles to the Government of Sardinia and to endeavour to obtain its support to them. This I shall do on all fitting occasions and to the best of my ability. I can however never hope to state the ideas of the Government of the United States on these subjects more clearly and forcibly than your Excellency has done in the paper above alluded to; and as a first step in the matter I have thought proper to communicate a copy of it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Turin, eliminating, of course, the first few paragraphs, which contain special statements and orders respecting a situation no longer existing.

I have therefore addressed a note to the Minister containing a brief explanation of my own, which you will find appended [A], and added in the form of an extract all that portion of your dispatch to Mr. Mason following the words «The tendency of modern civilization,» etc., to the end.

I shall endeavour to obtain a definite reply from the Sardinian Government, and, if I get one, shall hasten to transmit it. But I anticipate great difficulty in procuring an answer beyond an acknowledgement of my letter. For I know both from observation and experience that this Government is indisposed to engage in movements of this description or to occupy itself with abstract ideas concerning the general good of humanity. Its attention is too completely taken up with struggles for aggrandizement and selfish interests to care about such things. It is also



too weak to interfere with effect, and is content to follow the lead of stronger powers in their views of international law.

In the year 1856 Mr. Marcy caused me to address the Sardinian Government on similar topics. In that year the Congress of Paris, to which Sardinia was a party, communicated to the American Government a declaration of maritime law, containing among other things a clause for the abolition of privateering. The United States refused to agree and directed me to state its reasons. I did so in writing, and, not receiving a definite reply, I had an interview with Count Cavour to discuss the subject. But I failed to gain from him any judgment on the counterpropositions of Mr. Marcy. Indeed I found the ideas of the Minister on these subjects to be very ill-defined; he said frankly at the conclusion of the conversation that he was not prepared to express an opinion on the matter.

Receiving no further instructions from the Secretary of State, the negotiation rested at this point.

There is, however, a practical question growing out of the declaration of the Paris Congress which should in my opinion be settled by some definite understanding. The powers therein represented having declared privateering an illegal mode of waging war; and the United States persisting in its use, how will our privateers be treated by those powers should the exigencies of future wars force them to enter their ports? Suppose the case of a war between the United States and France;—and that an American privateer, having taken a French prize, should be forced by the pursuit of French men-of-war to run into the port of Genoa,—how would she be treated by the Sardinian Government? Hitherto I believe privateers have not only been allowed the same privileges of refuge in neutral ports with men-of-war, but in some cases they have sold their prizes there and always have sheltered them until a change of situation. Will their position be altered by the operation of the maritime law laid down by the Congress, or will the Declaration have no effect on the privateers of nations not adhering to it? Would the Sardinian Government, in the case above mentioned, allow the privateer to keep his prize at Genoa, sheltered by Sardinian guns, till he could carry it safely home, or would the Sardinian Government think itself bound to give it up to France as having been unlawfully captured.

I suggested these points in my conversation with Mr. Cavour. He said he did not know—he hoped that no such question would ever arise—that there was no danger of war now,—that there was an abundance of

time before the United States would go to war in Europe to ascertain the proper course; etc, etc

***John M. Daniel a Giuseppe Dabormida***<sup>152</sup>

*Copia*

Turin, July 24, 1859

Sir. Several indications of a disposition on the part of European nations to mitigate the calamities of war and to diminish its ill effects on the general welfare have lately become known to the Government of the United States and have excited its warm interest. That Government has long desired to see certain principles, already adopted as regulating the practice of war upon land, introduced also into the usages of maritime warfare, extended to their legitimate limits, and established as parts of the settled system of international law recognized by the common consent of the civilized world to be obligatory on all nations. The Government of the United States deems the present a proper time to bring the subject directly before the attention of other governments.

On the 22d of May 1859, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Cavour, communicated to this Legation a statement of certain rules by which his Government had determined to guide its conduct respecting neutral and enemy's vessels and property at sea during the war lately ended.

I hastened to send a copy of that statement to my Government, and and I have lately received from the Secretary of State at Washington a communication bearing on these topics which contains a complete exposition of the policy of the United States towards belligerent powers, and of its views upon the maritime law of war, which I am directed to impart to the Government of Sardinia.

The positions of the Sardinian declaration respecting neutral vessels at sea, blockades, and contraband of war, so far as they extend, meet with the approval of the Government of the United States. That Government however desires to see them fixed in the settled code of nations, instead of resting, as they now do, on temporary arrangements and partial conventions. It is also extremely desirous that the principles laid down respecting blockades and contraband of war should be extended to their logical conclusions and their application more distinctly defined. I am

<sup>152</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 119 di Daniel

directed to state its views on these points to the Government of Sardinia, in the hope of obtaining its concurrence in and support to them; and I cannot better do so than by furnishing your Excellency with an extract from the communication of the Honorable Secretary, which you will find at the conclusion of this note

As the views therein expressed accord in spirit with the declaration made by Sardinia at the commencement of the late war, and as they are conceived to be consistent with reason and justice, I hope that they will meet with your Excellency's approval and that you will enable me to inform my Government that they do so.

For should the enlightened and highly respected Government of Sardinia give its support and sanction to these liberal principles and ideas, a great step will be made towards a result which the United States believe to be highly beneficial for all mankind,—their final introduction into the general system of international law, recognized as binding on the conduct of all belligerents in all future wars.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 120*

Turin, July 26, 1859

Sir: M. Rattazzi has succeeded in forming a Ministry; but not in securing the chief place in it to himself. This is given to General Lamarmora, who will be at the same time President of the Council and Minister of War. The explanation of this arrangement is this:—Rattazzi, though the abler man and of more liberal views, is personally unpopular. He is also of the middle class, while Lamarmora, like Cavour, is patrician, and this is an aristocratic country.

General Dabormida is Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is the same who held that office in 1853 on my arrival here, and who refused the *exequatur* of Foresti then for the first time appointed American Consul at Genoa. At the time of the Crimean war he was obliged to leave the Ministry on account of dissentiment [sic] with Mr. Cavour, a man who brooked no opposition anywhere and permitted no will but his own in the Cabinet under his presidency.

Rattazzi is Minister of the Interior. The other names are little known, Oytana Minister of Finance, Monticelli, Public Works; Miglietti, Justice; and Casati, Minister of Public Instruction.

This Ministry has already entered on the ungrateful task of retracing

the too hasty steps taken by their predecessors in a moment of hope and triumph. It has recalled the Piedmontese commissioners from the Roman Legations, from Modena and Tuscany. About Parma nothing was said in the abbreviated publications of the Villafranca Treaty yet given to the world, and Sardinia acts as if she intended to keep it, for, during the past week only, the custom-houses between the kingdom and the duchy were shut up and abolished.

But the commissions in the other states have left behind provisional governments, and these governments as well as the people of those states make no secret of their determination to resist a return to the old order of things. Everywhere I hear of enrolment of volunteers and distribution of arms to be used against the dukes and the Pope should they attempt to resume their sway. A vast number of petitions and addresses to the King of Sardinia, signed it would seem by the whole adult population who can write, are sent here to Turin, in all of which these people declare that they will not be severed from the Piedmontese territory and Government, and it is now the rumour that polls will be opened and a vote taken to decide the election of rulers in Parma, Modena, Tuscany and the Roman Legations. This is certainly the case in Tuscany. The Archduke having abdicated in favor of his son, the latter has offered as a bribe to the people a constitution and the tricoloured flag. The reply of the Provisional Government is a publication in the *Monitore Toscano*:

« The Tuscans are called on to elect Representatives for themselves in a General Assembly which shall decide the fate of this country.

Their vote on this occasion is a thing so grave that no popular act can be more important. For it is this vote which shall say to Europe: "We will not and we cannot have again over us the House of Austria. We will have no more of it because it is opposed to Italian nationality, because it is spotted with the blood which flowed at Solferino, because it has been our eternal misfortune, and because it will trouble always the peace of Italy." »

The Duke of Modena is said to be at Mantua, whence it is supposed he will make an effort to recover his Duchy with some troops that followed him in his flight. Of all the sovereigns now in distress he is the one who excites least sympathy. In 1856 the Government of the United States gave me business to transact which caused me to visit Parma and Modena. A description of the state of the country as I saw it would occupy too much space, but from one fact, not an exception but a piece

of the whole, his Government may be judged. *The baking of bread was a monopoly of the Duke* No private oven was allowed in his dominions. So with everything else the grinding of flour, etc.—all was in the hands of the Government. When he fled from Modena, he carried with him all the public money from the Treasury, the pictures, the furniture, etc. What he could not carry he sold, even to the bed he slept on the last night. But this was not all the Duke carried off. His prisons were full of political prisoners. These too he transported with him to Austrian territory, where I believe these unfortunate persons are even now lodge in foreign dungeons. It may be imagined that the people who had the honour to belong to this pious gentleman will never belong to him again if they can get anyone else to rule over them. But the Duchess of Parma is a very different person and excites great sympathy. She was a French princess of amiable character, sympathetic manners and good intentions, who did her best to give satisfaction in the part which her birth and circumstances had imposed upon her. Devoid of all presumptuous and arrogant sentiment, her general style of life was simple, gay and popular. Having no army and no fortifications to keep up, or jails to build, there were few taxes of the ambitious spirit of Piedmont. England and Russia are said to have intervened in her behalf; and, if Parma remains with Piedmont, that some other territory will be allotted to this lady.

It is now almost universally believed here that Napoleon III will neither permit Austria to use force for reinstating the old order of things nor lend his own arms to that purpose. The meaning of the Villafranca treaty is now said to be that the dukes and the Pope and the Duchess must recover their territory by their own unassisted endeavours, if at all. If this be so, the treaty of Villafranca, so far as those potentates were concerned, was a mere stultification and mockery. The idea is nevertheless so generally credited at Turin in official circles as to give rise to belief that the Government has received authoritative intimations to that effect.

But even should this country succeed in holding fast to the duchies, by force or intrigue, by diplomatic arrangement at Zurich or vote of the people at home, it will never be consoled by them for the loss of its hope for Venice. In the lamentations made for the fate of the Queen of the Adriatic a good part of selfish sentiment is mingled. The possession of the Venetian port and territory was more necessary to the force and wealth of this country than all the rest of Italy together. With

Genoa and Venice, Sardinia would command the commerce of the two seas; and the magnificent lines of railway now completed between the two ports would be the direct route from Western Europe to the Orient. If this Kingdom thus extended across the northern part of the peninsula, the acquisition of the rest of it would be a simple question of time, and it would from the beginning be strong enough to defend its own against Austria without much assistance. It would be fully able to form what alliances it pleased and would not necessarily lean on France. It is quite probable that Napoleon perceived this fact when he got to the Mincio, if not before. As he has left it, Sardinia exists only by the will of the French Emperor and must be the vassal of French policy so long as a great Austrian army can come from Peschiera to Milan in a march of two days.

In breaking up the petrified network of despotism which covered Italy, Napoleon III has done it a service even though its present condition be more unsettled than it then was. In adding to Piedmont the splendid and wealthy province of Lombardy he has nearly doubled its importance. But in Italy gratitude is a sentiment less abundant than suspicion, and public sentiment is not now more kindly to Napoleon, despite his explanations to the *Corps d'Etat*, which your Minister at Paris has doubtless recounted, than at the date of my last dispatch. In those explanations he again gave the danger of a general war as the sole reason for the sudden change of his policy. But Prussia has since then denied with much appearance of truth that she had ever had or indicated a disposition to draw the sword in defence of the Austrian possession of Italy; and the Emperor of Austria has solemnly proclaimed that the reason why *he* accepted the peace offered by Napoleon was the fact that he had been abandoned by his natural allies. French publicists labour to reconcile the contradiction of these statements made by the two Emperors. The following is the most ingenious explanation I have seen:—

« Austria may say she has been abandoned because the Prussian Government made its assistance dependent on conditions which Austria could not think of accepting unless compelled by further reverses. The Emperor Napoleon, on his side, may say that the struggle was about to assume larger proportions, because he foresaw that, after another victory of his arms, Austria would probably submit to the conditions of Prussia. After the taking of Verona and Venice, Prussia, Germany, England, and perhaps even Russia, would have proposed their mediation and demanded that Venetia should be left to Austria. That intention was

well known France certainly could not have given up Venetia, when once conquered, and the issue would therefore have been a general war. German unity would have been realized in a spirit hostile to France; and the ruin of Austria, for the benefit of Prussia, would have been the result. So that to give another province to the King of Piedmont, it would not only have been necessary to support a war against two-thirds of Europe, but German unity would have been realised, and a work thus accomplished which ever since the time of Francis I it has been the object of French policy to prevent. On the other hand, the Emperor of Austria, being certain that, after more battles, after yielding to the exigencies of Prussia and establishing the sway of the house of Brandenburg over Germany, he would still be obliged to cede Lombardy, preferred treating directly with the Emperor Napoleon on the very bases which the mediating powers would have proposed. He could therefore say with truth that the desertion of his allies had compelled him to make peace; and the Emperor Napoleon could also justly affirm that he made peace to avoid a general war » Such a view of the affair has still great difficulties, at least so far as England and Russia are involved. M. Cavour, who has completely retired from all public affairs, and who is now I believe travelling abroad, is said to have retained his opinion that the treaty of Villafranca was nothing more or less than the result of the *temporary insanity* of a great personage.

As to the great scheme of the Italian Confederation, the sole official light yet shed on it comes from Rome. The following plan is said to be that of Cardinal Antonelli:—

« Art. 1. The states which shall, in consequence of the treaty between the Emperors of France and Austria, form parts of the Italian Confederation, reciprocally guarantee the integrity of their territories against all enemies foreign and domestic.

Art. 2 Each state of the Confederation shall keep a Representative at Rome, near the Holy Father, the Honorary President, and all these representatives shall form a Diet, on which it will be incumbent.

To provide for the public defence by organizing a general army of contingents, of which it shall dispose, and to provide for the territorial division of the states which shall form a part of the Confederation;

To provide general laws for an uniform system of weights, measures, moneys; to harmonize the postal system and commercial tariffs of the several states; and to unite under common arrangements the lines of railroads

And to take the initiative steps in all that concerns the general public interests of the states which compose the Confederation.

Representation in the Diet shall be obligatory on these states. But the action of the Diet shall not be binding on any state when it counsels changes in its internal administration »

The Sardinian Ministry yesterday appointed the Chevalier Des Ambrois de Nevêche its representative at the Conference at Zurich which is to sign the Treaty of Peace. As the King took no part in the formation of that Treaty at Villafranca and was not present at the interview, it was thought that Sardinia would refuse to send a Minister to the Conference. But she has been compelled to depart from that position by the fact that Austria will make an attempt at Zurich to place on this Kingdom that proportion of her public debt which would fall on the provinces of Lombardy. The Sardinian Minister will resist this pretension; but, if Sardinia shall be obliged to assume the public debts of the Austrian Government in Lombardy, he is instructed to present a counterclaim of debts due by Austria to the provinces of Lombardy. The Ministry here is busily engaged in manufacturing this account, which will contain all the requisitions, & c, made by the Austrian generals in these latter times, all the paper money now circulating in Lombardy, all the coin bearing the Austrian stamp, all the military works executed in Lombardy by the Austrians during the war, all the cost of transportation to the Mincio, & c., &c. They will make a heavy bill, though not perhaps the whole debt due by the province.

### *Postscript*

It is said that the Duke of Modena has collected no less than 5,000 mercenary troops in Venetia. On the other hand, the Provisional Government of the Duchy has 10 000 men under arms.

The Duchess of Parma remains quiet in Switzerland seeking to recover her position by diplomatic means. She has written an autograph letter to Napoleon.

Doubt is today thrown on the statement that the Duke of Tuscany has abdicated in favor of his son.



Turin, 16 juillet 1859

Monsieur le Ministre. J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint l'*exequatur* de la patente de Consul des Etats-Unis à Gênes en faveur de Mr. William L. Patterson, et je vous fais en même temps retour de la Patente que vous avez bien voulu me communiquer par votre note du 8. Juillet 1859. J'ai appris avec une satisfaction sincère les dispositions bienveillantes que vous m'annoncez de la part de votre Gouvernement envers la famille de la malheureuse femme Rebora décédée à la suite des blessures reçues par des Marins du *Macedonian*. J'aime à être persuadé comme vous, M. le Ministre, que la Législature des Etats-Unis s'associera avec empressement à cette pensée de réparation et je vous remercie vivement de l'initiative que vous en avez prise et de l'intérêt que vous y avez apporté.

Veuillez agréer, M. le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

**Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel**<sup>154</sup>

Turin, 20 juillet 1859

Monsieur le Ministre: Le Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, ayant daigné accepter la démission du Ministère que j'avais l'honneur de présider, a bien voulu ensuite confier à S. E. le Général Alphonse De La Marmora la présidence de son nouveau cabinet, et nommer M. le Lieutenant Général Chev. Dabormida aux fonctions de Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires Etrangères.

En vous annonçant, Monsieur le Ministre, ces déterminations de S. M. qui mettent fin aux rapports officiels que j'ai eu l'avantage d'entretenir jusqu'ici avec vous, je ne veux pas omettre de vous témoigner combien je vous suis personnellement reconnaissant de l'extrême obligeance que vous avez bien voulu apporter dans ces relations et qui m'en laisse le souvenir le plus agréable.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, avec l'expression de ces sentiments l'assurance réitérée de ma considération très distinguée.

<sup>153</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 120 di Daniel Minghetti firma per il Ministro

<sup>154</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 120 di Daniel

***Giuseppe Dabormida a John M. Daniel***<sup>155</sup>

Turin, 20 juillet 1859

Monsieur le Ministre Le Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, m'ayant fait l'honneur de m'appeler à la direction du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, je m'empresse de vous prévenir que j'entre aujourd'hui même dans l'exercice des nouvelles et honorables fonctions qu'il a plu à S. M. de me confier.

Je me félicite, Monsieur le Ministre, des rapports officiels que je vais avoir l'honneur d'entretenir avec vous, persuadé comme je le suis qu'en vouant tous mes soins à cultiver les relations heureusement existantes entre le Gouvernement du Roi et celui des Etats-Unis d'Amérique je pourrai compter toujours sur les dispositions les plus obligeantes de votre part et sur votre concours amical dans le but de les maintenir et de les rendre de plus en plus profitables aux intérêts des deux pays.

Veillez agréer, je vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***Marco Minghetti a John M. Daniel***<sup>156</sup>

Turin, 18 juillet 1859

Par la note du 4 Mai dernier le soussigné Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a eu l'honneur de faire connaître à la Légation des Etats-Unis d'Amérique les graves circonstances qui avaient obligé le Gouvernement du Roi de suspendre momentanément le service de la correspondance télégraphique chiffrée.

Le soussigné s'empresse maintenant de prévenir Mr John M. Daniel, Ministre Résident des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, que cette suspension cessera dès aujourd'hui et que par conséquent la transmission des dépêches télégraphiques chiffrées sera entièrement libre aux termes des conventions internationales.

Il saisit en même temps cette occasion de réitérer à Mr. Daniel les assurances de sa haute considération.

<sup>155</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 120 di Daniel

<sup>156</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 120 di Daniel Minghetti firma per il Ministro

*Dispaccio n 121*

Turin, July 31, 1859

Sir. I have this morning had an interview with the King Victor Emanuel, and presented to him the sealed letter of the President relative to the marriage of the Princess Clotilde.

The King charged me with a message to the President which I now deliver to your Excellency. The King said that he had reason to believe that he had had the personal sympathy and good wishes of the President and all the citizens of the United States in his late struggle; that this fact had given him very great pleasure; that he had himself a great regard for and sympathy with America; and that he wished me expressly to tell the President this as a message coming immediately from him and to thank him for the good feeling of all Americans towards him and his country.

The conversation which ensued was not of an official character, but, as I am the representative of the United States here, I may be permitted to state that this personage, who has now a direct influence on the affairs of state, which he never had before, made me special assurances of personal regard and good-will, and, at parting, shook me warmly by the hand, expressing a desire to see me oftener. He is about to leave Turin for a royal progress through Lombardy, and advised me to visit the country at the same time.

The new Ministry have published a paper, addressed to the governors of the provinces by Mr Rattazzi, which is looked on as the programme of the new Government and its policy. So much importance is attached to this paper that I am induced to translate and send it in the appendix A.

Matters stand as they did at the date of my last dispatch. The Duchies are arming and have chosen Farini, one of the Piedmontese Commissioners lately recalled, as their Dictator. But all things wait now the action of the Conference at Zurich.

One of the most interesting points yet in doubt, and to be decided there, is the amount of the public debt of Austria to be assumed by Sardinia as part of her duty on taking the province of Lombardy. In this connection the following statistics of that province, believed to be correct, may not be uninteresting.

« This province, which has a superficies of 377 square German miles, contains 2,903,874 inhabitants. It has contributed to the total receipts of Austria in direct and indirect taxes, which in 1856 amounted to

335,976,156 florins, a sum of 36,185,641 florins. That part is proportionally very considerable; for whilst in the whole monarchy the tax is on an average 8 fl. 53 kr. per head, it amounts in Lombardy on an average to 12 fl. 28 kr. Both in an agricultural and industrial point of view Lombardy was one of the richest provinces of the monarchy. The value of landed property is estimated officially, according to the net produce, at a capital of 1,054,722,666 fl., and the value of the soil only at 159,409,925 fl. The annual industrial revenue of the Lombards, among whom the lists of the contributions reckon 7,304 dealers and manufacturers, 1,216 hawkers, 60,7000 workmen in manufacturies, 56,388 servants, and 357,489 journeymen, is estimated at 61,858 fl. The portion of the Austrian debt which Lombardy would have to pay in case the treaty of peace should throw part of the debt on Sardinia may be estimated in two different manners:—1. in taking the population as a basis, and as the Austrian debt is equal to 55 fl. a head, the share of Lombardy would be 159,000,000 fl., 2. in taking as a basis the taxes paid, and as Lombardy pays the ninth part of the whole of Austria, her share of the debt would be 250,000,000 fl. This last manner of calculating would be most advantageous to Austria. »

***Circolare di Urbano Rattazzi ai governatori ed agli intendenti generali delle provincie del Regno***<sup>157</sup>

Torino, 25 luglio 1859

L'indole degli avvenimenti in mezzo ai quali si è compiuta l'annessione della Lombardia al Regno subalpino ha dato occasione agli esimii uomini che formavano il consiglio della Corona di rassegnare il loro mandato. Ma tale cambiamento non induce alcuna seria variazione nell'indirizzo politico che con tanta sapienza e fermezza essi mantennero finora al Governo dello Stato.

I sentimenti che legano il Re ed il paese al glorioso imperatore ed alla grande nazione, di cui regge le sorti; la necessità di assicurare e di lealmente eseguire nell'interesse della comune patria le condizioni della pace; l'opportunità di far partecipare quanto prima le provincie annesse alle franchigie di cui sono in possesso le antiche, lungi dal rimuovercene,

<sup>157</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 121 di Daniel. Se ne dà il testo italiano da *Il Diritto* del 28 luglio 1859.

devono persuaderci sempre più della convenienza di rimanere fedeli all'indirizzo che da oltre due lustri ci assicura, nell'accordo dell'ordine colla libertà, tutti i benefizi del nostro reggimento politico.

Eppertanto il nuovo Consiglio continuerà a promuovere quanto più largamente lo svolgimento dei grandi principii che il magnanimo largitore dello Statuto poneva a base del nostro diritto pubblico per l'avanzamento de' suoi popoli ed a salvaguardia dei destini dell'Italia, la quale troverà nelle riforme compite e nelle libertà praticate a nostro esempio, via a conseguire senza scosse quell'indipendenza che il voto dell'Europa in una colle ragioni della giustizia e della civiltà reclamano a vicenda.

L'opera che il nuovo ministero è chiamato a condurre a termine in un breve stadio, è altrettanto ardua, quanto sono importanti gli effetti che devono derivarne al paese intero. Essa ha perciò mestieri del concorso franco e della cooperazione intelligente di tutti gli ufficiali preposti alla pubblica azienda nelle diverse parti del regno. Il sottoscritto si rivolge quindi a quelli che dipendono dal suo dicastero, invitandoli, fidente, ad immedesimarsi nel pensiero del Governo e ad agevolargli con ogni studio l'adempimento del mandato che gli è imposto dalla fiducia della Corona.

A questo fine si faranno solleciti di calmare gli animi troppo presto sconcertati, di rialzare le depresse speranze, di assodare la fede nel diritto e nella libertà, di togliere di mezzo tutte le cagioni di dissidio, di afforzare dovunque le condizioni dell'ordine, di rannodare infine intorno al trono costituzionale del Re tutti gli interessi, tutte le aspirazioni, tutte le influenze legittime della nazione.

Il Governo del Re vuol essere sempre il Governo di tutto il paese, e non mai quello di un partito. E se egli è proprio degli ordini liberi che la nazione vada divisa in partiti, egli è parimenti una condizione essenziale di questi ordini stessi che le potestà, onde emana direttamente la guarentigia dei diritti e degli interessi dei cittadini, rimangano aliene da ogni spirito di parte.

L'autorità morale dei pubblici uffiziali si accrescerà di tanto quanto si mostreranno più compresi dei loro doveri a simile riguardo.

Nè vuolsi tampoco dimenticare dai rappresentanti del potere centrale nelle diverse provincie, che secondo lo spirito delle nostre istituzioni, essi sono in pari tempo e per molti rispetti i rappresentanti delle provincie medesime verso a questo potere stesso e che sono ivi costituiti per proteggere, secondare, afforzare, nei termini della legge, l'azione locale sì pubblica che privata, e non per negarla, soffocarla od impigliarla a profitto esclusivo dell'azione governativa. Non si deve per fermo scalzare presso di noi l'ordinamento accentrativo che costituisce la forza dei

grandi Stati moderni, ma non si può, senza pericolo di scemarne l'efficacia, esagerarlo, giacché ciò riuscirebbe a scapito dell'energia che si svolge naturalmente nella cerchia comunale e provinciale ed in quella delle private associazioni, onde di tanto cresce la potenza politica ed economica delle nazioni.

E siccome è mente del Governo di proporre riforme che le libertà comunali e provinciali allarghino e più ampiamente traducano in atto il concorso della Nazione con tutti i poteri dello Stato, gli ufficiali pubblici avranno cura di secondarlo, preparando, per quanto loro tocca, le popolazioni cui sono preposti a questa estensione delle pubbliche malleverie.

Nelle provincie dove l'istituzione rappresentativa non è peranco in vigore, essi procureranno di anticipare sul momento in cui ne saranno dotate, cercando di conoscere per conformarsi, secondo la ragione pubblica il consentirà, il voto delle popolazioni loro affidate, circondandosi a questo fine degli uomini che per lumi, per la moralità e per altre qualità sono tenuti come i rappresentanti naturali della contrada. In questo stesso intento, avranno cura di rimuovere dagli uffizi le persone che non godono della pubblica considerazione.

Il Governo del più leale dei Re deve non solo essere, ma altresì parere agli occhi di tutti il più onesto ed il più morale dei Governi. La Nazione ha diritto di apparire degna delle sue libertà. Epperò tutti i funzionari pubblici non lasceranno sfuggire delle occasioni, che si affaceranno loro, di rendere omaggio alla moralità civile.

La sicurezza pubblica dovrà infine attirare in supremo grado la loro attenzione. Accade spesso dopo le grandi guerre e le forti emozioni politiche che l'ordine sia a questo riguardo più o meno gravemente compromesso; essi dovranno quindi coll'aiuto delle Autorità municipali e della Guardia nazionale, che avrassi ad ordinare in ogni Comune, provvedere in guisa che tutte le persone, qualunque sia la loro condizione, e tutte le proprietà, qualunque sia la loro natura, abbiano a tenersi sicure sotto la tutela pubblica; avvertendo che egli è essenzialmente da ciò che con ragione i popoli misurano e riconoscono la bontà e la forza dei Governi.

In questi termini lo scrivente si ripromette da tutti gli Ufficiali, che tanto nelle antiche quanto nelle novelle provincie dipendono dal suo Dicastero, l'operosità ed il concorso necessario al compimento dell'opera che gli è assegnata.

*Dispaccio n. 122*

Turin, September 6, 1859

Sir: Light at last begins to dawn and something like certainty can now be attained in observation on the tangled web of Italian politics. Two results may be regarded as highly probable, 1st That an European Congress on the affairs of this peninsula can no longer be avoided; 2d That Tuscany, Parma and Modena will be annexed to Sardinia, which will soon rank as a power of the second order.

I have remained silent for a month, because during that time no reliable fact could be given and no speculation be made sufficiently supported to be worthy of attention. It was also expected that the Conference of Ambassadors at Zurich would proclaim its decision and display the means of enforcing the treaty of Villafranca. But though the Conference has been in session every day for a month, it is now well known that nothing whatever has been decided there, and the Ambassadors are at this moment just where they were on the first day of their meeting. The Ministry at Turin has no longer a motive to conceal its plan of action, and now makes no secret of the fact that their representative, Des Ambrois, had orders to prevent any decision at Zurich. This man was well chosen for such a purpose, and has admirably fulfilled his mission. His scruples, his difficulties, his propositions, his objections, his couriers to Turin, have been endless, and the result is that the Conference weaved the web of Penelope during all the month of July.

The sole object of the Sardinian Government has been to gain time, that the people of the duchies might declare themselves. This they have done in a very effectual and orderly manner. They have made known their intention and wish to become parts of Sardinia by popular election fairly and deliberately conducted and have appointed delegates to propose their annexation to the King of this country. The delegation from Tuscany<sup>158</sup> is now leaving the city after audience with the King, and the following is an accurate translation of the words which they addressed to him.

<sup>158</sup> Gli inviati della Toscana erano Ugolino della Gherardesca, Scipione Borghese, Rinaldo Ruschi, Giambattista Giorgini e Pietro Adami, quelli di Parma Giuseppe Mischi, Jacopo Sanvitale, Giuseppe Verdi, Carlo Fioruzzi, Giancarlo Dosi, quelli di Modena Pietro Muratori, Francesco Selmi, Luigi Ancini, Enrico Brizzolari, Giacomo Sacerdoti e Luigi Zini, quelli della Romagna Giuseppe Scarabelli, Giovanni Bentivoglio, Giovanni Gozzadini, Luigi Tanari, Luigi Salvoni, Achille Laderchi e Angelo Marescotti

« Majesty, An unanimous vote of the National Assembly, the faithful interpreter of the sentiments of all the people, has solemnly declared the will of Tuscany to become part of an Italian kingdom under the Constitutional sceptre of your Majesty.

The Government of Tuscany, commissioned to implore your Majesty to give a favorable reception to this demand, has accepted the task with that pleasure which arises from the union of duty with an ardent personal desire.

Majesty! if this homage of popular faith and devotion should have no other effect than the enlargement of the State, we might doubt the success of our prayer; but, since the will of the Tuscan Assembly is inspired by the love of Italian nationality and has in view the grandeur and prosperity of a common country, we are comforted by the hope that the thought of Italy will weigh more in your generous heart than all other calculations, and that you will deign to render Tuscany joyful by an adhesion to the proposition which her legitimate representatives have made in the face of the world. »

The King answered.

« I am profoundly grateful for the vote of the Tuscan Assembly which you have made known to me. I thank you for myself and for my people.

I receive the declarations you have made as a solemn manifestation of the will of the whole Tuscan people, wishing to end in their land, the mother of modern civilization, the last vestiges of foreign rule, and desiring to add to the constitutional cause a strong realm which will place Italy in position to suffice for her own protection.

The Tuscan Assembly must have understood, nevertheless, and all Italy must equally well know that the fulfilment of your wishes can only be effected by general negotiations for the arrangement of Italian affairs

According to your wish, I shall endeavor to maintain the rights conferred on me by your votes and I will defend the cause of Tuscany before those powers to whom with reason the Assembly looks with hope and especially before the generous Emperor of the French who has already done so much for the cause of Italian nationality

Europe will not refuse, I think, to govern its conduct towards Tuscany by the same principles which it has already observed with Greece, Belgium, and the Danubian Principalities

Your noble country, Gentlemen, has given a wonderful example of moderation and concord in these latter days. To these virtues, taught



in the hard school of misfortune, you will now add that which conquers the most trying difficulties—the virtue of perseverance. »

The positions assumed in these addresses, which really represent the true state of affairs, are so admirable that it would seem impossible to drive the parties from them. An European Congress will be held, but it cannot avoid ratifying the popular will so declared.

Meantime France has shown no disposition to interfere by force in the affair, and, as to diplomacy unsupported by arms, it is in such a case an empty shadow. Louis Napoleon has sent two agents here to effect the restoration of the dukes by negotiation. The first, Count Reiset, [sic] <sup>159</sup> had an interview with the Ministry and King to set forth the wishes of his master and to urge them to use the influence of Sardinia for their accomplishment. The King made a reply so firm that all further tentatives here were abandoned. He told the Frenchman in effect that if he could do no better, he would relinquish all ambition and resume his old position as the little king of five millions of people; but for no price would he become now or at any future time the gendarme of France and Austria in Italy. From Turin Reiset went to Parma, where he got his answer in the form of a queer popular demonstration. The people printed an enormous woodcut of the Sardinian King, bearing in huge letters an inscription declaring him to be « Victor Emanuel, *Our King* ». This they thrust in his face wherever he went. The reception room at the railroad was papered with it. When he went to his carriage it was already swung to the door-handle and set upright in the seat. When he went to bed he found *Nostro Re* already between the sheets. Thence he proceeded to Modena, where he met Farini, the dictator. This gentleman received him with the most friendly cordiality, affecting to treat him simply as a distinguished traveller. But when Reiset proceeded to inform him that he had a mission to fulfil, the dictator asked for his credentials. The Minister answered that he had none for the so —styled dictator of Modena; whereupon the other rose from his seat and with a face of stone wished him a good morning and retired.

M. Reiset having made a complete failure, the Emperor sent Prince Joseph Poniatowski <sup>160</sup> with a like result. This last, however, in a mo-

<sup>159</sup> Conte Gustave de Reiset (1821-1905), profondo conoscitore dell'Italia

<sup>160</sup> Giuseppe Poniatowsky (1816-1873), principe di Monterotondo. Nato a Roma, si naturalizzò toscano. Fu deputato nel 1848 e ministro plenipotenziario a Parigi e a Londra. Diede le dimissioni nel 1853 e si fece francese. L'anno dopo (1854) fu nominato senatore. Nel 1859, Walewski lo inviò in Toscana per aiutare la dinastia di Lo-

ment of irritation let fall some threats of a armed intervention in case reason should fail, which have rendered necessary something like a distinct disclaimer of all such intention at Paris. All well-informed persons seem now to be satisfied that France will neither use force herself nor permit Austria to do so and that the dukes must be restored, if at all, by their own hands or the will of the people. If such be the fact, the question may be considered as settled. The duchies have abundant means of resisting any bands of mercenaries which their ex-lords can collect, and, if the national will is considered, the future Congress will have only to record and ratify foregone conclusions.

But the revolted Legations are in a very different position. The Pope has not abdicated by flight. What proceeds there is mere civil war between an acknowledged and actual sovereign and certain revolted provinces. There can be no just interference in such a case, or, if there is any, it will necessarily be on the side of the Government. The Pope has the whole Catholic world with him; and it is doubtful whether Bologna and Ancona can maintain their ground against his Swiss if the rest of Italy leaves them alone.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 123*

Turin, September 20, 1859

Sir: The duchies of Parma and Modena have sent delegates, chosen in the same manner as those of Tuscany, on a similar errand. They are now in this city and have offered the sovereignty of their several countries, in solemn audience, to the King of Sardinia.

The address of these delegates and the response of the King are mere repetitions of those made by the Tuscans and answered by Victor Emanuel as detailed in my last dispatch. They are so completely the same both in form and substance that I do not again translate them. The King accepts the sovereignty offered him on condition that it shall be ratified by an European Congress. He declares that he will defend the right of these nations to annex themselves to Sardinia and of himself to receive them as his subjects by all the means in his power.

Meanwhile the annexation is *de facto* accomplished. The duchies

rena, ma senza risultati positivi. Assieme al fratello Charles divenne poi patrizio fiorentino col titolo di principe di Monterotondo

are nominally under their own provisional government. But the arms of Sardinia are over all the public offices, the custom-house laws between the several states are no longer enforced, and Piedmontese agents exercise nearly all the functions of the Government. The Austrians pretend that all this is in contradiction to the will of the real majority of the people, but no impartial observer on the spot can think so. Except the hangers-on of the expelled dukes, those people appear to me perfectly unanimous in their desire to merge their separate existence in this monarchy and seriously determined to resist all efforts, whether made by diplomacy or by force, to thwart them in that purpose

I have seen no reason to change the opinion expressed in my last dispatch that they will be fully successful. Your Minister at Paris has doubtless sent you the singular note on the subject published by the *Monteur*. In this publication the French Emperor expresses great dissatisfaction at the course on which the Italians of Central Italy are proceeding. He warns them that France is the only country in the world that will go to war for an idea, that he considers France as having accomplished her mission in Italy; and that, as the Italians have not fulfilled their part in the treaty of Villafranca, he holds Austria to be absolved from all the conditions therein imposed on her. This note has produced but little impression here. It is regarded as a « *satisfaction verbale* » to Austria; and if carefully examined, will be found to be but little more. It declares that France will not restore the dukes by force, and this country no longer fears Austria. Indeed, it would be a doubtful and difficult task should that discouraged and indebted Empire undertake to subjugate Central Italy by arms now that it is really united under the present Sardinian Government.

I append to this dispatch a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs complimenting Captain Barron and the crew of the *Wabash* for their humane conduct in a late conflagration at Genoa. (Appendix A)

I have received and presented the three volumes of plates belonging to the *Exploring Expedition* lately received in box of books from your Department and append the note of the Government relating thereto.<sup>161</sup> (Appendix B.).

<sup>161</sup> L'istruzione n. 30, datata Washington, 12 luglio 1859, informava Daniel della spedizione dei documenti della I sessione del 35° congresso — in tutto sessantadue volumi — ad uso della Legazione e, in due tomi, delle mappe allegate ai volumi 13, 14 e 16 della *Exploring Expedition* degli S U.

**Giuseppe Dabormida a John M. Daniel**<sup>162</sup>

Turin, 15 septembre 1859

Monsieur le Ministre: Les officiers et l'équipage de la frégate des Etats-Unis d'Amérique *Wabash*, Capitaine Mr. Barron, ont prêté le concours le plus empressé et le plus efficace pour éteindre un incendie qui dans la nuit du 7 au 8 courant éclatait dans un des magasins du port-franc de Gênes et qui aurait pu causer de graves malheurs aux établissements de la Marine et à la ville.

Le commerce et la population de Gênes ont été vivement touchés du dévouement de ces braves marins, et il m'est bien agréable d'ajouter que le Gouvernement du Roi en a éprouvé une satisfaction toute particulière.

Veillez, je vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, vous rendre l'interprète de ces sentiments, et agréer les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

**Giuseppe Dabormida a John M. Daniel**<sup>163</sup>

Turin, 7 septembre 1859

Monsieur le Ministre: Je m'empresse de vous accuser réception de votre note du 4 courant et des trois volumes ainsi que de l'Atlas qu'elle accompagnait.

Veillez, je vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, remercier en notre nom votre Gouvernement de l'obligeant soin qu'il se donne de nous faire tenir par votre entremise la continuation du magnifique ouvrage destiné à illustrer les résultats de l'exploration scientifique des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Je saisis avec plaisir l'occasion de vous renouveler les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

<sup>162</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 123 di Daniel.

<sup>163</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 123 di Daniel

Dispaccio n. 124

Turin, October 18, 1859

Sir. On the 10th of this month I read in the *Monitore Toscano*, the official Gazette of Florence, the laconic announcement « That the Tuscan Government by its decree of the Wednesday preceding had withdrawn the *exequatur* of Joseph Binda, Consul of the United States at Leghorn. »<sup>164</sup>

No explanations were given as to the reasons of this step. The United States have no diplomatic agent in Tuscany. I am myself the accredited Minister nearest to that country and the United States Government has sometimes made this Legation an organ of communication with the adjoining duchies. Hence, while having no authority whatever to act in this affair, I thought it incumbent on me to procure such information relative to it as I conveniently could for the use of the Secretary of State.

I went, therefore, to Leghorn, now placed by steam within twelve hours of Turin. Mr. Binda was not in the city, being absent, as I was told, on *congé* and at Paris. His vice consul could give no reason whatever for the action of the Tuscan Government, which, he said, had created great astonishment at Leghorn where Mr. Binda had been American Consul for seventeen years and was universally beloved by the population. On the same day I proceeded to Florence and paid an unofficial visit to Mr. Ridolfi, who acts as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government. After disclaiming all authority of a diplomatic character in Tuscany, I requested him to state to me privately, if it was no state secret, why the Tuscan Government had thought proper so abruptly to take away the *exequatur* of an American consul. The explanation which he gave was nearly in these words:—

« Mr. Binda is one of those persons who wish to see the Grand Duke restored. I have known Mr. Binda intimately for many years, and some months ago he said in conversation with me that he considered the restoration of the archdukes as a political necessity. He will do all he can to favour the designs of Walewski and the French Government. The reason why we took away his *exequatur* is a small affair which at another time we would not have noticed, but everything now becomes important. When Prince Joseph Poniatowski was here on behalf of the French Gov-

<sup>164</sup> Un breve resoconto del caso Binda si trova in H. R. MARRARO, *American Opinion* cit., p. 258.

ernment he gave a dinner, to the consuls at Leghorn. Wine passed freely round, and after dinner a paper was produced for the signature of all the consuls, representing the state of the country as deplorable, anarchy prevailing, and the protection to life and property insufficient. This paper was intended to be used by the French Government against us. Some of the consuls signed it, others did not. Among those who signed was the French consul, then drunk. When he got sober he went back and, having gotten possession of the paper, he tore it up, so that it never had any publicity. Now that paper was written by Binda, and, considering him as the chief agent in the affair, we turned him out. »

I asked Mr. Ridolfi if Binda signed the paper in question? He said no, but that he was the writer of it. As the paper had been torn up, I asked what evidence was there that the American consul had written it? « Evidence that satisfied us, » was the reply. Mr. Ridolfi further stated that the reasons of their action had been communicated to the Sardinian Government at Turin and would by them be laid before the Government of the United States;—and I suppose that your Excellency has by this time heard their account of the affair in full detail.

On my return to Leghorn next morning I saw the family and vice-consul or secretary of Mr. Binda and questioned them as to the points made by Ridolfi. They declared with great appearance of sincerity.

1st. That Mr. Binda was not at the dinner of Poniatowski at all;

2d. That he never wrote, signed or read the paper in question.

The account which they gave me of that document was this: in the month of August the mob of Leghorn insulted the Neapolitan consulate. A paper was written by the son of the Neapolitan consul setting forth the outrage, and asking the Governor of the town for more protection in future. This paper was signed by three of the consuls of the place, and torn by one of them after signing. It never came to light and its true character was never distinctly known. Mr. Binda had nothing to do with it.

Such are the statements made to me; which I lay before your Excellency as given. Having no official authority in Tuscany and no orders from my Government to meet such a case, I refrained from making any observations to either party. To yourself I may, however, be permitted to remark.

1st. That I am perfectly satisfied that the American Consul at Leghorn gave no just cause for action against him;

2d. That the Provisional Government of Tuscany is composed of hasty men having no experience in public affairs, who have acted in this

matter on the bad information of spies and informers, and have done injustice;

3d That in thus expelling a long accredited agent of the United States without hearing him, or even informing him that they had reason, real or supposed, to complain of him, and especially without consulting the American Government either through its agents abroad or directly at Washington, they have been wanting in courtesy to us and in the deference due to a friendly nation.

In 1856 the late Government of Modena had a quarrel with the American consul at Carrara. The case was grave, but the Modenese Government laid the matter before this Legation, requesting me to inform the Government at Washington, which I did. The late Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, considered their complaint well founded and turned out the consul (Torrey). It is to be regretted that a Government which affects to be like ourselves liberal and constitutional should fall so far short of their predecessors in decorum and international usage.

### ***Lewis Cass a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n 34* <sup>165</sup>

Washington, November 19, 1859

Sir: The Chevalier Bertinatti, *Chargé d'Affaires* of Sardinia in this City, has addressed to this Department a note, accompanied by one addressed to him by the Marquis Cosimo Ridolfi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Tuscany, assigning the reasons by which that government was actuated in withdrawing the *exequatur* of Mr. Binda, the Consul of the United States at Leghorn. A translation of Mr Bertinatti's note, which is dated the 2nd instant, and of its accompaniment, together with a copy of the reply of the Department, dated the 16th instant, are herewith transmitted for your information. <sup>166</sup>

<sup>165</sup> L'istruzione n 32, datata Washington, 10 novembre 1859, trasmetteva una lettera del Presidente al re di Sardegna che Daniel era incaricato di comunicare. L'istruzione n 33, in pari data, trasmetteva, per inoltro al Governo sardo, copia del rapporto sui lavori della *National Quarantine and Sanitary Association* che si erano svolti a New York nell'aprile del 1859. Daniel avrebbe dovuto richiedere anche, per incarico del dott. Bell, presidente del comitato dell'associazione, i regolamenti sardi sulla quarantena.

<sup>166</sup> Sarà pubblicata nel volume che conterrà la corrispondenza tra gli inviati sardi a Washington e il Dipartimento di Stato.

Sir: I have received your despatch No. 119, in which you inform the Department that you have made known to the Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs the views of this Government in regard to the rights of neutrals as presented in my communication to Mr. Mason of the 29th of June last. The course pursued by you under the instructions of the Department is approved. You will continue to enforce the views of this Government, as you find suitable opportunity, and it is hoped that your efforts to extend their influence will not be without effect. But, at the same time, it is not deemed advisable that the subject should be indiscreetly pressed, especially as circumstances do not require immediate decision, and it will lose nothing by being carefully considered.

It is proper that you should fully understand that there are certain rights, which are referred to in the despatch to Mr. Mason, which the Government of the United States considers fully established as a part of the law of nations, and which it will maintain for itself under all circumstances.

Besides this, the United States are under a deep conviction that injuries are committed in time of war upon neutral commerce, wanton and unnecessary for any just purpose, and unworthy of the age in which we live. These were also specified in the despatch to which reference has been made. But while this Government does not deny that they are permitted by the law of nations, it is not the less anxious that they should be annulled or modified as reason and humanity dictate. This can only be done with the consent and cooperation of other independent powers, and our appeal to them with a view to effect this object was two fold:

1. With several of them we had treaty stipulations, by which the parties mutually agreed to some of the principles which we have now brought forward. Our object in appealing to these states was not to give any additional security to these principles, for none was necessary. Neither the proceedings of the Paris Conference, nor any other arrangement to which we were not a party, could affect the obligations thus incurred. But the cooperation of these powers in the effort to procure the assent of other governments to the changes proposed, might materially aid in the accomplishment of the object, and therefore it was sought.

2. But the principal object was to bring other commercial powers



to the active support of our views, and thereby cause them to be engrafted into the law of nations.

The position of the United States in respect to this subject has now been placed before the leading powers of the world and cannot be misunderstood. It seemed especially appropriate to do this during the late war, and it was the more desirable in consequence of the Paris Conference and the discussions which had grown out of it. It is hoped that the liberal views thus presented by a maritime nation deeply interested in these questions, will not be without their due effect upon the opinions and policy of other independent governments. Under any circumstances, however, it may be confidently anticipated that the establishment of these principles is a question of time only, and that they are sure to be recognized ere long as a part of the law of nations.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 125*

Turin, November 22, 1859

Sir: To recount in detail the succession of political movements in Italy commenced but never finished since the peace of Villafranca would be as uninteresting and unprofitable as to chronicle the changes in the colours and the forms of the autumnal clouds that cover its sky. The position of the governments remains essentially the same, and I have never seen good ground to suppose that the treaty between the two Emperors could be carried into effect without force or that Sardinia would fail in its plan to absorb Central Italy unless force should be used to prevent it.

During the last few weeks, however, events have transpired which compromise its prospects so seriously that it is proper to note them.

You will recollect that Tuscany, Modena, Parma and the Roman Legations offered the sovereignty of their several countries to the King of Sardinia in the month of September last and that he promised to accept it, if a European Congress permitted the annexation. Since then months have past—the Conference of Zurich has finished its labours with a treaty in exact conformity with the preliminaries of Villafranca—and the French Government has redoubled its efforts for a peaceful restoration of the archdukes. But the Assemblies of Tuscany & c., tired of waiting for their King, and resolute to defy the diplomatists, by a solemn vote have offered the Regency of Central Italy to Eugene Prince of

Savoy Carignan, brother of the late Charles Albert and uncle of Victor Emanuel the present king of Sardinia. Cavour, D'Azeglio, Minghetti and other leading Italian politicians together with the majority of the Sardinian cabinet advised the acceptance of this offer; and the Prince had even, it is said, prepared his note of acceptance when a dispatch was received from the French Government informing Sardinia in precise terms that if the thing was done she would loose the alliance of France.

This message produced great alarm in Turin, and the Prince was compelled to decline the sceptre which he already touched. But the cabinet considering the length the matter had been allowed to go and the publicity it received deemed it impossible to retreat altogether from the position they had taken when so menaced. Hence they adopted a *mezzo termine*. The Prince while declining the Regency for himself recommended the delegates of central Italy to offer it to Mr. Boncompagni, an eminent member of the Sardinian Parliament, who figured largely in the Tuscan revolution and is otherwise well known to Central Italy.

The delegates of Central Italy have followed this advice. Boncompagni has accepted the Regency and departed to his Government; and the Legations, Tuscany, & c, are now ruled by this Sardinian agent. It is an evasion of the difficulty in terms but not in fact, and the action of Sardinia cannot be otherwise than very disagreeable to Napoleon III. It is the first serious and overt step towards a breach in the Franco-Sardinian alliance, and may gravely affect the course of France in the approaching European Congress.

Garibaldi has been forced from the service by rivalry and jealousy among his fellow chiefs and the intrigues of the French Government. He has retired in disgust to the island of Sardinia after publishing an angry address to the Italian people.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 127* <sup>167</sup>

Turin, December 4, 1859

Sir: I have this morning received from your Excellency a dispatch, No 32, dated at Washington the 10th of November, which is a repeti-

<sup>167</sup> Si omette il dispaccio n. 126, datato Torino, 29 novembre 1859, perché trasmette soltanto documenti amministrativi della Legazione per i trimestri con scadenza al 30 giugno e al 30 settembre 1859 e accusa ricevuta delle casse annunciate nell'istruzione n 30. Vedi nota n 161, p. 323.

tion of another No. 27, dated the 8th of June, directing me to present a sealed letter to the King, an open copy of which is enclosed.

This letter is addressed by the President to the King in answer to one received from His Majesty announcing the marriage of the Princess Clotilde and is an exact copy of that sent me in the dispatch No. 27, above referred to, and which has already been delivered into the hands of the Sovereign by myself on the 31st of July 1859.

In my dispatch dated the 31st of July 1859, no. 121, I informed you of the circumstances attending its presentation, detailing a conversation at the time between myself and Victor Emmanuel and communicating a personal message to the President which he requested me to convey.

The fact that you now send a second time the same letter caused me to think it possible that my dispatch relative to its prior delivery has never come to hand. I have, therefore, caused a copy of that dispatch to be made from the records of this Legation which you will find appended to this note. (Appendix A).<sup>168</sup>

As its repetition is evidently the result of error, I shall retain the missive just received in my hands until further orders.

It is my duty also to send a letter received from the Consul at Genoa relative to certain abuses of Consular powers at Nice, which you will please to find in Appendix B.

The United States constitutes a Consulate at Nice, without salary, and dependent on fees. Now there is so little commerce in that port that there can be scarcely any fees at all, fairly obtained. In the last year the Government gave the office to Mr. J. B. Costa, whose *exequatur* I obtained according to order, and who actually crossed the ocean took possession of his place. Finding it valueless, a few weeks after his arrival, he placed the archives in the hands of Mr. Wilbor the former incumbent and returned home. This Mr. Wilbor is an aged paralytic who has lived some fifteen years in Nice because physically unable to return to the United States. He is not only incapable of attending to the duties of the Consulate himself but also of supervising any other person. Hence the name and seal of the United States are abused by foreigners about him; and so long as the Government keeps an unpaid Consulate at Nice it will always be so abused, if not by the present incumbent, by any other into whose hands it may fall.

I should, therefore, recommend that the Consulate at Nice should be wholly abolished, or that, if the United States thinks proper to keep

open such an office, a small salary should be attached to it. For a thousand dollars, or even for six hundred, a competent person might be found to discharge its duties; but, in its present condition, it is only a source of difficulty.

***W. L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>169</sup>

Genoa, October 20, 1859

Sir: I wish to call your attention to the fact that within the last three weeks several passports bearing the signature and official seal of the U.S. Consul at Nice have been presented at this Consulate to be visaed.

Visas have in every instance been refused, because in addition to the fact that the Consul had no right to grant the passports, they bore no allegation in the body of them that the parties in whose favor they were granted were citizens of the United States. In fact in the one in favor of one « Avenel » the words « citizen of the United States » were erased or crossed out from the passport.

My clerk tells me that the parties presenting such passports before my arrival were Frenchmen.

Some trouble may arise if the practice of granting passports to French (fugitives I believe) is brought to the knowledge of the French Government.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 128*

Turin, December 9, 1859

Sir: I have the honour to receive this morning your dispatch of the 19th ultimo, No. 34<sup>170</sup>, enclosing your correspondence with Mr. Bertinatti relative to the proceeding of the Provisional Government in Tuscany towards the United States Consulate at Leghorn; and I thank you for having communicated to me your conclusion in that matter.

Mr. Ridolfi's official charge against Binda appears to consist of precisely the same matter which he imparted to me in the conversation

<sup>169</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 127 di Daniel

<sup>170</sup> Nella istruzione n 36, datata Washington, 7 febbraio 1860, Cass si congratulerà con Daniel per questo dispaccio e per « la chiara esposizione dell'attuale stato degli affari italiani qui comunicati e le preziose informazioni che sono state lette con grande profitto »

which I held with him in October and which was exactly reported in dispatch of this Legation No. 124. The sole difference is to be found in the verbose and stilted phraseology of his written style

Since that time I have met, in private and by accident, the Prince Charles Poniatowski whose name has a chief place in the Dispatch of Mr. Ridolfi and at whose house near Leghorn the consular dinner was given. He asked me why Binda had been so abruptly treated—he having seen the newspaper announcement. I told him briefly the reason alleged by the Tuscan Government, and mentioned that the imputed offence had been given in his (Poniatowski's) villa and at his table. He seemed to be, and I think really was, very much astonished. He assured me repeatedly, with great warmth and « upon the honour of a gentleman, » that Binda was not at that dinner or any other dinner that had ever been given in his house; that he supposed, as the dinner in question was to the consular corps, Mr. Binda had been invited as all the others were, but *that he did not come*, as he himself had particularly remarked the absence of the Consul of the United States and two others. As to the famous paper said to have been written and torn up, he had a vague recollection of it, but in no way connected with Binda either as writer, signer, or instigator.

He appeared to be heartily vexed and mortified that occurrences in his private residence should be used to ruin a man who had nothing to do with them, and expressly authorized me, without request for such permission, to state either to the Government of Tuscany or that of the United States « that he, Poniatowski, asserverated [sic], and pledged his honour to the assertion, that Mr. Binda was not at my dinner given to the consuls or to any other persons in his house. »

I have no doubt, from the evident sincerity with which he spoke, that this nobleman would not hesitate to make these statements in writing and in public should it ever be deemed desirable; and that it would be only necessary to address him a simple note by the post to obtain an answer of the most explicit character, to be used at discretion.

The Tuscan Government has played a remarkable part in Italian politics during the past months, which is completely in character with its conduct in this small affair. It has quarrelled with the Government of Sardinia, ruined the regency plan of the Turin Cabinet, and has only been prevented from making a great scandal by the prudence of the Ministry here in yielding to them the whole ground claimed.

You will recollect that in a late dispatch I informed you that the legislative assemblies of Central Italy had elected the Prince of Carignan

to be their Regent, and so abolishing their provisional governments. But a decisive menace from Louis Napoleon prevented that Sardinian Prince from accepting the offer. Nevertheless, to save themselves from the reproach of cowardice and impotence and as a sort of compromise between the orders of the master and the wishes of the people, Sardinian statesmen nominated Mr. Boncompagni to be Regent in place of their Prince. This was disagreeable to France, but the Emperor agreed to suffer it; while all the Italian provinces considered such a Regent, though having no dynastic signification, yet as better than none, because his appointment was a new step to consolidation. The announcement of this appointment had been officially made, and was regarded by all the world as a thing settled, when the Tuscan Provisional Government made such resistance to it that the Regency has turned to smoke and emptiness. Messrs. Ricasoli, Ridolfi and the others, while professing to be ready to receive the Prince of Carignan, flatly refused to accept so humble an individual as the Deputy Boncompagni.

Several attempts at a compromise have been made without success. The Chief of the Provisional Government was invited to Turin by the King and every effort made to make him yield to the exigencies of the situation, but he utterly refused to change or compromise an iota of his first intention. Hence to avoid an open breach which would at this moment be most detrimental to its ambitious projects, the Sardinian Government has yielded the point. There will be no Regent over Central Italy. Mr. Boncompagni goes to Florence with the vague title of Governor General of the League and with some authority still more vague over the foreign relations of the country. Tuscany continues in the hands of the Provisional Government; Parma, Modena, Bologna are consolidated into one independent province under Farini, the dictator.

Count Cavour has become tired of country life and desires to take possession of the Ministry again. This fact has become public in the following manner. The Congress of Paris draws near, and the selection of a representative for Sardinia becomes a necessity. No man is so fit for the post as Count Cavour, and the Ministry offered him the appointment. He expressed great willingness for the office, but attached to his acceptance the condition that he should appear at Paris not as a simple ambassador but as the Prime Minister of Sardinia, and all his newspapers and friends commenced a warm advocacy of his resumption of that high office. So much opposition was however manifested to the project that it seems now wholly given over; and it is not yet known whether he or another man will speak the wishes of Italy in that important assembly.

The opposition to Cavour's return to the Ministry comes from three quarters. 1st. The existing cabinet knows that the moment he assumes the Presidency of the Council all other ministers must be ciphers or leave it. Count Cavour is one of those domineering, grasping men who cannot brook opposition in the smallest trifle or suffer any power to remain in other hands than his own. Hence when obliged to go out of office after Villafranca, he had concentrated the entire Government in his own person. He was President of the Council, Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War, Minister of the Marine, all in one. 2d Cavour is no longer loved or admired by Louis Napoleon. Those two men resemble one another too closely in their disposition to absorb power to remain long in peace. 3d. He is personally detested by the King Victor Emmanuel, who looks with sincere horror at the prospect of falling again under his very heavy yoke. There are considerable difficulties, but the popularity of Cavour in the country as the originator of that Italian movement which has been so successful is almost unbounded, and may put him back into place in spite of all.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n* 129

Turin, January 1, 1860

Sir. The year opens under gloomy auspices. It is again, as it was on this day twelve months ago, the universal belief of all classes of people in this country that a great war is at hand; and the experience of the past forbids me to regard such impressions lightly or to pass them without notice. In truth, my own reflections on the circumstances of the situation lead me to the conclusion that the Italian issue was only adjourned at Villafranca, and that the negotiations which have since taken place have settled nothing and unsettled the little that then seemed fixed.

A month ago it was definitely arranged that a Congress should meet at Paris to regulate the affairs of Europe in general and of Italy in particular. The announcement was official, the invitations were accepted and the representatives of the chief powers of the continent were appointed. But towards the middle of December the Emperor of France published a certain pamphlet, now celebrated, under the title of the *Pope and the Congress*, which seems to have upset the scheme. In this publication it was formally proposed to take away from the Pope all his domain except the province of Rome, to leave him absolute in that province, and to

compensate him for his loss of territory by a pension to be paid by all the Catholic powers. The liberal statesmen of all the world unite in the opinion that this arrangement is the only one by which the Papal difficulty can be reasonably adjusted. It is useless to suppose that the Pope will ever govern his dominions as a constitutional sovereign, or that the people of that country will ever be content again with the regime of the past. It becomes necessary therefore to restrict the system which is natural to that government to as small a space as possible while leaving it independent; and in that event a large pecuniary indemnification will be necessary to maintain the Pontiff in his proper state as the head of the pompous and luxurious Church. But while the scheme is thus in accord with the spirit of this age, it is directly in opposition to the ideas of the retrograde powers and makes up an irreconcilable issue between the Church, Austria, Spain, Russia on the one side, and France and Italy on the other. Hence the Pope has declared that he will send no representative to a Congress which harbours such an idea. Russia has announced that her representation there is indefinitely postponed. What Austria has said is not distinctly known; but the result is the disappearance of all prospects of the Congress for the present. Whether the French diplomacy will be able to renew the negotiations so broken off is another question, but there are those who think that Louis Napoleon would never have made the publication referred to had he intended the Congress to meet. It begins to be the most common opinion among political and diplomatic persons that all his treaties and negotiations, that of Villafranca inclusive, have been mere delusions intended to amuse Austria and keep Germany quiet till he can recommence the war again at his own time and season and carry out his original design of driving the Emperor Francis Joseph altogether out of Italy. Last July, they say he found himself and his people fatigued by their rapid victories. The weather was desperately hot, his troops were tired, and sickness began to menace them. Hence he thought proper to patch up an impossible treaty on the Mincio that would put the end off till next May. Since then he has kept public attention busy with contradictory movements and idle promises, and now that the season for a new campaign draws near he begins to be less careful about concealment.

Such is the theory. There are two important facts of which I have now to inform you going to support the belief that there will again be war in Italy.

1st. On receiving the constituted bodies yesterday the King of Sardinia expressed to them his belief that hostilities would recommence on



a great scale in the spring and therefore urged on the said official persons the necessity of continued concord and harmony in the State and a full support of all the measures of the present Government.

2d. The Papal Government having opened an office for the enrolment of volunteers in Vienna, the Ministry of Sardinia has informed it that if the measure was not discontinued it would be considered a breach of neutrality and that the Piedmontese troops should be ordered to enter in the legations

Such, briefly, is the state of things at this time. They may take a different turn, but at present I think it most reasonable to anticipate a new issue of arms on the Mincio.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n. 130*

Turin, January 12, 1860

Sir: Since the date of my last dispatch the most singular and decisive diplomatic developments have transpired. They throw a broad light on the troubled waters and dispel the mystery which has hitherto hung over Italian politics. They may be named under four heads:

I. On the 1st of January 1860 the Pope of Rome received the customary visits of the official persons in that city. Among others came General Goyon, Commander of the French troops in Rome; and to him the Holy Father took occasion to make known his grief and indignation at the publication called the *Pope and the Congress* in a very free manner. The Pope declared that pamphlet to be a « striking monument of hypocrisy and an ignoble tissue of contradictions. » He further said that he had « in his possession letters which his Majesty the Emperor of the French had the kindness some time since to send him which are a complete condemnation of the principles therein set forth. »—A phrase which looks very like a threat of publication and exposure of correspondence.

II. The Emperor replies through the *Monteur* He reprints the remarks of the Pope and adds that they would never have been made had his Holiness received in time a letter which he lately addressed him. Then follows the said letter entire. I give a translation both of the Pope's speech and of the Emperor's reply in the Appendix to this dispatch. They are very important documents and a perusal of them is quite necessary to understand the history of the past year and the present position of European affairs. In his letter to the Pope, Louis Napoleon tells him

that the chief reason why he made the peace of Villafranca was the fact that he saw the revolutionary movement recommencing all over Italy and that he wished to save the Church from its effects. After making that peace, he seriously advised the Pope to make reforms in his states, to give a lay administration and a separate Government to the legations; and if he had taken that advice all things would have become tranquil. But the Papal Government had refused to receive that counsel; and in consequence the legations had definitely separated themselves from Rome. Neither the Congress nor any other power could restore them to it; as France would neither use force herself to do so, nor permit any other power to do so. Hence the Emperor in consideration of all these things now advised the Pope to resort to a conciliatory course, *to renounce his rights over the Legations* and content himself with a guarantee [sic] of his remaining provinces,—in short to accept the position definitely offered to him in the famous pamphlet.

III. Count Walewski, the chief Minister in the French Cabinet, has resigned. He was the champion of the arch-ducal restoration and the declared adversary of the Italian party. His resignation at this juncture proves that the Emperor has finally made his determination on completing his work in Italy, and is new evidence, if any was wanted, that the book called *the Pope and the Congress* is the true expression of the Imperial intentions.

IV. In all diplomatic circles it seems to be received as fact that the Austrian Government will not, or rather cannot, risk another resort to arms over the Italian question. If the dukes are not restored, if the principles of the Villafranca Treaty are set at nought, the Austrian Government will content itself with a protest. Internal discord and pecuniary difficulty put that country *hors de combat* for some time to come.

So there is an end of Austrian and Papal Government in Central Italy. I have for six months never ceased to assure you that without an overwhelming armed intervention such a result was inevitable.

But the open breach between the Church and the Emperor of France did not enter positively into the ordinary calculations, and it has had the effect of an electric shock on all the Latin race. It is impossible at this moment to foretell the consequences. The liberal party in Italy as everywhere else are highly delighted. All their statesmen regard the Papal influence as the real cause of the political and moral degradation in which this peninsula has so long wallowed; and if the power of choosing between Austria and the Pope, between foreign and priestly domination, were

given them, they would all unhesitatingly have pointed to the former as the less evil of the two.

The question of annexation remains still in the dark. There can be no doubt that the duchies and the Romagna by a large majority desire annexation to Piedmont, and the late developments indicate that France is not so much opposed to it as was supposed. *De Facto* those provinces, despite their provisional forms of government, are already parts of this kingdom; and I have never seen reason to vary from the opinion long since expressed that they will in the end become so in name and by law. There is but one contingency which can possibly defeat the project of the annexationists;—the sale of Venetia to Sardinia, through the instrumentality of France, sanctioned by a congress.

Such an event is not probable, but it is certainly within the range of possibility and has of late been more discussed than ever. . Austria is nearly bankrupt and a large sum of money which she would so procure might save her from revolution. The province of Venice is more discontented than ever since the war, and a large army is at this moment employed in holding it in subjection. Further, as long as Austria holds the line of the Mincio in her possession Europe cannot regard Italian troubles as ended. Intrigue, revolt, diplomacy and war will go on as before and forever until that portion of Northern Italy is delivered from the German domination. Many other reasons might be given why the sale of Venice by Austria to Piedmont would be a transaction beneficial to all parties. But if such an event ever takes place, Sardinia must give up its hopes of annexing Central Italy. For Venetia, Lombardy and Piedmont, with Genoa and Venice at its two extremities, with the command of the two seas and with the Alps in their hands on the North, would then already be too powerful to admit of further increase. A kingdom of Central Italy with Prince Napoleon, Leuchtenberg<sup>171</sup>, or some other, for its sovereign would become inevitable; and to get possession of Venice and thrust the Austrians altogether off their soil would render the Italians perfectly contented with such an arrangement.

The Ministry here is in a very insecure state, owing to the pressure brought to bear on them by the Cavour party. Between the Ministry and that party there is not the slightest difference in principle or measure. It is a struggle for power and nothing else. Today it is reported that

<sup>171</sup> Nel 1817 Massimiliano, re di Baviera, cedette il castello di Leuchtenberg al genero Eugenio di Beauharnais, primo viceré d'Italia, che assunse per sé e i suoi discendenti il titolo di duca di Leuchtenberg. I suoi figli furono Augusto Carlo Eugenio (1810-1835) e Massimiliano Eugenio (1817-1852).

they have come to a sort of arrangement with their adversary—it is that he shall go on a mission extraordinary both to London and Paris. This he is disposed to accept for the present. But it may be safely foretold that he will not be many months absent. He may go there in the hope of effecting some act of *éclat*, but he will return more determined than ever to resume his dominion over the political affairs of this country, and if the omnipotent and omnipresent Napoleon does not interfere in a very striking manner to prevent him there is little or no doubt that he will effect his object.

### **Pio IX e la Francia**<sup>172</sup>

#### *Traduzione*

« General— if we have every year received with pleasure the wishes which you have expressed to us in the name of the brave officers and of the army you so worthily command, those wishes are doubly dear to us today, in consequence of the exceptional events which have succeeded each other, and because you assure us that the French division in the Pontifical States is placed there for the defence of the rights of Catholicism. - May God therefore bless you and the whole French army! May He also bless all classes of that generous nation!

In prostrating ourselves at the feet of that Providence who was, is, and will be to all Eternity, we beseech Him in the humility of our heart to abundantly shower down His grace and His wisdom on the august chief of that army and of that nation, in order that, being enlightened by that wisdom, he may walk safely in his difficult road, and still admit the falseness of certain principles which have lately appeared in a pamphlet which may be called a striking monument of hypocrisy and an ignoble tissue of contradictions. We hope—we will go farther and say that we are convinced—that he will, by the aid of that wisdom, condemn the principles contained in that publication, and we are the more convinced of this that we possess documents which his Majesty some time since had the kindness to send us, and which are a complete condemnation

<sup>172</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 130 di Daniel. Si tratta della traduzione della replica di Pio IX al generale Goyon, comandante dell'esercito francese in Roma, al ricevimento ufficiale di Capodanno del 1° gennaio 1860 e del commento del *Moniteur* con la lettera di Napoleone III. Per il testo autentico della lettera, che è del 27 dicembre, cfr. Pio IX, e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato, vol. II. *La Questione romana 1856-1864*, a cura di PIETRO PIRRI, Roma, 1951, parte II, pp. 146-148.

of those principles. It is with that conviction that we pray God to shower down His blessings on the Emperor, on his august Consort, on the Prince Imperial, and on the whole of France. »

The *Moniteur* of France in publishing the foregoing speech of the Pope remarks.

« We copy from the *Giornale di Roma* of the 3d an allocution delivered on New Year's day by the Holy Father, in reply to the congratulations offered to him by General Count de Goyon, at the head of the officers of his division. This allocution would not perhaps have been delivered if his Holiness had before received the letter which the Emperor addressed to him on the 31st December, and of which we subjoin the text.—

« Palace of the Tuileries, 31st Dec. 1859

Most Holy Father—The letter which your Holiness wrote to me on the 2d Dec. has deeply moved me, and I will reply with entire frankness to your appeal to my good faith.

One of my most serious pre-occupations during the war, as well as after it, was the situation of the States of the Church, and certainly among the powerful reasons which induced me to make peace so promptly must be reckoned the fear of seeing revolution every day acquire greater proportions. Facts are stubborn things, and in spite of my devotedness to the Holy See, and notwithstanding the presence of my troops at Rome, I could not escape from a certain solidarity with the effects of the national movement produced in Italy by the contest against Austria.

Peace being concluded, I hastened to write to your Holiness, to submit to you the ideas which in my opinion were best calculated to lead to the pacification of the Romagna; and I still think that if at that period your Holiness had consented to an administrative separation of those provinces, and to the nomination of a lay Governor, they would have returned under your authority. Unfortunately that did not take place, and I found myself powerless to prevent the establishment of the new regime. My efforts have only had the effect of preventing the revolution from extending, and the resignation of Garibaldi has preserved the Marches of Ancona from certain invasion

At present the Congress is about to meet. The powers cannot set at nought the incontestable rights of the Holy See over the legations, nevertheless, the probability is that they will be of opinion not to have recourse to violence to make them submit, for if that submission were

to be obtained by the aid of foreign force it would be necessary to occupy the Legations militarily during a long period. That occupation would nourish the hatred and rancour of a great portion of the Italian people, as well as the jealousy of the great Powers—it would therefore be the cause of perpetuating a state of irritation, uneasiness and alarm.

What therefore remains to be done, for this state of uncertainty cannot endure for ever? After a serious examination of the difficulties and of the dangers contained in the different combinations, I say, with sincere regret, and however painful the solution may be, that appears to me to be most conformable to the true interests of the Holy See would be to make the sacrifice of the revolted provinces. If your Holiness, for the repose of Europe, would renounce those provinces, which for fifty years have been a source of embarrassment to your Government, and were in exchange to demand from the powers to guarantee to you the possession of the remainder, I have no doubt that order would be immediately restored. Then your Holiness would secure to grateful Italy long years of peace, and to the Holy See the tranquil possession of the States of the Church.

Your Holiness, I am willing to believe, will not misunderstand the feelings by which I am animated; you will comprehend the difficulty of my situation; will interpret, with kindness, the candour of my language, while calling to mind all that I have done for the Catholic religion and for its august Head.

I have expressed without reserve all my ideas, and I have considered it indispensable to do so before the meeting of the Congress, but I beg your Holiness, whatever may be your decision, to feel assured that it will make no change in the line of conduct which I have always adopted towards you

In thanking your Holiness for the Apostolical Benediction which you sent to the Empress, to the Prince Imperial, and to myself, I renew the assurance of my profound veneration.— Of your Holiness, your devout Son,  
Napoleon. »

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 131*

Turin, January 17, 1860

Sir. Your important Dispatch No. 35, dated the 16th [sic] of November, has been for two weeks in my possession. I have not immediately replied because I hoped when doing so to give also some definite expression

of the Sardinian Government's views. But I have as yet had no good opportunity to turn attention to the subject, and you have yourself advised me that it is not one that need be hotly pressed. The Ministry here is tottering. One of their number resigned a week ago, and the rumours of other resignations are continual. The truth is the present Ministry is engaged in a struggle for existence with a rival party—that of Mr Cavour. What attention they can spare from these things, it may well be imagined, is fully occupied by the hopes and fears, the intrigues and manoeuvres which have the annexation of all central Italy, to double the size of the country, and to triumph over the ancient enemies of Rome and Vienna for aim and goal. To address them formally on the principles of an abstract science at such a period would be useless; and I wait for some incident or occasion when it would be more natural and opportune to do so.

That the Sardinian Government or at least such men in it who know anything about national law heartily concur in all the views enunciated by the Secretary of State, I have no doubt at all. Interest renders it certain. All weak maritime powers have everything to gain and nothing to loose by the amelioration of the existing laws of maritime warfare. But, as they have repeatedly signified to me, they do not regard themselves as strong enough to take the incipient steps, nor is their position at present one in which they can afford to loose any of their strength or time on unnecessary work. In the improvement of the international law they are quite ready and eager to follow if any of the great European powers on whose alliance they depend or whose favour they hope to gain will lead the way; but they are unwilling to lead themselves, and are not easily roused by the voice of a nation so far away as ourselves.

I have made these explanations to satisfy you that it is not from indolence or inattention that I have as yet gained nothing in this matter, and I have no intention of permitting it to be forgotten without having some positive answer from the Sardinian Government. You may be assured that there is not a shadow of difference in opinion between the legists of Italy and America on the subject. The views expressed by the Secretary of State in his dispatch to Mr Mason would be accepted as self-evident propositions by all, if a decision was rendered indispensable by circumstances.

I have also to acknowledge the receipt of your Dispatch No. 33, together with the volume entitled the *Third Quarantine Convention of New York*. I have transmitted the same to the proper authorities in Turin and have asked for a complete set of all their sanitary laws and

regulations. These I will transmit to the Department of State by the first opportunity.

I make use of this occasion to forward the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending Dec. 31, 1859.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 132*

Turin, January 24, 1860

Sir. The Ministry of Lamarmora and Rattazzi has fallen and Mr. Cavour has resumed his old place at the head of the Government.

In my last dispatch I stated that the then existing Ministry was tottering [sic], that there was a struggle for command between it and Cavour, and that the crisis had been delayed by an arrangement that the latter should leave Piedmont for some months on an important extraordinary mission to the governments of France and England. Cavour accepted this arrangement and the ministers thought they had a new lease of life. But when a week had passed in the last preparations for the journey, Mr. Cavour returned to the cabinet with a condition on which only he would consent to leave the country. What was that condition? It was that the Ministry should convoke Parliament within a few days that he might have the means of conferring with it previously to his departure and so ascertaining the wishes of the country. The Ministry responded that it was impossible to convoke the Parliament in the short time desired as new elections must be held and the Constitution required a certain lapse of time and the performance of certain formalities in that operation. Cavour suggested that the urgency of the crisis was such as to authorize the Ministry to dispense with a portion of those constitutional forms. The Ministry differed from him and refused to convoke the Parliament under the conditions demanded by their adversary. Whereupon he left the city and returned to his country house. At this juncture one of the ministers, supposed to be a secret ally of the Cavour party, resigned his office and retired. The rest of the ministers then found themselves in this false position before public opinion—they were at issue with the great popular leader and they appeared to be condemned by one of their own number. The place became untenable, they all resigned, and the King had nothing left but to call on Mr. Cavour to form the new Ministry.



This he has done and the new Cabinet has been thus constituted:

Public Works	Signor Jacini
Grace and Justice	Signor Cassinis
Finance	Signor Vegezzi
Public Instruction	Signor Mamiani
War	General Fanti
Interior	Ct Cavour
Foreign Affairs	Ct. Cavour
President of Council	Count Cavour

It will be seen that the principal offices rest now as formerly in the hands of the Premier; while the others are filled by insignificant men who are in fact nothing but his secretaries.

There is one name, however, worthy of remark in the composition of this Cabinet. It is the name of the Minister of War—Fanti. This is the same officer who has been for six months in command of the army of the Italian League—that is to say, of the duchies Tuscany, Modena, Parma, &c, and he has evidently been chosen to represent them. What is yet more significant, he does not resign his command in those states when accepting the post of Minister of War in Sardinia. It would be difficult to imagine an act of fusion more unmistakable.

But yet this is a small matter to the steps towards annexation which we may soon expect to see. Although Mr. Cavour was, when I arrived in Sardinia, the representative in this Government of the retrograde and aristocratic party, he has become by slow degrees the head and type of the ultra national, ambitious, progressive party, whose aim is a general revolt throughout Italy to be followed by a general annexation to Piedmont. As the Chief of that party he was forced to leave office after Villafranca; and that he has now hastily returned to power proves that the star of his party is once more and decidedly in the ascendant. It is new evidence, if any was wanted, that Louis Napoleon has changed his course in Italian politics, that he again encourages the ambition of Piedmont, and will now sanction decisive movements in central Italy. If this were not certain, Cavour would not dare to take the helm of affairs. Those decisive movements in central Italy we may soon have to witness.

The first project of the series begins already to show its form in the horizon. Among the acts of the late Ministry was the promulgation of the new electoral law for the Kingdom of Sardinia. This law has not only been proclaimed here by the Piedmontese authorities, but the Pro-

visional Governments, which hold nominal sway in the duchies, will adopt and proclaim the same law in their provinces without changing a word. The consequence will be—as this law, apparently made for Piedmont, declares that a deputy to a Parliament to meet in Turin shall be chosen in every district—deputies will make their appearance here and claim their admittance into the next Parliament from all central Italy as well as from all the present states of the kingdom. Who will send them away? Not the Ministry of Mr Cavour, it may be safely predicted. By law and constitution they will have not more right to sit in the Sardinian Parliament than so many English or Frenchmen; but by admitting them the annexation will be quietly consummated, and the event so long talked over, fought over, commenced and left off, will come to be *de jure* as well as *de facto*. And their admission, strangely unconstitutional as it will be, can be consummated with an ease among an Italian people which can never be fully estimated or anticipated by Americans. Constitutional objections will only serve to raise a sneer in this race when in the way of expediency.

Mr. Cavour's return to the Ministry of Sardinia will doubtless attract great attention everywhere, because he has in appearance been not only a chief actor but the great mover in the events which have rendered 1859 memorable in history. Such has been the appearance, but not such the true fact. It is very clear to those who have been close to the scene that Mr. Cavour, so far from originating the Italian movement, did not even understand the Emperor's policy or comprehend his course. Twice during those six months he sent his resignation—once in April, just before the war broke out, under the supposition that Louis Napoleon had failed to keep his promises; and then again after Villafranca under the belief that all the hopes of Italy had been sacrificed by that monarch. The truth is he can in nowise be considered as a profound statesman, or as a statesman at all. He is essentially a politician. Adroit, clever, bold—those are the adjectives which characterise him justly. That which is best in him is the faculty to discern the changes and real movements of public opinion in advance of others; and this faculty so important to the public man, whose aim is personal success, he possesses in a very eminent degree. Thus he commenced life in the party of priests and aristocrats, and is now the leader of all Young Italy, and yet always kept office because in all his changes he never outran or lagged behind the public sentiment. His admirers liken him to Peel, but, though he has had a much more brilliant part to play for history, the comparison is unfair to the great Englishman and most unfavorable as a contrast to the Italian; for he

wholly lacks the steadiness of moral principle, the manly intellect, and resolute fortitude of the first Cavour passes easily from arrogance to despair. For the rest he is a Voltairian in his philosophy and wholly unscrupulous in his words and actions—a fact which should not be regarded as a fault in him, for, were it otherwise, he would be wholly unfit for, and incapable of, the government of an Italian people. He loves money and has made a large private fortune while attending to the affairs of his nation; and he dearly loves *power*. Of this he can never bring himself to partake with any other; nor can he brook the least opposition from any quarter, great or small. This trait in his character will, I think, be the breaker on which he will shortly make a wreck. For there is now another individual moving in the same sphere who has the same disposition to absorb all power in himself and who is so much more powerful and profound that he can break the Italian politician like a wooden puppet on his knee in a moment. Two such men as Napoleon and Cavour must necessarily come in collision, not from their opposing but their resembling traits. One of these men is secret, deep, and cold, the other is vain, passionate and garrulous, but they are both alike in this—a radical contempt for all law but their own will and a perfect determination to make all other men their tools.

In the Appendix I have placed the notes which inform me of the official movements referred to.

***Giuseppe Dabormida a John M. Daniel***<sup>173</sup>

Turin, 18 janvier 1860

Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur de vous annoncer que les Membres du Cabinet de S. M. ayant offert leur démission, elle a été acceptée par le Roi, qui a bien voulu ensuite charger S. E. le Comte de Cavour de la formation d'un nouveau Ministère.

Ces déterminations de S. M. mettant un terme aux relations officielles que j'ai eu l'honneur d'entretenir jusqu'ici avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre, je désire les clore en vous témoignant combien je vous suis reconnaissant personnellement de l'obligeance que vous y avez constamment apportée.

<sup>173</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 132 di Daniel.

Veillez croire, Monsieur le Ministre, que je garderai toujours le plus agréable souvenir de ces rapports, et recevoir en même temps les assurances de ma considération la plus distinguée.

***Ferdinando di Breme a John M. Daniel***<sup>174</sup>

Turin, 9 janvier 1860

Le Soussigné en ayant reçu l'ordre du Roi a l'honneur d'inviter Monsieur Jean Daniel Ministre Résidant des Etats-Unis d'Amérique au Bal qui aura lieu au Palais de S. M. le soir du 18 de ce mois à huit heures et demie.

Suivant aussi l'intention de S. M. le Soussigné transmettra également à Monsieur le Ministre Résidant, d'après la liste nominative qu'il voudra bien lui communiquer, les billets d'invitation pour les appartenants à sa Légation et pour les personnes Américaines présentées qui, se trouvant à Turin, désireraient assister à cette fête.

Le Soussigné saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à M. le Ministre Résident les assurances de sa considération très distinguée.

***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel***<sup>175</sup>

Turin, 20 janvier 1860

Monsieur le Ministre, Le Roi, mon auguste souverain, ayant daigné m'appeler à la Présidence du Conseil et me confier en même temps le portefeuille des Affaires Etrangères, je m'empresse de vous prévenir que j'entre aujourd'hui même dans l'exercice de ces honorables fonctions.

En me félicitant de reprendre avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre, des rapports officiels que votre parfaite obligeance m'a déjà rendu précédemment si agréable, je vous prie de recevoir les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

<sup>174</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 132 di Daniel Di Breme firma per il Prefetto di Palazzo

<sup>175</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 132 di Daniel

*Dispaccio n 133*

Turin, January 31, 1860

Sir: Facts of the greatest political interest are daily transpiring here I propose to note them as briefly as possible.

1. The annexation of the Emilia (See note A), that is to say, the Roman legations, the duchies of Parma and Modena, and of Tuscany, to the Sardinian Kingdom may be now regarded as almost accomplished. The Sardinian Constitution has been proclaimed in Tuscany, and the elections of deputies to the Sardinian Parliament which will meet here in Turin towards the close of February are partially completed. Those provinces have not yet been officially announced to the world as parts of Sardinia, but it is almost certain that such declaration will be made before this letter reaches your hand.

2. There is every reason to think that there is concert between England, France and Sardinia to settle definitely the Italian question in this year. To do so, it is indispensable that Austria should cede Venetia. So long as that province remains in the hands of Austria no one can expect the long war of Italian independence to be ended, and so well convinced is this Government and the two others named of that fact that I am satisfied, if Austria should refuse to accede to any plan of sale or cession, *that the war will recommence on the Mincio before the coming season is over.*

3. The Sardinian War Department is nearly as busy at this moment in the preparation of military stores and equipages, in the organization of troops and the enrolment of additional corps, as it was in this month of last year. It is not probable that they are expending their money without some solid reason. Opinion indicates not only the possible renewal of the struggle with Austria but great danger of collision with the Papal and Neapolitan forces in the Romagna<sup>176</sup>. It is generally believed that the King of the Two Sicilies will make the cause of the Pope his own, and, as he has a very considerable army, he may give full occupation to the forces of central Italy should he play to the end the game which he now seems disposed to commence. What foundation there may be for this view, in the state of things at Naples, your Minister at that Court is better able to say.

<sup>176</sup> Per i dispacci di Chandler da Napoli al segretario di Stato, durante questo periodo, vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations*, cit., vol. II, p. 479 e segg.

4. I have good grounds to think that there have been negotiations between the new Sardinian Government and that of France for the cession or sale of *Savoy* to the latter country. These negotiations are of a very late date. While the war was in progress, such a cession was regarded as certain. But after the unpopular peace of Villafranca the idea was abandoned by Sardinia. During a visit which I made to Savoy in the last autumn, I found the police and local machinery of the Government actively employed in putting down all manifestations of popular opinion in favour of annexation to France. So long as the Rattazzi Ministry lasted, there was nothing said about a cession. But it is now asserted on high authority that Mr Cavour seeks to make of Savoy, and perhaps also of Nice, a peace offering to Louis Napoleon, and that the arrangement will speedily be made public. This important province, if ceded at all, will be acquired by France for an alleged pecuniary consideration. Sardinia owes France 60,000,000 francs loaned her during the war; and 20,000,000 more paid for her since the peace of Zurich as the first instalment of her debt to Austria on account of Lombardy. The plan now said to be in course of arrangement is in the nature of a sale. France takes Savoy and cancels the Sardinian debt. If such should be the final result, the fact may be used as an important international precedent in our own possible negotiations for the purchase of Cuba

It is proper to add that even while I am engaged in writing this paper, the telegraph brings news that there was an excited demonstration at Chambéry yesterday in opposition to the annexation to France, and that the Governor of Savoy, in haranguing the people, declared that Sardinia had not and did not entertain the idea of ceding the province — This Governor was, however, an appointment of the late Ministry and is supposed to be ill-informed upon the intentions of the present Government.

I will only add that the Emperor Napoleon III is almost as popular at this moment in Italy as when he sent forth the proclamation of Milan. Late events have restored to him all the *éclat* which he lost at Villafranca. The La Guéronnière Pamphlet, the letter to the Pope, and his late conversion to free trade, have rendered him for a moment the idol of the liberal party all over Europe; while here in Italy the evident relinquishment of the provisions of Villafranca has satisfied the aspirations of the party for independence

The menaces which he addressed to the Sardinian Government when the Regency of the Prince of Carignan was proposed, and his long continued opposition to everything that tended to the annexation of the du-

chies, and his clamour for an European Congress, are here, and now, regarded as mere *ruses* to procure the signature of Austria to the Treaty of Zurich. By this Treaty Austria surrendered Lombardy, and by it only the peace was finally concluded. Certain it is, that from the moment that instrument was signed, we heard nothing more of the restoration of the archdukes, nothing more against the annexation of the Emilia by Piedmont, and the Congress which seemed almost already in session [sic] evaporated like a whiff of smoke, carrying with in the temporal power of the Pope.

If such a view of the case is the true one, and I think it nearly certain, it sheds a singular light on the morality of European politics and on what the Queen of England, one year ago, styled *the Faith of Treaties*

### ***Notizie sull'Emilia***<sup>177</sup>

*Emilia.* This geographical name has come into common use since the Treaty of Villafranca to denote the province of Bologna, the duchy of Parma and the duchy of Modena, which have been all united under the Government of the Dictator Farini. They are all traversed in a straight line by the *Via Emilia*, perhaps the most magnificent of the old Roman roads, still for long distances in perfect preservation and still forming the ordinary highway through the three great provinces above-mentioned, and furnishing a convenient title to designate their whole.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 134*<sup>178</sup>

Turin, February 7, 1860

Sir: The Minister of Foreign Affairs has addressed to the Sardinian agents in foreign countries a note exposing the position of the Government and detailing the march of events in Italy up to the 27th of January. He has thought proper at the same time to publish that paper in the newspapers here, and, as it is an important document in elucidating the present condition of affairs, I have appended a translation to this dispatch.

<sup>177</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 133 di Daniel.

<sup>178</sup> L'istruzione n 37, datata Washington, 1° marzo 1860, accusava ricevuta dei dispacci n. 132 e 134, e, come la precedente, diceva. «la chiara esposizione che essi danno della politica italiana attuale è stata letta con grande interesse e profitto».

But since that very late date—the 27th of January—some very important diplomatic facts have transpired.

The governments of France and England have simultaneously notified the Sardinian Government that it is now their opinion that the only solution of the present difficulty must be found in the formal annexation of central Italy. But previously to such a step France recommends that the will of the people should again be ascertained by a vote. The French Government further recommended that this election should be made by universal suffrage.

To English Cabinet has assented to the propriety of an election, but has objected to the principal of universal suffrage. It has proposed that the will of the people should be ascertained by the election of deputies to a new Convention which shall deliberate on the question of annexation. The French Government has accepted this amendment. As for Sardinia she declares that all further elections are superfluous, but will probably yield her opinion to the will of the two first named nations if they make a point.

The proposition as amended is neither necessary nor logical. By universal suffrage and a direct popular vote some new view of public opinion might possibly have been gained. But deputies and Convention have already had their say months ago,—they offered the crown to Victor Emmanuel,—and it is really senseless to repeat the process now.

As for the provinces, they have quietly elected deputies to the Sardinian Parliament as if they were already authentic parts of the Kingdom.

Meantime the fate of Savoy occupies the attention of the public even more than the question of central Italy. It is now well settled that Count Cavour is opposed to the cession of that province to France. I mentioned in my last dispatch the official declaration of its Governor « that his Government had no idea of ceding Savoy. » Since then an article has appeared in the *Opinione*, the organ of Count Cavour, apparently written by himself, combating with acrimony the arguments usually alleged for the annexation of Savoy to France.

Nevertheless it is my belief that France will get both Savoy and Nice, and that if the administration of Mr. Cavour undertakes to oppose the movement it cannot last long; for public opinion is fully in favor of the arrangement.

Late elections show very clearly what the people of Savoy themselves desire. The question of annexation was made by the Government, and *two-thirds* of the deputies to Parliament then chosen in those elections are in favour of that measure.



As to the Italians they are equally anxious to see Savoy separated from their country and placed into the hands of France. They have made enormous gains during the past year by an appeal to the sentiments and rights of nationality. They hope to get Venice in future on the same principle. But to do so, and to keep what they have, they must be just and logical in the application of their favorite principle. If Venice is a natural member of Italy, Savoy is equally part of France. It is so geographically, by language, by character, and by race. Besides, it is a poor country not profitable to Italy, while it is immensely important to France in a strategical point of view. It would greatly gratify the pride of the French people to acquire their natural limits, and give new strength and popularity to Louis Napoleon if he would gain them; and as that sovereign has been and is now again the most effective friend that the Italians ever had, they think it wise to give him all the power over his own people that they can help him to.

Besides and above all, it should not be forgotten that the present kings of Piedmont were long previously dukes of Savoy; and, so long as they keep that hereditary province, are not regarded altogether as *Italian Princes*, which the peninsula earnestly desires them to be. *Savoy to the Italians at the present time is just what Hanover was to England under the Georges*, and they would let it drop into the hands of its natural rulers with an equal pleasure

### ***Camillo di Cavour ai diplomatici sardi***<sup>179</sup>

Signore,

Torino, 27 gennaio 1860

Credo conveniente d'esporsi brevemente le nuove condizioni in cui trovasi l'Italia in momenti in cui la fiducia del Re mi chiama alla direzione degli affari esteri.

Le grandi potenze dell'Europa riconoscendo la necessità di porre un fine allo stato incerto e provvisorio delle provincie dell'Italia centrale, avevano consentito, or fanno due mesi, alla riunione d'un congresso, il quale proponevasi di deliberare sui modi i più appropriati per pacificare e rendere felice l'Italia, su basi sode e durevoli.

Il congresso che il governo del Re non cessò d'invocare come il solo

<sup>179</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 134 di Daniel. Ne diamo il testo italiano da *Il Diritto* del 3 febbraio 1860

mezzo adatto ad ovviare ai pericoli del momento, era stato accettato con fiducia dalle popolazioni dell'Italia centrale. Esse speravano che i voti da loro manifestati in modo così formale per la loro annessione agli Stati del Re sarebbero stati presi in grave considerazione ed approvati dai plenipotenziarii dei principali Stati d'Europa. Riposando su questa fiducia le popolazioni dell'Italia centrale e i loro governi si disponevano ad aspettare, con calma ed ordine, il giudizio del congresso, restringendosi ad accrescere e ad ordinare le loro forze per mettersi in grado d'essere uguali agli avvenimenti.

Ora, a cagione di difficoltà che io non debbo esaminare qui, il congresso venne rimandato a tempo indeterminato, e si ha ogni giorno maggior ragione di credere che non si riunirà più.

Venuto meno il congresso, tutte le difficoltà che si trattava di sciogliere con questo mezzo risorgono con un carattere di gravità e d'urgenza più decisa di prima. Una impazienza ardente ma legittima, un proponimento irrevocabile di procedere nella via intrapresa, succedettero, nel centro dell'Italia, alla calma e alle speranze dell'aspettazione.

Questi sentimenti che sarebbero già sufficientemente giustificati dalla condizione particolare in cui da sì lungo tempo trovasi l'Italia centrale, sono divenuti più profondi e più generali in seguito agli ultimi avvenimenti di questi ultimi giorni.

In fatti la proroga del congresso è stata preceduta dalla pubblicazione dell'opuscolo « Il papa e il congresso ». Io non m'arresterò nell'indagare l'origine e l'importanza di questo opuscolo. Io mi restringo a notare che l'opinione pubblica in Europa diede a quell'opuscolo il carattere e l'importanza di un grande avvenimento. Alla pubblicazione di questo opuscolo tenne dietro la lettera dell'Imperatore dei Francesi al Papa.

Nello stesso tempo l'Europa ode che l'alleanza anglo-francese, che credevasi scossa dopo la pace di Villafranca, era divenuta più solida e più intima, e questo accordo, certificato prima di tutto da importanti negoziazioni commerciali, apparve in modo più solenne dal discorso d'apertura del parlamento, dalle parole di Lord Palmerston, il quale, rispondendo al signor Disraeli, dichiarò ufficialmente che l'accordo il più cordiale regna tra l'Inghilterra e la Francia relativamente alla questione italiana.

La proroga del congresso, la pubblicazione dell'opuscolo, la lettera al Papa, il riavvicinarsi di Francia ed Inghilterra sono quattro fatti, de' quali il minore avrebbe bastato a precipitare la soluzione delle vertenze pendenti e resero impossibile una più lunga dimora.

Commentati da tutta la stampa europea essi terminarono di con-

vincere tutti gli uomini seri. 1° che vuolsi rinunciare all'idea d'una restaurazione la quale non sarebbe possibile più a Bologna e Parma che a Firenze e Modena. 2° che l'unica soluzione possibile consiste nell'ammettere in diritto l'annessione che in fatto trovasi già stabilita sia nella Emilia che in Toscana. 3° che infine le popolazioni italiane dopo aver a lungo ed indarno aspettato che l'Europa assestasse le faccende loro sulle basi del principio del non intervento e del rispetto ai voti dei popoli, hanno dovere di non aspettare più oltre e di provvedere esse stesse al loro governo

Tale è il significato che si diede in Italia ai summentovati fatti e, ciò che costituisce un altro non meno grave fatto, tale è pure l'interpretazione che diedero loro gli organi più accreditati della stampa europea.

I giornali i più influenti di Francia, d'Inghilterra e di Germania, famosi interpreti delle medesime idee, porgono gli stessi consigli, esprimono identiche convinzioni.

In presenza d'un tale stato di cose le popolazioni dell'Italia centrale sono decise di giungere ad una soluzione e di cogliere l'occasione propizia per dare piena e definitiva esecuzione all'annessione. Mossi da tal pensiero i governi di quelle provincie adottarono la legge elettorale del nostro paese e si dispongono a procedere alle elezioni dei deputati.

Il governo del Re si servì, sino ad oggi, di tutta l'autorità morale di cui poteva disporre per consigliare ai governi ed alle popolazioni della Europa centrale d'aspettare il giudizio dell'Europa. Ora nell'incertezza della riunione del congresso ed in presenza dei mentovati fatti, il governo di S.M. non ha più il potere di arrestare il corso naturale e necessario degli avvenimenti.

Questo dispaccio non ha altro scopo tranne quello di constatare l'attuale condizione delle cose in Italia: a suo tempo v'informerò delle determinazioni prese in proposito. Bastivi per ora il sapere che il governo del Re conosce tutta la responsabilità che a lui incombe in questi solenni momenti e che le sue decisioni non saranno ispirate che dalla coscienza del dovere, dagli interessi della patria italiana, e dal sincero desiderio di assicurare la pacificazione dell'Europa.

*Dispaccio n 135*

Turin, February 14, 1860

Sir. I should perhaps apologize for occupying your attention so often with Piedmontese politics. My excuse is the importance which attaches to them in the eyes of the diplomatic world in Europe at the present time, and the real interest which we may ourselves one day have in the results of events now passing in this peninsula. For several centuries Sardinia has been the only country of Italy independent both in fact and principle, and hence having a certain political signification; and since the present period of the year which has past Sardinia has nearly doubled its population and wealth. It is now upon the point of making a still larger acquisition which will render its total numbers upwards of twelve millions and open to it a field of future harvest only limited by the peninsula itself. It will soon be the European state next to Prussia in population and will probably attain a much greater importance in other respects. For it is inhabited by a people who, however corrupted in morals and of however doubtful firmness, have always possessed genius, activity and ardor, and who will, when national weight is attained, certainly play no indifferent or slight part in the future history of the world. Further, its geographical position gives it an advantage in the Mediterranean which no other power can rival, while the excellent sailors which it always has and always can furnish, its numerous ports, and general characteristics, will probably render it one of the most important maritime powers of the old world. It is from this particular circumstance that the increase and development of this new kingdom is somewhat interesting to us. For a long time it must be, what the United States now is, a state possessing a commerce and a coast altogether disproportioned to its naval defence, and in this condition it should be our natural ally in the designs so often set forth by the Government of the United States for diminishing the severities of naval war and ameliorating the law of nations for the high seas. Such are some of the reasons which induce me to furnish with due brevity the *genuine* facts and leading events which transpire under my eyes, and which are represented with higher colours, but with a large admixture of untruth and supposition, in the correspondence of the public press.

The King of Sardinia, accompanied by the Prince,<sup>180</sup> Mr. Cavour,

<sup>180</sup> Principe Eugenio di Savoia-Carignano

and by his four sons and by the Duchess of Genoa (see note to this dispatch), leaves Turin on the 15th inst. for Milan. The avowed object of the journey is to hold a royal court there for the first time since the annexations, but that which gives the occasion a real importance is the design to issue during those festivals a proclamation to the people of central Italy informing them that they have now the official consent of Sardinia, France and England to elect deputies to a convention which shall regulate its destinies by a vote which is to override and annul all previous votes and laws and fix its allegiance forever. The people are to be left free and uninfluenced in their choice, and all Sardinian agents, soldiers and public persons are to be summoned to quit the duchies until that choice is completed. Such is the present intention of the Cabinet of Turin, and, unless some unexpected event should occur, it will be executed in a few days more.

As to the action of central Italy on such an invitation there can be no doubt, provided that country is really left untrammelled to choose for itself. Annexation to Piedmont, I am satisfied, is the wish of nine persons out of every ten that it contains; and if, instead of new deputies and a new convention, they were allowed to manifest their will, by universal suffrage, directly on the question, the result would be even more distinctly marked.

But the question of Savoy and Nice attracts more attention at the present moment than that of central Italy because less clearly set forth and in a more doubtful condition. I think the following statements may be relied on as certain.

1st That the French Emperor no longer conceals his desire and determination to add both Savoy and Nice to the French territory

2d. That the vast majority of the people in those provinces desire annexation to France.

3d. That the Italians are either quite indifferent or rather in favour of their cession.

4th. That the Government of Mr. Cavour makes open and warm opposition to everything that tends to the cession of those provinces, and both by its public declarations and official action seems to be in complete discord with the French Emperor on that subject.

A semi-official article in the *Opinione*, the newspaper organ of Mr. Cavour, admits that by an arrangement between the cabinets of Turin and Paris, previously to the war, it was agreed, in case Lombardy and Venice should be acquired by Sardinia, that Savoy and Nice should be ceded to France. But Venice not having been gained, that arrangement has

fallen through, and Sardinia is *at present* under no obligation to give up any of its territory to France.

It will be observed that the Sardinian statesman adheres to the *letter* of the original treaty and ignores the probable acquisition of central Italy as an equivalent for Venice.

Demonstrations and public meetings in opposition to separation from Piedmont are encouraged by the Government in Savoy and Nice, while all manifestations of an opposite tendency are promptly put down. The means by which the French party in Savoy and Nice is kept quiet are quite simple;—any persons attempting public movement in favour of the separation are immediately arrested by the police for disturbance of public order and lodged in the nearest guardhouse; while any local newspaper that ventures to criticize the action of the national party or to advocate the policy of separation is abruptly suppressed by the Government. For instance, the opera house at Nice was the other day the scene of a demonstration in favour of continued union with Piedmont—that is to say, when the orchestra performed the King's march the audience applauded and caused it to be played again through the rest of the evening. The *Avenir* of Nice represented the audience as having been wholly composed of soldiers, and public functionaries, Russians, and English, and made an appeal to the French Government to deliver the province of the tyranny under which it was alleged to be suffering. For these remarks the *Avenir* was promptly suppressed.

I perceive that the writers of the English press choose to take these demonstrations as real evidence of public sentiment. But I myself have been for years intimately acquainted with those provinces and can safely assure you that they are completely French in language, character, habits, social ideas, private relations and commercial interests. They have nothing but history and government in common with Sardinia, and, although that country has a Constitution and is theoretically freer than France, there is but little in real fact and practice to choose between the two.

And while thus informing you of the *public* opposition made by this Government to the scheme of separation, it is proper to add that there are persons here in Turin, whose connection and position enable them to know much and on whose information experience has taught me to rely, who now say that the cession of Savoy &c. to France is a settled thing, which will assuredly be consummated in a few months, and that the public movement and declaration to the contrary are a mere sham, intended to save the Premier from attacks in Parliament by enabling him to declare that he yielded the national territory *de main forcée*.

Passing this subject, it will be recollected that on returning to France after Villafranca the French Emperor left in garrison at Milan, Piacenza and some other towns of Lombardy, an army of 50,000 men under Marshal Vaillant, and there it has remained in great quiet and order even since. So far from exhibiting any disposition to recall it, he has been steadily increasing the force and efficiency of this army. To explain the additions now being made he has put forth this statement:—that the army in Italy has lost in the last six months six thousand men by death and discharge and that fifteen thousand troops with additional artillery are now on the way to it. According then to the official statement, the army is to be brought to the actual force of sixty thousand men. Public rumour puts the reinforcements at a much higher figure; but, even taking the official statement, and adding the troops in the Roman States, it will be seen that there are eighty thousand French soldiers still in Italy and likely to remain.

In the first days of the present year, I informed you of the belief universal in this country that the coming, like the past, spring was to witness the gravest complications and the ensuing summer to be signalized by a great war. The six weeks which have past seem rather to have increased than weakened this popular impression. It is especially the conviction of the military profession, and with them it is based, not on political speculations, but on the movements of their own war department indicating immediate and extensive operations. Yet it is not yet possible to say from what quarter the storm is to be expected. The observers most elevated in position point to the menacing state of things at Constantinople and the great question of the Orient,<sup>181</sup> now again looming on the horizon,—while the decidedly warlike preparations of the Pope and king of Naples indicate the extreme probability of an armed struggle in the Romagna. But the generality look to Venice long on the eve of revolt, and expect a renewal of that memorable series of events which was interrupted at Villafranca on the 8th of last July.

This evening the statement is made here that the French Government has sent an energetic remonstrance to Vienna against the enrolment of volunteers by the Papal and Neapolitan governments in the Austrian states. Such a statement may in the event prove to be of little import;

<sup>181</sup> Nell'Estremo Oriente la situazione politica peggiorò con l'assassinio del reggente giapponese. Seguirono agitazioni contro gli stranieri e un attacco a Shanghai nell'agosto del 1860. La minacciata spedizione franco-inglese contro la Cina si mise in moto e l'imperatore cinese fu obbligato a fuggire.

but it may also be the beginning of the end, and in the present critical conjuncture causes no little emotion here

The Swiss Government has sent here for the first time a Minister Plenipotentiary. Switzerland hopes to get for herself a certain corner of Savoy—the Chablais and Faucigny, locked into her territory by nature, in case of the cession of that province to France.

Naples also has raised the rank of its chargé here to that of minister plenipotentiary.

*Note.*

The Duchess of Genoa, sister-in-law to the King, who lost her position at Court and the favour of the aristocracy some years ago, because she *married* a commoner of an undistinguished family, by whom she found herself previously compromised (see dispatch No 55, Oct. 11, 1856), and who has since then been living in complete retirement, has lately been recalled to her high place and will in future preside over the festivities of the Court. Her husband, M Rapallo, accompanies her under the title of *Chevalier d'Honneur*. The cause of the Duchess's recall is the necessity of giving some *éclat* to the festivities of the Court during its peregrinations and the impossibility of doing so when there was no lady to preside over it.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 136*

Turin, February 22, 1860

Sir. I have had the honour to receive from you dispatch No. 33 sending me the Proceedings of the National Quarantine Association for presentation to the Sardinian Government, and ordering me to procure for the said Association the Quarantine Regulations of Sardinia. I send herewith two volumes of laws and regulations on that subject, one containing those of Sardinia and the other of Tuscany. I also append the note of Mr. Carutti, the Sardinian Assistant Secretary of State, in which he explains why he is unable to furnish other documents at present and promises one day to place in my hands complete sets of all Sardinian laws on sanitary matters.



Turin, 10 février 1860

Monsieur le Ministre, Je me suis empressé de transmettre au Ministère de la Marine le volume contenant les actes de la Convention Sanitaire de New York que vous avez eu l'obligeance de m'adresser au nom du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, par votre note du 14 janvier, et je lui ai fait en même temps connaître le désir que vous m'aviez exprimé de recevoir copie des Lois et Règlements Sanitaires en vigueur dans les Etats du Roi relativement aux Quarantaines.

En me priant de vous remercier, Monsieur le Ministre, de l'obligeant envoi du volume dont il s'agit qui sera soumis à l'examen et aux études de la Direction de la Santé Maritime, le Ministère de la Marine m'a remis en même temps, pour vous la faire parvenir, la collection des Lois et Règlements Sanitaires Sardes que vous m'avez demandée. Il m'a transmis également un volume contenant les Lois et Règlements sur la même matière émanés récemment par le Gouvernement de la Toscane, basés sur les mêmes principes que les Lois et Règlements Sardes, dont ils ne diffèrent que par la forme plutôt que par le fond.

En vous adressant ci-joint les deux volumes dont il s'agit, je m'empresse d'ajouter que le Ministère de la Marine aurait vivement désiré pouvoir compléter cet envoi par la communication des Circulaires de la Direction de la Santé Maritime, mais qu'il s'est trouvé à son grand regret, dans l'impossibilité de le faire, attendu qu'on ne possède plus d'exemplaire disponible de ces Circulaires. Dans le cas où, comme il est probable, on réunisse les plus importants de ces documents pour en faire une nouvelle édition, M le Ministre de la Marine se fera un plaisir d'en mettre un exemplaire à la disposition du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis.

Veuillez agréer, Mr. le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 137*

Turin, February 25, 1860

Sir: It is well known, as stated in my last dispatch, that a manifesto on the annexation of central Italy was agreed to in the Cabinet Council held at Turin previously to the departure of the King for Milan,

<sup>182</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 136 di Daniel Carutti firma per il Ministro

and that its publication was intended during the festivities which have rendered remarkable the sojourn of the Court in that capital. But those fêtes are now drawing to a close, and no such state paper has been issued. Not only so, but the ministerial journal of this morning has formally contradicted the report that any such publication will be made at all.

It is generally believed that this change of purpose is due to the interference of the French Government. Louis Napoleon is not yet quite ready to permit Sardinia to grasp the prey which has so long been within her reach. Like a bright drop of quicksilver, central Italy slips from her fingers whenever they close upon it. The annexation has existed *de facto* for six months; but the resources of diplomacy to prevent its legalization are endless and will only cease to be exercised when the French Emperor has more confidence in his Italian *protégé* than he seems to have felt at any time since Villafranca.

This however is not the only, nor the most remarkable, development of the last few days. I have stated that the Government here, since the reaccession of Mr. Cavour, has made open and undisguised opposition to the proposed cession of Savoy to France. But that opposition has of a sudden ceased—ceased entirely—and the journals of the ministry which indulged in the most lofty and patriotic declamation against the measure have changed their ground without warning or apology and have for the last few days stated many reasons, drawn from history and supported by policy, for yielding Savoy to France.

What the French Emperor has said to Cavour to produce so speedy an alteration in his tone is best known to themselves. It is probable that the message was sufficiently decisive and not over agreeable, as I observe that his intimates, the men who are supposed to be the confidants of the Premier, speak with considerable acerbity of the French Monarch. But who could ever believe that France would permit the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont without the cession of Savoy? It would have been wiser to have yielded with a good grace than to have waited for the masters's word.

In an industrial or productive point of view Savoy is not worth a *sou* either to France or Sardinia. It is one of the most mountainous territories, inhabited by one of the poorest populations, in Europe. The taxes will not pay for the roads and government. But as a strategical position it is magnificent—invaluable—to France. With the frontier where it now is, France is forced to keep a hundred thousand men in *échelon* along the line from Lyons to Grenoble for the security of the country on that side. But the mountains of Savoy, with the troops which the province will

furnish under the French conscription, will entirely, or at least very nearly, suffice for the whole defence of France in that quarter; and the expense of the great army now so employed will be saved, or, rather, the troops now employed to guard that frontier will be added to the effective armament of France in other quarters;—on the Rhine, for example

The Government has issued its financial statement for the year 1859. According to the Minister Oytana, the following was the condition of the Treasury on 31st of September 1859, completing the first three quarters of the year:—

Receipts from all sources of taxation and from the loan of 50 millions dated

Feb. 1st. '59	Frs. 128,556,104.
Sum paid by French Government	
for provisions for its troops	4,000,000.
The Lombard contribution to	
war expenses	7,883,406.
Parmesan idem	227,994.
Treasury bonds	29,334,797.
Other Funds	987,000.
	<hr/>
Total Receipts	170,989,301.
Total Expenses	161,463,013.
	<hr/>
Remaining in Treasury	Frs. 9,526,282.

The estimated receipts and resources for the quarter commencing on the 1st. October and, completing the whole year of 1859 including the 9,526,282 remaining in Treasury as above stated are Frs. 108,108,095; and the estimated expenses are Frs. 157,287,237.

There was therefore at the end of last year a deficit, beyond the loan and all other resources, of 49,179,142 francs.

The receipts of Lombardy for 1859 are estimated at Frs. 100,000,000; and the expenses at Frs. 88,303,293.

According to this official statement there will be a deficit in 1860 of 68,741,236 francs, to cover which a loan 100,000,000 has been contracted.

Sir: On Sunday, the 26th of this month, a royal proclamation was somewhat unexpectedly posted in the streets of this and of every other city of the kingdom calling under arms the troops now in *congé* and reserve. These troops are divided into three categories. The first is required to present itself at their depots on the 12th of March and the two others at intervals of a week later.

These are the same troops which were called out at this period of last year. They served through the war and after Villafranca were disbanded. This proclamation places the army at once on war footing and gives it a numerical strength of nearly one hundred thousand men, independently of the army of the duchies

Last year the reason alleged for the measure was the « menacing attitude of Austria. » This year the motive presented by the Royal Proclamation aforesaid is the necessity of accustoming the troops of the new and the ancient provinces to act together under arms.

It is impossible to believe that this is the whole and only reason for raising up this great army. Sardinia is too poor—no country is sufficiently rich—to place its whole military population in the field,—to furnish it with weapons and with uniforms,—to provide for the subsistence and the pay of so great a multitude, and to subtract so vast a part of its men from the productive force of the nation, simply for idle parade, a military exercise, and a doubtful gain in discipline. It is impossible to believe that This measure can be nothing less than a preparation for approaching hostilities.

Here in Turin the political people pretend to say that it is a necessary preparation for the eventualities attendant on the approaching annexation of central Italy, and an effort to open the eyes of the Pope and the King of Naples to the vanity of their warlike projects. I myself do not credit their explanation. This call to arms means Venice. There lies the true arena. There is the Italian question. Never will the trouble in and about it be over, never can this peninsula even approach a settlement, so long as the province of Venice and the fortresses of the Mincio remain in Austrian hands.

The French are said to be occupied in increasing their stores of provisions at the depots in Genoa. It will be remembered that they last year rented the houses and the grounds which they hold in that city

not for one but for *two* years. What passes in the interior of the Austrian Empire is variously stated. The correspondents of the Italian journals declare that its whole force has been placed under the command of a new general, and that a colossal apparatus for speedy action is everywhere visible. This the German publicists deny. Your able Minister at Vienna can doubtless inform you of the truth. But there is one fact that I can state with some pretensions to accuracy,—that the military preparations of Austria in the province of Venice are very considerable and diligently executed. For the last ten days huge transport charged with materials of war arrive every night at the port of Venice, whence they are rapidly transferred to Padua. A long line of rifled cannon newly cast, have been lately seen laid out by the side of the railroad from Dalo to Padua, in numbers (as I am informed) sufficient to form twenty batteries. These cannons were said to be all field pieces, and not guns of position, brought straight from the arsenal at Vienna, where work goes on night and day. In the forts of the Quadrilateral much work is done to strengthen and restore every point and to furnish them with provisions. Even at Milan the agents of the Austrian Government are believed to be in the market for the purchase of grain and forage.

These circumstances make a strong resemblance between the present season of 1860 and the same month of 1859. The diplomatic position is also in many points similar to that occupied by the powers of Europe at the close of the last winter. There are two great and signal differences, which will be shortly pointed to, but the essential complication is the same.

1. Now, as then, England has her « four points, » which she proposes to France and Austria as true remedies of the public disease. Her Ministry thinks that the acceptance of these « four points » by France and Austria would at once solve the Italian question. They are as follows.

« 1. France and Austria shall renounce intervention for the future in the internal affairs of Italy, unless called on to employ it by the unanimous consent of the great powers.

2. The Emperor's Government shall come to an understanding with the Holy Father to evacuate the Roman States when the reorganisation of his army shall permit, and when our troops can be withdrawn from Rome without danger to the maintenance of order. Our army shall also quit the north of Italy within a suitable period.

3. The internal organization of Venetia shall be left out of the pale of the negotiations of the powers.

4. Finally, the King of Sardinia shall be invited by the Government

of the Emperor, and by that of H.B.M. acting in concert, not to send troops into central Italy until the different states and provinces, by a new vote of their assemblies, after a new election, shall have solemnly declared their wishes, and if those assemblies should pronounce in favour of annexation, France and Great Britain shall no longer oppose the entrance of Sardinian troops ».

II. The new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Thouvenel, in replying to these propositions of Lord John Russell does not demur to any of them France will accept them all; but he protests against doing so until Austria can be brought to do the same. The accord of the cabinets of St Petersburg and Vienna he deems absolutely necessary to the pacific settlement of Italian difficulties.

Hence M. Thouvenel addressed a note on the 31st of January to the Austrian Premier, Ct. Rechberg, remitting the « four points » to his decision. In this dispatch he gives at length a history of all the unsuccessful attempts of France to obtain a definite settlement of affairs in central Italy. The population of that country having persistently refused the restoration of the archdukes, he appeals to Austria to receive in a spirit of a conciliation the solution proposed by England.

III. The answer of the Austrian cabinet to the dispatch of Thouvenel and the English proposition bears date the 17th of February. Count Rechberg commences by—« expressing the high estimation attached by the Government of His Apostolic Majesty to the communication from France. The Austrian Minister is happy to discover in these friendly steps an evident desire to maintain a cordial understanding between the two courts.

Passing to the examination of the four points proposed by England, Count Rechberg points out, under the question of non-intervention, two essential things—1st, the principle of the right of intervention, and 2d, the opportunity for its application. Without prejudging the principle in any way, the Austrian cabinet recognizes that, in the present circumstances, there is no opportunity either for Austria or France to interfere in central Italy. The second point, as Count Rechberg observes, now applies to France alone, Austria having withdrawn her troops from all parts of Italy not under her domination.

Referring to the third point, which regards the interior organization of Venetia, Count Rechberg declares that although this question must remain quite extraneous to the negotiations between the powers, the Emperor of Austria loyally maintains all the promises of Villafranca as regards Venetia. If these promises have not yet been realized, the fault

can only be attributed to the intrigues and continual provocations of the Italian revolutionary party, which no longer conceals its intention of turning these concessions against Austria herself, in order to deprive her of Venetia.

As regards the fourth point, Count Rechberg considers it useless at the present moment to engage in a discussion of the principle of the proposed combination for the settlement of the affairs of Italy.

Austria confines herself to the expression of her own conviction that the re-establishment of the former dynasties and the realization of the project of an Italian confederacy would much better guarantee the future prosperity of the peninsula

She will leave it to time and the course of events to confirm the justice of her judgment. »

IV. The four points have been similarly communicated to the Russian Government, but have been less positively and less favourably replied to. The Emperor Alexander accepts the communication of M Thouvenel as a base of future negotiations and as a means of uniting the great powers in a Congress to discuss the affairs of Italy which, he thinks, should be no longer abandoned to the « sport of passions and the strife of parties. » But according to all accounts (for the document is not yet printed) he repels with energy the doctrines of popular sovereignty which form the base of the English propositions; he condemns them in the name and for the safety of the monarchical and dynastical principles which are now the fundamental laws of Europe; and he denounces them on account of the mischief which they will cause to all governments on the day when they shall prevail. But he is willing nevertheless to accord large concessions to the exigencies of the time and of the situation.

V. Reply has, it is said, also been received in Paris and London from the cabinet of Berlin, but I have not been able to obtain any authentic account of it beyond the general statement that it is unfavourable to the four points, and that it supports the suggestion of Russia that a Congress should be called together for the settlement of these affairs.

VI. For the last two weeks there has been in circulation a statement that the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Vienna have come to an understanding that the latter shall support the policy of the former in the East and that Russia in return will guarantee the territory Austria yet holds in Italy. This report has been frequently and authoritatively contradicted, and yet it is still persisted in by many well informed persons. That any such treaty exists between those two powers there is yet no good reason to believe; but in view of the answers given by

Gortchakoff to Thouvenel, and the persistence of these reports, together with the unexpected and sudden tightening of the Anglo-French alliance in January, it may be rationally supposed that there has been some approach to better relations between the two great despotic powers of the north; and that Austria is no longer so completely isolated in Europe as she was at this time last year. It is often stated that the Emperor Francis Joseph has determined to make concessions to his subjects; to give such reforms in Venetia as will satisfy that province and to restore to Hungary her ancient constitution. *No reforms*, you may rest assured, will satisfy Venetia—nothing but separation from Austria will ever end the trouble there; but, if Francis Joseph concedes the ancient privileges of Hungary *that* difficulty is at once off his hands, and he will have a hundred thousand soldiers the more at his command. What truth there is in the statement others will inform you better than myself; but one thing is quite certain,—that the diplomatic bearing of Austria and language to the rest of Europe forms a marked contrast to that which she used and held at this period of last year. She is, at least, no longer insolent and arrogant nor possessed of that «pride which goes before a fall»

Such are the principal traits of the present situation of affairs. They make up a complication almost as involved as that which was solved by the sword of France last summer. The Italian people among whom I live are quite confident that it will again lead to hostilities. Their wish is perhaps the father of the thought, but such a result is possible, and should be duly taken into consideration. It is proper to state however that there is much less reason to be confident of war in the summer than there was at this period of 1859; and even that the probabilities have rather decreased than strengthened since the close of last month. This is owing to two remarkable points of difference in the attitude of parties at present and what they were in the spring of 1859. I have already alluded to those points in the beginning of this summary, and I now proceed to state them.

First, there is not *now* that perfect accord and distinct combination between the Emperor of France and Mr Cavour, the Premier of Sardinia, that there then was. A hundred small facts have come to my notice which satisfy me that Cavour is no longer in the confidence of Louis Napoleon. He does not know what the other is going to do. He gropes in the dark, hoping to find France with him but evidently preparing for other results. There is neither concert nor sympathy between those two men. If a tangible fact is demanded to prove this, I may point at once



to the misunderstanding and cross purpose which evidently existed in the policy of the two powers about Savoy in the early part of this month. So soon as Cavour's Government committed itself to the retention of that province, France made public her resolution to claim it. Up to the time that Cavour came back into office all went well. Napoleon had told the Pope that the Romagna was lost to him. Thouvenel accepted the English propositions, supporting the annexation of central Italy to Piedmont. But since January these favourable signs have ceased, and uncertainty has begun to prevail. This uncertainty, this want of confidential communication between Turin and Paris, take away the force and value of the Piedmontese call to arms, considered as a political indication. When the same preparations were made last year, they assured the war, because they were the acts of France though done by Piedmont, and were so understood. But at present they may be only the result of meditations and hopes of Mr. Cavour, he may be in error and Sardinia is not strong enough to make a war without France.

The second difference in the situation is the struggle between the Pope and the Emperor. At the commencement of the year I detailed the first movements—the pamphlet of Louis Napoleon, the allocution of the Pope to Goyon, the reply of the Emperor. Since then I have said nothing because I knew that all subsequent developments would be better detailed by others. But the strife so commenced has not ceased. The Pope has continued it by his encyclical letters to the Bishops and the Church at large; the Bishops of France have made charges to their clergy in a spirit of resistance to Napoleon; his Government has published menacing admonitions to the Bishops, and newspapers in the Catholic interest have been summarily suppressed. But these measures have failed to stop the clerical agitation in France, and the Romish priests of other countries are open in their denunciations of Napoleon. There can be little reason to doubt that the French Emperor has gotten the whole Catholic Church on his arm. It is a dangerous adversary for any Catholic sovereign. Terrible is the revenge of priests—they combine the enmities of man and of woman. Many grave persons think that there are but two courses open to Napoleon,—either to recoil and conciliate, or to follow the track of Henry VIII. It is probable that he wishes to do neither, but the difficulties of his position in the matter are perhaps sufficient to render him disinclined to undertake another great war until they are settled.

I have thought right to make this general summary of affairs at the present moment because we are on the eve of great developments. On

March 1st the Emperor will deliver his annual address to the Legislative Corps of France. The position of things is such as to render positive declarations as to his intentions natural, and almost inevitable. Yet no one knows what he is going to say. A message from Paris is said to have been received here to-day in which an entirely new scheme for central Italy is set forth:—to place the Romagna under a vicar of the Pope, to make Tuscany a separate State under the Duke of Genoa (infant son of the Duchess), and to give Parma and Modena to Sardinia. The telegraph to-morrow will probably dispel the painful uncertainty which now prevails and perhaps also change the whole face of affairs as I have endeavoured to delineate them now.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 139*

Turin, March 4, 1860

Sir. The Government and people of this country are at this moment in a state of considerable consternation. The cause is the speech of the French Emperor to the Legislative Corps.<sup>183</sup>

That important document will be placed in your hands long before these lines can reach your eye. I do not therefore transcribe it here, and shall confine my observation to the one or two passages which affect most materially the destinies of Italy.

By the last mail I forwarded to your Excellency a dispatch (No. 138) of some length in which it was endeavoured to delineate with some degree of fulness the actual state of the Italian question and the attitude of all European powers upon it as things stood on the 29th of February, the day previous to the Emperor's speech. If you have received that paper, you cannot be surprized [sic] that the Imperial manifesto has produced great despondency here, and places the Piedmontese Government in a most awkward position.

Cavour had called out the reserves on the Sunday preceding. He had made great and expensive preparations for war. It is now known that he had addressed to all the Sardinian legations abroad a circular

<sup>183</sup> Il 1° marzo 1860, all'apertura del parlamento francese, Napoleone III pronunziò un discorso davanti alle Camere unite nel quale dichiarò che in Italia « le difficoltà stanno per volgere alla fine ». Aggiunse che aveva avvertito Vittorio Emanuele II di accettare il plebiscito delle popolazioni italiane che si erano rivolte a lui, di lasciare l'autonomia alla Toscana e di rispettare i diritti e l'indipendenza della Santa Sede. Egli chiese anche apertamente la cessione di Nizza e della Savoia.

(See Appendix) complaining anew of the tyranny of Austria in Venetia, and thus rendering it apparent that these preparations referred to that power. But the Emperor speaks most kindly of Austria in his speech, declares in terms the most positive the amicable character of his relations with all the powers of Europe, maintains that the « time has come to put an end to a state of anxiety which has lasted too long and to seek the means of boldly inaugurating in France a new era of peace. » He announces a reduction of the French army by 100,000 men at the moment Sardinia calls fifty thousand new soldiers to the field.

But this is not all nor the worst of the contrast. On the very day when Napoleon delivers his speech in Paris, the provisional governments of Tuscany, of Parma, Modena and Bologna, acting in accord with the wishes of Sardinia, issue their decrees convoking the people of central Italy to vote at the polls on the 11th and 12th of March, by closed ballots, *and by universal suffrage* upon these two several propositions:—

« *Union with the Constitutional Monarchy of Victor Emmanuel,* »  
Or

« *A separate kingdom of central Italy.* »

This new appeal to the people originated in the acceptance by France of the English « Four Points. » The features of universal suffrage and vote by ballot were specially introduced into the original plan to satisfy the Emperor of France.

But what is the language now held by the Emperor relative to central Italy?

« I have not hesitated to declare, » says he, « to the King of Sardinia that, while leaving him entire liberty in his acts, I could not follow him in a policy which was attended with the disadvantage of appearing in the eyes of Europe to imply a wish of absorbing all the states of Italy, and selves to him, *but to maintain the self-government of Tuscany and to the wishes of the provinces* » (Parma and Modena) « which offered themselves to him, *but to maintain the self-government of Tuscany and to respect in principle the rights of the Holy See* If that arrangement does not satisfy every one, it has the advantage of reserving principles and calming apprehensions, and it makes Piedmont a kingdom of more than nine millions of souls. »

This passage in the Imperial discourse supports and confirms the reported message said to have been sent here from Paris a day or two previously and alluded to in the conclusion of Dispatch 138. It contained this new scheme for central Italy—the annexation of Parma and Modena to Piedmont, the government of the Romagna by a Vicar under the

supremacy of the Pope, and the establishment of a separate independent state in Tuscany under the infant Duke of Genoa.

But it is in clear contradiction to the « Four Points » made by England and accepted last January by Thouvenel, and, what is more serious, to the vote decreed at this same moment by the provisional governments of central Italy as above set forth. It is in direct opposition to all the hope, ambition, and plan of Piedmont, arising from the general policy of France and the dispatches of the French minister to the legations at Vienna, etc.

The passage declaring the Emperor's intention to « demand the French sides of the Alps »—a phrase which will include both Savoy and Nice—is not so unexpected. It was known two weeks and more since that France was determined to have them and that the Sardinian Government had been at fault in committing itself to their retention as it publicly did shortly after the reaccession of Mr. Cavour. But it was never supposed that Sardinia would have to surrender these provinces without getting Tuscany.

In fact it can no longer be concealed or denied that there is neither concert nor sympathy in the action of the present Sardinian Cabinet and that of the Emperor of France. I have repeatedly pointed to that circumstance in these dispatches; but it was never so clear and patent as now. Persons who are well informed as to the condition of affairs assured me that there was no good feeling or confidence between Cavour and Napoleon since Villafranca, and predicted a speedy change in the bearing of France towards Italy when the former came back into office on the 18th of January. Up to that moment all went well for the annexation—since then there has been uncertainty as to the designs of the Emperor— and that uncertainty has been unfavorably ended by his present discourse.

But Sardinia has gone too far to recoil. She cannot countermand the call upon her troops. She cannot evade or change the popular vote now decreed in central Italy. Should the people of those countries vote for the annexation, she can no longer in honour refuse to accept their act. I cannot believe that the Sardinian Cabinet will even attempt to evade the issue it has now so clearly brought up. If the people of central Italy vote for the annexation, central Italy will be annexed, despite the Emperor's speech, unless he resorts to armed intervention to prevent it, which he consistently declares he will not do.

I say *if* the people should so vote. Hitherto I have expressed the opinion that such a result was the only one which could come to pass if a popular vote was taken. Of Parma, Modena and Romagna, I am still

certain. But I have received intelligence lately from Tuscany which makes me somewhat to doubt the result of a secret ballot of the whole people in that province. Well informed and eminent Tuscans with whom I have lately conversed think that there is a majority against the annexation. They reason thus,—that Tuscany has hitherto received vast sums of money from strangers who came there while it had a court of its own, and who will no longer come when it shall sink into the condition of a province; that it has hitherto had no need of a large army, whereas, if annexed to Sardinia, its conscription must be increased; it has hitherto been lightly taxed—, but, joined to Sardinia, it must bear the heavy burdens and assume the disproportionate debt of this ambitious and expensive government. It is clearly the material interest of Tuscany to remain independent; and they believe that a fair ballot and universal suffrage will give a majority against annexation.

But so great is the desire of all Italians to form part of a strong Italian kingdom, that I still believe that Tuscany will go with the other provinces

If the annexation is so consummated in disregard of the Emperor's admonition, it remains to be seen what he will do. The worst that he can do, according to the politicians here, will be to take away his army, withdraw his diplomatic support, and leave Sardinia to finish alone the contest she has so long provoked with Austria.

Parliament has been convoked for the 2d. of April. Between that time and this day the fate of central Italy will be decided.

### *Camillo di Cavour ai diplomatici Sardi*<sup>184</sup>

Milano, 20 febbraio [1860]

Signor ministro, mi fo premura di chiamare la vostra attenzione sul documento unito a questa mia, che venne pubblicato da un giornale di questa città.

Or fa qualche tempo l'Austria fece smentire dai suoi giornali uffiziali la notizia della proclamazione dello stato d'assedio della Venezia. Nel tempo stesso si accusò il governo del Re di mantenere, per mezzo dei suoi emissarii, l'agitazione delle popolazioni italiane che il trattato di

<sup>184</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 139 di Daniel, del quale è la Nota. Ne diamo il testo italiano da *Il Diritto* del 4 marzo 1860

Zurigo lasciò sotto il dominio austriaco. Il documento che ho l'onore di trasmettervi potrà illuminare il governo di... sui veri motivi del profondo malumore e della costante agitazione che regnano nella Venezia.

Con questa circolare alle I. e R. delegazioni austriache nella Venezia, il conte di Bissingen<sup>185</sup> sottopone all'arruolamento forzato nelle compagnie disciplinari (specie di punizione che nessuna nazione incivilita comminò nei suoi codici, che invano si cerca nello stesso codice austriaco e che equivale presso a poco ai lavori forzati) tutti gli individui i quali per la loro vita anteriore, per i loro sentimenti e pel loro contegno sembrassero capaci di progettare conati ostili all'I.R. governo austriaco.

Voglia, sig. ministro, far notare al governo di...

1. Che l'elasticità di tali espressioni è tale che quasi tutta la popolazione maschia della Venezia può cadere in quella categoria;

2. Che la circolare dice espressamente, che non sarà tenuto conto dei motivi di salute che potrebbero opporsi all'applicazione di tal genere di pena;

3. Che tale provvedimento di cui si tratta non è temporario, come lo è per sua natura lo stato d'assedio stesso e che da esso consegue intanto che nella Venezia l'autorità militare si sostituisca alla giurisdizione dei tribunali militari.

Io credo che convenga comunicare queste osservazioni al ministro degli affari esteri a lui lasciando la cura di arguire quali conseguenze debbano necessariamente derivare dallo stato di cose nella Venezia

*Note* A few days after the date of this circular, the Royal Proclamation calling the Sardinian reserves under arms made its appearance.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 140*<sup>186</sup>

Turin, March 10, 1860

Sir: The governments of Sardinia and France appear to be fairly at issue, the one with the other. This fact becomes clearly evident to the world from the publication of important diplomatic communications

<sup>185</sup> Conte Kajetan von Nippenburg Bissingen (1806-1890), governatore di Venezia dal 1855 al 1880

<sup>186</sup> Nell'istruzione n. 38, datata Washington, 2 aprile 1860, Cass metteva in rilievo l'importanza di questo dispaccio « la chiara analisi presentata delle recenti importanti comunicazioni diplomatiche fra i gabinetti di Torino, Parigi e Londra, è molto soddisfacente ed è stata letta con grande interesse »

between the cabinets of Turin, Paris and London, which have all been printed this week in the newspapers of those three cities. The press of London will afford you accurate copies and translations of these documents sooner than I can do so from this legation; therefore I do not find it necessary to encumber these dispatches with them. I shall confine myself to a brief summary of their purport, that you may thus have at one moment a view of the whole position and perceive the truth of the remark with which this note commences.

I A voluminous correspondence relative to the future destiny of Savoy between the British Foreign Secretary and his agents at Berne, Paris and Turin has been laid before the British Parliament. From these papers it is certain that the cession of Savoy and Nice to France was discussed by the governments of France and Sardinia previously to the late war; and such cession was deemed necessary by France in case Lombardy and *Venetia* were added to Piedmont so as to form a strong state in the north of Italy. When the war concluded without the acquisition of Venice, nothing further was said of the matter for sometime, France in fact renouncing its design. But when it became evident that the duchies were to be annexed to Sardinia, France returned to that design, considering the aggrandizement of Sardinia on that side as equivalent to the acquisition of Venice, and rendering it alike necessary to provide for the safety of its frontier against the new power which it had partially created.

A certain slip of territory in Savoy adjoining Switzerland is at present neutral ground. As it appears from the dispatches of these ministers, the Swiss Government is very solicitous about the position of that soil. In case of the cession of Savoy to France she desires to acquire that territory completely; and, in that case, she is favorable to the proposed arrangement; otherwise the Swiss are opposed to it.

The views of the Sardinian Government are less clearly defined in this correspondence. Count Cavour at one time gave to the English Minister a formal contradiction to the report that any bargain or arrangement existed by which Sardinia had agreed to cede Savoy to France under any contingency whatever. Nevertheless the terms admit of the supposition that the expediency of such an event had been actually discussed between the two Governments and its necessity in some cases admitted. He represents the wish of the people of the province as very doubtful, being sometimes manifested favorably and sometimes in opposition to annexation to France.

As for the English Government it has opposed the cession of territory to France first and last, with energy and consistency. It has signified

to Sardinia that such a cession would be little short of dishonour and a certain cause of weakness to the state. To the French Government it had declared Savoy wholly unnecessary to the security of France, whether Sardinia remains a kingdom of 5,000,000 or becomes a state of 11,000,000. In either case Sardinia could never be a danger to France except by alliance with a stronger power, and then the possession of the Alps by Sardinia would be the same peril to France whether the population of the former was five or eleven millions. It states that such an acquisition of territory would deprive the late war by France of its disinterested character, and warns the French Government against the public judgment should a new and unpleasant light be thrown on the history of that affair.

II. Then comes a dispatch addressed by M. de Thouvenel, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to his representative at London, which he directs him to read to Lord John Russell. He refers to the « four points » proposed by the the English Government for the settlement of Italy, to which France at one time gave its assent on condition that Austria would agree to them. He now informs the British Ministry that Austria has refused its acquiescence and in consequence France also withdraws or greatly modifies its assent, considering the whole question again open to discussion. What plan the French Government believes to be the best adapted for the settlement of Italy, he will state to the Cabinet of Turin. M. de Thouvenel concludes by politely reminding the British Government that France is in a position to entitle its opinion on Italian affairs to more weight than should be accorded to that of England. France has made great sacrifices for Italy and borne all the burden of a great war, while England has refused to give either men or money or even diplomatic support to the hostilities undertaken for the Italian cause. Hence France believes she has superior claims to judge these affairs and to be heard by the Italian people.

III. Next comes the very important dispatch of this same M. de Thouvenel to the Baron de Talleyrand, Minister of France in Sardinia, which he is directed to communicate to Count Cavour. Here M. de Thouvenel declares that the motive which impels the population of central Italy to unite themselves to Piedmont is not their aversion to Austria and that France can only look on their annexation a menace of new wars and trouble to Europe. If they are united, as they propose, to Sardinia, the latter will have a proportion of new territory and people too great for its immediate assimilation. Hence the political centre of the country will be changed, and Sardinia will no longer be able to direct her own



policy She will be forced to engage in new wars with Austria to satisfy the popular demand for the conquest of Venice or incur by resistance to that national feeling the dangers of revolution. Hence M de Thouvenel advises Sardinia to renounce the idea of general annexation and to accept instead the following arrangement.—

1st The annexation unconditional of Parma and Modena to Piedmont.

2d. The temporal government of the Romagna by the King of Sardinia as a Vicar of the Pope, an arrangement which he thinks would satisfy the aspirations of the people of that country while preserving inviolate the rights of the Holy See

3d. To re-establish the independence of Tuscany, and to renounce all claim and pretension to it, leaving the people there free to form for themselves hereafter a government suitable to their wants.

By this arrangement, M. de Thouvenel declares that Sardinia will secure an unattackable position: for France will not only support her in a Congress of Powers, but also give distinct and formal pledges to protect her independence and her new territory against all the world.

If, however, Sardinia will not follow the counsel of France, and persists in the present proceedings for the acquisition of all central Italy, M. de Thouvenel gives Count Cavour clear warning that the French Government will then look only to the interests of France and withdraw from all connection with the probable consequences which Sardinia will at her own peril provoke. She will be left to support herself in the position she has assumed and to walk in the path of conquest and aggrandizement she has chosen with her unaided forces. In other words the French troops in Italy will be withdrawn and Sardinia will settle her account with Austria as she may.

In conclusion M de Thouvenel informs M Cavour that the formation of powerful state at the foot of the Alps, whether consisting of all or only some part of the Italian states, renders the acquisition of Savoy and Nice by France a geographical necessity. But such an acquisition will never be made against the will of the people of those countries or without « consulting » the great powers of Europe, or without securing the interests of Switzerland in a part of that territory

IV The reply of Count Cavour, addressed to the Chevalier Nigra, Sardinian Minister at Paris, to be read to M. de Thouvenel, is dated the 29 th of February and is published in the Turin newspapers of March 7th. After recapitulating the proposition of the French Minister, he says that if it had been made immediately after the peace of Villafranca, it

would have been accepted without repugnance; but the condition of things is no longer such as to admit of its success. The people of Central Italy have become habituated to the idea of their right to dispose of themselves; that idea has been strengthened by the repeated promises of the Emperor to prevent all foreign interference and by his acceptance of the « four points » of the English Government; and it is now quite certain that they will refuse to be disposed of in the manner advised by M. de Thouvenel. Sardinia herself cannot even undertake to be the defender of that plan; and her Government will limit itself to transmitting the dispatch of M. de Thouvenel to the governments of Tuscany and of the Emilia. These may perhaps submit the project of the French Government to a vote of the people, who will repudiate it. The Romans cannot be satisfied with a Vicariat because it admits the right of the Pope to interfere in their affairs and to control their Government. The Pope will never accept it, because the institutions which his Vicar must introduce could never be reconciled to the political and religious ideas predominant at Rome and do acts for which the Pope would never be willingly responsible. M. Cavour thinks that it would be easier by certain offers which the Emperor of France is in position to make to induce the Holy Father to acquiesce in the present separation from the Holy See than to admit of the arrangement proposed by M. de Thouvenel. As to Tuscany the project of a separate government would be rejected by the patriotism of the people. Since 1848 they have never ceased to desire the unity of Italy and to be themselves a part of that unit. If erected into a small separate state, Tuscany would be the refuge of men holding extreme opinions from all parts of Italy, who would soon force its government to a *coup d'état* and the introduction of foreign troops to support it. Lastly, M. Cavour thinks Sardinia will have no difficulty in assimilating all this territory and does not fear the loss of power over her own course.

For these and other reasons Italy will not accept the project of the French Government. As for Sardinia herself, M. Cavour informs M. de Thouvenel in distinct and emphatic terms that if the people of central Italy again openly manifest their wish to be annexed to Piedmont, in the vote by universal suffrage shortly to be taken, the Sardinian Government will assuredly yield to their desire and receive them as provinces of this kingdom. The Sardinian Government would lose all moral power over the Italian people if it did otherwise, and the King would be reduced to govern by force alone. In view of the declaration that France will withdraw its support from Sardinia in the event of this annexation, the Government is perfectly aware of the grave risks that it will run, and is

determined nevertheless to run those risks. It will incur any hazard rather than again refuse the legitimate demand of central Italy.

V. In this dispatch Cavour gives no reply to the passage in Thouvenel's note relative to Savoy. Today, however, appears a second dispatch of Cavour to Nigra, dated March 2d, fully meeting that question. He denies that the new accession of territory will render Sardinia more dangerous to France than before, and he declares that the Sardinia Government will never agree to barter for any ulterior advantages any portion of the hereditary states of the Crown. Nevertheless he takes in consideration the changed position which Savoy and Nice will in future hold should a large part of Italy be attached to them, and he admits that the right of the people to choose their own destiny belongs to them as well as to the people of central Italy. While claiming it for the duchies, he is willing to accord it to Savoy and Nice. If, therefore, the question is submitted to the people, and they declare their desire to be annexed to France, Sardinia will not oppose their wish.

V This evening (March 9th) a subsequent correspondence between Cavour on the one part and Farini and Ricasoli on the other, dated the 29th February, the 2d and 4th of March, appears in the journals of Turin. Cavour communicates to the rulers of the Emilia and Tuscany the plan proposed by M. de Thouvenel and suggests that it should be submitted to the people. Farini and Ricasoli in reply object to the new project, which they deem inexpedient and impossible. They are willing to *publish* the propositions of Thouvenel, but do not say that they will call a vote of the people upon them. They both refer to the propositions which are already submitted to universal suffrage on the 12th of this month—annexation or a separate Nation—which will serve as a test of the popular sense of the plan of settlement suggested by France. The replies of these rulers are evasive. They promise nothing except to publish the French note.

From these documents, therefore, it seems that France and Sardinia are at issue. France proposes to Sardinia a line of conduct which the latter refuses to adopt. In case of refusal France threatens to leave Sardinia to her « unaided forces » in the difficulties which may ensue, and Sardinia declares her readiness to risk the dangers of that position.

The annexation of all central Italy to Piedmont will in a few days be voted by the people, and no conceivable contingency if that vote is given, can prevent the annexation from being effected. Meanwhile the Marshal Vaillant, commanding the French Army in Italy, has received orders to complete all the business of the troops at their various stations,

to prepare all his baggage, and to be ready to leave on immediate notice. When the annexation is made, will those troops be indeed withdrawn? This is the inquiry in every one's mouth. The Italians are firmly convinced that they will not. Habituated to falsehood, they believe the contrary of all they hear and they have persuaded themselves that these orders to the troops as well as the menace so distinctly expressed in Thouvenel's dispatch, are mere shams to deceive and govern them.

Should the troops really retire into France, I find the general opinion to be, even among the highly educated classes, that the Austrian army will almost immediately advance to occupy the duchies, and that war would ensue between united Italy, unaided by France, on the one hand, and Austria alone on the other. This contingency does not at all alarm them. They are now again possessed with their old idea that they are capable of a duel with Austria. They say that they can put 160,000 troops at once into the field, of which 100,000 will be of perfect quality; their arsenals and storehouses at this moment present a spectacle of unparalleled activity. Their preparations are now on a much larger scale and much more ardently directed than at this period of last year when war was certain. I am told of a single contract for 800,000 francs worth of horses. In short the old policy of *Italia farà da sé* is again uppermost.

If my own opinion is worth stating, I think the Italians are wrong in all of those conjectures just stated. They do not believe that Napoleon will withdraw his troops, because they do not conceive it possible that he can be willing to see all his last year's work undone. But that man has manifested a will so bizarre,—he has conceived and executed so many startling and illogical determinations,—that one can no longer be surprized by anything that he may determine to do. It seems not only possible but probable, if the diplomatic difference is not in some way arranged or modified, that he will actually withdraw his army towards the French frontiers; but he will arrest their march in Savoy and Nice, and profit by their presence there to draw from the population of those provinces a vote for annexation to France. Nor do I think that such a movement will be the signal for an immediate advance of the Austrian forces. Austria does not act in that way. Before she undertakes hostilities in Italy there will be on her part long diplomatic negotiations and protests, with much lumbering preparation of arms. But should hostilities really recommence on the terms anticipated, I cannot believe that the result will in that case be what the Italians hope. History affords many examples of successful resistance by nations less numerous and wealthy

than the Italians to nations more vigorous and intelligent than the Austrians. Three millions of Americans, divided in counsel and in the field, withstood Great Britain for eight years. The Dutch were invincible by all the powers of Spain and of France. But in these and all similar cases the weaker party had moral advantages which are unhappily wanting here. The Italians are not the Americans of '76, nor the Dutch in the time of the Stadtholders; nor is Count Cavour in any manner to be likened into William the Taciturn. Modern Italians have ardour of mind and a sudden violence of character which may enable them to gain some early advantage in a struggle; but for a disproportionate contest they have need of solid virtues in the population, which are not here. I can anticipate from the policy of « *Italia farà da sè* » on the present occasion no result very different from that which it has ever produced under similar circumstances from the days of Barbarossa to those of Radetzky.

During the week I have passed three days at Milan. While there a new order to the French commander for putting everything in perfect order of departure, arrived by telegraph. My acquaintances among the officers assured me that this order was severely executed. The last debts were paid, the last provision laid in, the troops carefully reviewed, the fourgons packed, the baggage collected, packages enveloped in oil-cloth; nothing was left to be done except to hitch the horses and to fall into columns. Should the telegraph bring an order to march, in a few hours after its receipt, the French army in Milan would leave no more trace of their residence in that capital than a cloud that has thrown its shadow on the ground leaves there when the wind has wafted it over the sky. It is proper however to state that these same officers were, like the Italians, inclined to think that no such order would be given.

I observed a very bad feeling between the French and Piedmontese officers in Milan, and the sentiment extended to the soldiers. The French complain of the discourtesy and jealousy of the Piedmontese. When they meet or pass in the streets *they never salute*. The coffee-houses haunted by the French are never entered by the Sardinian officers, and the Frenchmen studiously and openly avoid all those houses where the other uniform is seen. There have been no duels, but simply because they have no points or place of contact.

*John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass*

*Dispaccio n 141*

Turin, March 20, 1860

Sir: When I last wrote, the duchies of Modena, Parma, and the Roman province of Bologna, known as the Emilia, and the duchy of Tuscany were on the eve of a vote by universal suffrage to decide the question whether they would be annexed to Piedmont or constitute an independent country. This vote was taken on the 12th of this month. It resulted in the complete triumph of the party favorable to annexation.

The population of Tuscany is 1,806,940. Of these 386,445 voted. For annexation to Piedmont 366,571; and for independent existence 14,925, while 4,949 votes were declared null.

The total population of the Emilia is 2,127,105. Of these 427,512 voted. For annexation 426,006, for a separate organization 746, while 750 votes were nullified.

On the 18th day of this month, Signor Farini, the Dictator of the Emilia, came to Turin with definite announcement of the popular will. He was received in solemn audience by the King, on the throne, surrounded by the great officers of State, and, after receiving the announcement, that monarch then and there signed a decree declaring the Emilia to be from that moment an integral part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. By another decree the electoral colleges of the new province are ordered to choose delegates to the Sardinian Parliament.

To-morrow, Signor Ricasoli, the chief man of Tuscany, will come with a similar commission from that duchy. He will be received in the same manner and with the same result. It is said that the Prince of Carignan will be sent to Tuscany, as Royal Lieutenant, to keep at Florence the semblance of a Court.

But with regard to Savoy and Nice there is yet some uncertainty. There is of course none about their annexation to France. That may be regarded as an accomplished fact. It is also now quite sure that Switzerland will not get a single foot of the ground. All that will be done in her favour is this—the French custom-houses will be placed some leagues within the frontier, so that Geneva may continue to receive its provisions free of duty from the territory at its gates. This will be called neutral ground. The uncertainty relates to the mode of ceding Savoy to France. The Sardinian Government desires to have the question decided by universal suffrage as in the duchies. It is understood here that this does not quite content Louis Napoleon. He wishes a cession pure and uncon-

ditional, after a simple consultation with the municipal councils of the provinces. It is supposed that this will be more agreeable to the great powers than an acquisition by universal popular suffrage,—a measure distasteful always to the adherents of Right Divine. The probable result of the negotiations will be the occupation of Savoy and Nice by French troops; after which the local authorities will be consulted, and the cession made by decree of the King which will be submitted to Parliament and confirmed as a law.

The meeting of Parliament has been adjourned till the 12th of April. In the meantime, the French Government has interrupted the call of the Savoyard troops to the Sardinian army, and this diplomatic movement at once deprives this country of some 20,000 of its very best soldiers.

The Pope threatens Victor Emmanuel with the great excommunication. But I cannot believe that such a measure will be carried into effect. It belongs to ages remote from ours.

There have been demonstrations for a Republic among the students at Milan, but too unimportant to claim detail here.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 142*

Turin, April 3, 1860

Sir: The long approaching events so often mentioned in these dispatches have become historical facts. On the day after my last letter, Mr. Ricasoli, the Chief of the Provisional Government of Tuscany, came to Turin the bearer of the official vote of that duchy declaring its desire for annexation to the Kingdom of Sardinia. He was received by the King with the same ceremony which had been observed towards Mr. Farini, the Dictator of Central Italy, and, after his announcement of the popular wish, the King accepted the proffer so made to him and signed a decree declaring Tuscany to be from that moment a province of Sardinia.

No sooner did intelligence of this fact reach Paris, in a telegram from the French Minister at Turin, than a telegraphic order was sent back to the French commanders of the army of occupation in Italy to commence the immediate march of their troops towards the French frontier; and, so every preparation had long been made, the order was executed in the hour of its reception. For instance, it reached the commander of the French corps stationed in the city of Genoa at midnight; and when the people of that town, who had seen the streets and theatres full of them

the evening before at eleven o'clock, arose in the morning, not one soldier of France was to be found in all the environs. The distant roll of their drums and rumble of their waggons [sic] along the Cornice road was all that they left in Genoa at daybreak. At Novî the order was received at one o'clock in the night, and at two they were in march through the gateways. So in other places. But in Milan the retreat was executed less hastily, two companies being directed from that city to Nice and one to Savoy every day, until all were transferred to those provinces of which they were ordered to take possession. At the strong place of Piacenza 1,200 French Grenadiers still remain, and it is thought will continue to remain for some indefinite time—certainly not to protect it against the Austrians.

This movement seems to have put a sudden stop to all the hesitations and negotiations of the Sardinian Government as to the cession of Savoy. A treaty was forthwith signed by the plenipotentiaries of France and Sardinia surrendering the above named province and the *arrondissement* of Nice to France peremptorily and immediately. This treaty was published in the journals of Turin on Friday last <sup>187</sup>. But French troops were already on the territory in question before the treaty was either signed or published. The manner in which the business has been managed by the Sardinian Ministry has produced a strong popular feeling. It is considered unworthy of the country in every point of view. I append to this dispatch a translation of this document which is not only important in essence, but singular in style.

Switzerland, getting nothing but fair words, has protested both in Turin and at Paris. It is difficult to perceive how the law of nations or existing treaties are infringed by the transaction or of what Switzerland has a right to complain. By this treaty of 1815 a part of Savoy was rendered neutral ground in favour of the Swiss Republic. This neutrality is not destroyed by the cession to France—France takes the provinces subject to that provision. It is true that Switzerland was better satisfied to have that neutrality in weak than in strong hands, but her interest there is not a matter of right.

It is however undeniable that the conduct of the Emperor towards that Republic has not been generous. He seems to have forgotten the days when it protected him in arms against all the forces of France. If the matter ends where it now stands, his treatment of Switzerland will

<sup>187</sup> Allegata a questo dispaccio vi è la traduzione del trattato franco-sardo per la cessione di Nizza e della Savoia, che omettiamo



be one of the many stains on his historical reputation. But several persons who know Louis Napoleon think that now, having the whole matter in his hands, and having proved to Europe that the protests of England in a matter which does not concern her are ineffective to change his course, he will of his own free choice and without condition make a present of the Chablais to the Government of Berne, and so give occasion to his partizans to cover him with adulation for chivalry and disinterestedness.

The King of Sardinia has issued a proclamation to the people of Savoy and Nice absolving them from their oath of allegiance. Commissioners are now engaged in marking out the new frontier between France and Sardinia. But all these treaties,—the annexation of the Emilia, the annexation of Tuscany, the cession of Savoy and Nice,—can only have their full legal effect when they shall have been confirmed by act of Parliament. There is not doubt but that they will be so confirmed within a very few days; for Parliament met yesterday and these treaties will be the first business before it.

The meeting of this body has an importance and a solemnity unusual to it. It is the birth of a new nation. The delegates of Lombardy, Parma, Modena, of the Roman legations and of Tuscany, have made full appearance and have been admitted to seats by the side of the ancient representatives of Piedmont.

The ceremony by which the session was opened yesterday, Monday the 2d of April, was distinguished by great pomp and parade. The following is a translation of the speech from the throne:—

« Senators and Deputies,

When I last opened Parliament in the midst of the grief of Italy and the dangers of this State, faith in Divine Justice alone gave me strength to predict good fortune to be near at hand.

In that short space of time which has since elapsed, an invasion has been repulsed, Lombardy has been liberated by the glorious deeds of the army, Central Italy has been freed by the admirable virtues of its own people, and to-day the representatives of the rights and the hopes of Italy are assembled around me.

For these great gains we are indebted to a magnanimous ally, to the valour of our soldiers, to the self-devotion of our volunteers, to the persevering concord of the people, and to the grace of God; for without His superhuman aid we could never have fulfilled undertakings so memorable to the present and to future generations.

By gratitude to France, for the welfare of Italy, and to unite two

people who have a common origin, principles and destiny, we are bound to submit to some sacrifices which cost dearly to my own heart (His Majesty pronounced those words with manifestations of emotion.) Subject to the act of this Parliament and to the vote of the people, and subject to the rights of Switzerland as secured by international law, I have concluded a treaty stipulating the re-union of Savoy, and of the *arrondissement* of Nice to the French Empire

We have many difficulties yet to overcome, but encouraged by public opinion and by the affection of the people I will not permit any right to be forgotten or any liberty to be offended.

Firm, as my ancestors have been, in my adhesion to the dogmas of the Catholic Church and in my respect for its head as the Chief supreme in matters of religion, nevertheless if the ecclesiastical authorities attempt to adapt their spiritual weapons to temporal affairs, I will find, with a clear conscience, in the traditions of those same ancestors the means of maintaining intact both civil liberty and my own authority, and for those means I am responsible to God and to my people only.

The provinces of Emilia have received an organization similar to that of my ancient provinces, but, Tuscany having laws and ordinances proper to itself, a temporary arrangement of a different character has been deemed necessary.

The brevity of the time and the rapidity of successive events have prevented the preparation of laws necessary to the settlement and force of our new State. In the early period of this session you will be occupied with the most urgent matters. My ministers will then prepare, with due consultation, other designs on which you can deliberate at leisure.

Founded on the Constitution, on our political unity, military and financial, and on our uniformity of penal and civil laws, the progressive liberty of the provinces and the communes will renew in Italy that splendid and vigorous national life which was the end and object of our *ancient autonomy of municipalities*, (under different forms of civilization and in an arrangement of European affairs other than the present), now become impossible by the changed genius of the time and by the constitution of powerful states.

Senators and Deputies,

In joining our forces for a new arrangement of affairs without searching the records of our ancient parties to find who has rendered more or less service to the common cause, we invite all sincere persons to pursue the noble task to its end, which is the welfare of the people and the greatness of the country. This is no longer the Italy of the

Romans or that of the Middle Ages; it should no longer be the theatre of foreign ambition, but become indeed the Italy of the Italians. »

Such was the King's speech, which was well adapted to conciliate public sentiment and was received with thunders of applause. In the evening the city was illuminated and decorated with a splendour altogether unexampled in the history of public pageants.

To understand the passage relative to « ecclesiastical authorities », it is necessary to mention that the Pope has launched the greater excommunication against all persons who have projected, effected, assisted, or in any manner either taken part in or encouraged the annexation of the Romagna to Piedmont. This bull has been posted up at Rome, but has received and can receive no official publication in Turin. Until it is published over the signature of the Archbishop of Turin, it can have no legal effect in this country; and as the said Archbishop has been informed that he will be forthwith seized by the police and thrown into prison should he conceive the idea of moving in the matter, it is not probable that the Pope's thunder will disturb the old women of Piedmont.

Events having been thus completed in northern Italy, affairs here have no longer the interest which uncertainty gave them. That interest now attaches itself to Rome and Naples, where disturbance is imminent. While giving the order for the withdrawal of his troops from Lombardy, Louis Napoleon commenced a similar movement in the States of the Church. Its completion has been delayed by the certainty that, the moment the French forces are withdrawn, the Papal Government will be overthrown. It is now said that they will not leave until the army of some Italian power is ready to take their place. There is no Italian power in position to do so except the King of Naples. The Pope has invited this Potentate to send in his troops, and the latter has expressed his readiness and willingness to come. But Austria, who desires no immediate disturbance, has arrested his march by her diplomacy, while Sardinia has declared such interference to be cause of an entry into the Marches of Ancona and the Umbria by her forces. Everything that I know points to approaching turmoil in that quarter, and I have reason to believe that the Italian party have emissaries at work in the Neapolitan dominions to provoke revolution there. I should not be surprised to hear on any day that civil war has broken out at Naples and in Sicily.

I cannot conclude the concise history of the last fortnight's events without a remark upon the effect produced throughout Europe by the extension of the French frontier to the Alps. It is regarded as the

explanation of the past year and the key to all the future. It is supposed that the policy of Napoleon III is at least unveiled—it is to regain the natural frontiers of France. The honorable Secretary of State has lived in that country, and knows as well as myself how profoundly the whole people desire that consummation. Legitimists and Orleanists, the Ultramontaines and Republicans, the bourgeois and the aristocracy, all are united by that one sentiment. It is the secret wish, the pet project, the *dada* of every Frenchman. Any ruler who sets before himself that end has behind him all France. The annexation of Savoy and Nice gratifies this sentiment. It will render Louis Napoleon more popular in France than he has ever been. But it places him on an inclined plane, which he must needs descend. While it pleases the national passion it also kindles it. The French appetite for territory being awakened, he must gratify it. He may delay further action for a year or so, but he must sooner or later advance on Belgium and on the Rhine, and, before he gets there, must encounter other wars than those he has yet waged—wars for life and existence. He will endeavor to effect his object as he has always done by roundabout ways and difficult combinations, to avoid a coalition of all Europe against France alone. If he succeeds, he assures the throne of France to his family; if he fails, he shares the fate of his uncle. From every point of view the annexation of Nice and Savoy must be regarded as the precursor of the most serious events of future history.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 143*

Turin, April 10, 1860

Sir. The Parliament has been occupied during the week with the verification of elections, and nothing has transpired of general interest except an interpellation of the Government by Garibaldi relative to the cession of Nice to France.

This Parliament was deemed a body entirely devoted to the administration of Mr. Cavour. No pains and no money has [sic] been spared to keep out all prominent members of the ancient opposition, and the feeble minority of dissentients which it contains was thought to be without a spokesman. It appears however that they are to find one in this celebrated soldier, who up to this time has neither been supposed by others to be endowed with the faculty of discourse or been even conscious of such a power himself. The free remarks which he made the other day

on the « sale of Nice » have, however, caused commotion and irritation in the Ministry and have found a deep echo in the popular heart. In passing the Place Carignan on Sunday evening, I saw many thousands of individuals assembled in front of the Parliamentary building to cheer Garibaldi as he left it.

Garibaldi is a native of Nice, strongly attached to its nationality, and bitterly opposed to Louis Napoleon and to his system; he is a naturalized citizen of the United States<sup>188</sup>, and, though now a member of a monarchical government, does not hesitate, as he has ever done, to declare himself a republican in principle and by conviction. But though such a man, influenced by such ideas and sentiments, may make a telling speech, as he may have well led a flying column in Lombardy, yet he has not the general capacity necessary to render him a considerable statesman.

He called at my office a few days ago on an errand quite illustrative of his character. He desired to know whether the United States would give protection or assistance to Nice in case it should separate both from France and Sardinia and established a free form of government for itself? I told him at once that the United States would interfere in no manner with such a matter, and that though I believed it to be the policy of our republic to recognize all governments that succeeded in establishing themselves and that could be regarded as responsible organizations, yet I doubted whether they would hold any intercourse, even of the most temporary character, with a mere province in rebellion against powers so much more powerful than itself as to render its immediate subjection almost a certainty. He said that he had anticipated the reply I made to his inquiry, but, in the present moment, he thought it right to leave no chance for assistance untried.

The 22d day of this month is fixed for the election of the people in Savoy and Nice. The question whether they are willing to be annexed to France will then be submitted to them and they will be called on to vote yes or no. Despite all the efforts of a few patriotic individuals like Garibaldi, I anticipate an affirmative majority.

The King and Court leave Turin for Florence on the 15th. After a few days in that city, they will proceed to Bologna, thence to Ravenna, and, after a tour in Parma and Modena, will return to Turin. The Prince of Carignan is Lieutenant Governor of Tuscany. His chief function appears to be the giving of balls in Florence.

<sup>188</sup> Garibaldi non completò mai la naturalizzazione come cittadino degli Stati Uniti. Durante il suo breve soggiorno a New York egli ottenne semplicemente una ricevuta della sua richiesta di divenire cittadino americano.

The Duchess of Parma, the Duke of Modena, the Granduke of Tuscany and the Emperor of Austria have severally published their protests against the annexation of their states to Sardinia, and declare that they will maintain their rights over their subjects and will enforce them whenever circumstances shall permit them so to do. As to the Pope, he has not only protested but has excommunicated the powers and the individuals who have deprived him of Bologna. It appears that this excommunication has created some sensation in France and the Government has even strictly interdicted its printing even in the newspapers. Here in Italy it has fallen without effect. All the journals have been permitted to publish it and have done so. The truth is the Italians are a much less religious people than the French. Indeed of all people that I have yet seen, they are the least influenced by religious ideas and sentiments, properly so called. Religion here is politics. Since I have been in Italy I have never met one single individual who seemed to me under the slightest moral influence arising from his religious creed.

Switzerland continues to protest against the annexation to France of the neutralized provinces of Savoy and continues to receive answers from Mr. Cavour based on the rights of sovereignty which Sardinia has always exercised over those provinces. In the last few days it appears that the republic has demanded an European Congress on the question, and France has positively refused to accede to that demand. The French Emperor, it is believed, fears that an European coalition might be suggested by such a meeting.

Revolution has been attempted in Naples; but up to this time has been successfully resisted by the King of that country. It was unquestionably the work of emissaries from northern Italy. I doubt very much whether the people of Naples desire a different government from that which they possess, or whether they are fit for any other. Of this, however, your Minister at Naples will doubtless give you better information than I can hope to do.

***John M. Daniel & Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 144*

Turin, April 17, 1860

Sir. The vote on annexation to France commenced to be taken in Savoy and Nice on the 15th. The result in Savoy has long been so well ascertained that the fact interests [sic] no one. But the Italian

party at Nice have made so much noise that many persons have supposed that there was a majority in that province opposed to the French annexation. The news of the election received from Nice by telegraph on yesterday evening indicate a very different state of things. It appears that the people of the parishes came to the polls in large masses headed by their priests and *curés*, and voted almost unanimously for annexation to France. At two o'clock on the first day 5,000 out of the whole 7,000 voters of the province had already given their votes on the French side. The Italian party say that they « abstained » from voting. But it cannot be doubted that they did so because they knew themselves to be in a minority.

Popular elections of this sort in France and Sardinia, I may be permitted to remark, are of little worth considered as true expositions of the popular will. Government takes a part in all such proceedings to a degree that can scarcely be conceived of in a country like ours. Every *employé* and office-holder, civil and military, in the land is openly addressed and required by their chiefs to use every means in his power to affect the voters. Men who are known to be opposed to the measures or candidates of the Government are not unfrequently conducted to prison or otherwise detained as « *mal-pensant* » or dangerous to the public security. Nearly every family of the slightest note in these countries has one or more of their members employed in some manner by the Government, and these are not only required to vote with the Ministry but all their kin are likewise demanded on the penalty of certain expulsion and long persecution. It would be tedious to enumerate all the means which they employ. Those named are among the least grave. It is certain that Napoleon or Cavour can have a popular vote of any description that they may desire; for they have not only a machinery but a material to work on which is unknown in England or the United States;—the people in France and Italy being habitually and generally afraid of their governments, looking on all opposition to them on such occasions as a rashness and impudence certain to secure for the individuals indulging in it a long series of ills.

The King and Court of Sardinia left Turin on Sunday the 16th for Florence. He will pass eight days in that gay city, and will there assume (it is said) the new title of « King of Italy ». This, however, I give as rumour, having no exact information as to the scheme. From Florence he goes to Bologna, thence to Parma and thence to Modena. The diplomatic corps has not been invited to accompany the Court in this tour. It was ascertained by personal inquiry that the ministers of France,

England, of the United States and of Turkey were the only representatives of foreign powers who would accept the invitation on this occasion. The others by abstaining would make a silent protest against the annexation of central Italy and of Tuscany, and, to deprive them of the opportunity to do so, the invitation usual in such cases was withheld.

In the official Gazette of Turin this morning I find the famous correspondence between the King of Sardinia and the Pope of Rome, long known to have taken place and now for the first time published. I hasten to translate it from the Italian and send the translation in the Appendix to this dispatch<sup>189</sup>

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 145*

Turin, April 21, 1860

Sir: I. In dispatch No. 144 I sent a translation of the letter addressed by the King of Sardinia to the Pope on the 6th of February last and of the singular reply made by the Head of the Church. A sequel to that correspondence is now public—a letter from the King dated 20th March announcing the annexation of the Papal legations to this kingdom, with the Pope's reply, and a note from Ct. Cavour to Cardinal Antonelli, with the Cardinal's answer. I send translations, Appendix A; such correspondence being not only an interesting chapter in history, but curiously illustrating the position of the Christian Pontiff in Italy and in the 19th century<sup>190</sup>

II. I have also translated and appended a letter of the Count of Syracuse to the King of Naples, his nephew, which has been made public here in Turin this morning, probably by the indirect agency of that personage himself<sup>191</sup>. The Count of Syracuse is brother to the late King of Naples. His reputation is not enviable. The letter in question can

<sup>189</sup> Si tratta della lettera di Vittorio Emanuele II a Pio IX del 7 febbraio e della risposta del 14. Vedile in *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II* cit., vol. II, parte II, pp. 155-160.

<sup>190</sup> Si tratta della lettera di Vittorio Emanuele II a Pio IX del 20 marzo e della risposta del 2 aprile (vedile in *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II* cit., vol. II, parte II, pp. 161-165), e della lettera di Cavour ad Antonelli del 20 marzo (vedila in *Il carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861*, a cura della R. Commissione editrice, vol. III, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1928, pp. 200-201 e della risposta del card. Antonelli del 2 aprile (vedila in C. CAVOUR, *Lettere edite ed inedite*, a cura di LUIGI CHIALA, vol. III, Torino, 1884, p. 231).

<sup>191</sup> Sulle simpatie del conte di Siracusa per la Sardegna, vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations*, cit., vol. II, pp. 414, 547, 561.



be regarded only as a bid for the throne of Naples. He criticizes the policy of isolation long prevalent in that kingdom, recommends his nephew to separate himself from his Austrian allies and to become a confederate of Victor Emmanuel in the great scheme of liberating Italy from foreign domination. As the Count of Syracuse is considered to be a man without principle, and as Sicily is at this moment in revolt, the publication of such a letter here in Turin, while the crown of his nephew is in danger, cannot be regarded as anything but an attempt to secure favour with the Italian party and to gain for himself, should the revolution they are now attempting succeed, his nephew's throne.

Such a document should more properly come to your hands in the dispatches of your Minister at Naples. But as its publication in that kingdom will almost certainly be interdicted, he may never see it, and hence I have thought proper to send it myself.

III. I am assured that Ct. Cavour has lately addressed two notes to the Government of Naples. In the first he calls the attention of that Government to the late territorial modifications of Italy, and informs it that an « Italian policy » is the only one proper and salutary to any Italian state, and by such alone can the peace of the peninsula be secured. He declares that it is the desire of the Sardinian Government to preserve amicable relations with Naples and is ready to settle all difficulties which may give to Naples « erroneous views » of the intentions of Piedmont. But he concludes by telling the Government of Naples that these amiable sentiments can become practical things only when the cry of Italian independence shall have the same signification in Naples and Sicily as in Piedmont and Sardinia, and when his « Italian policy » shall be adopted in Messina and in Gaeta. In the second note he complains that the Government of Naples permits the arms of Tuscany, Parma and Modena to remain over the doors of persons still styling themselves ministers of the *ci-devant* dukes. He demands their removal, and declares that their retention will be considered an act of hostility to Sardinia. These letters have not yet been published, but I believe that the information received as to their purport may be regarded as authentic.

It is in Naples that the chief interest in Italian affairs is now concentrated. The political people in northern Italy have determined to get up a revolution in that kingdom for the overthrow of the present Government, the expulsion of the present king, and either the annexation of the country to Sardinia or the establishment of a new monarch there who will act with them in their ultimate designs on Venice.

All thoughts of an immediate war with Austria seem to have left

them They are now satisfied that Austria is not in position to attack Sardinia, and they have no intention of provoking her, now that the French have left them, to hostilities during this summer. Unless some unforeseen circumstance arises there will be no more war this year; but there will be revolutions, if it is in the power of intrigue to make them They seek to unite southern with northern Italy Should they succeed in securing Naples and the rest of the Papal States this summer, they will prepare for war with Austria in the winter and in the spring the great struggle will probably commence.

I have given in these lines what I believe to be the policy now prevailing in this part of Italy. In consequence of that policy, documents bearing on the state of things at Rome and Naples are interesting. Up to the present moment the king of the latter country appears to have resisted the revolutionary movement in Sicily; and Rome seems to have become much more quiet since the Pope has had the good sense to place at the head of his army the French General Lamoricière. He is an able, active and practical officer, long removed from public view on account of his opposition to the *coup d'état*. He is quite capable of creating an army at Rome such as a Pope has not seen in his service since the days of Alexander the Sixth and Caesar Borgia. History informs us that those personages paid their troops well and drilled them carefully; hence they were sure of them to the last and by that means exercised over the rest of Italy as great an influence as that possessed from the same cause by Piedmont at this moment. A letter from Lamoricière since his taking command at Rome shows him to be quite confident of success in his enterprise. He says that the Pope's gendarmes, 4,000 in number, are quite as serviceable as any French troops. The rest of the army is at present worthless because they have been from time immemorial badly paid and armed and in all things treated as an useless appendage of a priestly government. He thinks he has the means of changing all this—that he can secure them good arms and pay, and, after the discipline and organization which he can give them, that the Pope's army will be quite able to resist all and every effort of the revolutionary party, and even to secure the frontier that has been left to him from further encroachment by Sardinia. It is not however the intention of the Papal Government to make at present any attempt to wrest the legations from Victor Emmanuel. It contents itself with concentrating the best part of its force near Ancona, to prevent the game of the legations from being repeated in the Marches.

It is announced that the new kingdom is to be divided into six grand

departments —Piedmont, extending from the Alps and Apennines to the Sesia; Lombardy, from the Sesia to the Mincio, Tuscany; the Emilia; the island of Sardinia; and Liguria (hitherto better known as the city and province of Genoa). Each of these will have a governor for its general affairs, while the communes or parishes will be left to administer their local business.

*Leopoldo conte di Siracusa a Francesco II*<sup>192</sup>

Sire<sup>1</sup>

Napoli, 3 aprile 1860

Il mio affetto per voi, oggi augusto capo della nostra famiglia, la più lunga esperienza degli uomini e delle cose che ne circondano, l'amore del paese, mi danno abbastanza diritto presso V.M., nei supremi momenti in cui volgiamo, di deporre ai piedi del trono devote insinuazioni sui futuri destini politici del Reame, animato dal medesimo sentimento che lega voi, o Sire, alla fortuna dei suoi popoli.

Il principio della nazionalità italiana, rimasto per secoli nel campo dell'idea, oggi è disceso vigorosamente in quello dell'azione. Sconoscere noi soli questo fatto sarebbe cecità delirante, quando vediamo in Europa altri aiutarlo potentemente, altri accettarlo, altri subirlo come suprema necessità dei tempi. Il Piemonte, e per la sua giacitura e per dinastiche tradizioni, stringendo nelle mani le sorti dei popoli subalpini, e facendosi iniziatore del novello principio, rigettate le antiche idee municipali, oggi usufrutta di questo politico concetto e respinge le sue frontiere fino alla bassa valle del Po. Ma questo principio nazionale, ora nel suo svolgimento, com'è natural cosa, direttamente reagisce in Europa, e verso chi l'aiuta, e verso chi l'accetta, e su chi lo subisce.

La Francia deve volere che non vada perduta l'opera sua protettrice, e sarà sempremai sollecita a crescere d'influenza in Italia, e con ogni modo a non perdere il frutto del sangue sparso, dell'oro prodigato e dell'importanza concessa al vicino Piemonte. Nizza e Savoia lo dicono apertamente. L'Inghilterra che pure accettando lo sviluppo nazionale d'Italia, deve però contrapporsi all'influenza francese, per vie diplomatiche si adopera a stendere pur essa la sua azione sulla penisola, ed evoca sopite passioni nei partiti, a vantaggio dei suoi materiali e politici interessi. La

<sup>192</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 145 di Daniel. La lettera è stata pubblicata prima dalla *Perseveranza* e poi il 18 aprile da giornali piemontesi, dai quali la riproduciamo.

tribuna e la stampa in Inghilterra accennano già lontanamente a doversi opporre alla Francia ben altra influenza nel Mediterraneo, che non sono Nizza e Savoia a piè delle Alpi. L'Austria, dopo le sorti della guerra, respinta nei confini della Venezia, sente ad ogni ora vacillare il mal fermo potere e benché forse presaga che il solo abbandono di questa provincia potrebbe ridonarle la perduta forza, pur tuttavolta non ha l'animo di rinunciare alla speranza di una rinnovata signoria in Italia. Né occorre che io qui dica a V.M. dell'interesse, che le potenze settentrionali prendono in questo momento alle mutate sorti della penisola, giovando infine più che avversando la creazione di un forte Stato nel cuore d'Europa, guarentigia contro possibili coalizioni occidentali.

In tanto conflitto di politica influenza, quale è l'interesse vero del popolo di V.M., e quello della sua dinastia?

Sire! La Francia e l'Inghilterra, per neutralizzarsi a vicenda, riuscirebbero per esercitare qui una così vigorosa azione, da scuotere fortemente la quiete del paese e i diritti del trono. L'Austria, cui manca il potere di riaffermare la perduta preponderanza, e che vorrebbe rendere solidale il Governo di V.M. col suo, più dell'Inghilterra stessa e della Francia tornerebbe a noi fatale, avendo a fronte l'avversità nazionale, gli eserciti di Napoleone III e del Piemonte, la indifferenza britannica. Quale via dunque rimane a salvare il paese e la dinastia minacciati da così gravi pericoli?

Una sola. La politica nazionale, che riposando sopra i veri interessi dello Stato, porta naturalmente il Reame del mezzogiorno d'Italia a collegarsi con quello dell'Italia superiore, movimento questo che l'Europa non può disconoscere, operandosi fra due parti di un medesimo paese, egualmente libere ed indipendenti fra loro. Così solo V.M., sottraendosi a qualsivoglia estranea pressione, potrà, unito politicamente col Piemonte, esser generoso moderatore dello svolgimento di quelle civili istituzioni, che il rinnovatore della nostra Monarchia ne largiva quando, sottratto il Reame al vassallaggio dell'Austria, lo creava sui campi di Velletri il più potente Stato d'Italia.

Anteporremo noi alla politica nazionale uno sconsigliato isolamento municipale?

L'isolamento municipale non ci espone solo alla pressione straniera, ma, peggio ancora, abbandonando il paese alle interne discordie, lo renderà facile preda dei partiti. Allora sarà suprema legge la forza; ma l'animo di V.M. certo rifugge all'idea di contenere solo col potere delle armi quelle passioni che la lealtà di un giovine Re può moderare invece e volgere al bene, opponendo ai rancori l'oblio, stringendo amica la destra

al Re dell'altra parte d'Italia, e consolidando il trono di Carlo III sovra basi che la civile Europa o possiede o domanda.

Si degni la M.V. accogliere queste leali parole con altrettanta benignità, per quanto sincero ed affettuoso è l'animo mio nel dichiararmi novellamente.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio senza numero*

Turin, 25th April 1860

Sir. Since I have had the honour to be occupied with the foreign service of the United States, I have never had a leave of absence. Such indulgences are sometimes permitted to officers engaged in such service, when the exigences [sic] of public business allow of them. If the present can be regarded as a proper period, it would be a great gratification to me, if I could have leave to absent myself from this post for the space of sixty days. At the expiration of that limited interval, I shall surely be again in my Legation and resume the punctual discharge of my duties.

Lest the motive of this request should be misunderstood, I beg leave to add that reasons of a domestic nature—affairs of family,—and the condition of a dear relative nearly approaching the close of an honourable life,—alone, have prompted it.

Should the present be deemed an inopportune season for a foreign minister to withdraw himself from his post, I submit without a murmur to the decision of my superiors. But if the favour which I ask can be considered consistent with official duty, it would be a great solace and service to me at this time

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 146*

Turin, April 27, 1860

Sir: Savoy and Nice have declared their wish to be annexed to France by a vote so complete and overwhelming as to silence all objection.

The definitive result in Nice is as follows:—whole number of electors 26,149; of these 24,448 voted for the annexation; 160 voted against it; only 1,549 abstained from voting. So that what has been known as the Italian party in that province was without doubt an insignificant though noisy faction.

The whole vote of Savoy is not yet known. The returns from twenty-three communes are wanting. But from the rest the result is as follows whole number of electors 67,968—for annexation 65,658,—against 71.

The King and Government are still on their tour of rejoicing in central Italy. During their absence Parliament does nothing. But it is certain that so soon as business is resumed the laws will be passed which will render Savoy and Nice parts of France, and Tuscany, &c., will become legally as they have long in fact been parts of Sardinia.

Meantime the angry protests of Switzerland against the annexation of the neutralized provinces to France have rendered a diplomatic conference on the subject at Paris quite probable. France resisted and refused the project of an European Congress on the subject. The plan now said to be agreed on is this: that the ordinary ambassadors of the powers who signed the treaties of 1815 shall be empowered to draw up a protocol in which the rights of Switzerland shall be again guaranteed. France agrees to accept Savoy with the burden of neutrality upon it and to hold it on the same terms upon which Piedmont possessed it. In case the conference shall advise a modification of those terms—as the incorporation of Savoy into France modifies the strategical position of Switzerland—France signifies her willingness to accept any new arrangement that does not affect the rights she has just acquired by the treaty of cession concluded between Piedmont and herself and does not implicate a division of Savoy itself. Unfortunately these two conditions involve the whole question so far as the Swiss are concerned. They hope to make an acquisition of territory under the new arrangement; and all their noise about neutral rights has but a feeble echo in their secret heart.

In the dearth of intelligence properly belonging to a diplomatic dispatch, I may permit myself to communicate two circumstances which serve at least to illustrate the times and countries in which I write.

Four hundred years ago, when Italy was divided into many small independent states that have now disappeared, the cities of Pisa and Genoa possessed a relative importance which can now only be imagined by reference to history. They were wealthy commercial republics, powerful in war and peace. Their rival interest brought them into frequent and fierce collision. About the middle of the fifteenth century the Genoese fleet under their famous admiral Doria defeated the Pisans, took and sacked their city, filled up their port with earth, and carried off in triumph the huge iron chain with which it was wont to be closed. The City of Genoa hung up this chain as a trophy over their highest gate, and

there it remained for four hundred and two years. Every traveller of our own times who has visited Genoa has seen it as one of the lions of the place. But it is no longer there. When the King left Genoa for Tuscany the other day, the city took down the chain from its Pisan Gate and sent it back to its ancient rival, now its sister, by a deputation with another Doria as its head, descendant of him who brought away that trophy of victory. This episode, otherwise trivial, may be taken as an illustration of the sentimental fraternization now going on between the municipalities of a country so long divided and now for the moment united in peace.

Mr. Louis Veuillot, the editor of the *Univers* a violent clerical paper at Paris lately suppressed, has been to Rome where he was received with open arms by the Holy Father and all the College of Cardinals. On his return to France he was made bearer of dispatches to the Papal Nuncio at Paris and also of many letters from the Pope to certain French Bishops. When he got to Marseilles, the police seized his correspondence. He was subsequently informed that certain private papers would be retained for further examination; but as the police was satisfied of his diplomatic capacity, they hastened to restore the official dispatches which they found among the rest. Veuillot wished to know whether they were intact; and was informed that the French authorities had too much respect for themselves to answer such a question—there were his dispatches, he might see for himself. He *did* see, and found the seals in perfect condition; he counted them, and found not only the full number, but *one more!* Neither he nor the police could explain the superfluity; but when he delivered the letter to the Nuncio it became clear. The additional letter had been sent *enclosed* in the Nuncio's despatch, and the French police, who have copies of all the official seals in the world, had forgotten to place it again under cover.

For the absolute truth of this account I cannot vouch. It is circulated here in well informed circles, and I believe it.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 147*

Turin, May 10, 1860

Sir: I have to announce the most startling and significant event that has occurred in Italy during the year. I refer to the expedition of Garibaldi to the island of Sicily, of which you have already heard something through the public press. But the statements sent abroad through

that medium on this subject are purposely distorted, and the most important details do not seem to be generally known. I have taken some pains to obtain them, and propose to state here what I believe to be wholly reliable.

1. Garibaldi sailed from the Gulf of Genoa on the 5th of May 1860 with 2,200 men, with good arms and provisions, and with several pieces of cannon,—their number is said to have been twenty-four.

2 He chartered large steamers belonging to a Sardinian line of boats, the same whose vessel called the *Cagliari* was seized by the Neapolitan Government while engaged in a similar enterprise some three years ago The price at which he chartered them was 88,000 francs for the voyage He took two of these with him at starting, the *Lombardo* and the *Piemonte*, with the nerve of his force. The third steamer with other vessels are now said to have followed.

3. The place of embarkation and rendezvous was Quarto a village near the city of Genoa. The whole business was conducted without concealment or disguise. Its progress was known to every one even here in Turin The assemblage and embarkation met with no hindrance or interference, great or small, direct or indirect, from the Sardinian authorities.

4 I am informed by good authority that Garibaldi changed three millions of francs from notes to gold at the Bank of Genoa the day before starting. Some small part of this money was no doubt derived from the subscription for a million of muskets which he got up last year; but I have all reasonable ground for believing, and I do entirely believe, that the greater part of this and other large sums which have lately passed through his hands was directly received from the Government of this country for the purpose of overthrowing that of Naples.

5. Garibaldi sailed under the English Flag. He took out his ships papers for the English ports of Malta and Corfù.<sup>193</sup> I am asured by a very credible intimate friend of Garibaldi that he himself and his chief men received English passports from the English Minister in Turin; and that his followers in general were similarly provided for by the English Consul at Genoa. But although this statement has been furnished by the highest authority, I will not vouch for its absolute exactitude; I am more inclined to believe that the Minister in question gave *his visa for Malta* to passports already in their possession. But it is certain that Garibaldi

<sup>193</sup> Le navi americane che concorsero al trasporto dei garibaldini furono. il clipper *Charles and Jane*, il *Franklin*, l'*Oregon* e il *Washington* Vedi i dispacci del Daniel n 153 e n 154



and his chief officers were entertained by the English Minister at a great dinner given on their departure for this expedition.

6. The men who compose Garibaldi's corps are for the most part the same who served under him in the campaign of last summer. The leaders are his old officers who were with him in the defence of Rome in 1848 [sic] and in most of his other enterprises. When he had finally assembled his party previously to the embarking he told them that the object of the expedition was to aid the revolution in Sicily, that it was most dangerous to those engaged in it, and he counselled such men as had their affections too much occupied at home to go with a good will, now to step forward and to say so. Seven sailors did as he invited them to do. He gave to each ten dollars and sent them away with good words. The rest promised to obey him through all things, and devoted themselves to their perilful [sic] undertaking.

7. The day after sailing the expedition landed for water and to complete its organization at Talamone, a little port on the confines of Tuscany and the Papal States. Here officers were appointed and the whole corps divided into seven divisions. Such arrangements having been effected, the steamers sailed again for their uncertain destination, and nothing further has been heard of them up to the hour of writing. Intelligence has however been received from Naples, where the Government is said to be in a state consternation. The whole Neapolitan fleet is cruising around Sicily to intercept the expedition. In the meantime the royal troops have possession of Palermo and Messina only—all the rest of the island being in the hands of the insurgents.

The foregoing are all the particulars which I can give as certainly true. Here in Turin the Government takes no pains to contradict the general belief of its participation in this strange movement. Its friends in London and Paris, as I see by the latest journals, represent Garibaldi as a parallel to Walker,<sup>194</sup> and describe his expedition as an affair of his own hands and will alone, undertaken against the law and the wish of the Sardinian Government. They describe him as leaving Sardinia by violation of authority, and declare that the Piedmontese Government has sent out its cruisers to overhaul all vessels sailing towards Sicily under the Sardinian flag. This however is prevarication [sic]. It is, I believe, true that the Government has sent forth a squadron with such orders;—but all the world knows that Garibaldi sails under English, not Sardinian,

<sup>194</sup> William Walker (1824-1860) di Nashville nel Tennessee. Famoso bandito, ucciso a Truxillo nel Nicaragua.

colours If the Sardinian cruisers interfere in the affair at all, it may be safely predicated that it will be for the protection of Garibaldi and his men. Apart from the private sources of information which enable me to say with almost absolute confidence that this expedition has been gotten up under the patronage and with the assistance of the Sardinian Government, the mere facts that three well known and authorized passenger steamers were publicly chartered by Garibaldi; that 2,200 men assembled in Genoa, that arms, soldiers and cannon were embarked almost on the outskirts of the city itself, and that this whole armament sailed peaceably out of the Gulf of Genoa, where Sardinia keeps a large fleet, a great garrison, a watchful police, and whose cliffs bristle with forts and artillery—these public facts render it impossible even for the passing observer to doubt for a moment that this is the act of the Sardinian Government itself. In a movement organized on so vast a scale it would have been impossible to have taken even a single step without the full knowledge and authority of the powers at Turin. This is *undeclared war* of Sardinia against Naples. It does not suit the convenience of the Government here to avow that they undertake hostilities against the King of the Two Sicilies to drive him away, abolish the separate existence of that country, and to unite his territory to their own. They have no tangible ground for a declaration of war. Hence they pursue their object under the name of Garibaldi.

In private and unofficial conversation it is argued that unless this expedition had been permitted they would soon have been engaged in conflict with the Pope and the King of Naples at Bologna. The reorganization of the Papal army, the concentration of troops at Gubbio, and the evident concert of the king of Naples with Lamoricière, give colour to this view. Hence the friends of the Government think that it was both justifiable and adroit to strike the first blow and disconcert the plan of the enemy by an insurrectionary assault of his own home.

In dispatch No. 145 I stated what seemed to me the present policy of the ultra Italian party, which now controls Cavour and the cabinet of Turin. Deserted by France, they have no idea of carrying on the struggle with Austria on the present footing. At the same time there can be no peace till Venice is wrested from the hands of that power. Hence it behoves [*sic*] them to unite the entire peninsula to the south of the Po under one head, and they can only effect this object by revolutionizing the kingdom of Naples, expelling the Bourbon dynasty, and then by procuring a popular vote for annexation to Piedmont, as they have already done in Parma, Modena, Tuscany and the legations. All their

energies and intrigues have for sometime past been directed to these results. A revolution in Naples and the consolidation of that country in the Subalpine Kingdom before the end of this year is a matter of life or death to the Italian party. They easily succeeded in rousing an insurrection in Sicily; but, with the exception of some slight movement in Calabria, it has not spread to the mainland, and there can be little doubt that if left alone the Neapolitan Government would in the end put it down. Hence the managers in Piedmont were compelled to resort to the bold step of letting loose Garibaldi and of committing themselves to acts so thinly disguised that they may be accounted as official proceedings.

The countenance given to these measures by the English Minister in Turin, amounting almost to participation in them, is to me very surprising. That he could or would have done so without the direction of his superiors at London is impossible. England has long been on bad terms with Naples. The Government there is the constant theme, not only of its newspaper declamation but of its parliamentary vituperation. The nation which has hardly finished in India the bloodiest series of executions and massacres that the world has heard of since the fourteenth century is horror struck to know that the King of Naples imprisons his subjects for political offences. That the Garibaldi expedition should be popular in England can easily be understood; but that a nation which makes such very great pretensions to legality and respect for national right should permit its flag and its passports to cover a step so little in accord with law is very surprising.

Up to the moment of writing I know of but two ministers in Turin who have formally protested against the expedition—those of Russia and of Naples. The latter is said to have made great outcry, both previous to the sailing of Garibaldi's force and since, with what avail may be imagined. The Minister of France (so the statement) has made some observations to the Government of Sardinia—of what nature is yet a mystery. Indeed I have reason to believe that the Government is much perplexed and very uneasy as to the manner in which Napoleon III may take up this affair. He has very lately showed symptoms of hostility and acrimony towards the Government of Sardinia which have produced an unpleasant sensation in Turin.

It only remains to give my own opinion as to the probabilities of Garibaldi's success. That opinion would not be obtruded, were it not possible that a man living some years on the spot might have a more correct judgment on such a matter than any details of facts could enable others to form at a distance. The greatest danger which Garibaldi has to

run is in the passage by sea. Naples has a considerable number of vessels of war. Garibaldi's steamers could stand no chance if they came in reach of them, and, though a vessel of passage can outstrip most ships of war in a race of speed, they might be so headed and surrounded by a fleet that they would have to risk the cannon shot, and a few broadsides would end the affair by sinking the whole expedition in the sea. On the other hand, I am confident that in the last emergency the English or Sardinian squadrons cruising over the same ground would interfere in some way to the advantage of the expedition. The chances that it escapes the danger of the voyage are equal. But should Garibaldi effect a landing, I have no doubt at all as to his success. Should he fairly land, the days of the Bourbon dynasty at Naples are numbered, and the separate existence of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies will soon have place in history alone.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 148*

Turin, May 15, 1860

Sir: Intelligence has this morning been received from the expedition of Garibaldi. It comes in the form of two telegraphic dispatches, one to the government of Sardinia, the other directed to the British Minister in Turin. Garibaldi and his whole force landed at Marsala in Sicily on the 12th of this month. It appears that he was chased by the Neapolitan fleet and barely escaped. Four men are stated to have been killed while landing—the number of wounded are [sic] not mentioned. Both his steamers were lost—the *Lombardo* having been seized by the Neapolitan vessels when the landing was effected, the *Piemonte* was run on the rocks to escape from them. The published dispatch is not clear as to the fate of the arms and munitions on board of these vessels, but indicates that they were saved. An English ship-of-war was on the spot, but the part which it played in the affair is not declared.

This intelligence is brief and unsatisfactory, but, as the weekly post for the United States closes this evening, I have thought it proper to send it as it stands.

It is now known that the French Minister in Turin by order of his Government has made a very warm protestation against the expedition of Garibaldi, and that Mr. Cavour has replied in substance as follows:—

He declares that the Government of Sardinia condemns the enter-

prise of Garibaldi as energetically as that of France can do so. But while his audacious expedition is contrary to the interests of Piedmont, it appeals to the sympathies of the people with whom Garibaldi is a hero, and the government is unable to use violence against a man who controls a popular force so great. While the undertaking of Garibaldi is condemned by Europe, the situation of the Neapolitan Kingdom is so critical that his complete success would astonish no one. And while professing himself unable to foresee the result of the affair, Mr Cavour cannot believe that it will give rise to an European contest

The public here is in a painful state of anxiety. With the success or failure of Garibaldi is bound up peace or war for Piedmont. If he succeeds, it is believed that there will either be a change of dynasty at Naples or the annexation of that country to Sardinia. In that case the Pope and Lamoricière will be powerless. But if he fails, the King of Naples will complete his league with the Pope and there will be an Italian war in which Austria cannot fail to take part.

***John M. Daniel & Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 150*<sup>195</sup>

Turin, June 4, 1860

Sir: In dispatch No. 148 I informed you of the successful landing of Garibaldi in Sicily and stated my opinion as to his speedy and complete success. Events have hitherto fully justified that view. From the day of his landing up to this moment Garibaldi has been borne onward by an uninterrupted tide of victory. The whole population of the island has joined him, he has received vessel after vessel from Leghorn and Genoa filled with arms, stores and new troops; he has beaten the Neapolitans in every encounter, and on the 27th of May took the great city of Palermo by assault. The Neapolitans retreated to the citadel. Garibaldi offered them a capitulation with honours of war and embarkation on board the Neapolitan fleet. These terms they are said to have accepted on condition that their King should ratify them; and an armistice of three days was granted for the purpose of consulting the monarch.

According to the last telegram, the King of Naples has refused to sanction these arrangements and has ordered his troops to recommence

<sup>195</sup> Il dispaccio n 149, datato Torino, 17 maggio 1860 trasmetteva i conti della Legazione per il trimestre con scadenza 31 marzo 1860 e accusava ricevuta delle Istruzioni n 38 e 39

their resistance. If it is indeed true that he has issued these orders, it is possible that their sole effect will be to cause all his army in Sicily to pass over to the ranks of the insurgents

It is the common—indeed the universal statement of the press and public tongue in Italy that the landing of Garibaldi was effected by aid of an English frigate on the coast of Sicily. It is said that Garibaldi's vessels were chased by the Neapolitan fleet and overtaken by it when he touched the shore. The Neapolitans opened fire and would have without doubt destroyed the greater part of the little force in a short time had not an English frigate, which by a singular coincidence was found at the spot of the landing, sent word to the Neapolitan commander that some of its officers had visited the shore that morning and that he must cease firing till they came aboard; declaring that it—the frigate—would fire on him if he continued action. The Neapolitans ceased firing, the English officers remained on shore for two hours, and, in the interval, Garibaldi got both men and munitions out of danger. I give this startling statement as it is universally circulated and believed here, as has been published without contradiction in all the Sardinian press, and as it has been even written in the correspondence of the *London Times*. It is proper however to take notice that the English captain, in his official account of what took place, as published by the British Government in London, does not state these particulars. I myself cannot undertake to decide their truth or falsehood. I am fully satisfied however that the agents of the English Government are much and favorably occupied with the expedition of Garibaldi.

As to the Sardinian Government, it has officially denied all participation in, or encouragement of the expedition. It declares that it was undertaken in defiance of its laws and in violation of its authority. But it is impossible to give any weight at all to these formal statements. That expedition could never have been undertaken against the will of the Sardinian Government. It could not have been organized on the scale upon which it was executed without public assistance. It is probable that the insurrection from beginning to end is the work of a dominant party in northern Italy, and that its result will be the annexation of the Two Sicilies to Sardinia. I have never seen and scarcely ever heard of an instance in which the ordinary rules of international law were so openly set at naught.

As for Garibaldi himself, the following proclamation issued on the 14th of May will give a clear idea of his purpose and object:—

« Salem, May 14.

Garibaldi, Commander-in-Chief of the national forces in Sicily, on the invitation of the principal citizens, and on the deliberation of the free communes of the island, considering that in time of war it is necessary that the civil and military powers should be united in one person, assumes, in the name of Victor Emmanuel, in Italy, the dictatorship in Sicily.

G. Garibaldi »

Sicily may be considered as lost already to the King of Naples. Up to this moment there has been no sign of insurrection on the mainland. But it will come. In less than six months it may be reasonably anticipated that the kingdom of Naples will be obliterated from the political map, and, before this year is ended, it is quite possible that the entire Italian peninsula, with the exception of Venice and perhaps the city of Rome *intra muros*, will be united under the sceptre of Victor Emmanuel. Only one thing can prevent it—a great effort and an actively conducted war by the Austrian Empire. It is said that the King of Naples has already demanded the armed intervention of that power in his affairs. It is quite improbable that he will receive it. The battles of last summer seem to have prostrated Austria. All the pride and spirit was then taken from her. She rests an inert mass on the bank while the river of Italian revolution runs a straight, and now an unresisted, course.

The Parliament of Sardinia has been occupied for the last week with the French treaty. The Ministry has been violently attacked by the minority opposed to the cession of Savoy and Nice. But the bill effecting that cession has passed the Chamber of Deputies by an overwhelming majority. It is now before the Senate where it will give no trouble, and will soon be a law. Savoy and Nice will then be French territory.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 151*

Turin, June 12, 1860

Sir: I have had the honour to receive your dispatch No. 40 dated the 23d ult. declining to grant a leave of absence at this time<sup>196</sup>. The

<sup>196</sup> L'istruzione n 39, datata Washington, 9 aprile 1860, annunciava la spedizione di una cassa contenente 48 volumi di documenti della seconda sessione del 35°

reasons for that decision are at present very evident; and I beg leave to explain that when I made that request the expedition of Garibaldi had not been heard of and the state of Italy was very different from what it is at this moment.

It appears to me clear that one of those great movements of nations and races which have from time to time altered the political condition and relative proportions of European states is now on foot in this peninsula. What passes here is not the work of individuals, of factions, or even of parties. It is the general sentiment and unanimous volition of nearly all the inhabitants of Italy. There is an universal determination, of all its people—Romans, Tuscans, Neapolitans and Lombards—to do away with their former system of divided government and to unite in one body. When twenty millions of people, having already some general bonds and means of union at their command, become possessed of an idea and wish so general and deeply seated as that which now prevails here it is quite impossible to resist or thwart them. A nation under such circumstances accomplishes its destiny with the force and certainty of the elements, blind to consequences and deaf to both menace and persuasion. The Emperor of France during the last winter did use all the means that statecraft could devise to stem or turn the general current of affairs in Italy, but he had not more success than King Canute when he commanded the tide of the German ocean to rest at low water<sup>197</sup>; and now all the powers of Europe seem satisfied of their impotence for effectual interference in what is now in course of accomplishment.

The Ministry of Naples, having demanded the intervention of the Five Great Powers in the revolution in Sicily, and having failed to obtain it or met with direct refusal in every quarter, now appears to have determined to abandon that island. The capitulation agreed on between Lanza and Garibaldi was refused by the King, who ordered the bombardment of Palermo to be resumed and the city to be destroyed rather than to leave it in the hands of the insurgents. But the temper of the Neapolitan

congresso, 2 volumi (n. 5 e 6) dei documenti di Stato, il libro azzurro del 1859 e l'almanacco del 1860 ad uso della Legazione di Torino. L'istruzione n. 40, datata Washington, 23 maggio 1860 informava Daniel che il presidente era spiacente di non potergli accordare il congedo richiesto poiché « lo stato di disordine degli affari italiani in questo periodo sembra richiedere che voi rimaniate per il momento al vostro posto »

<sup>197</sup> Canuto il danese, re d'Inghilterra nel 1017. Disgustato dei suoi seguaci per la loro adulazione, un giorno fece portare il suo trono in riva al mare e finse di dire al mare di non avanzare a bagnare le sue vesti poiché la terra era sua. Quando, naturalmente, venne l'alta marea, egli sottolineò il fatto che nessun re della terra poteva sfidare Dio, che possedeva il comando del mare.



troops rendered the execution of that order quite impossible. Desertions had become so frequent that it was probable that the whole mass would refuse obedience if ordered to resume the contest. Hence after a new delay the capitulation was sanctioned, and, according to the last intelligence, eighteen thousand Neapolitan soldiers were leaving Palermo on Neapolitan vessels. The royal troops still hold Messina and some other towns in Sicily, but their possession cannot now be long. Garibaldi seems to have organized a species of provisional Government, and the general sentiment of the population is favorable to annexation to the Kingdom of Sardinia. La Farina, the President of the National Society of Italy, the friend of Cavour, and who is supposed to be the manager of all the relations of the Sardinian Ministry with the expedition of Garibaldi, has left Turin for Sicily. He possesses the full confidence of the Sardinian Government, and I expect to hear shortly that he is at the head of Sicilian affairs.

The Neapolitan Government, from whose official statements the charge that the English captains<sup>1</sup> on the coast at Marsala directly effected the landing of Garibaldi by threatening to fire on the Neapolitan vessels of war who were pursuing him, have withdrawn their accusation. Other contradictions and corrections of fact now supposed to be true will probably follow. The true history of this affair as yet cannot be accurately given. The general features can be seen, but the details cannot be given with assurance or without many doubts. Even in the brief accounts which I have forwarded in these dispatches, I fear that some circumstances may have been related, because considered exact at the moment, which future developments may partially qualify. In justification, I may point to the absolute impossibility of obtaining exact information relative to such an affair at the time of its transaction. The parties engaged in it, those who permit, and those who encourage it, well know that it is one of those things which can be justified only by success. Judged by the regular law of nations, it is impossible to defend it. Hence they shroud the affair in as much mystery as they conveniently can. Yet it is necessary to inform the Government so far as possible and at the earliest moment, and under such conditions it is impossible to be positively and exactly certain of all that I relate. With this explanation let me observe that any publicity to statements so given would not be convenient or useful. I give the best information that the moment affords for the information of the Secretary of State; but it would be impossible to do so with freedom if papers written under such necessities are to be subjected to the public eye.

*Note.* It is known now that Garibaldi did not sail under English colours as reported. He has used the Sardinian flag during all periods of his expedition, and acts in the name of the King Victor Emmanuel

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio senza numero*

[Turin], June 18, 1860

My dear Sir. A friend writing from Washington mentions a call for my dispatches in the Senate as a possible contingency<sup>198</sup>. The Government will of course do as it thinks best with all papers furnished by its diplomatic agents, and were I to offer my opinion as to the expediency or in expediency of the publication in question to a statesman of your experience, I should be justly liable to the charge of presumption

But as data for the formation of your own judgment, I may be permitted to state one or two facts, and offer an explanation of the objects in my view while writing to the State Department

I wrote for the information of the Secretary of State alone, that he might have some views of the important facts transpiring in Italy more complete than those furnished by the official publications of the Sardinian Government and more impartial than the relations of the press. In doing so, I did not think it necessary to consider whether I was in accord or disaccord with public sentiment, or whether the Sardinian Government desired, or did not desire, their policy to be represented as I thought it to be. Supposing that my dispatches on affairs in which we were concerned only as spectator would be always regarded as the privileged communications of the Department, I did not hesitate to use the style that would most clearly and quickly express my meaning, but which I should rendered less free in a diplomatic publication.

From the peculiar situation of the Government of Sardinia it was impossible for me to execute my design of furnishing the State Department with what I regarded as the undisguised truth without crossing many official fictions which that Government desires to keep up. For instance, it protests that Garibaldi's enterprise is undertaken in violation

<sup>198</sup> Nell'istruzione n. 42, datata Washington, 25 giugno 1860, Cass loda i dispacci di Daniel per la « pronta e piena conoscenza che dimostrano sugli importanti e interessanti avvenimenti del vostro luogo di residenza, verso il quale si rivolge ansiosa l'attenzione di questo paese. Il Senato ha richiesto copia dei vostri dispacci, ma la domanda non ha potuto essere esaudita a così pochi giorni dalla chiusura della sessione »

of its authority and against its wish; but with the circumstances present to view on May 10th, I was compelled to think differently. The facts which I then communicated are essentially the facts still, though some statements of detail were necessarily erroneous, and were corrected in a subsequent dispatch. Yet it may be imagined that the publication of such a paper would be unpleasant to the Sardinian Government and embarrassing to your agent.

It should also be known to you that the public mind and popular passions are deeply engaged in the transactions of the present time in Italy. It is not in condition to receive impartial remark upon them with equanimity. Foreign ministers at Washington, without doubt, inform their governments relative to our parties, policy and public men with a freedom equal to mine; but the publication of their papers on those subjects would create in the United States but little feeling in comparison with the sensation which similar action would produce here.

With these explanations which may possibly seem quite superfluous, I leave your Excellency to judge whether reserve would not be best for the public service on these matters.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 152*

Turin, June 19, 1860

Sir I had the honour to receive the note of Mr Appleton (Dispatch No 41, of June 1st), enclosing the Commission of Edward Mallet to be Consul General at Florence, on the 17th<sup>199</sup>, and I enclosed it the same evening in a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, requesting the usual *exequatur* of the King.

I have not yet received the reply, but there will be no difficulty about the request. On the contrary I have reason to suppose that the Sardinian Government will be much gratified at it, as one of the first official recognitions of that kind which they have received since the annexation of Tuscany. I do not know how the matter stands at this present moment, but I have been informed that during the last month the Government caused a notice to be given to the foreign consuls at Leghorn (with the exception of Mr. Binda) that they should send in their

<sup>199</sup> L'istruzione n 41, datata Washington, 1° giugno 1860, trasmetteva soltanto la nomina di Edward Mallet di New York a console generale a Firenze

commissions and have their *exequaturs* renewed in the name of the Sardinian authority. that none of them complied; and that two went so far as to say that their governments would not permit them to do anything of the kind until the conferences at Paris had sanctioned the annexation. This information was sent to me from the American Consulate at Leghorn. I am disposed to think it correct; and if so, the Ministry here will be well pleased at the recognition of their rights over Tuscany implied by the appointment of a Consul by the United States at Florence.

In the note sent to demand the *exequatur* I avoided all expressions of unusual signification; but the bare fact of such a demand addressed to the Government of Sardinia is in itself the fullest admission of their power and legal authority in Tuscany that they could desire.

I have received a note from the Consulate at Nice, informing me of the death of J.B. Wilbor, Sen., which is appended <sup>200</sup>.

Mr. Costa was the last commissioned Consul of the United States at Nice. He stayed but a few months, and, on going away, left the Consulate again to the charge of Mr. Wilbor the former incumbent. In his hands, as I have already had the regret to inform you, the Consulate seems to have been the scene of grave abuses. Now that he is dead I have ordered the seal and archives to be sent here. If received they shall be preserved at this Legation until the United States' Government sees fit to appoint a new consul at Nice.

I will again however repeat the recommendation formerly made, that the Consulate at Nice be abolished. There is no salary. There are no fees. No good officer could be induced to live there and conscientiously discharge the duties of the office for the title. Under these circumstances it must necessarily fall into the hands of individuals who make the place valuable to them by a traffic in passports and other official papers

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 153*

Turin, June 19, 1860

Sir: The telegraph this morning brings the statement that an *American clipper*, towed by a small steam vessel, laden with troops and

<sup>200</sup> J B Wilbor Jr., in una comunicazione datata Nizza, 31 maggio 1860, informava Daniel della morte di suo padre avvenuta quello stesso giorno. Nella risposta Daniel richiederà che i sigilli e gli archivi di quel consolato siano spediti alla Legazione di Torino. Si omette questo allegato

arms for Garibaldi and bound for Sicily, has been captured by Neapolitan vessels of war.

I have also lately learned that three French passenger steam-boats, old and in bad condition, have been purchased by, or at least in the name of, a person at Genoa who claims the title of an American citizen. These vessels then hoisted the American flag, and, having been severally christened the *Washington*, the *Franklin*, and the *Oregon*, got up steam and left Genoa without cargo. It is supposed that they are engaged in the affairs of Sicily.

I have this morning addressed notes to the consulates of Genoa, Spezia and Leghorn, requesting further information relative to these vessels. What I possess at present is very unsatisfactory; but I have thought it well to mention the matter, as I now know of it, by the present mail.

That more of Garibaldi's vessels have not been captured, indeed that all of them have not been captured, is a striking proof of the weakness which pervades the whole organization of the Neapolitan Government. It possesses a large and expensive fleet which cruises around Sicily, yet this is the first thing that they have done. On the other hand the publicity with which the various reinforcements are sent to Garibaldi is complete. Days before the vessels set out their proposed departure, the force that they will convey, and even the hour of their leaving Genoa or Leghorn is known to every one here and sometimes announced in the newspapers. When the appointed hour arrives, and the vessels are loaded, the men assemble in the most frequented parts of those cities, the expedition sails with the regularity of a packet boat, and, some days after, their safe arrival at a Sicilian port is chronicled by the telegraph as if it was part of the regular business of the world. The fact that the Neapolitan fleet have not taken every one of these vessels exemplifies the weakness and cowardice of that Government better than words could do it.

Since the capitulation and evacuation of Palermo, Garibaldi has taken no further active step. He appears to be occupied with the organization of his new forces. Various decrees relative to the government of the island, which appear to be quite expedient, have appeared in his journals. He is also said to have organized and equipped twenty regiments for future operations. He has plenty of money, as it is I believe quite certain that on taking Palermo he found twenty-four millions of francs in the public treasury which the opposite party, not crediting the possibility of his success, had made no attempt to remove.

The Neapolitan troops still hold the powerful fortress and important

city of Messina. The population of that city, anticipating bombardment, have nearly deserted it, and the troops in the fortifications are said to be completely disorganized by the events at Palermo. Nevertheless it will be extremely difficult to take Messina, and the friends of Garibaldi in this city say that he has no idea of attempting it. When his organization is complete he will pass over to the mainland with his whole force and endeavour to do in Naples itself what he has done at Palermo. His place of landing will probably be somewhere in Calabria where he is supposed to have friends.

On the dominions of the terra-firma [sic] Garibaldi will have more difficulties before him than he had in Sicily. The people of the island have ever hated the Neapolitans and their Government and have ever been ready for rebellion against them. But it may well be doubted whether the Neapolitans themselves are dissatisfied with the present rule. The whole population have been so long sunk in sloth, vice and superstition that they have lost, if they ever possessed them, the idea of liberty and the sentiment of ambition. They are contented with their despot and their priests, they are utterly afraid of their police and their spies. Even the warmest advocates of revolution in the kingdom seem disposed to admit that if a free popular vote was taken at this moment to decide the question the people of Naples would retain their present dynasty. In a conversation with Garibaldi a short time previously to his departure, I expressed this opinion to him and he reluctantly assented, but added with much simple faith, that « Liberty itself must sometimes be forced on the people for their future good ». The King of Naples has money, a very numerous and well appointed army, fortresses of immense strength, and the majority of the population with him. Yet such is my confidence in the spirit and conduct of Garibaldi, and such my disbelief in Neapolitan courage and capacity, that I am quite convinced that should he land in Calabria he will send the monarch into exile in less than thirty days.

There is but one procedure by which that sovereign can save himself. If he would quit his palace, place himself at the head of his columns and expose himself to the enemy's fire like a common trooper, he would triumph. His father and himself have spent vast sums in organizing an army of some eighty thousand men. It has been well paid, it is well disciplined, led by tolerable officers, and commanded by generals sufficiently expert. All that is wanting to it is spirit and resolution. This would be given by a king who was himself personally brave and daring. If those troops saw their monarch in the fire they would fight, and if his generals were encouraged by his example they would by superior numbers

quite crush the hasty levies of Garibaldi who would himself be probably killed in some *mêlée*. But who can expect such a course from a young man of ordinary character reared by priests and governed by an aged and bigoted German dowager?

Instead of relying on his own force he offers concessions to the discontented and promises a constitution *on the model of that of France*! Instead of relying on his own resources, he has sent the Chevalier de Martino<sup>201</sup> on a special mission to Paris and London to solicit the interference of the French and English governments in the affairs of his kingdom. That intervention was officiously proffered three years ago and was disdainfully refused by his father; it is needless to say that his prayer for it at the present moment has been utterly refused. The envoy did not get as far as London—Lord Palmerston having expressed so much abhorrence of the bombardment of Palermo in Parliament that he did not think worth while to go there. He saw the Emperor at Fontainebleau, failed in obtaining French mediation and returned to Naples. It is said that the Emperor on seeing the unfortunate ambassador told him with a smile that « he had mistaken his road—he should go to Turin ». Whether this anecdote, credited in Turin, is true or not I am unable to decide, but it is certain that the mission wholly failed in its object.

On Friday last, the 14th inst., the bill for the cession of Savoy and Nice having passed the Sardinian Senate and been sanctioned by the King, those provinces were formally delivered over to the French authorities. The Sardinian flag was saluted and then lowered, the French flag hoisted in its place, and the Imperial officials took possession of the public offices.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 154*

Turin, June 26, 1860

In my last dispatch I gave notice of a report that vessels belonging to citizens of the United States and bearing the American flag were employed in transporting troops and munitions to Sicily. I have now official information of the fact with some details which may be found in the papers appended to the present communication. Those papers are two letters from the Consul of the United States at Genoa, and one from

<sup>201</sup> Su Giacomo De Martino vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations*, cit., vol. II, pp. 532, 533-534, 556-557, 559-561.

Count Cavour, in reply to a note from the undersigned requesting him to place in my hands such intelligence of these affairs as the Sardinian Government might receive and be willing to communicate.

It appears from these documents that four American vessels have been engaged as above mentioned. Three of these were purchased in Genoa by William de Rohan, stated to be an American citizen, and their transfer to his hands from those of their foreign owner was regularly effected at the Consulate in that place. These vessels were then named severally the *Washington*, *Franklin* and *Oregon*; they hoisted the American flag and cleared for Athens. But they subsequently put in at a neighboring village and were laden with troops and arms, and when the Consul last heard of them they were at Cagliari in the island of Sardinia. I have since learned that they reached Palermo in Sicily and there discharged their cargoes.

The fourth vessel is the *Charles and Jane*, of Baltimore, Samuel Donnel master. Arriving in Genoa with a cargo from the United States and being bound subsequently to Trapani in the island of Sicily, offers were made to the said master so remunerative, that he engaged his vessel to transport men and munitions as far as *Cagliari* in the island of Sardinia. He cleared Genoa « for Trapani touching at Cagliari » While on the high seas between the two Sardinian ports above named, he was captured by a Neapolitan frigate and carried into Gaeta. The American Minister at Naples has demanded the release of the vessel and cargo.

At the same time a small Sardinian steam vessel towing the *Charles and Jane* was also captured and carried into Gaeta. In the letter of Count Cavour to the undersigned it appears that the Sardinian Government consider the capture of both vessel void and illegal on account of the scene of their taking and the port of their destination. Hence the Sardinian Minister at Naples has demanded the release of the Sardinian steamer and acts in concert with the Minister of the United States.

I have also added Appendix C, a note from the Neapolitan to the American Consul at Genoa with a reply of the latter. Some other papers have been received in relation to the affair, but contain no new information. The foregoing are the facts so far as it is within my province to relate them. Your Minister in Naples will doubtlessly furnish full details of what passes there.

*Private Note* In the letter of Ct Cavour given in the Appendix to this despatch occurs the first *written* observation which I have yet been able to obtain from him upon the labours of the United States



Government in behalf of neutrals upon the high seas. He speaks of the United States « *qui a tant d'intérêt de maintenir la liberté des mers, et qui a toujours défendu avec une indéfatigable énergie les droits de la navigation* ».

As the incident of the *Charles & Lane* has at length awakened his interest in this class of subjects, I shall once more endeavour to induce him to take a position on the principles very powerfully discussed by Mr. Cass in the communication to the Dabormida Ministry last year, and to prevail on him to develop the views of Sardinia in a written statement. The new Kingdom of Italy should be our natural ally in that effort to mitigate the wages of maritime war; as it must soon have, and indeed already has, a coast and a trade altogether disproportioned to its means of maritime defence.

As to the case of the *Charles and Jane*, I have confined myself to a bare exposition of the facts, such as may be fitted, if necessary, for official use, and have avoided an expression of opinion thereon, because not considering it called for by my relation to that affair.

***William L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>202</sup>

Genoa, June 20, 1860

Your despatch of the 18th inst. asking information in regard to three steamers reported to have sailed from this port, bearing the American flag, has been received and I hasten to give you all the information in my power.

On the 8th inst. Monsieur Finzi and Mr. William De Rohan a citizen of the United States from Philadelphia appeared at this Consulate and before me concluded and signed the contract of purchase on the part of Mr. De Rohan of three steamers the *Washington* 469 59/00 tons, the *Oregon* 126 99/00 tons, and the *Franklin* 233 tons. The money was paid by Mr. De Rohan and a formal delivery of the vessels was made into his hands. Of the *Washington* Mr. De Rohan took command himself, and he appointed to the commands of the others Mr. J. W. Nevins, a native of the U.S., and Mr. Oregoni, a naturalized citizen of the U.S.

It was my private opinion that the purchaser of these vessels intended to employ them in the transportation of men and munitions from

<sup>202</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 154 di Daniel.

this to Sicily At least rumor said so. But in as much as the conditions of the law were complied with and the contract of sale and purchase a valid one, I could not allow my private opinion as to the ultimate destination of these vessels to interfere to prevent my official confirmation of the purchase. Nor had I the right to refuse

These vessels cleared from this port on the evening of the 9th inst. for Athens, Greece, bearing I am told the American flag—which their ownership and papers authorized them to wear I am likewise credibly informed that after leaving this port they put into Cornegliano, a short distance from this city on the western coast, and took on board men and munitions of war. These vessels were, or at least two of them the *Washington* and the *Oregon*, at Cagliari on the 11th inst I have heard nothing of them since.

***William L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>203</sup>

Genoa, June 20, 1860

On the evening of the 8th inst an American ship the *Charles and Jane*, Samuel Donnel master, cleared and left this port under the following circumstances.—

Capt. Donnel having discharged his cargo from New Orleans and being unchartered for a cargo home was about proceeding to Trapani on the western coast of Sicily to purchase a cargo of salt on account of his owners. On the 7th inst, the day before he sailed, he called upon me and stated that a proposition had been made to him by certain parties offering him a very remunerating sum of money to take men and munitions of war to Cagliari in the island of Sardinia; he wished to know of me if he would run any risk in taking such freight. I told him that he had a perfect right without fear of molestation to take any cargo from this port to Cagliari, being ports within the same kingdom, that the authorities of the place allowed him to depart with. But that a cargo contraband of war for Sicily would endanger his vessel. He told me that the freight was for Cagliari, and, having closed with the terms of the proposers, he cleared as I have stated on the evening of the 8th « *for Trapani touching at Cagliari* » where his cargo was to be delivered.

The Captain having unsettled business with his consignees here

<sup>203</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 154 di Daniel

could not leave with his ship but departed the day after to Cagliari where he expected to find her. I received a letter from him dated from that place on the 11th inst; his ship had not arrived and he was awaiting her with some anxiety.

On yesterday Captain Denegri, in the Sardinian mercantile marine, deposed before me that on the 10th inst. whilst proceeding to Genoa off the island of Elba he saw a small steamer with a ship in tow taken possession of by a large steamer which he recognized as a Neapolitan and which with the prizes proceeded in the direction of Naples

Now as the *Charles and Jane* which left the harbor on the evening of the 8th did not go to sea until the morning of the 9th and as she was in tow of a small tug steamer and as from the distance and direction with the winds then prevailing the *Charles and Jane* should have been at that time off Elba in her course to Cagliari, I infer she was the vessel captured by the Neapolitan. From the facts I have stated and the place of capture you will see at once that the capture was unlawful. I have written to our Minister at Naples and placed him in possession of these facts—of which in this note I have the honor to inform you. I have the honor to subscribe myself with great respect—

P.S. Since writing the foregoing Capt Donnel has arrived from Cagliari in search of his vessel. There is a rumor that the vessel has been demanded by our Minister at Naples supported by the representatives of the other powers—nothing is known of the result as yet.

P.S. I have this instant received a telegraphic despatch from the Hon J.R. Chandler saying that the *Charles and Jane* was captured and is now at Gaeta. He had applied to the Government.

***Camillo di Cavour a John M. Daniel***<sup>204</sup>

Turin 23 juin 1860

Monsieur le Ministre, Je m'empresse de répondre à la Note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser pour me demander des renseignements sur la capture de deux bâtiments dont l'un Sarde, l'autre Américain par une Frégate Napolitaine.

<sup>204</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 154 di Daniel. Questo originale si trova negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n 13, vol 12, pp 190-192.

Les informations que le Gouvernement a reçu de ses Agents à Naples confirment que ce fait s'est passé en haute mer, à quinze milles du Cap Corso. Le petit vapeur Sarde *Utile* remorquait de Gênes à Cagliari le navire Américain *Charles and Jane* qui était chargé de passagers.

La Frégate Napolitaine *Fulminante* qui rencontra ces deux bâtiments, après avoir reconnu leur nationalité respective, les força par deux coups de canon à la suivre à Gaète où équipage et navires sont tenus sous les feux de la Forteresse et gardés par des factionnaires Napolitains

A la demande du Marquis de Villamarina qui n'a été informé de ce fait que fort tard (car on a refusé de lui transmettre un télégramme que le Déléгат Consulaire Sarde à Gaète lui avait expédié à cet effet) les Capitaines des deux navires dont il s'agit ont été conduits à Naples où l'on permit aux Ministres Américain et Sarde de les visiter à bord de la Frégate Napolitaine *Archimede*.

Après avoir entendu les explications du Capitaine du vapeur Sarde *Utile*, le Marquis de Villamarina a déclaré que la capture de ce bâtiment était nulle et illégale. Je n'ai pas le moindre doute que de son côté le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, qui a tant d'intérêt à maintenir la liberté des mers et qui a toujours défendu avec une infatigable énergie les droits de la navigation, prendra aussi les mesures nécessaires pour faire respecter son pavillon.

J'ajouterai que l'Agent Consulaire Sarde à Gaète a offert ses services et des secours pécuniaires au Capitaine et aux passagers du *Clipper* Américain capturé, qui l'ont remercié en assurant n'avoir besoin de rien.

Agréé, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***Ippolito Garrou a William L. Patterson*** <sup>205</sup>

Genova, 22 giugno 1860

Tre bastimenti a vapore ed uno a vela che vi entrarono con nomi e bandiera diversi sortirono dal porto di Genova nella notte dal 9 al 10 corrente coi nomi di *Franklin*, *Washington*, *Oregon* e *Charles and Jane*, e coperti da' colori degli Stati Uniti d'America.

Ciò supponendo necessariamente la formale autorizzazione del Con-

<sup>205</sup> Allegato come il dispaccio seguente, al dispaccio n. 154 di Daniel. Questo originale si trova negli Archivi nazionali di Washington, Archivio della Legazione degli Stati Uniti a Torino, serie n. 13, vol. 12, pp. 194-195

solato degli Stati Uniti in questo porto, sola autorità ch'era competente ad accordarla d'ordine del suo Governo, il sottoscritto, Console Generale del Regno delle Due Sicilie, prega il suo Collega degli Stati Uniti di volerli far conoscere se realmente l'autorizzazione fu accordata, e quale era la bandiera che allora portavano i prenommati bastimenti.

È con particolare compiacenza che il sottoscritto si vale dell'opportunità per far gradire al suo Collega, il Console degli Stati Uniti in Genova, gli attestati della sua perfetta considerazione.

***William L. Patterson a Ippolito Garrou***

Genova, 22 giugno 1860

I tre vapori *Washington, Franklin, Oregon*, essendo divenuti proprietà di cittadini degli Stati Uniti d'America, sono autorizzati a portare bandiera del loro paese e partirono da questo porto coperti da detta bandiera.

La nave *Charles and Jane* similmente posseduta da Americani lasciò il porto di Genova sotto la propria bandiera

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

Dispaccio n 155

Turin, June 26, 1860

Sir: The *exequatur* of Mr. Mallett to be Consul General at Florence was yesterday signed by the King in the first Royal Council that has been held since I sent in his commission. I have today forwarded both documents in a registered letter to the address of Mr. Mallett in Florence. He will find it on his arrival at his post.

The English Government have at length concluded to send in the Commission of their consul at Leghorn thereby giving official recognition of the annexation. I am disposed to think that its action was prompted by the example of the United States.

There is today an important piece of intelligence from Naples, which has all appearance of authenticity. That Government, in consequence of an autograph letter from Napoleon III to the King, has determined to yield. It proposes the adoption of a limited constitution, a change of ministers, a general amnesty, an alliance with Piedmont, and the Italian

tricolor with the Neapolitan *écu* in place of the present white-Bourbon banner. The King himself is sick and has not yet given his assent to the measures proposed by his council, but although he has lately said that he had rather be an Austrian corporal than a constitutional monarch it is probable that he will agree to them.

The only question is whether these concessions are in time to satisfy the insurrection, and whether its leaders will now be contented with anything short of abdication and annexation. There is a journal in Turin called the *Opinione* which has long been accepted by all parties as the organ of Count Cavour, who is universally believed to contribute with his own hand the leading notes of its politics. In publishing the foregoing intelligence today, this newspaper accompanies them with some observations which are probably authoritative —

« After the insurrection of Sicily, » says the writer, « after the defeat of the royal army, and the capitulation of Palermo, and when Sicily has prepared itself to declare the free will and thought of the population, *can* Piedmont accept an alliance with Naples which will have for its basis a guarantee [sic] of its territory and a restoration of Sicily to the domination of Francis? »

*Can* Piedmont counsel Sicily to yield? Could she hope for success were she to do so? Is she not under obligation to respect the national will? It is easy to foresee that the Sicilians would refuse every proposition for a transaction, and that the Government of Sardinia would be compromised in making them »

It is probable that the concessions of Naples will be flouted on every side. The King must maintain himself by his courage and his arms or depart and leave the field open to the ambition of Sardinia.

According to the last telegram, Garibaldi was about to march on Messina. It is a strong place, garrisoned by 7,000 picked troops, yet it is quite possible that the gates may be opened on the arrival of that chief.

He has sent here a diplomatic agent, the Count Amari, to represent the provisional government of Sicily near the King of Sardinia. This envoy has been *officieusement* received and his character recognized in public documents. It is singular that under these circumstances a regular diplomatic intercourse is still kept up between the governments of Naples and Sardinia. The latter has a Minister at the court of Francis, and the Neapolitan Chargé remains in Turin.

*Dispaccio n 156*

Turin, July 3, 1860

Sir. The Minister of the King of Naples at the court of Turin has made an official communication to the Government of Sardinia to the effect that the American clipper *Charles and Jane* and the Sardinian steamer *Utile* have both been released with their crews and passengers. He states also that his Government has directed him to give passports to all the Neapolitan exiles in this country who choose to apply to him for them.

The Government of Naples has granted the general amnesty and liberal constitution mentioned as probabilities in my last dispatch. The Italian tricolor has been hoisted and saluted at Naples, at the same time the city has been put in state of siege. The Government of Naples declares its warm friendship for that of Victor Emmanuel and seeks an offensive and defensive alliance with this country. A Neapolitan ambassador is said to be on his way—perhaps he has already arrived—to solicit a treaty. But the result is a foregone conclusion. All conventions with Naples will be refused. Whatever may have been thought and said at the time Garibaldi sailed for Sicily, there can be no longer any doubt that France, England and Sardinia have agreed on the fall of the Bourbon dynasty. These concessions and prayers will have for their sole effect to take away all dignity from its catastrophe.

Garibaldi has purchased a number of steamers to convey his troops to the mainland. Some of them were a short time since in the ports of Genoa and Leghorn. But he has as yet made no new offensive movement, and an apparent inactivity, so different from his usual conduct has occasioned great surprise. The truth is Garibaldi has for a month had his hands full of a very difficult business—the organization of a government in the island of Sicily. This has proven a much more arduous task than the conquest of that country. He has had to deal with the most impracticable and unstable people in the world, who will forever be a trouble to their rulers, whoever they may be.

No sooner were they permitted to open their mouths than all the communes passed resolutions declaring their wish that the island should be *immediately* annexed to the Kingdom of Sardinia; and presented a general petition to Garibaldi, requesting him to take instant steps towards that end. To this demand the Dictator has given a formal refusal. He declared that the end of all his efforts would be the union of Italy in one country, under one government, and that the head of that Govern-

ment would be the Constitutional King of Sardinia. But the present moment was inopportune for the annexation of Sicily. The revolution was incomplete; and, should Sicily be placed under the Government of Sardinia, he, Garibaldi, would be obliged to act under the orders of the Sardinian Ministry. In that case he would immediately retire from the field and go back to his rock of Caprera, as experience had shown him the impossibility of an accord between himself and the chiefs of the departments of Turin. This reply has put an end to the movement for the present.

The revolution of southern Italy pursues an uninterrupted course to its goal, which will be the formation of a great Italian kingdom. Whatever may be thought of the merits of that result, however bad the Government displaced may have been, and however indubitable the right of revolution by every people, it is certain that all international law has been violated and set at naught to accomplish it. When we reflect that the press and other organs of public opinion in France and England and Sardinia have never ceased to declaim and rail against the United States for every movement of its people having for object the acquisition of new territory, it is impossible to pass this fact unnoticed. The expedition of Garibaldi and the encouragement given to it in all of those countries and the connivance or open assistance of all those governments, places in a strong light the insincerity and hypocrisy of their denunciations of similar but much less marked and distinct undertakings on the American continent.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 157*

Turin, July 4, 1860

In the appendix to this dispatch is given a correspondence between myself and the Consul of the United States at Genoa relative to two appointments of consular agents lately made by him, and as he says, duly referred to the Department.

In December 1854, Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, instructed this Legation that reliable information had reached the Department to the effect that there were persons in this kingdom styling themselves consuls and vice consuls of the United States without authority who were guilty of gross abuses. He directed me to put an end to their flagitious practices and to recognize no consular agents in Sardinia except those commissioned by the Department.



I communicated with the Government of Sardinia and with all the regular consuls of the United States in the kingdom without discovering the names of the persons referred to by the Secretary; in all of the above named quarters I met with declarations of ignorance or denials of their existence. It was only after two years of delay and search that I got official proof that no less than eight Sardinian subjects in the island of Sardinia styled themselves vice consuls of the United States and committed depredations under that title abundantly justifying the severe expressions used by the Department. It was clearly proven that they were protected in their pretended places by the local authorities of the Sardinian Government, and they all produced patents from a former consul at Genoa, who (*it is said*), in his turn, sold such articles at a fixed price.

By notes to the Sardinian Government I put a stop to their career. Those notes and the whole facts were communicated to your Excellency in dispatch No. 86.

The order of the Government to recognize no consular agents save those regularly commissioned has never been rescinded; and under these circumstances I have been obliged to inform Mr. Patterson, the Consul at Genoa, that I cannot consider the appointment by him of two Italians, one in the island, the other at Chiavari on the mainland, as giving any official character till they shall be recognized by the Department of State. I have given my objections in the note to be found in the appendix.

In his reply Mr. Patterson appears to regard those objections as well founded; and states that after he had made those appointments, only, did he become aware, from the inspection of papers in his archives, of the annoyances which similar agents have hitherto caused the Government. He has very properly suspended those appointments till they are confirmed by the Department.

If that confirmation has not already been given I would recommend that it should be wholly withheld. The Government has hitherto consistently discouraged the appointment of useless consular agents; and it has formally declared to Sardinia that it will only recognize certain persons as its officers in this country. It is also my observation that the multiplication of unpaid consuls and vice consuls leads to no good. The persons who take such appointments are foreigners. Having no salary, and few honest fees, they make their profit by illicit means. They escape duties which they owe to their own governments, they have advantages in trade, they sell the seal of the United States to papers on which it should not be put, they traffic in passports to foreigners, and, what is worse, they pillage Americans who pass. If a little village possesses one of these

American consular agents, a traveller cannot go by without signatures and formalities which never would be required if no such pretended officer was there. By sharing their profits with the Italian police, they can effect this and much more.

I do not desire my objection to these appointments to be considered as a reproach upon Mr Patterson, who appears to me a very fair consul. What he says in his concluding note as to the utility of a consular office at Cagliari in the island of Sardinia is probably quite just. There is certainly more need for such an agent at Cagliari, where we have trade, than at Nice, where we have none. But that officer should be some man paid by the United States to do the work faithfully, and not an irresponsible agent who must live on what he can extort.

***William L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>206</sup>

Genoa, June 14, 1860

I do not find it required by the *consular regulations* but my sense of what is due your position requires me to inform you that I have appointed Gaetano Rossi Doria Consular Agent of the United States at Cagliari and Alexander Botti a like position at Chiavari and Sestri. This latter appointment was made some weeks since and I owe you an apology for not sooner apprising you of the fact; but the truth is it entirely passed out of my mind. There was a pressing necessity last week for the immediate appointment of an agent at Cagliari, of which I inform you and avail myself of the occasion to explain and apologize for my previous remissness.

***John M. Daniel a William L. Patterson***<sup>207</sup>

Turin, June 18, 1860

I regret that I had not an opportunity of conferring with you before the appointments in the island of Sardinia announced in your note of the 14th inst. had been made. Persons calling themselves vice consuls

<sup>206</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 157 di Daniel

<sup>207</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 157 di Daniel.

and consular agents in that island have been the cause of annoyance to the Government. In the year 1855 I received a dispatch from the Secretary of State stating that his Department had been informed on good authority that there were individuals in this kingdom assuming those official titles who had no authority to do so from the Government of the United States, but who received salutes from our vessels, signed invoices, and sold passports to foreigners which they signed as officers deriving their powers from the recognized consulates of the United States. The Secretary of State required me to put an end to these flagitious practices. He directed me to recognize no consular agents in the ancient States of Sardinia except those at Genoa, Nice and Spezia.

I informed the Sardinian Government of the complaint made by that of the United States. The Sardinian Government denied all cognizance of the unauthorized agents referred to. I inquired of the consuls at Nice, Spezia and Genoa, and you will find my communications on the subject in the archives of your office. From each of those consulates I received the same reply,—that they knew nothing, had heard nothing and could give no information of the individuals referred to by the Secretary of State. It was only after two years of watching that I discovered their traces. I found that there were no less than *eight persons in the island of Sardinia*, whose names were not mentioned in any official record at this Legation, who assumed the character of vice consuls and consular agents of the United States; who performed official actions and exacted fees as such; and who were recognized and assisted in their operations by the local authorities. I called the attention of the Sardinian Government to these facts and had their pretensions investigated. It was found that these people had *obtained their appointments from a former Consul at Genoa* and had performed their functions unknown to this Legation or the United States Government for a very long series of years. Having peremptorily put an end to these gross abuses, I again informed the Sardinian Government that the United States recognized no consular agents in Sardinia except those of Nice, Genoa and Spezia, and except such others as might be hereafter duly commissioned by the President. I sent a similar notice to the three consulates already named.

Under these circumstances you will without doubt perceive the impossibility for me as at present advised to recognize the two new appointments in the island of Sardinia. As a general principle, I am opposed to the multiplication of unpaid officials, knowing from observation that it is a source of frequent abuse. And with the clear orders of the United

States Government, which have not been altered or rescinded, I am of course unable to consider the two persons named as having any authority or power to do any official act or claim any official relation with the United States or with its consulates unless they shall be confirmed or recognized by the State Department.

***William L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>208</sup>

Genoa, June 20, 1860

Yours of June 18th inst. is before me. Since the appointment of Mr. Botti to the Consular Agency at Chiavari and Sestri Levante, it came to my knowledge from papers in the archives of this Consulate (among which I find your letter to Mr. Herbemont of date April 12, 1855, referred to in your note to which I have now the honor of replying) that great abuse had been made in former years of the appointing power, and flagitious practices committed by the appointees of a former consul at Genoa.

Since this fact came to my knowledge, I have constantly refused all applications for such appointments to divers small places on the Riviera and in the island of Sardinia, on the ground that no commercial necessity existed for them and that the U.S. Government was apposed to having agents abroad whose services were uncalled for—« The name » of these applications for Consular Agencies is « *legion*. »

But whilst our Government discountenances the existence of such a class of agents, who seek these appointments to escape duties which they owe to the local government as well as for purposes of plunder, it cannot mean to intimate that the consul here, in the exercise of a sound discretion, shall not appoint a consular agent to any place within his jurisdiction where a necessity may arise for such an agent or the demands of an increasing commerce may require the appointment of one.

In confirmation of this I find in the archives a despatch from the Department of date Nov. 13, 1855, transmitting to the then consul an extract from a despatch from you to the Department appending a petition of certain captains in Cagliari asking the appointment of a consular agent there. The Department refers the matter entirely to the discretion of the consul

I am satisfied from various and repeated representations that there

<sup>208</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 157 di Daniel

exists a need for an agency at Cagliari—and has existed for a long time—not the least of which need in former years was in the fact that American masters of vessels and travellers were constantly exposed to the intrigues and extortions of persons pretending to be vice consuls of our Government. The existence there of a regular accredited agent would of course prevent the recurrence of such practices as well as supply the commercial need

Last winter I sent the names of the appointees for confirmation of the President I have as yet received no answer.

Mr. Botti at Chiavari when I appointed him was advised by me that the appointment was a nullity in itself—without the confirmation of the President—it gave him no authority to act—It seems that he has obtained his exequatur. This hurry on his part may expose him to mortification For I think it is very likely that the President will not grant his confirmation, as there really exists no commercial need for an agent at that place—and he was recommended only as being a very worthy gentleman residing at a port where American vessels sometimes put in, in a stress of weather.

Immediately on hearing that he had obtained his exequatur, I addressed him a note telling him that he could by no means act as a Government agent—notwithstanding his exequatur—until he was confirmed by the President, and that I should not recognize him as such until then I am expecting every day to hear from the Department on the subject when the matter will be settled.

The appointment of Mr. Doria,—although his nomination was sent home for confirmation last winter,—was not sent to him until some weeks ago—when a sudden emergency arose in my opinion for the immediate action of an agent at Cagliari. This letter of appointment was despatched by the American ship *Charles & Jane*, captured lately on the way to Cagliari by a Neapolitan steamer and consequently has never reached Mr Doria. And since the emergency has passed, I have directed the bearer of the appointment to withhold it from M Doria and return it to me. Until I hear from the Department of State I shall take no further action in the matter—although in the last twenty-four hours I have received from Americans at Cagliari additional representations of the great need of an U S consular agent at that place.

*Dispaccio n 158*

Turin, July 24, 1860

Nearly a month has passed without any essential change in the position of Italian affairs. Garibaldi has been organizing his Sicilian Government and steadily enlarging his army;—no less than seven different expeditions, each carrying from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, have left the Sardinian ports to reinforce him. He has had much to contend with in the island itself; a large party there desiring instant annexation to Sardinia, which he has steadily refused to permit. If the newspapers and common rumour are to be believed he has become involved in an irreconcilable quarrel with Cavour and the Piedmontese Government. But this general opinion, I have reason to know, is wholly incorrect. The true statement is this:— Garibaldi hates Cavour, and since gaining the power in Sicily he has treated the latter with no little insolence. La Farina, the friend, confidant, and agent of Cavour, whom he sent to Sicily to represent him and manage his affairs there, was sent out of the country by Garibaldi in custody and at half an hour's notice. Garibaldi refused all overtures for a personal reconciliation with Cavour. « He says he brought Louis Napoleon to Italy, » said the Dictator, « he shan't say he brought Garibaldi to Naples. » But this conduct has produced no real breach between the Piedmontese Government and that of Sicily. The interests of the two parties are grave and identical. The former cannot afford to quarrel with the latter. Besides, since the affair of Savoy and Nice, public opinion is no longer with Cavour, but it is with Garibaldi. Cavour cannot oppose him. Hence he has submitted to the haughty proceedings of the Dictator with much prudence and, instead of taking up the cause of his friend La Farina, he has sent in his place Depretis a coadjutor of Garibaldi and a leader of the opposition who was demanded by that chief as a person with whom he could agree.

But these affairs have undoubtedly delayed the movement of events and given time to the King of Naples to try the effect of diplomacy abroad and concessions at home. This he has done, but, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the result has been a complete failure. He has granted a constitution and put an end to the system of repression and silence at Naples, but the effect has been only to render more manifest the radical determination of a large party in his kingdom to unite it to that of Victor Emmanuel. He has sent to Turin an embassy with his two ablest diplomatists at its head—Manna and Winspeare—to pro-

cure an alliance with Piedmont <sup>209</sup> It is even yet in the city, but, although its dealings with the Sardinian Ministry are not fully declared, enough is known to render it certain that there will be no alliance and no compromise. The decree has gone forth that the Bourbon dynasty shall fall. Except Russia, no other power seems to give it any sincere assistance. The Russian Government has protested strongly against the proceedings in the south of Italy and its Minister has been withdrawn from Turin. But Russia is too far off to interfere effectually without overturning all Europe and causing a general war.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 159*

Turin, July 29, 1860

A great battle has been fought near Milazzo in Sicily, in which two thousand men were killed, without counting the wounded, and resulted again in the victory of Garibaldi. But this event is not the most important of the week nor that which most occupies the public attention. The negotiations at Turin and the propositions of the Neapolitan embassy here are the most signal symptoms of the approaching dissolution of the Bourbon dynasty in the Two Sicilies.

So far as I can ascertain them the following is a brief recapitulation of the facts.

In the first conversation between Count Cavour and the Neapolitan envoys, the latter declared that one of the chief objects of their mission was to solicit the Government of Piedmont to use all its influence with General Garibaldi to induce him to abandon all designs that he may have conceived of attacking the Neapolitan dominions on the mainland. And to obtain such friendly interference, they added, the King of the Two Sicilies was ready to suspend hostilities and *to evacuate the island itself*.

Count Cavour replied that he thought the influence of the Piedmontese Government on the intentions of Garibaldi was extremely small, and

<sup>209</sup> Giovanni Manna, ministro delle finanze e Antonio Winspeare, incaricato d'affari napoletano a Costantinopoli furono inviati a Torino per raggiungere un punto d'intesa fra il regno delle Due Sicilie e il regno di Sardegna. Il piano crollò dopo la notizia delle brillanti vittorie di Garibaldi e dello sfaldamento dell'esercito borbonico. Nel luglio la Russia esprimeva il desiderio di adoperarsi per un'intesa fra Torino e Napoli. Per questo motivo Cavour troverà opportuno prolungare i colloqui con Manna e Winspeare, anche dopo che era apparso evidente che nessun accordo sarebbe stato possibile.

cited as a proof of the fact his undertaking the expedition to Sicily itself without the knowledge or consent of the authorities at Turin. Nevertheless, continued the candid Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Government of Piedmont, to prove its friendly disposition, will consent to communicate the good intentions of His Sicilian Majesty to General Garibaldi should the former, as a guaranty of his pacific projects, *put into immediate effect his promises relative to Sicily*; it being absolutely impossible for Garibaldi to content himself with mere declarations so long as the Neapolitan troops kept possession of the fortress of Messina.

The Neapolitan ambassadors communicated the words of Count Cavour to their King, and urged the immediate and total evacuation of the island of Sicily on the ground that this was the only plan upon which it could be hoped to cause Garibaldi to desist from his designs upon the mainland.

In pursuance of this advice immediate orders were given by telegraph to the Neapolitan generals in Sicily to evacuate the island. These orders were simultaneously communicated to the embassy here and through it made known to the public.

The Government of Sardinia then sent to Sicily Count Litta,<sup>210</sup> an aid-de-camp of the King, bearer of an autograph letter or the Sovereign to Garibaldi in which the pacific disposition of Francis II was communicated and a desire on the part of the Sardinian Government expressed that hostilities should cease, nevertheless, Gen. Garibaldi was left free to act as he pleased on his own responsibility.

It may reasonably be supposed that such advice was never intended to take effect; it may certainly be believed it will have none whatever on the conduct of Garibaldi, except to strengthen his moral and material position. It is said that the King of Naples agreed to this absurd scheme on the advice of the English Government, which has been from first to last very busy with these affairs. At all events it is certain that the King of the Two Sicilies has been duped. He will gain nothing by his order; he loses one of the strongest fortresses in the world; and he opens wide the door for Garibaldi to enter his dominions of the *terra firma* whenever it may suit him. This order to evacuate Sicily may be and indeed generally is, considered as the first abdication of Francis II.

<sup>210</sup> Il Conte Giulio Litta Modignani, milanese, capitano e ufficiale d'ordinanza del Re, era latore della famosa lettera di Vittorio Emanuele II a Garibaldi nell'importanza del passaggio dello stretto



**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 160*

Turin, August 7, 1860

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of this Legation for the last quarter

Since writing no remarkable change in the political condition of affairs has occurred Garibaldi has declined to follow that affected recommendation of an armistice made by Victor Emmanuel, for which Francis II bargained away his title to Sicily. The latest telegraph states that Garibaldi's troops are passing the strait between Messina and the mainland. This news wants confirmation, but such an event may now be daily expected. Whenever he does come Garibaldi may write the history of his campaign in the words of another Captain—*veni, vidi, vici*. The King of Naples is now only a shadow, his executive without the slightest authority, his army and navy a mob, and their officers resigning by hundreds. Even his three ambassadors here in Turin, sent as his last hope, to gain the alliance, or rather to implore the pity of the Piedmontese Government, have neither done nor sought to do anything for him. From the day of their arrival they have been occupied with one thought,—to make their peace and private bargain with Cavour, fraternize with the Italian leaders, and arrange their future career under the new Government which will supersede that of their master. The play is near its end.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 161*

Turin, August 14, 1860

There is a piece of intelligence generally circulated here, which, though as yet unconfirmed by official documents, yet comes to me in such a manner that I believe it true, and it is so important that I feel bound to communicate it. It is stated that the Austrian Government has officially declared to the Government of France that, if Garibaldi lands on the Neapolitan dominions of the *terra firma*, it will immediately intervene in arms between that General and the King of Naples and send a corps of its army into that territory to resist him. Further that the Government of France having communicated this declaration to the Government of Sardinia, the latter has replied in terms equally formal that in such case it will immediately dispatch a corps of the Piedmontese army

under Cialdini to the scene of action to oppose the Austrian troops and assist Garibaldi.

The statement derives official confirmation from the fact that the Government has suddenly mobilized the National Guard and called under arms a large body of new troops. It is also further confirmed by a circular letter of the Minister of the Interior which comes to hand this morning and of which a translation is appended to this dispatch. This paper is evidently intended to right the position of the Government in the face of Europe in the event of an approaching conflict with Austria in consequence of the expeditions in aid of Garibaldi which have left the Sardinian ports. Now that all have gone that were expected to go, the Minister is warm in his denunciation of « hostile preparations » against neighbouring governments by unauthorized persons in the country and calls on his Intendants to prevent them at every cost.

Within the last week this Government has raised a new loan of 150 000.000 francs by popular subscription in its own territory. The loan was offered at 80 ½ per cent., and bears 5 per cent interest. The Government raised it on the plan inaugurated some years ago by Napoleon III, opening the books for subscriptions in small sums directly made by the people without the intervention of bankers. No less than six times the sum demanded was subscribed within a few days; and this fact is startling proof both of the efficiency of that system of raising money and of the popular faith in the speedy success of the ambitious designs of this country on the rest of Italy.

As to Garibaldi, he has yet made no movement. His army is ready, his vessels prepared, all the world is expectant; it is the confident belief of all men of all parties, his enemies as well as his friends, that he has only to land and the army and King of Naples will fall before him like leaves from the forest in autumn. In this universal confidence only one man hesitates, and that man is Garibaldi himself. He does hesitate. Through one of his intimate friends, a distinguished officer in his army, here the other day for the cure of his wounds, I gained the explanation of his unaccustomed vacillation. Garibaldi is an honest man who sincerely believed that the cause he embraced was that of the people. But when he got to Sicily he found that all the noise was made by a few hundreds; the mass were either indifferent or on the other side. Now that he has finished with Sicily he knows that the Neapolitans are even less with him than the Sicilians. As for the peasants they are all unquestionably against him; they are reactionists, if they fight at all it will be on the side of the King. The priests are naturally his enemies; most of the nobles are

retrograde. By this time Garibaldi knows well that if the Government of Naples is overturned it must be by his own arms and not by the will of the Neapolitan nation; and in this position he hesitates.

But every day increases the danger for the rest of Italy. German troops arrive, Austria arms, the Pope and the King consolidate their position. He must move soon or not at all.

***Circolare di Luigi Carlo Farini ai Governatori e agli  
Intendenti generali***<sup>211</sup>

Torino, 13 agosto 1860

Sollevati, or son tre mesi, i Siciliani allo acquisto della libertà, ed accorso in aiuto il generale Garibaldi con pochi valorosi, l'Europa fu piena della fama di sue vittorie; tutta Italia ne fu commossa e grande fu l'entusiasmo in questo regno, dove gli ordini liberi ed il libero costume non pongono impedimento alla manifestazione dei sentimenti della pubblica coscienza. Indi le generose collette di denaro ed il grande numero di volontari partiti per la Sicilia.

Se in tempi meno commossi andarono lodati i popoli che diedero favore e soccorso alla liberazione di nazioni straniere, e se i Governi ubbidienti, diremmo, all'autorità del sentimento universale, dove non favorirono apertamente, lasciarono soccorrere le Americhe, la Grecia, il Portogallo, la Spagna, che combattevano per la indipendenza e per la libertà, è a credersi che l'Europa civile porti giudizio equanime sui modi tenuti dal Governo del Re in questo accidente dello irresistibile moto nazionale. Ora la Sicilia è venuta in condizione di esprimere liberamente i propri voti, ed il Governo del Re, che deve custodire tutte le prerogative costituzionali della Corona e del Parlamento, e deve adempire eziandio quell'ufficio di suprema moderazione del moto nazionale che a lui s'appartiene, e per le prove che ha fatte e per pubblico consenso, ora il Governo ha il debito di moderare ogni azione scomposta e di correggere gli ingerimenti illegittimi nelle cose di Stato di chi non ha le costituzionali e le morali responsabilità, che esso ha gravissime verso la Corona, il Parlamento e la nazione. Altrimenti potrebbe avvenire che, per consiglio e opera di chi non ha mandato né responsabilità pubblica,

<sup>211</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 161 di Daniel. Ne diamo il testo italiano da *Il Diritto* del 14 agosto 1860

lo Stato venisse a pericolo, e la fortuna d'Italia sinistrasse. E posciach  negli Stati liberi l'ordine e la disciplina civile, pi  che nel rigore della legge, hanno presidio nella pubblica opinione, il sottoscritto la invita a dare ogni maggiore pubblicit  possibile a questa lettera circolare.

Pi  volte il sottoscritto ammon  non potersi, n  volersi tollerare che nel Regno si facessero preparazioni di violenza a Governi vicini, ed ordin  che fossero impedito ad ogni costo. Esso spera che la pubblica opinione basti a frenare gl'impeti sconsigliati, ma in ogni evento si confida nelle podest  civili e militari per la pronta esecuzione degli ordini che ha dato. Raccomanda pure nuovamente che con ogni maggiore diligenza siano ricercati, e con ogni legale severit  puniti coloro che, cospirando e trafficando ad ingiuria dell'onore nazionale e della disciplina militare, si fanno fautori e procuratori di diserzioni.

E perch  il sottoscritto deve compiere l'ordinamento della Guardia Nazionale mobile e preparare la formazione dei corpi composti di volontari della Guardia Nazionale che la legge abilita, non vuolsi altrimenti permettere che altri faccia incetta e raccolta di soldati volontari.

Concludendo, il sottoscritto deve dichiarare, che se il Governo del Re   costante nella volont  di accettare il leale concorso di tutte le parti politiche, che intendono la libert , unione e grandezza della patria, esso   pur fermo nel proponimento di non lasciarsi soverchiare da chi non ha dal Re e dalla nazione il mandato e la responsabilit  del Governo. L'Italia deve e vuole essere degli Italiani, ma non delle sette.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 162*

Turin, August 21, 1860

The two notes from the Consulate of the United States at Genoa which may be found appended to this dispatch disclose a singular state of affairs in that port. It appears that a number of American sailors belonging to our merchant vessels arriving there have been induced to desert and to join the volunteers continually leaving Genoa to join Garibaldi in Sicily. Receiving the complaints of their captains, the Consul of the United States applied in the usual manner to the Questor, or chief of the police, to have these deserters apprehended and delivered up according to the provisions of the treaty between Sardinia and the United States. But that officer declined to comply on the frankly assumed ground that he did not choose to incur the unpopularity

which would follow an attempt to interfere with the expeditions in aid of Garibaldi. Hence these deserters parade the streets, clad in the Sicilian uniform, and insult with impunity the captains of the vessels to which they belong.

While laws and treaties exist and while the United States keep officers here to see that they are observed, such abuses cannot be endured. Popularity and public opinion cannot be considered at all in the matter. I have addressed a decided representation of the case to the Government of Sardinia, and I shall not fail to cause this grievance to be redressed.

As for Garibaldi he has not moved and the most painful anxiety relative to his course and future exists in all minds here. The Piedmontese regard his victory or defeat as their success or ruin. The statement of a menacing note from Austria has met with official contradiction, but there remains an universal persuasion that in some form or another it has been sent by that power and communicated to Sardinia.

***William L. Patterson and John M. Daniel***<sup>212</sup>

Genoa, Aug 15, 1860

For the last ten days the seamen on American ships in this port have been deserting to engage in the service of Genl. Garibaldi. Ships ready to sail are detained for want of men. The police are ineffective in arresting these deserters, they have either not the will or are afraid.

I have called upon the *Questore*. He expresses great regret that our commerce should suffer, but frankly says that he does not wish to incur odium by interfering with the Garibaldi movement; that if a deserter can be found alone and unprotected by others the arrest of him will be effected, otherwise he does not feel disposed to enforce it.

The *Questore* has the material force to apprehend ten times the numbers of the deserters, but he lacks the disposition to take the responsibility. In the meantime our ship owners are suffering serious loss.

Please, if it is in your power, take such steps as may seem best to urge the *Questore* here to greater energy and a better observance of the treaty between the two countries in the premises, for there is no knowing how long this thing may continue.

<sup>212</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 162 di Daniel

I take occasion to do the *Questore* this justice—that in no instance before these late desertions has he failed in the most satisfactory promptness.

***William L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>213</sup>

Genoa, Aug. 18, 1860

Sir. In answer to your note of the 17th inst. I reply briefly as follows:

The deserters from American ships in this port, whose arrests I have ineffectually requested of the *Questore* within the last ten days, are in number seventeen—and are named and belonged to ships as follows:

Belonging to ship *Realm*—Dunn master—Deserted Nolan Sinclair, John Dinmont, John Lewis;

To the ship *H. R. Cooper*—Stevens master—James Barry, Berry Holcum, Wm. Morgan, Antonio Sianburg, John Money.

To the ship *Express*—Frost master—James Black, Ed. Smith, J. H. Jackson, Wm. Chase, James McLaughlin, Geo. Meredith, R. Warning, Geo. Liscomb, H. B. Newell.

Applications were made in writing to the *Questore* for the arrest of all these men by name—at different times within the last ten days—in such numbers as they deserted. The request for the apprehension of the deserters from the *Express* was made on the 14th inst. for the second time. I enclose to you the blank form of request for arrest used by me. The requests were in every instance made in writing to the *Questore*. The *Questore* did not return me any answer. It is not the custom; but upon my request issued the orders. The policemen reported to me verbally their inability to arrest the men. Finding my written requests followed by no desired results, I called upon the *Questore* in person, accompanied by Cpt. Frost of the *Express*, and the *Questore* then told me what I have already written you about the difficulty of his position—his not desiring to incur the odium of seeming to thwart the Garibaldi movement, etc., etc.

On that occasion he desired me verbally to give him a particular description of the men (names & ships), which I did, embodied in a new request to him in writing for their arrest—but with like result.

On the 15 th eight men deserted from the *E Z*— but the Captain

<sup>213</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n 162 di Daniel.

seeing how vain it was to seek to arrest deserters, being too on the instant of sailing, made no application for their apprehension to me.

All these men named above have departed for Sicily. They paraded the streets in the Sicilian uniform and insulted the masters of American vessels with impunity

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 163*

Turin, August 28, 1860

I have the honour to append the correspondence between this Legation and the Sardinian Government relative to the desertions from American merchant vessels at Genoa and the inaction of the police in that affair. The Ministry admits the justice of my reclamation and promises to take measures for the redress of those grievances. These admissions (Appendix, B) are however evidently made with reluctance; and the note concludes with a querulous counter complaint against the Consul at Genoa. « As to the hesitation which the Questor of Genoa exhibited, » says the Minister, « I believe that functionary would have experienced much less embarrassment, if the Consul of the United States himself had not on several occasions given reason to suppose that he was much interested in the expedition of volunteers for Garibaldi. »

I have thought proper to communicate this remark, without comment, to the said Consul and he has sent me in reply a note which is also appended (C.) It does not however seem to me worthy of further notice in my correspondence with the Sardinian Government. The essential thing is to remove just ground of complaint from our commerce.

The country is naturally agitated and excited to the last degree at the present moment. The telegraph is interrupted between Turin and Naples, but, though we have not the intelligence of the last events, it may reasonably be supposed that the last scenes of the great drama are at this moment passing in the capital of the Two Sicilies. After long hesitating whether he should assail the King by sea and endeavour to disembark his troops in the streets of Naples itself, or land in Calabria and fight his way up to the city, Garibaldi decided on the latter course. Three or four hundred of his men having made their way to the interior of the province, the semblance of a partial insurrection was at last effected. Garibaldi then landed in person with four thousand troops, then another corps of the same strength followed him, and finally Cosenz, one of his

principal lieutenants, joined him with eight thousand more. He had also with him at the latest intelligence a considerable number of the Calabrian insurgents, though these can hardly be counted as an useful force. With the bands so collected Garibaldi assaulted the city of Reggio, which commands the part of the straits between Sicily and the mainland. After a combat of eight hours the Neapolitan troops capitulated, and were marched out with their muskets, but leaving behind their artillery and stores. The Neapolitan general, Viale,<sup>214</sup> after withdrawing his men to some distance, threw up his commission on the ground (it is reported) that his troops would not obey him. On approaching the town of Pizzo, the two brigades of the Neapolitan army left to defend it surrendered at discretion, or, in other words, they passed over to the enemy. The city of Potenza has declared for Garibaldi, with its royal governor for chief of the movement. Thus the revolution proceeds on its anticipated course in the southern part of the kingdom. In the city of Naples all appears to be confusion. Dissension [sic] is rife even in the royal family, and the King has been compelled to send one of his uncles, the Count of Aquila,<sup>215</sup> into exile at an hour's notice and on one of his vessels of war. The King has declared that he will defend himself to the last extremity and he has taken command of the army in person. That army still consists of some sixty thousand disciplined troops, and a part of them are Swiss and German mercenaries who will certainly fight. But, despite these odds, no one in northern Italy doubts the triumph of Garibaldi and the speedy downfall of the Bourbon dynasty.

In addition to its fleet the Sardinian Government has sent to the bay of Naples on its vessels several companies of *bersaglieri*, or riflemen, to protect the lives and property of Sardinian subjects at Naples in case of disorder. Some of the riflemen having been permitted to land in their Piedmontese uniform, a quarrel soon sprang up between them and the royal guards. The riflemen were wounded, but the national guard, or militia, having taken their part, no lives were lost and the men regained their ships. The Sardinian Minister demanded and received an apology and an indemnity. The inci-

<sup>214</sup> Il generale Giambattista Viale aveva il quartier generale a Monteleone e come tale comandava 12 000 uomini dell'esercito napoletano di stanza in Calabria. Sebbene fosse nota la sua incapacità, ebbe l'incarico di impedire ai garibaldini di sbarcare in Calabria. Egli non fece assolutamente nulla con il risultato che i suoi generali, Melendez e Briganti, rimasero inattivi.

<sup>215</sup> Luigi, conte d'Aquila (1824-1897), figlio di Ferdinando II. Nel 1860 prese parte a una cospirazione in seguito alla quale divenne reggente. In seguito fu arrestato per ordine di Liborio Romano ed esiliato. Sul principe Luigi, vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations*, cit., vol. II, pp. 414, 552, 562 n., 675.



dent exemplifies the imbecility of the Neapolitan Government and the evident readiness of Sardinia to take possession of the new conquest at the first possible opportunity. In Sicily the Government of Garibaldi has declared the Sardinian code to be the law of the land. A new currency has been proclaimed uniform with that of Sardinia. The pieces, from one to twenty francs, now struck at the ancient mint of Palermo bear the effigy of the Piedmontese monarch and this superscription.

« *Vittorio Emanuele, Re d'Italia* »

What occupies the public mind in Turin much more is the danger of attack from Austria. There is a panic in some quarters, as there was last spring at the time of the annexation of the duchies. From all that I learn I judge it to be equally unfounded now as then. Austria will not move. There is an enormous force collected in Venetia, but it is to meet, not to initiate, attack. Nevertheless the Government here prepares for war with all the dispatch and energy that it can put forth. The army is to be speedily mobilized and collected in six great camps of manoeuvre. What particularly attracts attention is the collection of provisions and the clearing of barracks at points along the Alpine frontier by which troops can enter this country from France. This would signify that the Government still expects aid from that quarter in case of a *coup de main* on the part of Austria. The reality of these preparations is indisputable. I have the information from eye witnesses. Not only has the Sardinian Government made these preparations, but officers of the French engineer corps have been there to inspect them.

Whether the Austrian Government menaced this country in case Garibaldi should land at Naples or not is still a mystery of state, which will not probably be immediately cleared up. Despite the official denegations [sic], most well informed persons believe that Austria did actually communicate to France an intention to interfere in the above named case; but that the project was withdrawn and speedily hushed up when the French Emperor declared in distinct terms his intention to protect Piedmont. It will be a long time before Austria again disregards the warnings of Napoleon III.

That there will be another war with the Austrian Empire in Italy is a point on which I have never had any doubt. But it will not be immediate. When Garibaldi has conquered Naples and part of the Roman States, and when these are annexed to Piedmont, the movement cannot stop, or be stopt [sic]. The Sardinian Government will not have the power to arrest the current. It would be destroyed if it attempted to do so. Even should all Europe menace this country, its Govern-

ment would be forced to turn a deaf ear to diplomacy and obey an irresistible popular sentiment. But some time must elapse before the progress of events places it in that alternative. Next spring Austria and Italy will battle for Venice, but for the rest of this year the scene of interest will be found in the southern portion of the peninsula. Austria will wait to be attacked. Her Emperor has been cured of his propensity to provoke struggles which will come fast enough even when he waits for them

*John M. Daniel a Camillo di Cavour*<sup>216</sup>

Turin, August 17, 1860

His Excellency Ct. Cavour: Grave complaints have reached me, through the United States Consul in Genoa, from the captains of American vessels in that port. Within the last ten days so many seamen have deserted to engage in expeditions from that port to Sicily that American ships ready to sail are detained at Genoa for want of their hands; and the police, whose duty to arrest and deliver up these deserters is unquestionable, have altogether failed to perform it.

The Consul of the United States has called on the *Questore* of Genoa to enforce the provisions of our treaty in these cases. The Consul informs me that « the *Questore* expressed regret that our commerce should suffer, but said that he does not wish to incur odium by interfering with the Garibaldi movement;—that if a deserter could be found alone and unprotected by others his arrest could be effected,—otherwise he does not feel disposed to enforce it. » The Consul adds that the *Questore* has at his disposition force sufficient to apprehend ten times the numbers of the deserters, but lacks the disposition to take the responsibility, and that in the meantime our shipowners are suffering heavy pecuniary losses by the delay so occasioned.

Being well satisfied of the accuracy of these statements, it becomes my duty to call your Excellency's attention to this extraordinary state of things, and to request that steps may be taken for a better observance of the provisions of the treaty between Sardinia and the United States bearing on the premises. I ask that such orders may be issued to the *Questore* of Genoa as may induce that officer to discharge his duty in

<sup>216</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 163 di Daniel

these cases with greater energy and with less regard to circumstances which should in no way affect his action

I am assured by the Consul that in no instance before these late desertions have the *Questore* and police of Genoa ever failed to act with the most satisfactory promptness; and it cannot be doubted that they do nothing at present from want of will and not of power.

***Domenico Carutti a John M. Daniel***<sup>217</sup>

Turin, 20 Août 1860

Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai communiqué sans retard à M. le Ministre de l'Intérieur la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 17 de ce mois au sujet des marins appartenant aux équipages de navires marchands des Etats-Unis d'Amérique stationnés dans le port de Gênes, qui se rendent déserteurs pour joindre des expéditions de volontaires partant pour la Sicile

Je ne doute pas que mon Collègue ne s'empresse de prescrire des mesures efficaces pour remédier à cet inconvénient. Quant à l'hésitation qu'aurait laissé apercevoir le Questeur de Gênes, je crois que ce fonctionnaire aurait éprouvé beaucoup moins d'embarras si M. le Consul des Etats-Unis d'Amérique n'avait, en plusieurs circonstances, donné lieu de penser qu'il s'intéressait aux expéditions des volontaires de Garibaldi.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les nouvelles assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***William L. Patterson a John M. Daniel***<sup>218</sup>

Genoa, Aug. 24, 1860

Your note of the 21st informing me of the promise of the Government as to my complaints has been received.

To the extract from the note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, contained in yours without comment, I hardly know how to reply.

That any supposed interest of mine in Garibaldi's expeditions could

<sup>217</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 163 di Daniel. Il Carutti firma per il Ministro.

<sup>218</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 163 di Daniel

have embarrassed the *Questore* and caused him to fail in having made at my repeated requests the arrest of the deserters is simply absurd. On the contrary the opposite effect might have been expected

If you substitute the words *le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à Turin* for « M le Consul des Etats-Unis d'Amerique » in the extract, you will find the attempt of the Minister to account for the *Questore's* conduct to become quite rational.

The extract seems to amount to a counter complaint against me, saying nothing as to the grace with which this comes from the Government at Turin, as I am ignorant in what manner I have interested myself in these expeditions to warrant any complaint, I have nothing to reply—except a general denial of any intention at any time of giving offence to the Sardinian Government or of having done anything contrary to the duty I owe my own.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n 164*

Turin, September 4, 1860

Affairs have assumed a very serious aspect. The Sardinian Government, encouraged by England and France, has resolved to enter actively on the scene and to take the management of southern Italy into its own hands. This new disposition of things results from the fears entertained by the greater powers of general revolution and war should Garibaldi have the time and opportunity to carry out his entire plan, which is by no means confined to the kingdom of Naples. When he has succeeded in overcoming opposition there and given the country a provisional organization, his intention is to render Naples the basis of future operations against Rome and Austria. The conquest of the Roman territory alone, provided he left the city and the French garrison untouched, would not render Piedmontese intervention necessary. But a collision between the French garrison and Garibaldi's troops would be nearly inevitable and it is easy to perceive the consequences. In a strife between the French and the Italian leader, the Piedmontese Government would be compelled by popular opinion to assist the latter, indirectly, at least, if not openly, for so great is his popularity at this moment in the whole peninsula that no Ministry could hope for a day's existence that either opposed him or stood by with folded arms while he should be crushed. A Piedmontese intervention in Rome to prevent these results is therefore indispen-

sable. But this is not the only reason for the step. Even should Garibaldi be sufficiently prudent himself, and have sufficient control over the troop of Mazzinians, republicans and socialists about him, to occupy the Roman territory without approaching the city of Rome itself, it is well known that he would not stop there. He has in his head the fixed idea of attacking Austria in Venetia. His ablest officers are Hungarians; he is much in the hands of the Hungarian leaders and exiles, and with them he will attempt the liberation of Venice and Hungary at the same moment. Their plan is to land on the Dalmatian coast and raise an insurrection in Hungary, to occupy the forces of the Austrian Empire, while they enter the Venetian territory from various points. The Ministry of England and the Emperor of France desire to prevent the execution of these projects which they believe to be the beginning of general war and disturbance. The Cabinet of Turin deems it to be clearly their interest, to prevent its inception. Should Austria be thus attacked on her own ground they think that she will regain in a moment all the advantages which she lost last year by entering the territory of Piedmont. No French intervention will then be possible, and Italy, half organized, will be left alone in the presence of the well disciplined armies of the Austrian Empire.

Hence the Government of Sardinia seem fully resolved to occupy the Marches of Ancona and Umbria with their own forces and thus cut off all further advance of the revolution. The nerve of its army has been concentrated on the Tuscan frontier of the Roman States, in readiness to enter the territory of the Pope on the north the moment Garibaldi enters it on the south. They will move directly on the city of Ancona where Lamoricière has concentrated his army, and where there will probably be a serious collision between the troops of the Pope and those of Victor Emmanuel.

The Sardinian Government is no less eager to take the affairs of Naples into its own hands and is prepared to land a complete corps of the army on the Neapolitan soil so soon as the flight of the King gives it an excuse to do so. This army is concentrated at Novi near Genoa. Last week, a dispatch having been received by the Cabinet from Villamarina, the Sardinian Ambassador at Naples, to the effect, that the crisis has come and that the King would probably embark that evening, immediate preparations for sending of the troops were made. But the King did not go, the orders were countermanded, and the Government put forth a semi-official contradiction of the statement that the troops for Naples were embarked or embarking. In this official note however they admit

that when Garibaldi enters Naples and the King leaves, they intend to send down a large body of their own forces to prevent, they say, further confusion and bloodshed.

The Sardinian Government hesitated and vacillated a long time last year before it accepted the annexation of the duchies. But it evinces none of that uncertainty now. It is eager to put its hands on the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and will take possession of the country at the first possible opportunity and with the slightest legal excuse. It is very desirous to bring about a vote of the population on the question of annexation and uses all its resources of intrigue and persuasion to induce Garibaldi to yield and permit an immediate appeal to the people. Every day the Piedmontese statesmen flatter themselves that they have gained their point. They are thoroughly afraid of Garibaldi and anxious to take the material power of the Two Sicilies away from him as soon as it can be done.

But the work of Garibaldi even in Naples has not yet been completed. It appears now certain that the King will not run away. It is probable that he will stand the chances of a considerable battle, and he is concentrating the troops that remain faithful to him near the capital with that avowed purpose. A part of these are the Swiss and German mercenaries, who will fight. As to his Neapolitan army, it seems to have nearly deserted him. Wherever Garibaldi approached a part joined and the rest disbanded. His generals, with one exception—that of General Bosco, a man of courage, the same who handled Garibaldi so roughly at Milazzo—have declared that they deem it impossible to do anything more in the defence of his crown. His uncle, the Count of Syracuse, whose letter (see Dispatch No 145) of last April was the signal of all this convulsion has now addressed to him another which he has published and distributed by millions of copies. In this letter he counsels his nephew to avoid the useless effusion of blood and to imitate the example of the Duchess of Parma, who retired without a blow, and thereby, he says, secured the blessings of Italy to the end of time. The King not having followed this advice, this estimable relative has left him and come here to Turin, where he was received with royal honours and where he is now lodged in the Royal Palace.

Garibaldi is still some days march from the city of Naples. The provinces being nearly all insurgent, that city, the fortress of Gaeta and the country commanded by those two places seem to be nearly all the ground possessed by the monarch.

*Dispaccio n 165*

Turin, September 11, 1860

The Piedmontese Government is at this moment taking a position from which it cannot recede, and the uncertain affairs of southern Italy will soon be brought into definite form.

The Marches of Ancona, the province of Umbria and various cities and towns in the remaining territory of the Pope have risen in general and determined rebellion. Victor Emmanuel has been proclaimed king by the people in these States of the Church. A deputation from the Marches and Umbria arrived here in Turin yesterday evening to offer the sovereignty of the country to the Sardinian monarch and to implore him to take it under his immediate protection.

But the Piedmontese Government had taken the first step before the arrival of these delegates. On Friday evening at 5 o'clock Count Minerva, the diplomatic agent generally employed by Mr. Cavour in his correspondence with Rome, left Turin bearing a letter to Cardinal Antonelli calling on him *to dismiss his foreign troops*, and declaring that the employment of those mercenaries is a breach of the principle of non-intervention which the Sardinian Government will no longer tolerate. This is all that is certainly known at the moment relative to the purport of this letter, which has not yet been communicated even to the official world of Turin; but Cavour's newspaper, the *Opinione*, declares that, in case of a refusal of this demand by the Pontifical Government, the Sardinian army will forthwith enter the States of the Church and the Government of Victor Emmanuel will take on its hands the protection of the people against the troops of Lamoricière.

This letter left Turin on Friday evening and Count Minerva reached Leghorn Saturday night. On Sunday he resumed his journey to Rome, and it is possible that the dispatch was delivered into the hands of the Papal Secretary on yesterday. There is no room for conjecture as to the result. The Pope cannot turn away Lamoricière and discharge the little army which he has collected with so much expense and pains because his enemy orders him to do so. Indeed the Sardinian Government never intended to produce such a result. This letter to Antonelli is simply a declaration of open war to the Pope, and Ct. Minerva is merely the herald who precedes the armed men who enter the field close behind him.

The military attitude of Sardinia at this moment leaves no doubt on this point. In my last dispatch I stated that the Government has for

sometime past assembled a large force on the Roman frontiers of Tuscany. The interior of the country has indeed been drained of regular troops to form that force;—the city of Turin, the provinces of Piedmont and other parts of the country are now only defended by the National Guard, which has been called to arms for the purpose. By actual inquiry of an official friend in the Department of War, last Saturday, I have ascertained the exact strength and position of the army assembled in the south. It consists altogether of 90,000 men; and is disposed in three lines.—thirty thousand between Ferrara and Cattolica, thirty thousand between Parma and Piacenza, and thirty thousand at Arezzo in Tuscany. The corps near Cattolica, under the command of Cialdini, an able and ambitious young general long eager to measure himself with Lamoricière, will be the first to enter the Papal States.

The latter general has but 24,000 troops in all. They are of nearly every nation—Swiss, German, French and Irish making up the mass. Most of them are men who have already served and fought in other armies. Lamoricière himself is unquestionably a very able and energetic officer, but against such vast odds, and with a whole population insurgent against him, his prospects must be poor in the extreme.

Cialdini has already made a significant movement of his troops, and it is possible that he should enter the Papal territory before the week is ended. The Minister of War with all his staff left Turin for Arezzo on Saturday morning. It is stated that the King himself will leave this city for the frontier on the 15th inst.— From these facts it is clear that the Sardinian Government is about to throw off the mask and walk boldly up to the appropriation which has so long been the goal of its tortuous course.

The will of the French Emperor and the attitude of the French Government are circumstances which should never be lost sight of in the consideration of Italian affairs. There is a French garrison at Rome and at Civita-Vecchia. A reinforcement of 2,000 men is now on the way from Marseilles, and the new commander who replaces General Goyon has made known his orders to maintain the authority of the Pope and resist all invasion or insurrection in the city of Rome, the Province of Comarca and the port of Civita-Vecchia. This I think is all that the Imperial Government will do. But, as usual, the oracle utters double speech on the Italian question. During the late tour of the Emperor in Savoy, Signor Farini, the Minister of the Interior, was sent by the King to compliment his ally on the arrival at Chambéry. Farini was most graciously received, and in the conversation which ensued, relative to Italian



affairs in general, it may be confidently stated that the Emperor was most encouraging. He was desirous that Italy should be pacified and its affairs settled, and this result could not be obtained without the direct and energetic action of Sardinia. The only reservation which he laid on that action was the immunity of Rome. So that the city and the province immediately around it was left untouched, the Italian party would have no interference to dread from him. In case Austria should undertake to oppose it, Piedmont must fight its battles without assistance from France, but the Emperor would see that Austria did not abuse her victory in case of a result disastrous to his ally. Such is the current report of this conversation. Of course it is only report; but I believe it to be authentic and I think it probable that the bold course at present adopted by Sardinia was based upon such an understanding with Napoleon. But this morning comes the *Constitutionnel* with an article on the affairs of Rome from M. Grandguillot in a very different strain. He denounces the movement of Sardinia as a breach of the principle of non-intervention and an outrage to the laws of nations, and counsels the Ministry to lay aside all thoughts of aggression on the Papal territory. M. Grandguillot is one of the writers whom the Emperor uses as a medium of communication with the public, and there is little doubt in Turin but that this very article is directly inspired by the Imperial Government. But it produces little impression here. The Italians have become accustomed to the double utterance of France on all their affairs. The Emperor says one thing, his organs another. There is a verse for Austria, and another for Sardinia. The newspaper or the Minister is generally sacrificed in the end, and, so long as the Emperor does not oppose physical resistance to their course, the Italian party is satisfied that he wishes them to proceed.

The Government of Sardinia has gone too far to turn back now. The die is cast. Victor Emmanuel must assume the championship of Italy in the open field. Garibaldi has rendered the policy of temporization impossible. He has subdued Naples and no human power could persuade or force him to stop there should Sardinia remain longer inactive. He would enter Rome and attack Austria, and Piedmont would be forced at last to follow in his wake and engage in complications which it will avoid by a decisive course. By undertaking the revolution of southern Italy on its own account, the Government can limit the dangerous tide of affairs and secure the universal confidence and support of the nation.

The diplomatic corps as may be expected is in movement at this moment. Warm remonstrances are said to have been addressed to the Government by the representatives of several powers. It was anticipated

that the President of the Council would publish this morning a manifesto explaining the position and intentions of Piedmont. He has not done so; and it is just possible that the diplomatic interference referred to may have modified his intention.

The Neapolitan revolution is at an end. At the date of my last dispatch the King Francis II had assembled the wreck of his army under his own command at Salerno near Naples with the intention of there battling with Garibaldi for his crown. But on the approach of that chief desertion and disaffection in his ranks assumed such stupendous proportions that he was compelled to renounce all thought of war. He returned to Naples; and, after publishing a manifesto or protest against the injustice done to him, he left for Gaeta with a few followers on the Spanish steamers. Gaeta is a fortress of great strength, and can be taken only by a long siege or by treason of the garrison. The object of the Monarch is to keep a foothold in his Kingdom and take advantage of any eventuality to regain his throne or prevent the annexation of his territory to Sardinia. But he cannot be certain even of the guard of Gaeta. He may now be ranked among ex-kings.

Garibaldi entered Naples with small retinue and without parade on the 8th inst. His first act was to break a Provisional Government which had been formed in the brief interval without his consent and to constitute another at the head of which is Liborio Romano, Minister of Interior under the fugitive sovereign. *He then proclaimed Victor Emmanuel king of Italy.* His next step was to surrender into the hands of the Sardinian Admiral Persano, commanding the Piedmontese fleet in the port, all the navy of Naples and Sicily with the arsenals and military stores belonging to them. The Admiral accepted them as parts of the « Royal Italian Navy. » It will be seen that there is no longer opposition or discrepancy between Garibaldi and the Ministry of Turin. From the moment when they were ready to renounce what he styled their « vulpine policy » and openly enter the lists for Italy, Garibaldi becomes their obedient servant. The Government will have no need to send to Naples any part of their army to take possession of that kingdom.

Victor Emmanuel has now been proclaimed King by no less than twenty-two millions of people. The Italians have at last their destiny in their own hands. It now remains to be seen whether the authorities at Turin have the talent and resolution necessary to play the great game before them at this moment.

*Note* From the same source I ascertained the actual force of the Sardinian army. It is 179,000 men of all arms But in efficiency and discipline it is not what it was before the war. It has lost the Savoyards and has not gained in Tuscans. The War Department has had a great deal of trouble with them. They are said to be deficient in all military qualities and incapable of discipline.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 166*

Turin, September 12, 1860.

On yesterday I sent addressed to your Excellency a dispatch (No. 165) in which I endeavoured to inform you of the important events passing here. Late in the evening, after the post had departed, I received a supplement to the official gazette, containing the royal manifesto which I mentioned as probably to be published It is not however one of those argumentative and diplomatic papers that the Sardinian Government has been hitherto in the habit of putting forth on such occasions. It is a short, sharp, decisive declaration of an immediate movement. The importance and interest of this paper induce me to send the following translation without delay —

Turin, 11 September 1860

«His Majesty has this morning received the Deputation from the Marches and Umbria who invoke his protection in favour of their provinces exposed to the ferocity of foreign mercenaries. Profoundly moved at the condition of those provinces, His Majesty has accepted their protectorate and has ordered his troops to enter those provinces to preserve order and to prevent the renewal of the disaster of Perugia. He has issued the following proclamation to his army.—

“ Victor Emmanuel II

“ Soldiers!

You enter the Marches and Umbria to restore civil order in their devastated cities and to give to their people liberty to express their wishes. You have no powerful army to encounter, but you have to deliver those unhappy provinces of Italy from bands of mercenary adventurers. You do not go there to punish insults to me and to Italy but to prevent popular hatred from breaking out in vengeance on wicked rulers You will teach by your own example the pardon of offenses [sic] and christian charity to those who stupidly liken Italian patriotism to Islamism.

At peace with all the Great Powers, and, opposed to every species of provocation, I intend to remove from central Italy a perpetual cause of disturbance and discord.

I shall respect the Seat the Head of the Church, to whom I am ready to give, in accord with friendly and allied powers, all those guaranties of security and independence, which his blinded counsellors have vainly hoped to gain from the fanaticism of a mischievous sect that conspires against my authority and the liberty of the nation.

Soldiers!

I am accused of ambition. It is true that I am possessed of an ambition,—to restore the principles of moral order in Italy and to preserve Europe from the continual danger of war and revolution.

11 September 1860

Victor Emmanuel II

Cavour—Farini. " »

The orders of the Government have already been executed. The Sardinian army entered the Papal territory yesterday at mid-day.

Now, if ever, Austria will move. It is certain that very large bodies of troops have been collected on the Venetian banks of the Po within the last few days; and, to guard against the possibility of sudden attack, the Sardinian Government has dispatched a strong corps of its army to confront them. But it does not seriously apprehend danger from that quarter. Two causes are relied on to keep Austria quiet—1st the financial condition of that Empire; 2d. the certainty of insurrection in its southern and eastern provinces in case of a new war in Italy.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 167*

Turin, September 18, 1860

During the last few days several curious state papers have appeared in the official press of Sardinia and several important diplomatic developments have transpired. I have prepared translations of the documents referred to and send them with this dispatch. I propose also to add a few remarks in explanation.

1. In No. 165 I stated that Count Minerva had been sent to Rome with a letter from Cavour to Antonelli containing a peremptory demand for the dismissal of Lamoricière and his foreign legion from the Roman

service and declaring that the Piedmontese troops would enter the Roman territory in case of refusal. When Count Minerva reached Civita Vecchia with this letter, the authorities stopt [sic] him there, and an officer having been sent to receive his missive, bore it to Rome and brought him back an answer in a few hours. Minerva then made a formal protest against the reception he had met with and returned with Antonelli's response to Cavour. Both letters may be found in the Appendix A. Rome and Turin have had some singular correspondence in this year, but even the letters of the King to the Pope and of the Pope to the King in last spring are eclipsed by those with which the world is now gratified. The honeyed style of diplomacy seems to be wholly forgotten by these eminent disputants. Cavour denounces the enrolment of foreigners in the Pope's army as something unheard of in the usage of nations and as an offence against all civilization. But his heaviest charge against them is based on the fact that they prevent the Pope's subjects from rebelling against him; and he demands their dismissal for the expressed end that Umbria and the Marches may have an opportunity to « manifest a national sentiment; »— or in other words that they may overthrow the government which he addresses, without resistance by it. The tone is singularly harsh and even insolent, though less bitter than the Proclamation of the King, written by Farini, which I forwarded in my last, and which is probably unique even among declarations of war.

Antonelli's reply is wrathful and haughty. Having all the law on his side, he tears to pieces the Count's new doctrine on the employment of foreign legions and lays at his adversary's door all the bloodshed of Perugia. He declares that insurrection has been gotten up in the Papal States solely by the money and means of Cavour; that the people have no part in it; he refuses with indignation the demand and defies the menace of Piedmont.

II. Ct Cavour has addressed to the diplomatic corps of Sardinia a Memorandum of the reasons which have induced the Government to invade the Papal States, and a translation is given in the Appendix B.<sup>219</sup> This distinguished statesman has not the gift of eloquence either in speech or on paper, but his logic is generally adroit. But in this important document his style is more than usually insult and lame, while his logic is far from satisfying. In fact he has undertaken an impossibility—to reconcile the present invasion of the Pope's States to the ordinary law of nations. It is difficult while reading his manifesto not to recall the reasoning of the wolf in his quarrel with the lamb for troubling the

<sup>219</sup> Vedilo in *Il carteggio Cavour-Nigra*, cit., vol. IV, pp. 204-208.

stream at which they both drank His declamation against the employment of foreign troops touches nearly every government on earth. England has had her foreign legions in all the wars of the century. They form a large corps in the present French army. Sardinia herself enrolled thousands of Hungarians last summer. The right of a government to enlist all the foreign adventurers who choose to follow the trade of arms under its flag is as unquestionable as the usage is universal. The Count's arguments against the right of the Pope to employ his troops in the suppression of rebellion and in support of the established laws of the land are nothing less than preposterous in a legal point of view.

But in truth this statesman is so situated that he is unable to do more than allude to the true reason of the invasion, and can only touch upon the sole ground where its justification can be placed. The Piedmontese Government seizes the Pope's territory to stop the career of Garibaldi, and the right of self-preservation justifies this act as many others equally questionable. If that chieftain continues his projected career, it is clear that he will bring down on this peninsula the weight of both French and Austrian arms; and, as Sardinia would probably lose its existence in such an event, it is justified in any action that is really necessary to prevent such an event. Houses are blown up to stop conflagrations; and so by taking possession of the Pope's States with its powerful army it cuts off Garibaldi from Rome and Venice, and removes the sceptre of revolution from his hand by placing the King himself at the head of the Italian movement. But in the present state of public sentiment and in face of Garibaldi's prestige at this moment, it would be very imprudent and even dangerous for the Piedmontese Premier to declare that the invasion of Rome was war against that renowned leader. He was obliged to content himself with such a case as he was able to make up on the faults of the Pope's Government, and present the singularly original views of public law contained in his memorandum, to justify an interference which may well startle the conscience of the world, if it has any, and which has had no parallel in national practice since the dismemberment of Poland.

It is to be remarked that the Sardinian Government guarantees the city of Rome and the territory immediately around it from all attack. This will under all circumstances be left to the Pope with the port of Civita Vecchia; both garrisoned by French troops.

III Garibaldi has addressed a proclamation to the people of Palermo, which causes the greatest consternation in northern Italy, and indeed among the wiser friends of the Italian movement everywhere. See

translation, Appendix C.<sup>220</sup> The people of Sicily desire and have long desired immediate annexation to the Kingdom of Sardinia, and their wish has been steadily opposed by Garibaldi. In this indiscreet proclamation he tells them clearly that there will be no annexation till all parts of Italy are free, and that he will soon proclaim the union of Naples to Piedmont from the top of the Quirinal Hill! He distinctly indicates an intention to attack the city of Rome regardless of the French garrison that holds it, and is full of confidence as to the issue. Should he succeed in putting this scheme into operation before the Sardinian troops can get far enough into the Pope's dominions to interfere between the city and Naples, the results cannot be calculated. Garibaldi listens to no one. In case of a collision between him and the French, Piedmont will be placed in a painful dilemma. If it helps Garibaldi, it loses [sic] the support of the French Emperor, who made it what it is and who can as easily unmake it. If it sides with the French and attacks Garibaldi, it will gain the animosity of a large majority of the Italian people and kindle the flame of civil war. It may therefore be well imagined how seriously this proclamation is viewed and how anxiously the Government presses forward its troops.

Garibaldi is one of those single minded men who produce great results when started in a right direction, but who are capable of doing an equal amount of mischief when engaged on a bad route. He knows nothing of fear at any time and his judgment is just now biased [sic] by the ease with which he has overthrown the kingdom of Naples. It should be remembered also that he is possessed of two dangerous and violent enmities—one against Napoleon III, the other against Cavour. He hates the first, in his quality of despot in general; and in particular, because he overthrew Garibaldi's Roman Republic of '49. His abhorrence for Cavour knows no bounds since the latter sold Nice and bullied him, Garibaldi, in the Chamber of Deputies at Turin. Cavour pays him an enormous compliment in the *Memorandum*, and never ceases his unavailing efforts to flatter and cajole him; while Garibaldi speaks of Cavour in no measured terms of contempt and disgust on all occasions.

IV On last Friday morning the following announcement appeared in the *Monteur* of Paris:

« In presence of the facts which have just been accomplished in

<sup>220</sup> Vedi il proclama in G. GARIBALDI, *Scritti e discorsi politici e militari*, a cura della Reale Commissione, Bologna, Cappelli, 1934, vol. I, pp. 298-299.

Italy, the Emperor has resolved that his minister shall quit Turin. A secretary will remain to conduct the business of the Legation »

Accordingly Baron de Talleyrand has left this city for France

It may be supposed that this event would cause the most serious alarm. But such is not the fact. The Sardinian Government is satisfied that this diplomatic rupture is only part of the comedy which Napoleon III has played for the last twelve months and is unshaken in the confident belief that by annexing the states of the Pope they are fulfilling the wishes and executing the designs of their powerful ally. They believe that he affects opposition in public and breaks off his official relations as a satisfaction to the Catholic party of France and Europe, but that, while so clearing his responsibility, he is not the less determined to give them the support of his arms should they be attacked by a third power.

The memorable pamphlet entitled *The Pope and the Congress* published at Paris on the 1st of last January has not been forgotten. It was then proposed to unite the dominions of the Supreme Pontiff to the rest of Italy; to leave him (for residence) the city of Rome with the campagna around it, and the port of Civita Vecchia as a means of access for pilgrims to the seat of the Church, and to compensate him for the loss of territory by an annual pecuniary compensation sufficient to defray the expense (of the) Christian capital. Napoleon III was the author of that pamphlet, and the Sardinian Government is at this moment actually executing the programme there marked out. It is satisfied that the views of Napoleon as to the best disposition of the Roman question have not changed, and, despite the protests of his government, the denunciations of his press, and the withdrawal of his minister, that they are doing precisely what he thinks best for them to do.

But I cannot suppose that the Piedmontese statesmen have undertaken the audacious game they are now playing without some better understanding of the Emperor's views than that to be derived from that pamphlet or from observation and induction. The project of the Roman invasion was never heard of till after the interview of the Minister of the Interior with Napoleon III at Chambéry, and the circle around the government here is assured that a sincere accord between Piedmontese was then effected. What passed cannot be exactly stated. It is evident that even the Emperor's ministers at Paris know nothing. It will probably be long after the actors are all dead that the full history of the present time will be written; and then only will the world know what conversation was held by Napoleon and Cavour at Plombière before the war on



Austria, and what words passed between Napoleon and Farini at Chambéry before the Pope was reduced to be Bishop of Rome.

V. Rumours of a coalition between the three great powers of the North to regulate the affairs of the South of Europe are among the most serious preoccupations of the day. Your ministers at St. Petersburg, Vienna and Berlin can best tell you what foundation for those rumours exists in fact. I can only give the view taken of them here. Piedmontese statesmen do not believe that any coalition for action has really taken place. That there has been some advance to a reconciliation between Austria and Russia is unquestionable; but there is a large interval between a reconciliation and a coalition. Even if the latter should be attempted, they are satisfied that there would be an immediate rupture on the means of execution. And even should a coalition be formed and put in action, I think Piedmont would not at all regret it. For such a coalition would be aimed at France even more than Italy, and with France this country thinks that it would only gain by war, even with all the North.

It appears certain that Austria will not interfere alone. Positive assurances are said to have been received from the English Government that Austria will not attack Piedmont unless she should be assailed in Venetia; and, in such a case, England will herself withdraw all her sympathy from the Italian cause.

***Camillo di Cavour al cardinale Antonelli*** <sup>221</sup>

Eminenza,

Torino, 7 Settembre 1860

Il Governo di Sua Maestà il Re di Sardegna non potè vedere senza grave rammarico la formazione e l'esistenza dei corpi di truppe mercenarie straniere al servizio del Governo pontificio. L'ordinamento di siffatti corpi non formati, ad esempio di tutti i Governi civili, di cittadini del paese, ma di gente di ogni lingua, nazione e religione, offende profondamente la coscienza pubblica dell'Italia e dell'Europa. L'indisciplina inerente a tale genere di truppe, l'improvvida condotta dei loro capi, le minacce provocatrici di cui fanno pompa nei loro proclami, suscitano e mantengono un fermento oltremodo pericoloso. Vive pur sempre negli

<sup>221</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 167 di Daniel D'Amo il testo italiano da *Il Diritto* del 15 settembre 1860

abitanti delle Marche e dell'Umbria la memoria dolorosa delle stragi e del saccheggio di Perugia. Questa condizione di cose già da per se stessa funesta, lo divenne di più dopo i fatti che accaddero in Sicilia e nel reame di Napoli. La presenza dei corpi stranieri che ingiuria il sentimento nazionale, ed impedisce la manifestazione dei voti dei popoli produrrà immanabilmente la estensione dei rivolgimenti alle provincie vicine.

Gli intimi rapporti che uniscono gli abitanti delle Marche e dell'Umbria con quelli delle provincie annesse agli Stati del Re e le ragioni dell'ordine e della sicurezza dei propri Stati impongono al Governo di Sua Maestà di porre per quanto sia in lui immediato riparo a questi mali. La coscienza del Re Vittorio Emanuele non gli permette di rimanersi testimone impassibile delle sanguinose repressioni con cui le armi dei mercenari stranieri soffocherebbero nel sangue italiano ogni manifestazione di sentimento nazionale. Niun Governo ha diritto di abbandonare all'arbitrio di una schiera di soldati di ventura gli averi, l'onore, la vita degli abitanti di un paese civile.

Per questi motivi, dopo aver chiesti gli ordini di Sua Maestà il Re mio augusto Sovrano, ho l'onore di significare a vostra eminenza che le truppe del Re hanno incarico d'impedire in nome dei diritti dell'umanità che i corpi mercenari pontificii reprimano colla violenza la espressione dei sentimenti delle popolazioni delle Marche e dell'Umbria.

Ho inoltre l'onore di invitare vostra eminenza per i motivi sopra espressi a dar l'ordine immediato di disarmare e disciogliere quei corpi la cui esistenza è una minaccia continua alla tranquillità d'Italia.

Nella fiducia che vostra eminenza vorrà comunicarmi tosto le disposizioni fatte dal Governo di Sua Santità in proposito, ho l'onore di rinnovarle gli atti dell'alta mia considerazione.

### ***Il cardinale Antonelli a Camillo di Cavour***<sup>222</sup>

Eccellenza,

Roma 11 Settembre 1860

Astraendo dal mezzo, di cui vostra eccellenza stimò valersi per farmi giungere il suo foglio del 7 corrente, ho voluto con tutta calma portare la mia attenzione a quanto ella mi esponeva in nome del suo Sovrano, e

<sup>222</sup> Allegato, tradotto, al dispaccio n. 167 di Daniel. Diamo il testo italiano da *Il Diritto* del 15 settembre 1860.

non posso dissimularle che ebbi in ciò a farmi una ben forte violenza. I nuovi principii di diritto pubblico che ella pone in campo nella sua rappresentanza, mi dispenserebbero per verità da qualsiasi risposta, essendo essi troppo in opposizione con quelli sempre riconosciuti dall'universalità dei governi e delle nazioni. Nondimeno, tocco al vivo dalle incolpazioni che si fanno al governo di S. Santità, non posso non ritenermi dal rilevare dapprima essere quanto odiosa, altrettanto priva d'ogni fondamento ed affatto ingiusta la taccia che si porta contro le truppe recentemente formatesi dal Governo pontificio, ed essere poi inqualificabile l'affronto che ad esso vien fatto nel disconoscere in lui un diritto a tutti gli altri comune, ignorandosi fino ad oggi che sia impedito ad alcun Governo di avere al suo servizio truppe estere, siccome in fatti molti le hanno in Europa sotto i loro stipendi. Ed a questo proposito sembra qui opportuno il notare che, stante il carattere che riveste il Sommo Pontefice di comun padre di tutti i fedeli, molto meno potrebbe a lui impedirsi di accogliere nelle sue milizie quanti gli si offrono dalle varie parti dell'orbe cattolico in sostegno della Santa Sede e degli Stati della Chiesa.

Niente poi potrebbe essere più falso e più ingiurioso, che l'attribuirsi alle truppe pontificie i disordini deplorabilmente avvenuti negli Stati della Santa Sede, né qui occorre il dimostrarlo. Dappoiché la storia ha già registrato quali e donde provenienti siano state le truppe che violentemente imposero alla volontà delle popolazioni, e quali le arti messe in opera per gettare nello scompiglio la più gran parte dell'Italia e manomettere quanto v'ha di più inviolabile e di più caro per diritto e per giustizia.

E rispetto alle conseguenze di cui si vorrebbe accagionare la legittima azione delle truppe della Santa Sede per reprimere la ribellione di Perugia, sarebbe in vero stato più logico l'attribuirle a chi promosse la rivolta dall'estero: ed ella, signor conte, troppo ben conosce donde quella venne suscitata, donde furono somministrati danaro, armi e mezzi di ogni genere e donde partirono le istruzioni e gli ordini d'insorgere.

Tutto pertanto dà luogo a conchiudere, non avere che il carattere della calunnia quanto declamasi da un partito ostile al Governo della Santa Sede a carico delle sue milizie, ed essere non meno calunniose le imputazioni che si fanno ai loro capi, dando a crederli come autori di minacce provocatrici e di proclami propri a suscitare un pericoloso fermento.

Dava poi termine alla sua disgustosa comunicazione l'eccellenza vostra con l'invitarmi in nome del suo Sovrano ad ordinare immediatamente il disarmo e lo scioglimento delle suddette milizie, e tal invito non andava disgiunto da una specie di minaccia di volersi altrimenti dal Piemonte impedire l'azione di esse per mezzo delle regie truppe. In ciò si manifesta

una quasi intimazione, che io ben volentieri qui mi astengo di qualificare. La Santa Sede non potrebbe che respingerla con indignazione conoscendosi forte del suo legittimo diritto ed appellando al *gius* delle genti, sotto la cui egida ha fin qui vissuto l'Europa; qualunque siano del resto le violenze alle quali potesse trovarsi esposta senza averle punto provocate, e contro le quali fin da ora mi corre il debito di protestare altamente in nome di Sua Santità.

Con sensi di distinta considerazione mi confermo.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 168*

Turin, September 18, 1860

Having recorded the diplomacy of this memorable week in another dispatch, I propose to give a brief account of the military operations in the Papal States.

The five *Corps d'armée* which compose the regular military force of Sardinia—179,000 actually under arms—are at this moment disposed in the following order:

The 1st and 3d Corps hold the line of the Po from Piacenza to Ferrara; the 2d guards the Mincio from Brescia to Montechiaro under the orders of General Lamarmora, the 4th commanded by Cialdini is moving down the coast of the Adriatic towards Ancona; the 5th proceeds, in parallel with the 4th, down the valley of the Tiber, under General Della Rocca. Both these last act under the orders of Fanti, the Minister of War, who commands in chief, and together they make up a force of 50,000 men already in the Papal territory with reinforcements following them.

To meet these two armies, Lamoricière has only 24,000 men, and even these he is unable to concentrate on any one point from the fact that the moment he withdraws his garrisons the towns revolt and cut off his communications. Lamoricière is a good officer, and there have been generals who have beaten great armies with a force as small as his. But in those cases imbecility [sic] led the opposing host, and such is not here the case. Cialdini and Fanti are both resolute men of unquestionable ability and instruction, of energy and decision. When the generals are equal, fortune marches with the heaviest columns.

The corps of Cialdini left Cattolica on last Wednesday and arrived the next day before the old walled town of Pesaro on the Adriatic.

Here Monsignor Bella,<sup>223</sup> the Papal Governor, with 1,200 Germans attempted a defence. But after an hour's cannonade a white flag was hoisted and the Monsignor came forth to parley with the General. Cialdini received him with his hat on and with a cigar in his mouth, and, in reply to a proposition to capitulate with honours of war, he told him that he would come to no terms with « the heroes of Perugia, the assassins of peaceful citizens, » and forced him to return to the city. The defence was ended the same evening, the 1,200 Germans sent prisoners of war to Alexandria; while Monsignor Bella was brought on to Turin and locked up in a chamber of the curious old building which occupies the centre of the chief square of the city, called the « Palace of Madame. » Cialdini then advanced on Sinigaglia, which he carried in like manner and where he captured 200 German soldiers. He is now before Ancona with his whole corps. This is Lamoricière's stronghold. He has fortified it and concentrated the best part of his army there, but the telegraph may at any hour bring the news that Lamoricière is on his way to this city in custody.

The other corps of the Sardinian army led by Fanti, Minister of War, in person, left Arezzo on the same day that Cialdini quitted Cattolica and advanced on Perugia. Here General Schmidt, the same whose exploits at Perugia last year were memorable, commanded 1,600 Swiss. He had sometime previously declared martial law and menaced the city with every calamity in case of insurrection. Fanti ordered an immediate assault and carried the fortifications with some bloodshed. The 1,600 Swiss were taken prisoners, with Gen. Schmidt at their head, and were sent on, the troops to Genoa, the General to Turin. Since then Fanti has overrun all the country as far as Spoleto, which city he took yesterday with 1,600 more of Lamoricière's men. He will probably continue his march down the whole valley of the Tiber to the sea, so as to cut off the possible advance of Garibaldi on the city of Rome.

It will be perceived that the progress of the royal arms is rapid, and that Lamoricière has no chance. It is probable that this war will be at an end before I can write again.

Apart from the necessity of interrupting Garibaldi, the possession of the country is indispensable to Sardinia for strategical and commercial reasons. The States of the Church divide the north from the south of Italy, and should Naples be annexed to Piedmont without their possession, there will be no land communication between the two chief portions of

<sup>223</sup> Mons Tancredi Bella successe a Pasquale Badia, che era stato trasferito a Perugia

the new kingdom. Before the war of Italy the States of the Church were divided into four legations, not counting the district of Rome. The first comprised the provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, Forlì and Ravenna, were called Romagna. They have been annexed to Piedmont. The second consisted of the provinces of Urbino, Pesaro, Macerata, Loreto, Ancona, Fermo and Ascoli, and are commonly called the Marches. They have on the north the Romagna, on the east the Adriatic, on the south Naples, and on the west Tuscany and the provinces of Spoleto and Perugia. They separate Romagna from the Neapolitan states. The third legation consists of the provinces of Spoleto, Perugia, and Rieti; the first two constitute what is called Umbria. The town of Foligno, which is in Perugia, is the Fulginium of the ancients. The fourth legation comprises the provinces of Velletri, Frosinone and Benevento; the latter, however, is surrounded by Neapolitan territory. The district of Rome, which is placed under a special *régime*, consists of that city, of Viterbo, Orvieto, and Civita Vecchia, the latter being an important commercial port. The great railroads between north and south Italy will run down the sea-coast by Ancona, other communication is down the Tiber. The city of Rome and its district will be cheerfully left to the Pope, as it does not interfere in any way with the relations of the rest of the country, and that will be all that he will possess. Sardinia will offer him an annual sum for the maintenance of the religious capital in compensation for the states which she appropriates. That the present exasperated Pontiff will accede to such an arrangement is highly improbable. But the rulers of this country's destiny flatter themselves that if they succeed in maintaining the position they are taking for some years, his successors will prove more flexible and make the best of a position forced on them by the revolutions of the age.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 169*

Turin, September 25, 1860

Sir: The Papal war may be regarded as already at an end; for, although Ancona is still in the hands of Lamoricière, his army is destroyed or dispersed and the Pope has not another to replace it.

In dispatch No. 168, I gave a brief statement of the earlier events of this short campaign. The conduct of Lamoricière, who then distributed his troops in small bodies and garrisons of 600, 1,000, or 1,600 men in the

small cities of Umbria, where they were simply enveloped by the advance of the Piedmontese columns and so cut off in detail without the hope of resistance, instead of concentrating his whole force on some one point and there striking at least one glorious blow before sinking under the weight of numbers,—was inexplicable to those who regard him as one of the best officers in Europe, till the interception of his telegraphic dispatches within the last few days made known the key of his plan. From these it appears that Lamoricière expected the aid of the army which the late Duke of Modena carried off with him in his flight, and had arranged his campaign with regard to their intervention. He was quite assured that the Austrian columns would advance, and, therefore, endeavoured to keep his position in the towns and chief places till their arrival on the scene. But the two armies of Piedmont poured in without interruption; the Austrians massed on the side of the Po were quiet spectators of the scene; and Lamoricière arrived at the painful conclusion that the assurances he had received from the Vatican relative to foreign aid were fallacious. No sooner did he perceive the true state of things than he did what his admirers expected. He formed from the *debris* of his little army a column of 11,000, and with this attacked Cialdini before Ancona, while 4,000 men of his garrison in that town made a sortie. Thus he brought 15,000 men to bear on his adversary. But against a good general with 30,000 efficient troops, and a powerful fleet lying within cannon shot, but one result could arrive. The struggle was exceedingly fierce while it lasted, but it was short, and terminated in the annihilation of the Pope's army. The number of the dead is not yet authoritatively stated, but it is known that the Piedmontese have 4,000 prisoners, all the cannon, baggage, &c, and that the rest of Lamoricière's troops, with the exception of four or five thousand in Ancona, are dispersed.

Since this event, to be known in history as the battle of Castelfidardo, fought on the 18th of September, the Piedmontese army and fleet have cannonaded Ancona by sea and land, but so far without effect. Regular approaches are now opened, and the end cannot be far off.

The armed resistance of the Pope may be considered as ended; and the clouds in the north have as yet sent forth neither winds nor storms. If public report is to be believed, the coalition is already formed, and the meeting of the emperors of Russia and Austria at Warsaw is a mere ceremony to solemnize an alliance already contracted. A distinct treaty is said to have been signed at Vienna, and persons who profess to know the secrets of St. Petersburg give even its stipulations. As the pro-

gramme in circulation may possibly have some truth for its foundation, I will insert it here:

1. Open war on all revolutionary movements
2. Security to the dynasties now on the thrones of Europe and defence of actual frontiers.
3. Disapprobation of all the acts lately fulfilled and now in the course of fulfilment in Italy.
4. Engagement to favour the restoration of the Italian princes dispossessed since Villafranca.
5. Concessions on the part of Austria to Russia in the Orient, by which the latter is to be restored to the position she occupied before the Treaty of Paris.
6. Russian support for Austria in Hungary in case of need
7. An agreement to preserve the present division of Poland and to put down all efforts to awaken a national spirit in that country.

But, while giving this statement as made to me, I must again add that there is not only as yet no proof of its truth, but that I have reason to know that the Sardinian Government itself gives no weight to it and is under no apprehensions relative to the convention of sovereigns at Warsaw. It is persuaded that a coalition against France or Piedmont, or even an alliance offensive and defensive between Russia and Austria, is, under present circumstances, wholly impracticable and impossible.

It is known that at the moment the Sardinian troops entered the Papal States, the Prussian, Russian and Spanish legations expected to be immediately recalled. There is even reason to believe that they received orders to that effect. But, to the astonishment of every one, when France took the initiative, the cabinets of Berlin, &c, changed their intentions and determined that for the moment their missions should remain at Turin. But their stay here may still be short. Two of them at least have commenced the sale of their furniture and made other domestic arrangements indicative of a speedy departure.

While Sardinia is thus comparatively at ease regarding events in the north, affairs in the southern part of the peninsula have assumed a menacing aspect and have taken a turn that may prove fatal to all the hopes of Italy.

Internal division and civil discord have in all ages been the springs of Italian misfortunes. So long as they had the bayonets of Austria at their throats they seemed to be free from their hereditary malady. But no sooner is the theatre partly cleared of foreign enemies than do the domestic quarrels commence.



The enmities of Cavour and Garibaldi have broken into open war. They were commenced by the jealousy of the former. Last fall when Garibaldi commanded the royal forces in Tuscany he wished to undertake on the public responsibility that enterprise against Naples which he has since successfully completed on his private account; and he would have done so but for the intervention of Cavour, who, though nominally in private life at that moment, so managed the King as to force Garibaldi to throw up his commission and retire from public life in disgust. In the winter he was elected to the Parliament as deputy from Nice; and there Cavour caused him to support every species of insult and humiliation that he was able to put upon him. Then followed the sale of Nice, Garibaldi's electoral district and native country. The latter sought a new election from another college of the state then vacant. The Premier left no stone unturned to defeat him; and, as he hesitates before no intrigue to gain his objects, he succeeded so well that Garibaldi only got 30 votes! Since the latter, supported by the general enthusiasm of the country, has overthrown the Bourbon dynasty at Naples, he has chained his enemy to his chariot wheels, and Cavour has been as anxious to effect a reconciliation as ever he was to mortify and belittle him. But his efforts have been unsuccessful. Garibaldi is one of those simple characters who do not understand a change of sentiment, and who, once angered and disgusted, can scarcely ever be appeased. All this has been well known in the country for a long time, but the quarrel has within the last week been rendered open war by the publication of the following note in the official gazette of Naples:

« Naples, 15 Sept. 1860

Dear Brusco <sup>224</sup> (at Genoa),

You tell me that Cavour gives every one to understand that he is in accord with me and my friends.

I can assure that, though I am still ready as I have ever been to sacrifice all private resentments on the altar [sic] of my country, I have not and never can be reconciled to a man who has destroyed the dignity of the nation by the sale of an Italian province

(Signed) G. Garibaldi. »

<sup>224</sup> Enrico Antonio Maria Brusco (1829-1901) Partecipò attivamente ai moti rivoluzionari di Genova, sia come avvocato, sia come giornalista. Nel 1860 fu membro attivo del comitato centrale per gli aiuti a Garibaldi. Nel luglio andò in Sicilia per rimuovere alcune difficoltà relative al prestito chiesto da Garibaldi per sostenere le

This chieftain wishes to extend his military operations to the city of Rome and the province of Venice. To the mind of the Piedmontese Premier the scheme is dangerous to the state. The latter wishes the immediate annexation of Sicily and Naples to Sardinia, and the former has declared a settled determination that no such annexation shall take place till it can be announced from the top of the Quirinal Hill. On this point they are at distinct issue, and, if neither one nor the other gives way, the inevitable result will be civil war.

Cavour has set all the agencies at his command in operation to procure from the people of the Two Sicilies a violent expression of their wish to be immediately annexed; and he has fully succeeded in doing so, but without the slightest effect on the will of Garibaldi. The louder the shout for annexation, the more determined and dictatorial has his opposition become. Finding that his Prodictator, Depretis, and his lately founded Ministry were giving him a timid support, he broke his Ministry and appointed a New Prodictator. Discovering that the people of Sicily were nearly unanimous in their cry for immediate union, he suddenly landed in the island, harangued the people, and issued the following proclamation, which, if it has no other effect, at least leaves no doubt as to his inflexible resolution

« The People of Palermo have confronted the corrupt agents who have been sent here to lead them astray with the same resolution which they lately opposed to their assailants on the field of battle.

Those men have talked to you about annexation, as if they desired the regeneration of Italy more fervently than myself. Their true aim was the service of the base and selfish interest of individuals, and you have answered them as became a people that knew its own dignity and that trusted in the sacred and inviolate programme which I set before them—Italy and Victor Emmanuel.

At Rome, People of Palermo, we will proclaim the Italian Kingdom. there only we can sanctify the union of the freemen and the slaves who are yet the members of the same family.

At Palermo a month ago they cried for immediate annexation because I would never pass the strait.

At Naples they demand instant annexation because I can never pass the Volturno.

spese di guerra Brusco ebbe un ruolo importante nella vita pubblica di Genova, come organizzatore di società democratiche, consigliere provinciale e membro di parecchie associazioni benefiche

But while there are in Italy yet chains to break, I will pursue my own course or leave my bones on the way.

I leave Mordini here as my Prodictator, and he at least will be worthy of you and of Italy.

G. Garibaldi

Palermo, 17 Sept. 1860. »

He does not confine himself to words. On returning to Naples he commenced the immediate formation of battalions to act against Rome and it is not impossible that they are already in march.

Such a movement, if really effected, will produce armed collision with the French garrison in that city and with the Piedmontese troops on the way. To prevent the catastrophe which would follow, all the bystanders have anxiously undertaken the reconciliation of the quarrel. At the head of these peace-makers is the King. But in answer to the messages of the Monarch, Garibaldi has sent him a letter which is the most remarkable of all the papers belonging to the affair. It is not published, but its purport is fully and certainly known. In this letter Garibaldi demands the dismissal of Cavour and Farini from the council of the King<sup>225</sup>. In case of compliance Piedmont will get Naples, and Garibaldi will submit his future course to the judgment of the nation. But so long as the Government remains in the hands of Cavour he will pursue his own route regardless of the consequences.

The impossibility of compliance with this demand is evident. The state would be humiliated by submission to such dictation. But even if the King desired it, he has not the power to dismiss Cavour, who holds his place by the same tenure that Lord Palmerston keeps his in England—the will of the majority in Parliament. Cavour has a Parliamentary majority, no other man now before the public, in this country could collect another if Cavour was out, and until some one arises who is capable of doing so it is vain to ask for his removal.

When the Premier was informed of the purport of Garibaldi's letter, he first indulged in a hearty fit of temper, and then issued a proclamation convoking Parliament for an extraordinary session on the 2d of October next. He will lay his whole case open before this body and demand a vote of confidence. Should it be refused or given by a weak majority, he will resign, and Rattazzi will endeavour to take up the burden he

<sup>225</sup> Vedi la lettera dell'11 settembre in *Il Carteggio Cavour-Nigra*, cit., vol. IV, pp. 212-213

lays down. But in the event, nearly certain, of receiving the vote of confidence, he will demand discretionary powers and then dissolve the Parliament. Armed with these new forces he will push the Piedmontese armies down to the Neapolitan frontier, if Garibaldi has not then approached Rome, and provoke a collision between them and the volunteers, and then overrun the whole Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The disproportion in numbers, the superiority of arms and discipline, leave no doubt as to their certain triumph over the ill-formed legions of Garibaldi; he himself will be slain in battle; and, having crushed the conquerors of Naples, Sardinia will quietly appropriate the spoils.

Such I have reason to think is the present scheme of the Sardinian Minister. There are those who think it possible yet to dissuade Garibaldi from his dangerous design on Rome. But they are only those who do not know Garibaldi. He has never been known to renounce a design or an idea when once fairly embraced; and now that he has resolved to go to Rome, to Rome he will go, if not destroyed by a superior physical force. He never changes, never doubts, never despairs even in the worst moments of fortune. What motives can be presented to deter from action a man who is really ignorant of both physical and moral fear, who reveres neither man nor God, and all whose personal wants in this world have never been more than bread and cheese with a flannel shirt?—Reason and patriotism, it may be answered. But Garibaldi's mind, despite his unquestionable military genius, is a machine that does not reach far in politics, while his character renders him incapable of seeing both sides of a question at once. He arrives at his conclusions by short or an idea when once fairly embraced; and now that he has resolved to reconsider. Here is the way Garibaldi reasons. «Cavour stopt [sic] the revolution and put an end to our schemes for the liberty of Naples last fall when we permitted him to annex the duchies. Now if we give him Naples, he will stop the movement in Venice and Rome, and Italy will not get another chance in our time—Cavour bought Napoleon's permission to take the duchies by the sale of Savoy and Nice, he will now purchase his consent to receive Naples by swopping away Elba and the island of Sardinia.» All the eloquence of all the archangels is wasted on him when once he establishes a little circle like this. As answer to everything he repeats the same story again and again, and no logic can make him see a fault in it

Such a man as Garibaldi is extremely dangerous when started on a false route; and at this present time he is in the worst possible hands. Around him are collected Mazzini and all the rest of that extravagant

clique who ruined the Italian revolution of 1849. They call themselves republicans; but apart from the fact, of which you are well aware, that their ideas are wholly opposed to what we deem to be republicanism, they care nothing in fact either for a republic or for Italy. Their real object is *power*, and they are endeavouring to establish a gulf between him and Piedmont for the sole purpose of setting up a Government under their own auspices. I do not think that Garibaldi would even have gotten into his present position if left alone, but these men have irritated and inflamed his mind by incessantly recalling the misdeeds of Cavour, till they seem now in a fair way to destroy a reputation that might otherwise be one of the brightest in the history of our times, and sink in an abyss one who is not only the bravest, most honest, most candid of all Italians, past or present, but who more nearly resembles a hero out of Plutarch than a figure of the 19th century

The King of Naples still holds Gaeta with 20,000 troops, mostly German; and General Bosco handled a corps of volunteers near Capua very roughly some days since. The state of the kingdom at large is decried as something very like anarchy.

From Rome I learn that the Pope and cardinals have been in great alarm since the defeat of Lamoricière, and are strongly disposed to fly. But General Goyon, who has arrived with the French reinforcements, has reassured them. If the Pope should become seriously frightened at the approach of war and persist in flying to Spain or Austria, affairs in that region would at once be simplified. The French garrison would be withdrawn and the annexation to Piedmont accomplished to the satisfaction of all parties.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 170*

Turin, September 27, 1860

Sir. I have had the honour to receive your Excellency's kind note dated at Washington, the 25th June, from the hands of Professor Schale de Vere.

I have also to acknowledge the receipt of a box of books sent from the Department to this Legation, and containing six volumes of the Transactions of the American Society for the King, Victor Emmanuel,

with a sealed letter addressed to that Sovereign. I have delivered them through the proper channel to their destination and append a note from the Department of Foreign Affairs acknowledging their receipt.

***Domenico Carutti a John M. Daniel***<sup>226</sup>

Turin, 29 Août 1860

Monsieur le Ministre: J'ai reçu la note que vous m'avez bien voulu m'adresser sous la date du 23 du mois courant pour me transmettre les six volumes de l'ouvrage intitulé *Transactions of the American Institute* destinés à la Bibliothèque de S. M.

Je me fais un devoir de vous annoncer, Monsieur le Ministre, que cet ouvrage et la lettre qui l'accompagnait ont été immédiatement envoyés à leur haute destination

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 171*

Turin, October 2, 1860

Sir: The Sardinian Parliament which met today in extraordinary session has done one of the most hardy actions that any legislature has performed for very many years. It has accepted the project of a law offered by Mr. Cavour, according to which the Ministry may annex by a simple decree signed by the King any Italian province that expresses a wish to be so annexed to Sardinia. The intention of the act was clearly explained by Cavour. Declaring that the dissensions between the Government and Garibaldi render decisive action immediately necessary, he proposes to annex the states of the Pope and the kingdom of Naples to this country by a royal decree, to occupy them forthwith and then invite a vote by universal suffrage to sanction the fact.

The law will be passed to-morrow, and before another week passes all the southern half of this peninsula will by legal form be part of the King's dominions.

<sup>226</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 170 di Daniel Il Carutti firma per il Ministro.

The Ministry carry the public sentiment with them. Assurances have been received from France that the Emperor will in no way interfere, and even counsels the annexation so far as Naples is concerned, while the northern powers are either afraid or unable even to protest.

Meantime Ancona has fallen, and the whole of the Papal States are occupied by the Piedmontese troops, whose outposts are within six miles of Rome itself. The King in person is at this moment at Ancona; and his presence there cannot be otherwise regarded than a formal seizure of the States of the Church. I have no doubt that he will enter the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies with his troops in a few days. His personal presence will probably prevent the effusion of blood. The patriotic army will not fight against the King in person. Garibaldi will retire in disgust to his rock-island off the coast of Tuscany, and all that flock of *songe-creux* that have collected around him for his ruin Mazzini, Victor Hugo, Dumas, Miss White, Louis Blanc, Ledru Rollin, will disperse into their original obscurity.

Meantime it does not seem decided at the Vatican whether the Pope will quit Rome or not. To judge by appearances it would be supposed that France desired to persuade him to remain where he is. But I have lately had some ground to believe that these appearances are fallacious and that the French Emperor desires the Pope to fall completely into his hands by quitting Rome. In that case he will eventually be compelled to settle at Avignon; and you need not be reminded that a part of the original system of Napoleon I was the residence of the Pope in France as the spiritual chief of the Empire or rather as the dependant [sic] and complete tool of the Emperor himself.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 172*

Turin, October 9, 1860

Sir. The proceedings in the Sardinian Parliament during the past week have not been marked with that unanimity which the Government perhaps anticipated. There exists in that body a strong Garibaldi party, and a more decisive opposition to the Ministry than had been expected. Warm debates have taken place and violent scenes are imminent. Certain questions as to the pecuniary expenditures and contracts of the Provisional Government of Naples which will soon come forward cannot fail to produce the most envenomed altercations.

Meantime Garibaldi, warned by the voice of all common sense at home and abroad, has somewhat abated the ardour of his opposition to the policy of Cavour and seems disposed to cut himself loose from the wrong-headed advisers who were urging him on a course that would have proved fatal to himself and perhaps to the cause of Italy.

All talk of marching on Rome is now ended, for he has as much as he can do to hold his own against the army of Francis II. He has fought and gained, though with difficulty and with great losses, a general battle near Capua; but this victory is not decisive. His army is rapidly diminishing by loss under arms, by sickness, and by the retirement of large numbers of his volunteers. He is now said to be anxious for the approach of the regular forces of Piedmont.

These have already entered the Neapolitan territory and have their head-quarters at Aquila. But the Sardinian leaders are not at all anxious to attack the King at Gaeta. Strange as it may seem, they still desire and even hope to keep up the forms of lawful action. They wish to see the King driven away by Garibaldi and take the country afterwards on the pretext of suppressing anarchy.

But it is probable that they will soon be obliged to take the war against that Monarch distinctly on their hands. A volunteer army like that of Garibaldi cannot be kept up forever on its present footing, and, if the Piedmontese columns do not enter the fight, it is difficult to foresee how long the King may not retain his present strong position.

The question whether the Pope will or will not remain in Rome now that his territory is gone from him occupies much of public attention everywhere. I can only state that well-informed persons here in Turin are confident in the belief that he will soon quit Italy, and that the French Emperor, despite his professions to the contrary, and although he is at this moment sending large reinforcements to his army in Rome, desires to see him go and manoeuvres to make him do so.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n 173*

Turin, October 16, 1860

Sir: Judging by present appearances the Italian millennium is near at hand. Garibaldi has definitely broken with the Mazzinist party and has decreed an election by the people upon the question of annexation. The vote will be taken on the 21st of this month and the issue presented



will be in this form —« Do you desire Italy to be one and indivisible with Victor Emmanuel and his legitimate successors as its constitutional kings? »

To such a question there will be an unanimous affirmative answer.

Meantime the King of Sardinia is already on the Neapolitan soil with a large army and goes straight to the city of Naples. A part of his troops are already in line before those of Francis II at Capua. In the Neapolitan churches the mass is already celebrated with the prayer:—*Salvum fac nostrum regem Victorium* [sic] *Emanuelem*. The Sardinian Ministry has just put an end to its diplomatic relations with the King of Naples, which have never been interrupted till this moment, by a letter which I append <sup>227</sup>. In this note to the Neapolitan envoy in Turin, Ct. Cavour informs him that the King of Naples in quitting the city, and retiring to Gaeta has abdicated his crown, and that « Providence » had given to Victor Emmanuel the mission of reorganizing Italy.

Much attention has been directed to a discourse lately delivered by the Sardinian Premier in the Parliament. He has formally declared that Rome is the ultimate object of all the movements of the Government; that Rome shall be the capital of the new Italy of 25 000 000. He has further declared that Sardinia has no intention to attack Austria at present in the Venetia, that the actual attitude of the European powers does not permit of it, « but who », he added, « can undertake to say what may be the state of Europe six months hence? »

Meantime the whole Austrian Empire resounds with the clangour of arms and military preparation. Forty thousand Austrian troops are on this side of the Po, occupying a strip of territory which the Emperor still possesses to the south of that river. But I cannot think that the Austrian Empire will make any aggression on Italy while Hungary remains in its present condition; and the seat of the Hungarian danger is not in Hungary but in Paris, where Francis Joseph cannot reach it, and where a committee of eminent exiles and leaders of that nation have their plans for insurrection in perfect readiness for use at the moment Austria enters on a new difficulty with any foreign enemy.

The question of the Papacy is now the most doubtful and the most interesting before the political public. But, amid the contradictory statements and speculations which surround it, I am unwilling to hazard a

<sup>227</sup> Lettera del 6 ottobre 1860 inviata da Cavour a Francesco Winspeare Vedila in *La liberazione del Mezzogiorno e la formazione del Regno d'Italia. Carteggi di Cavour*, a cura della Commissione editrice, vol. V, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1954, pp. 192-193

word at this moment. Count Cavour pretends that Sardinia does not desire the Pope to leave Rome. He thinks that his departure would cause great embarrassment both to him and Napoleon III; and that the interests of Italy require that Pius IX should occupy his present position during the short remainder of his career. A new Pope may at the end of it be chosen, who will be devoted to the Italian interest and with whom arrangements can be made by which Rome may be at once the capital of Italy and the metropolis of the Catholic world.

**John M. Daniel & Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n. 174*

Turin, October 23, 1860

Sir: Late events have produced a feeling of great apprehension among the political personages of Turin; and, unlike the popular panics which have once or twice prevailed during the last twelve months, there is now very serious ground for their alarm.

Russia has withdrawn its whole Legation from Turin. The Russian Minister himself has long been absent on a *congé* which was understood to be a mark of his master's disapprobation of the course pursued by the Sardinian Government. But within the last few days the embassy has been definitely closed up and the last *attaché* has departed. The Sardinian Government has been compelled to withdraw its own Minister from St. Petersburg, and the diplomatic rupture is complete. In this case it means much more than the feigned retirement of the French ambassador.

Prussia has sent through her Minister at this Court, Brassier St. Simon, a very severe reply to the *Memorandum* of Count Cavour in defence of his proceedings in the States of the Church. A translation of the said *Memorandum* was appended to my dispatch No. 167. In this protest the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs exposes the insufficiency of the reasons alleged by Count Cavour to justify the steps he has taken and expresses the displeasure of the Prussian Government in the warmest terms. It is apprehended that the Prussian Government will ultimately follow the example of the Czar and break off its diplomatic relations with the Court of Turin.

Meanwhile the Czar, the Emperor of Austria, and the Prince Regent of Prussia are in conclave at Warsaw, and in ten days more we shall know whether they have been able to agree on any active course in Italy, which is avowedly the object of their meeting.

The Sardinian Government has long been confident that nothing dangerous to the Italian cause would come of this much talked of conference. But it is impossible not to see that Austria no longer stands alone in the presence of the Western Powers, or to deny that a closer union now exists between the three Great Powers of the North than has existed for a long time past.

And what alarms Sardinia far more than the Congress of Warsaw, than the rupture with Russia, or than the protest of Prussia, is the news just arrived that the Emperor of Austria has granted a constitution based on the principles of self-government to his discontented provinces. It appears that liberal institutions have been re-established in Hungary, on the basis of the Pragmatic Sanction, that the Curia and Aulic Council are again in existence, that the University of Pest is re-opened, and that the Hungarian language is recognized as the official dialect. The other provinces of the Empire are organized on the basis of autonomy. In all their calculations relative to their future struggle with Austria, the Sardinian politicians have taken it for granted that either the Emperor of Austria would refuse all concessions to his people, or else grant them so few that they would only serve to render the national discontent more apparent. Hence they concluded that the opening of a new war with Italy would be the signal of insurrection in the strongest provinces of the Empire. But the measures of Francis Joseph, as here reported, seem to be sufficiently large to satisfy the mass of his people. Even Hungary has never seriously desired a separation from the Austrian Empire. That country fought for its original institutions in 1849 as at many other periods of its history; but it will be perfectly contented with its position if they shall be integrally or even partially restored, and become a source of incalculable strength to the Austrian crown. The same may be said of all the other provinces of the country, with the exception of Venetia which will never be satisfied with anything short of union with the rest of Italy.

But if the Emperor of Austria has really conceded enough to pacify the rest of his dominions, he becomes again one of the most powerful potentates in Europe. He can again command both men and money and he will be supported by the energy of many millions of people. Already the Austrian funds have risen three per cent.

The Government at Turin is justly alarmed at this last movement and has suddenly called to arms forty other battalions of the National Guard. These with those already mobilized are sufficient to hold all the

strong places in the interior of the country, so as to leave the whole regular army at liberty to act in the field.

Meantime the Austrian Government continues to pour troops and munitions into Venetia. This process has never wholly ceased for the last eight or nine months, and if what is stated be even partially true, it must have now assembled in that province one of the greatest collections of warlike material ever gotten together.

All things point to a renewal of the war which ended last year. To speculate on the probable date of hostilities would be improper and useless at the present moment. In ten days more, when the Conferences of Warsaw are ended, we shall be able to form more correct ideas than at present. But while it is impossible to deny that any day may hear the first cannon shot, I cannot think that Austria will venture on the first aggressions, and, if left to Italy, the first steps will not be taken this year.

Meantime the popular vote on the question of annexation to this country has been taken throughout the kingdom of Naples, except in that small portion held by the forces of the King, and has resulted in an affirmative almost unanimous. Victor Emmanuel continues his triumphal march through the provinces towards the city of Naples. He will make a solemn entry into that capital on the 28th and the annexation will be proclaimed next day. The whole royal household left Turin on the day before yesterday to go direct by sea to the city, to prepare and arrange the royal palace at Naples for his reception.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio n. 175*

Turin, October 24, 1860

Sir. I have the honour to acknowledge your Excellency's dispatch No. 43, enclosing Mr. Trescot's<sup>228</sup> much needed note to the Consul General at Florence<sup>229</sup>; and thank you for having communicated it to this Legation.

I have also to forward the account and vouchers of this Legation for the quarter ending September 30th 1860.

<sup>228</sup> William H. Trescot del South Carolina, fu nominato segretario di Stato aggiunto dal presidente Buchanan l'8 giugno 1860; diede le dimissioni il 10 dicembre 1860.

<sup>229</sup> Nell'istruzione n. 43, datata Washington, 27 settembre 1860, vi è il seguente riassunto del dispaccio datato 17 settembre 1860 che il dipartimento di Stato aveva indirizzato a Mallet, console generale a Firenze: « The Department has received with

*John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass*

*Dispaccio n 176*

Turin, November 13, 1860

Sir. Since the abrupt dissolution of the Conference at Warsaw, all fears of Austrian intervention in Italy have left the minds of the Ministry at Turin. As I have frequently noted, they never entertained great apprehensions of the results to come from that abortive meeting. They had long been satisfied that a real coalition of Russia and Prussia with Austria for the recovery of the lost provinces of this peninsula was under existing circumstances impossible; and the course of events has fully justified the accuracy of their calculations. It appears that the Russian Emperor demanded a revision of the Treaty of Paris as a preliminary to other agreements; and, meeting a dry refusal from Prussia and an evasive answer from Austria, the Conference dissolved with no accord except upon the affairs of Poland and Hungary. But the essence of the difficulty in the way of a coalition I believe to be thus:—that while the imperial family of Russia, from its despotic instincts and attachment to the theory of divine right, is willing and desirous to sustain the pretensions of Austria in Italy, the *interests* of Russia are diametrically opposed to all movements tending to strengthen the Empire whose seat is at Vienna. The key of all Russian policy is the extension of its dominion on the Danube and towards Constantinople. But whenever that Government has attempted to put its schemes in execution, it has invariably been hampered and opposed by that of Vienna; and it has arrived at the well founded conviction that so long as Austria remains that powerful Empire it has been in the past, it will be impossible for the Czar to attain a real success in the south-east. Hence it is the interest of Russia that Austria should be weakened, humbled and reduced. When that Empire arrives at the point where it can no longer sustain itself at all without the aid of Russia and shall be compelled to obey that power as a dependant [sic] and a vassal, the plans of Peter the Great may become possible.

Meanwhile Sardinia is borne forward on the fullest tide of success. Every new development in Italy turns to its advantage. The King Victor

much surprise your three despatches 3, 4 and 5 addressed to *The President*. In entering into correspondence with Baron Ricasoli, who is at the head of the Government at Florence, you have violated both the law of the United States and your consular instructions. You must not do it again. Ask Mr. Daniel Minister at Turin, your superior in office, for any information. A consul has authority to issue passports if there is a diplomatic agent in the country »

Emmanuel is enthroned at Naples, the vote annexing the Two Sicilies and the Papal legations to his dominions has been nearly unanimous in his favour, and, though reactionary movements have been made by the uncultivated peasantry in various parts of the Neapolitan kingdom and though its legitimate monarch still holds out Gaeta, it is impossible not to regard him as the actual and future sovereign of the country. Garibaldi has been quietly bourned off to his islet of Caprera to live there with his goats and cow till wanted for the Venetian revolution yet to come. His friends have been pitched roughly out of the places he conferred on them in the local governments, their posts have been filled by those opposed to his person and plan;—among others by La Farina whom he sent out of Sicily at half an hour's notice, and who has now returned there as vice-governor of the island;—the policy and the power of Count Cavour has triumphed on all points, and the first Italian Parliament to consist of five hundred deputies from all parts of the peninsula will meet here in Turin before the end of the winter. Even while I write a great building of glass and iron, to be finished by the 15th of next January, is in its hasty process of erection. With the meeting of that body will commence the third series of those remarkable events which have attracted the eyes of all the world to Italy for the last two years. The first ended with the peace of Villafranca; the second will conclude with the departure of Francis II from Gaeta. When will the curtain fall on the third act of this great drama? Who can pretend to answer that solemn question with confidence? For myself I am inclined to believe that it will end with the capitulation of Verona; for I have been long satisfied that the movement of Italy is no temporary disturbance created by statesmen and soldiers, but one of those great tides in the affairs of nations which change the political configuration of the world, over which individuals have little control.

Sardinia continues necessarily to be in bad odour [sic] with diplomacy. The Spanish Minister has followed the Minister of France, the Minister of Russia, the Minister of the Pope; the Minister of Austria and his Legation has been removed from Turin. But even in its diplomatic relations the Government of Turin is not without consolation. Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, under date of the 27th October has addressed a published letter to Sir James Hudson, the British Minister in Turin, in which he not only finds that the people of southern Italy « had excellent reasons for resisting their governments, » but approves the action of the Sardinian Government itself in all that it has done and permitted to be done in these affairs in terms as warm

and positive as either Cavour or Garibaldi could desire. When it is remembered that Lord John Russell, a few weeks previously had addressed another letter on these matters to his Minister in Prussia, at the moment when the Italian enterprise seemed to be in great jeopardy, couched in very different terms, animated by a very different spirit, and arriving at conclusions diametrically opposed, it will be thought that his ideas of international right are measured by success rather than by reason and justice. But the last of these two letters is in the opinion of Sardinia a full equivalent for the rupture of relations with Spain.

In truth one event is just equal in importance to the other. The one country cannot fight, the other will not, and the approbation of the last and the displeasure of the first are hence equally without weight in the councils of Europe. The statesmen of the continent are fully satisfied that Great Britain will never incur another debt for the balance of power. Her intervention in the affairs of Europe will hereafter be only through advice and « moral-influence, » and this, unsupported by arms and money is small indeed.

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n. 177*

Turin, November 20, 1860

Sir. The Consul General at Florence has written to me on behalf of Mr. Magnani<sup>230</sup>, whom he describes as vice consul of the United States at Ancona; the principal port of the late Papal States. He wished to know what steps should be taken by him to retain his official character in the presence of the new authorities established there by the Sardinian Government.

I have replied that he should continue to discharge his duties as heretofore, until those authorities shall require of him some step rendering necessary the intervention of a diplomatic agent of the United States, and that there will then be abundant time to give him further advice.

The Sardinian Government will probably soon call on all the consuls in the Papal and Neapolitan states to produce their credentials and have their *exequatur* renewed at Turin. They took this course after annexing the duchies, and will therefore probably do the same in their newly as-

<sup>230</sup> Sul consolato di Caesar A. Magnani ad Ancona, vedi L. Stock, *Consular Relations*, cit., pp. XXV, 362-363, 373, 374, 377-385.

sumed territory. This will render diplomatic action on my part necessary in countries where the interests of the United States have hitherto, and, so far as I know, are still placed in charge of the legation at Rome and Naples. As I believe it to be the settled policy of the United States to recognize all governments established *de facto*, I should think it my duty to perform the functions of a Minister in the case. But as such action would be a recognition of the Sardinian annexations, which very many European governments refuse to give so long as the Pope is at Rome and the King at Gaeta, I should be glad to receive from your Excellency some advice or indication as to the extent of my powers in the new arrangement of Italian territory. There will probably be full time for me to receive a note on this subject from the Department before action shall be required

**John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass**

*Dispaccio n. 178*

Turin, November 27, 1860

Sir. I have had the honour to receive your dispatch of Nov. 6th, No. 44, and thank you for the communication of Mr Trescot's note to the Consul at Genoa <sup>231</sup>.

I send herewith (Appendix A) a letter from Mr Chandler, the Minister Resident of the United States at Naples, informing me that he has closed his mission at that place, on account of the political changes in the arrangement of Italian territory, and has gone to await the instructions of the Department at Paris. The archives of his Legation remain at Naples.

Since my last communications no event of great importance has occurred here. But much dissatisfaction prevails on account of the cold treatment by the Sardinian Government of Garibaldi and his volunteers. His army has been disbanded and the commissions of his officers taken away.

Naples is far from being contented with the new authorities. On the other side, Victor Emmanuel is said to be very sick of his new subjects. He went to Naples to spend the winter. It is now stated that he will return to Turin before the middle of next month

<sup>231</sup> L'istruzione n. 44, datata Washington, 6 novembre 1860 trasmetteva copia del dispaccio 29 ottobre 1860 del dipartimento di Stato al console degli Stati Uniti a Genova, dispaccio che riguardava la nomina degli agenti consolari. Il dipartimento si mostrò completamente concorde con il punto di vista espresso da Daniel sull'argomento



***Joseph R. Chandler a John M. Daniel***<sup>232</sup>

Naples, November 17, 1860

Sir: In consequence of the political changes in the south of Italy I have closed the mission submitted to my care for the present.

The archives of the Legation are placed (sealed) in the hands of Mr. Hammett, the U.S. Consul in this city.

I shall go to Paris to await further instructions from the Government. My address will be to the care of Henry W. Spencer, Consul of the U. States Paris.

***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Riservata*

Turin, December 4, 1860

Sir: At the Legation in Turin there has always been a large amount of that species of business which is elsewhere discharged by a secretary or a consul. Nearly all the American travellers who come to Italy pass through it, and the commercial intercourse between the United States and Sardinia is sufficiently great to cause many enquiries to be made at the office, and to occasion a considerable correspondence between it and citizens of both countries. In other cities similarly situated, where the Government has not attached a secretary to its diplomatic agent, there are consuls on whom most of these affairs referred to devolve. In Turin there is no consul, and if the Minister performed all of them in person, he would have little time left for his legitimate occupations. Hence, both my predecessors and myself have been compelled to employ a private secretary or clerk, to remain constantly in the office for the transaction of its ordinary and constant business.

I have for seven years maintained here a secretary at my private expense because of this necessity, and although the withdrawal of the Legation at Naples and the absorptions of all Italy by Sardinia has rendered an assistant of some character clearly indispensable, I should continue to do so without remark to the Department, but for the following circumstances:

<sup>232</sup> Allegato al dispaccio n. 178 di Daniel. Sui risultati della missione di Chandler, vedi H. R. MARRARO, *Diplomatic Relations*, cit., vol. II, pp. 588-591.

In a short time I shall conclude my mission here and return to my native state. It is possible, and even probable, that there will be some brief interval between my departure and the arrival of my successor, and in that case there should be some person here, having authority from the Government to perform the necessary formalities for travellers, and to take charge of the large mass of books, records, and official manuscripts which have accumulated for thirty years. They fill a large room and could not be removed to Genoa without much inconvenience.

Hence, I beg leave to suggest that if the Department does not think it advisable to attach a secretary to this Legation, it should allow a clerk such as it affords to most consulates, with authority to sign passports and take charge of the archives in case of emergency.

The only American citizen in Turin or its neighbourhood is Mr Frederick Daniel, who has so long been my private secretary. Our relationship forbids me to say more of him than that he is master of the three languages in use here, and that he is certainly experienced in the duties of the place, as he has performed them without a single intermission every day for seven years. I will go so far as to add, that such an appointment though insignificant in itself, and necessarily brief in its tenure, would be most gratifying, as that just approval of a long and laborious fidelity to duty, which is always agreeable to deserving minds.

Whether the Department grants the request I have made or refuses it, may I hope that Mr. Cass, or Mr. Trescott will briefly inform me of its decision by the returning mail? My private arrangements necessarily depend upon it; and I hope that the kind attention which the Secretary of State has given to so many of my dispatches may be extended to this note and gain for me the great service of a speedy reply.

### ***John M. Daniel a Lewis Cass***

*Dispaccio* 179 <sup>233</sup>

Turin, December 11, 1860

Sir: In the month of May last, by your Dispatch No. 40, your Excellency informed me that the Government could not *at that time* give me a leave of absence on account of the disturbed condition of Italian affairs.

Since then the disturbing causes have been removed and the affairs

<sup>233</sup> Il dispaccio n. 180, datato Torino, 5 gennaio 1861, trasmetteva il resoconto delle spese della Legazione per il trimestre con scadenza al 31 dicembre 1860.

of Italy have been settled for some time to come. No business of interest to the United States Government is or will likely to be transacted here this winter, and owing to the political and financial condition of the United States there are few or no American citizens in this peninsula

These circumstances embolden me to ask again for a leave of absence, which I have never had accorded to me since I have been in the public service of the United States, to commence on the 10th of next month.

**Jeremiah S. Black<sup>234</sup> a John M. Daniel**

*Istruzione n. 46*<sup>235</sup>

Washington, January 8, 1861

Sir. Herewith I transmit a copy of a letter of the 5th instant from the Secretary of the Navy, enclosing the transcript of a despatch addressed to him by the Flag Officer of the U. S. Squadron in the Mediterranean, detailing the particulars of an accident to the U. S. Steamer *Iroquois*, and suggesting that proper acknowledgement be made to the Commandant of the Naval Station at Genoa, Admiral Serra, and to the Syndic of Quarto, Signor Giuseppe Ricca, for the timely and valuable assistance rendered by them on the occasion. Approving of this suggestion, I have to request that you will communicate in suitable terms and in such manner as you may deem proper, the thanks of this Government for the prompt and efficient services of Admiral Serra and Signor Ricca.

Your despatches to No 178, of the 27th of November last, have been received.

**Jeremiah S. Black a Romaine Dillon**<sup>236</sup>

*Senza numero*<sup>237</sup>

Washington, January 28, 1861

Sir: The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having appointed you Secretary of the Legation of the United

<sup>234</sup> Jeremiah S. Black, della Pennsylvania, prese le funzioni di segretario di Stato il 17 dicembre 1860. Si ritirò il 5 marzo 1861.

<sup>235</sup> L'istruzione n. 43, datata Washington, 22 novembre 1860, trasmetteva la copia di una comunicazione indirizzata dal dipartimento di Stato il 3 novembre 1860 a G. B. Wilbor a Parigi in cui lo ringraziava per essersi preso cura degli archivi — discontinui — del consolato degli Stati Uniti a Nizza dopo la morte del console.

<sup>236</sup> Romaine Dillon, di New York, fu nominato segretario di Legazione il 24 gennaio 1861. Funzionò da incaricato d'affari *ad interim* dal 16 aprile al 23 giugno 1861. Fu esonerato dall'incarico il 30 marzo 1862.

<sup>237</sup> Questo dispaccio è indirizzato a Parigi.

States at Turin, I herewith transmit your commission in that capacity, your printed personal instructions and the papers referred to therein. Your salary will commence on the date of your receipt of these instructions. Of this date you will apprise this Department as well as the Bankers of the United States at London.

***Jeremiah S. Black a John M. Daniel***

*Istruzione n. 47*

Washington, January 30, 1861

Sir: Your despatch No. 179, of the 11th ultimo, has been received. In answer to your request for a leave of absence from your post for two months, I am directed by the President to inform you that the indulgence is cheerfully granted. The affairs of the Legation during your absence will be conducted by Mr. Romaine Dillon, whose appointment it is proper to state had been determined upon previous to the receipt of your unofficial communication of the 4th ultimo, is now at Paris, and his commission and instructions are sent by the mail which carries this despatch. Should his arrival at Turin, however, be delayed beyond the period fixed for your departure, you will commit the archives etc. of the Legation to the hands of Mr. Frederick Daniel, with directions to deliver them to Mr. Dillon upon his arrival. Should it be your wish to take formal leave of his Sardinian Majesty before quitting your post, you are at liberty to do so. For that object I herewith enclose a letter of recall, accompanied by the usual office copy.

It gives me great pleasure to add that your conduct of the affairs of the Legation has been entirely acceptable to the President and to this Department.

***John M. Daniel a Jeremiah S. Black***

*Senza numero*

February 5, 1861

Sir: I have the honour to acknowledge [sic] the receipt at Turin of your dispatch dated the 19th of December 1860, informing me that the President had called you to discharge the high functions of Secretary of State.

I have also to thank your Excellency for a later note, according the

leave of absence for which I made application on the 11th of December 1860

The letter of immediate recall which I was allowed the option of using having arrived at the Legation too late for presentation before my departure *en congé*, I accept the leave of absence from the 10th of January as granted, *until the 2d of March next*. On that date, in view of the retirement of the distinguished gentlemen who compose the present administration from the functions of Government, I shall cause my letter of recall to be delivered at Turin by my private secretary or the acting chargé d'affaires, and I desire that my connection with the diplomatic service may cease.

Permit me to add that while the actual Chief Magistrate of this nation and the great officers of the law who surround him have always received my entire sympathy and profound respect, their approval of my official conduct, most kindly communicated by yourself, will be a source of justifiable pride to me for the rest of my life <sup>238</sup>.

<sup>238</sup> A parziale rettifica di quanto è stato pubblicato nel vol I, pp XVII, XVIII, XXII, desidero rendere chiaro il fatto che Daniel non è mai stato richiamato dal dipartimento di Stato. È più corretto asserire che si minacciò il suo richiamo a causa della lettera che il Daniel aveva scritto a un amico della Virginia nel 1854 e per un altro incidente diplomatico del 1859. Poiché i due episodi non sono noti in Italia, ne tratto brevemente, a illustrazione della missione Daniel.

Sul finire del 1853 (non si conosce la data esatta della lettera), Daniel scrisse al dott. E. A. Peticolas, suo medico personale ed amico, che risiedeva a Richmond, uno sfogo che mai avrebbe dovuto essere pubblicato, anche perché, nel complesso, rappresenta l'espressione della sua nostalgia per la patria, pur dicendo che Torino era « the most beautiful city I have ever seen », si lasciava andare a apprezzamenti poco lusinghieri sulla aristocrazia piemontese. Un altro amico intimo di Daniel e suo successore alla direzione del *Richmond Examiner*, pensò bene di dare alle stampe la lettera, non certo nell'intento di danneggiare il Daniel, ma piuttosto di controbattere il *New York Tribune*, che lo aveva accusato di essersi recato a corte con l'abito corto da cerimonia, contravvenendo agli ordini di Washington. Lo Hughes, inoltre, desiderava replicare alle « daily enquiries which are so kindly made concerning his health and opinions of Europe ». Il paragrafo con le offese contro la aristocrazia piemontese è il terzo della lettera che ne conteneva cinque e della quale non si conosce il testo completo, ma solo quello che è stato pubblicato sul *Richmond Semi-Weekly Examiner* del 6 gennaio 1854, e poi riportato in altri giornali di New York, come la *Tribune*, l'*Herald* e l'*Eco d'Italia* e, a Boston, nel *Pilot*. L'incaricato d'affari sardo, marchese Andrea Taliancarne si affrettò a comunicare il testo, che aveva letto sulla *New York Tribune*, a Giuseppe Dabormida. Purtroppo tutti i giornali avevano fissato l'attenzione su quel disgraziato paragrafo che riguardava l'aristocrazia piemontese. Ma ecco il testo della famosa lettera, tratta dal *Richmond Semi-Weekly Examiner*.

« It may be strange, but it is nevertheless true that I have been really and truly homesick, for the last three months, as ever was any little girl at the boarding school. If you ever knew how much pleasanter a life of real work and study in the United States is than this nonsensical travel and idleness, you would not be so

**Jeremiah S. Black a Frederick Daniel**

Washington, March 2, 1861

Sir: Mr. John M Daniel having resigned the mission to Sardinia and, contrary to the expectations of the Department, there being reason to believe that Mr. Romaine Dillon, who was appointed Secretary of the Legation, may not reach Turin as soon as was anticipated, you are authorized to continue in charge of the archives, and to transact any indispensable business until Mr. Dillon or the successor of Mr. J. M. Daniel shall arrive.

discontented One will only learn by experience, however, and the best thing I expect to get out of this mission is just this—that I will be satisfied when I get back, and never again be haunted by those intolerable longings for Europe, which tormented me in the years gone by

The pleasure of actually seeing celebrated places is small It is all anticipation and memory. The real comforts of Europe don't compare with those of the United States The people are nowhere as good as ours The women are uglier; the men have fewer ideas I intended to write a book about it all, and I thought when I left the United States that I would have to stretch the blanket a good deal to make out our superiority But there is no need The meanness, the filthy life, the stupidities of all the countries I have seen, surpass all I expected and all I hoped

Here in Turin, which is the most beautiful city I have ever seen, I am busy learning to speak French and studying what is popularly, but most falsely, termed *the great world* and *polite society* I have dined with dukes, jabbered bad grammar to countesses, and am sponged-on for seats in my opera-box by counts, who stunk of garlic as does the whole country I receive visit from other diplomats with titles as long as a flagstaff, and heads as empty as their hearts, and find the whole concern much more trashy than I ever imagined I must, however, keep up their miserable acquaintance, for this is the way to see the Elephant of European life So I dance the dance of fools, like the best of them, and return their visits sedulously, carrying about great cards, like that I enclose for your inspection

The pictures, the operas, the ballets, of Europe, are good things, the people, the governments, the society, more contemptible than can be imagined

I have not yet altogether got rid of my terrible attack of last July Till shortly after I got here, I was troubled with a chronic irritation — the remains of the epidemic — which annoyed me excessively I was cured of it by a physician who is the cleverest person I have seen He gave me a concoction of tamarinds and poppies, a tumbler full every three hours and a hot bath every morning. In some things, I think better of European medical practice than our own. I find the idea current among them which I have often broached to you, that chemistry is not competent to extract all the essential components of natural production

L'imbarazzo di Daniel fu grande e sulle prime pensò di dare le dimissioni, poi se ne astenne perché il suo « power as a public man in Virginia would forever be destroyed » Il governo sardo non chiese il suo richiamo anche per le pressioni degli amici personali, di famiglia e politici che il diplomatico aveva numerosi negli Stati Uniti

Il 24 gennaio 1859 Daniel provocò un altro scandalo, che minacciò la sua posizione, in un periodo, però, nel quale il governo di James Buchanan aveva già deciso una rotazione nel corpo diplomatico In occasione del ballo di corte in onore di Clotilde e Gerolamo Bonaparte, il Daniel vi si presentò al braccio della futura moglie di Urbano Rattazzi, Maria de Solms Bonaparte Wyse, che non era stata invitata. Cavour fu molto seccato della cosa, e chiese il richiamo di Daniel. Questi, però, aveva dato le dimissioni un anno prima, dimissioni che il dipartimento di Stato

aveva accettate. Così si chiuse l'incidente, con soddisfazione di tutte le parti in causa. Sta il fatto, però, che Daniel era ancora in attesa del suo successore, quando accadeva questo scambio di corrispondenza tra Torino e Washington.

Esprimo la mia gratitudine a Mr. Sexon E. Humphreys che mi ha gentilmente permesso di leggere il nono capitolo della biografia di Daniel che sta preparando. Ringrazio anche il bibliotecario della Virginia Historical Society per le notizie che mi ha dato sulla lettera di Daniel. Sull'argomento vedi anche GEORGE WILLIAM BAGBY, *John M. Daniel a memoir of the late editor of the Richmond Examiner*, opuscolo di 40 pagine pubblicato nel 1868, che ho potuto consultare nel Special Collections Department della biblioteca della Columbia University.





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